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Abstract
This study of Karl Marx’s pre-1844 writings argues that the crucial link between his 
‘mature’ social theory and preceding philosophical traditions lies in the elaboration in 
these early texts of what is here termed a ‘political epistemology’. This can be 
summarised as a critique of laws and social institutions which treats them as human 
beings’ operative conceptualisations of their practical interdependence. It is on the basis 
of this implicit equation that Marx transposes the terms of German Idealist investigations 
of consciousness and knowledge into an original analysis of political power and social 
conflict
The historical and philosophical background to this idea of a ‘political 
epistemology’ is sketched through a consideration of the neo-Scholastic rationalism of 
the eighteenth century, the critical idealism of Kant, and the post-Kantian idealism of 
Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Marx’s student writings provide evidence of the importance 
of key post-Kantian themes and problems in shaping his early intellectual outlook.
Marx’s political journalism of 1842-3 takes forward these epistemological issues into an 
engagement with the social antagonisms of Vormar\ Prussia. Finally, Marx’s 1843 critique 
of Hegel is re-interpreted, not as an outright rejection of the post-Kantian project, but as 
an attempt to refound it upon new ground, with the aim of realising more adequately its 
original principle of understanding human experience and activity as radically self­
determining.
In conclusion it is proposed that a reading of Marx that attends carefully to his 
redeployment of post-Kantian arguments will help us to make clearer sense of the 
complex theorisations of society, history, and economy developed in his later writings. 
Such an interpretation suggests that Marx’s central concern remains one of realising a 
self-conscious and self-determining collective agency in society, and an epistemologically 
informed diagnosis of the unbridgeable oppositions and illusory misrecognitions that 
result from the obstruction of this practical goal.
2
Author’s declaration
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is mine alone. 
Signed
James Martin Mclvor
3
Acknowledgements
The main part of the research upon which this thesis is based was made possible by a 
three year postgraduate studentship awarded by the British Academy (latterly the Arts 
and Humanities Research Board).
I owe a debt to Professor John Charvet which goes a long way beyond his supervision of 
the bulk of the research and writing contained in this thesis. It was his course in political 
philosophy which fed my interest in the subject as an undergraduate, and it was also his 
encouragement which led me to pursue that interest at postgraduate level. He then came 
to my rescue when my initial supervisor moved on, a year into my research. Through 
subsequent years his guidance was supportive, appropriately sceptical, and always wise. I 
am very grate fill for it.
Dr Diemut Bubeck played a crucial role in supporting my transition from Master’s to 
PhD level, advised on my initial research proposal and supervised the first year of work. 
Without her I would not have started this project, nor I suspect would I ever have 
reached the end were it not for her judicious steers in its early stages.
Dr Paul Kelly and Professor Rodney Barker were Advisors on my research at different 
stages and were the source of many valuable comments and suggestions, in this formal 
capacity and at other times.
Dr Michael Rosen and Dr Andrew Chitty very kindly agreed to discuss some of my ideas 
with me at a time when I was looking for more specialised advice. Their comments were 
as lucid and insightful as their published work had led me to expect.
Many others have made invaluable contributions to my efforts, sometimes by responding 
direcdy to papers or presentations, sometimes more unwittingly, in exchanges about 
related subjects and issues. These include Michael Bacon, Sebastian Budgen, Tony Burns, 
Terrell Carver, David Casde, Cecile Fabre, Cillian McBride, David Palfrey, Jorgo Riss, 
Justin Rosenberg, Alan Ryan, and Larry Wilde. I want especially to express my 
appreciation to Philip Cook, whose intellectual companionship and shared enthusiasms 
will always be one of my best memories of the years spent on this thesis.
I am also grateful to those friends and colleagues who provided healthy distractions from 
lonely research at various points over the years, but who generously and without 
complaint allowed me the time and space to finish it when it was time to do so: Hilary 
Wainwright; my fellow editors at Historical Materialism; and everyone at Catalyst, especially 
John Underwood and Mark Donoghue.
Theba Islam and Benjamin Smith are both inspirational friends who taught me to find 
ways of doing the things I wanted to do.
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother and father, Elizabeth Hargest and James 
Mclvor, for being wonderful parents; and to Claire Moon, who inverted my world, and 
set me on my feet.
4
Table of Contents
IN T R O D U C T IO N ......................................................................................................... 8
1. Missed connections: Karl Marx and political philosophy............................................. 8
2. The idea of a political epistemology.............................................................................  13
3. ‘Marx before Marxism’.....................................................................................................18
The canonical accounts..................................................................................................18
The ‘mythology of docrines\.......................................................................................... 21
The ‘tacit dimension .................................................................................................. 24
The young Marx and ‘philosophy...............................................................................25
Theyoung Marx and ‘politics*...................................................................................  27
4. Organisation of the thesis.............................................................................................. 31
5. A note on translations......................................................................................................34
CHAPTER O N E:
EPISTEM OLOGY AND T H E  STATE...................................................................  .36
1. Natural law and the sceptical challenge..........................................................................37
2. Enlightened absolutism and the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy....................................41
3. Kant’s Copemican revolution......................................................................................... 50
The two sources of human knowledge...........................................................................  50
The structures of rational ageny.................................................................................. 56
Deducing the Rechtsstaat............................................................................................ 60
CHAPTER TWO:
REV O LU TIO N  U N F IN IS H E D ?............................................................................... 67
1. The ‘determinate and express principle of Idealism’.....................................................68
2. ‘Kant’s way out of Kant’..................................................................................................71
3. The immorality o f ‘morality’............................................................................................83
4. The state of the Understanding....................................................................................  90
5. Beyond Reflection............................................................................................................98
CHAPTER T H R E E :
MARX’S STU D EN T W RITINGS, BERLIN  1837-41..............................................  102
5
CONT E NT S
1. Law and philosophy.........................................................................................................102
2. Epicurean atomism: objectifying the contradiction....................................................  110
Hegel's history of atomism..........................................................................................  112
Marx's correction.........................................................................................................115
3. Religion and self-consciousness.................................................................................... 126
God as the reality of self consciousness............................................................................130
God as practical reality.............. ........ ........................................................................133
4. Young Hegelian criticism............................................................................................... 138
CHAPTER FOUR:
MARX’S JOURNALISM , T H E  RH IN ELA N D  1842-3............................................142
1. Politicising epistemology................................................................................................. 143
2. The ‘true’ state................................................................................................................  148
3. Law and conceptuality...................................................................................................  155
Between Wolff and Kant............................................................................................  160
The legislative Understanding........................................................................................165
4. The state and subjectivity................................................................................................ 171
The \social abstraction' of the universal class................................................................  172
The manifold of private interests.................................................................................. 178
The antinomies of representation.................................................................................. 180
5. Reason and the public sphere.......................................................................................  183
Publicity as constitutive............................................................................................... 185
Publicity as self-development..........................................................................................189
6. ‘Critique’ revisited: the polemic o f ‘essence’................................................................  191
CHAPTER FIVE
MARX CONTRA H EG E L, KREUZNACH 1843......................................................202
1. The ‘demiurge’ reading.................................................................................................... 202
2. The Philosophy of Right as political epistemology............................................................. 206
3. Hegel’s failure................................................................................................................... 211
A  Hegelian Verstandesstaat........................................................................................ 212
Hegelian mystification.................................................................................................. 218
4. Democracy........................................................................................................................227
6
CONTENTS
5. The inverted world..................................................................................................... 235
CONCLUSION
MARXISM AND EPISTEM OLOGY.......................................................................... 242
1. Between ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’............................................................................ 243
2. Labour and history........................................................................................................  246
3. Capitalism as a form of knowledge..............................................................................  251
BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................258
7
Introduction
1. Missed connections? Karl Marx and political philosophy
Marx is something of a ‘dead dog’ within political philosophy today. Even those who 
would acknowledge his continuing importance to contemporary political and social issues 
(his relevance to the academic discussions and real practical conflicts generated by 
‘globalisation’ is frequently noted) might suspect the philosophical interest of his writing to 
have been exhausted. We have seen the dissolution of the ‘Western Marxist’ tradition, 
that vast industry of intensive Marxological scholarship and commentary that spanned 
nations and decades, but which seemed by the end of the twentieth century to have 
largely run its course.1 Even if the startlingly rapid eclipse of the great continental schools 
of Marxian theory had more to do with the fate of the political movements, communist 
and new left, with which they were always closely, though rarely easily, involved, surely 
we would think that all those seminal and fiercely contested debates, with their armies of 
disciples on either side, had by then talked the subject to death.
Within the sphere of Anglophone political philosophy Marx’s fate seems less tied 
up with that of figures such as Lukacs, Adomo, Althusser or Della Volpe (whose 
influence was only ever fleetingly and indirectly felt on the margins of the discipline, if at 
all) than with the careers of a well-known group of writers once grouped under the 
banner of ‘Analytical Marxism’. Originally driven by a vision of a modernised Marxism 
cleansed of its nineteenth century anachronisms and raised to the idiom of contemporary 
Anglo-American philosophy and social science, none of the key individuals in this group 
are today practising anything that could be described as ‘Marxism’ in any usefully 
discriminatory sense. It is still these figures who most contemporary students of the 
discipline would point to as examples o f ‘Marxists’, and their effective abandonment 
(even if not always explicit renunciation) of the pursuit seems to tell us all we need to 
know about it.2 Excise the dialectical sophistries, the methodologically dubious holisms
1 For useful overviews see Anderson 1976 and 1983, and Jay 1984.
2 The chapter on ‘Marxism’ in Will Kymlicka’s Contemporary Political Philosophy is almost 
entirely taken up with the discussion of ‘analytical’ Marxists who no longer practise the 
trade. The recently published Second Edition finds barely any new references to add to
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and teleologies, and the confused equivocations over its own normative status, and it 
seems that one is left only with a leftwing interpretation of liberal egalitarianism and a 
collection of hypotheses about social class, historical change, and the tendencies of 
capitalist economies, to be confirmed or refuted empirically in the same way as any 
others that one might care to propose.3
This is ironic because, at the very same time, there has been an extraordinary 
revival of philosophical interest in those same German thinkers whose influences on 
Marx’s thought it had seemed so important to expunge.4 Much of it driven by the 
renaissance in normative philosophy consequent upon the publication of John Rawls’s 
Theory of Justice, contemporary Anglo-American thinkers have increasingly found that the 
more deeply they pursue debates such as that between liberalism and communitarianism, 
and issues around public reasoning, moral agency, and cultural identity, the more they are 
led back to the uniquely powerful and sophisticated exploration of similar issues by Kant 
and Hegel (one thinks particularly of writers such as Christine Korsgaard, Onora O ’Neill, 
Allen Wood, Charles Taylor, and Robert Hardimon). This trend has coincided and 
productively dovetailed with a new wave of rigorous and illuminating English language 
scholarship on the German Idealist movement manifested in the work of people such as 
Karl Ameriks, Henry Allison and Paul Guyer on Kant, and Henry S. Harris, Robert 
Pippin and Terry Pinkard on Hegel. As the astonishing richness and complexity of this 
extraordinary conjuncture in the development of modem philosophical inquiry — ‘a 
cultural phenomenon whose stature and influence has been frequendy compared to 
nothing less than the golden age of Athens’, notes Karl Ameriks5 — is brought home to
the chapter from the twelve years since first publication, and all of these feature as 
specifically non-Marxist efforts to develop left or socialist arguments from alternative 
philosophical resources. Kymlicka 2002.
31 should make clear that while I may have criticisms of some of this work I by no 
means wish to dismiss it as misguided and worthless, only to suggest that it has 
prematurely diverted attention away from the task of trying to ‘make sense’ of those 
aspects of Marx’s thought that less easily fit current intellectual paradigms.
4 I allow myself the term ‘German Idealism’ as a convenient and widely recognised 
shorthand to denote, loosely, a group of influential thinkers (primarily Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel) and the concepts and issues that they shared and debated with each 
other. I do not mean to presume that ‘Idealism’ can in this context be straightforwardly 
defined, certainly not in a way that holds good for all of these thinkers throughout all 
their careers.
5 Ameriks 2000, p. 1.
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us afresh, some have begun to suggest that its importance and interest may go beyond 
that of an intellectual historian’s minority pursuit in the normal division of academic 
labour. Thus Terry Pinkard has summated the ‘legacy of idealism’ as ‘a set of some of the 
deepest and more thorough reflections of what it could mean for us to be free both 
individually and collectively under the inescapable conditions of human plurality’.6 And 
Robert Pippin has argued that
much of the controversy about philosophical modernism, antimodemism, and 
postmodernism can still be profitably formulated within the framework first 
proposed in the German Idealist version of modernism, especially in Kantian 
and Hegelian discussions, especially in their discussions of agency, self- 
determination, and rationality.. ?
The present study is premised upon an enthusiastic endorsement of such 
assessments, and attempts to effect an important extension: that this revival should 
suggest and inform a new engagement with the thought of Marx, by virtue o f his 
intellectual proximity to this movement, and on account of his searching and 
transformative application of its theoretical constructions to emerging political and social 
questions of his age — questions of interdependence and collective agency, of relations of 
power and market exchange — that remain today the most fundamental questions of our 
own. I do not mean by this to put the philosophers of Idealism iDack in their place’ as 
mere prologues to Marxism and foils to its glorious development, a place to which they 
were traditionally consigned by more celebratory narratives of Marxism’s emergence.8 
Marx had very little to say direcdy about consciousness, knowledge, subjectivity,
6 Pinkard 2002, p. 367.
7 Pippin 1997a, p. 5. A similar return to source may be underway in more continentally 
orientated discussions. Slavoj Zizek, his interest driven by the problems of post­
structuralist and psycho-analytic theory, has asserted that ‘the notion of modem 
subjectivity elaborated by the great German Idealists from Kant to H egel... forms the 
unsurpassable horizon of our philosophical experience.’ Zizek 1999b, p. ix.
8 A recent new entry in the burgeoning literature o f Hegel commentary suggests: ‘At first 
largely motivated by the quest for the origins of Marx’s project, this revival o f interest has 
begun to focus on Hegel in his own right, and one with perhaps something more 
profound to offer than Marx.’ Franco 1999, p. ix. I certainly think Hegel should be 
regarded as a profound thinker in his own right; I don’t think this need mean reducing 
Marx to the status of a pale imitator.
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rationality, and certainly nothing remotely as developed or complex as the discussions of 
his more philosophically-minded predecessors who remain in this respect unsurpassed. 
Nor do I wish to overplay Marx’s innovation in carrying the epistemological concepts 
and arguments developed by the idealists forward into the social and political domain — 
as I will set out in what follows, such an extension is at least implicit in Kant and was 
elaborated in some detail by Hegel. But my claim is that Marx picked up these insights 
and suggestions and ran with them (so far and so fast, indeed, that their origins quickly 
disappeared from view in his writing) and with these tools began to develop an analysis 
of modem politics and the market society that went way beyond anything envisioned by 
Kant or Hegel, not least because they could only glimpse these newly emergent historical 
realities within the span of their lifetimes.
At the other end of this intellectual journey is the unique and radical social theory 
found in Marx’s monumental Capital' and an accompanying practical commitment to a 
communist political ideal. And here I must make an important qualification to my 
opening suggestion that Marx is no longer being read philosophically today. For there 
has been, concurrendy with the revival of interest in Kant and Hegel and surviving the 
fate of analytical and continental schools of Marx interpretation, an ongoing project of 
investigation into the presuppositions of Marx’s mature critique of political economy, 
and particularly its relation to the thought of Hegel, carried out by English language 
scholars, that has made major advances in understanding in recent years.9 The present 
study is very much inspired and informed by this fascinating body of literature and hopes 
in its way to contribute a small addition to it. The problem is not that such work is not 
being undertaken, but that it is litde known to anyone without a central interest in Marx’s 
thought. My suggestion is that the revival of serious interest in the idealism of Kant and 
Hegel and its value for thinking through problems of moral, political and social theory 
should naturally follow through into precisely this sort of investigation of the relation of 
Marx’s social thought to the philosophical debates from which he emerged. But for most 
people the connection has yet to be made. Part of the reason why this work does not 
receive the attention it deserves stems, I suspect, from the fact that most of it begins with
9 I have in mind the work of writers such as Chris Arthur, Patrick Murray, Tony Smith, 
Geert Reuten, and others. A useful introduction to this new literature is given in the 
opening chapter of Arthur 2002. Representative selections can be found in Moseley (ed) 
1993, and Moseley and Campbell (eds) 1997.
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two feet already inside Marx’s theoretical project and as a result can seem rather a 
scholastic pursuit to anyone approaching from more standard intellectual starting points. 
One of the most interesting debates within this literature, for example, concerns whether 
‘Capital’ follows a logic of ‘Essence’ or the logic of ‘the Concept’.10 Few would view this 
as the most burning issue in political philosophy and social theory today (though my 
contention is that perhaps more should). Most obviously, as has long been recognised, 
there is no standard disciplinary category to which Marx’s mature theory obviously 
belongs and it tends to appear as a marginal trespasser at the boundaries of political 
theory, economics, sociology, and history. This, of course, is due to an ambitiously global 
intent that transcends familiar disciplinary boundaries — an agenda I am not 
unsympathetic to. But one needs to show how we get there from here — and one of my 
aims here is to stake out one possible route, the one that can be discerned in the texts of 
Marx’s earliest intellectual development.
So the present study aims to provide the beginnings of a bridge between two 
bodies of literature and ongoing projects of intellectual inquiry: that concerning the 
political lessons of the German Idealist movement, and that concerning the philosophical 
dimensions of Marx’s ‘mature’ writings. It aims to do so by providing a clear and 
sensitive reconstruction of how the former issued into the latter — that is, how Marx’s 
thought, as exhibited in the writings of his earliest adult years, progressed from an 
inaugural encounter with the dilemmas and historical predicament of German Idealism, 
via an energetic engagement with the political and social questions of his day, through to 
the first formulation of the new research agenda (historical materialism and the critique 
of political economy) and practical political project (revolutionary communism) with 
which his name would become identified.
The hinge in this development, I am proposing, is Marx’s deployment in these 
writings of what I call a ‘political epistemology’ -  roughly summarised, an approach to 
political institutions and ‘subject positions’ which treats them as human beings’ practical 
conceptualisations of their material interdependence. This is not a presupposition that 
Marx ever makes explicit as a methodological principle, and it may well be that it 
operated at such a tacit level in his thought that he would not have immediately 
recognised it as here articulated. But my basic argument in what follows is that this is a
10 See Murray 1993, Smith 1993b.
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conception which has a firm basis in the German Idealist discussions within which Marx 
was immersed, and that it can take us a long way toward making sense of and rendering 
coherent much that otherwise remains obscure and disparate in these early writings, and 
indeed in later ones. Attempting to demonstrate this will be the primary task of the 
chapters ahead. But the basic coinage perhaps calls for a little preliminary explanation.
2. The idea of a political epistemology
The starting point for the discussion that follows are some striking and highly suggestive 
appearances at various points in these early writings, of a particular philosophical version 
of a very old analogy in the history of political thought.11 The analogy is that between the 
state, as a collective political entity, and the individual knowing subject. The particular 
terms through which this analogy is articulated in Marx’s early texts are those provided 
by the philosophy of German Idealism. Thus Marx discusses the problems and conflicts 
of the modem state in terms that parallel, and at times explicidy invoke, philosophical 
discussions of the limitations and paradoxes of the finite subject. And, by extension, his 
aspiration to a political project that in some sense reaches beyond or abolishes the 
division between state and society seems then to parallel the philosophical search for a 
philosophical standpoint that transcends or revokes the primordial split between subject 
and object — and, perhaps, leads to similar difficulties and dilemmas.
Reflection on the possible basis for drawing such a connection suggests the 
possibility that, in certain respects, this is not just a matter of superficial analogy but in 
some sense an identity, and that this identity forms one of the most basic organising 
assumptions of Marx’s political thought in this period. What this means is that in these 
texts Marx critiques political forms precisely as more or less adequate embodiments of 
human beings’ operative conceptualisations of their practical interdependence in society,
11A recent critical survey of this analogy is given in Neocleous 2003, who observes the 
modem prevalence of ‘a set of rhetorical tropes centred on the idea of the mind, such as 
“reason” and “intelligence”’ that show how ‘the statist tendency in political thought has 
imagined the state as a necessary mechanism for human knowledge and, moreover, a 
knowing subject in itself. Neocleous does touch on Hegel and Marx, but does not 
explore in any depth the philosophical arguments involved in making such a link, tending 
to see the analogy as a rhetorical device serving simply to legitimise domination.
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and that as such, philosophical frameworks and vocabularies developed by German 
Idealist thinkers for the analysis of knowledge and consciousness are directly applicable 
to them. This presumption of identity can be broken down into the following rough and 
schematic steps:
1 The necessary structure of the knowing subject will in important respects be 
paralleled in the necessary structure of the acting agent. This is not to say 
(necessarily) that either reduces to the other, nor that there are not important 
differences in their status and application. Conclusions about one do not 
automatically extend to the other. But certain elements and logical 
relationships are the same in both.
2 The necessary structure of the individual agent will at the same time be the 
necessary structure of any collective agency. This again does not necessarily 
mean that the transition from one to the other is straightforward, nor that 
there could be such a thing as a ‘collective agency’ that is in no important 
respects different from ‘individual’ agents. But to the extent that individual 
agents can act ‘together’, towards shared or agreed ‘ends’ and on the basis of 
shared or agreed understandings of their situation, there are important 
respects in which they will be replicating the structure of individual agency on 
a collective or interpersonal level.
3 The structures of collective agency constitute the fundamental or immanent 
logic of actually existing political institutions and social forms. For it is 
through these institutions and forms that individuals seek to realise a 
collective agency, to act together, in however limited or expansive a sense. 
This is a legitimate characterisation and starting point for analysis irrespective 
of how the agents concerned think about or describe these institutions and 
forms. Its theoretical purchase depends rather on how successfully we have 
identified the real nature and preconditions of their agency.
My claim is that this series of theoretical ‘simultaneous equations’ (structure of knowing 
subject = structure of acting agent — structure of collective agency = ‘inner logic’ of 
political institutions) unpacks a key premise of Marx’s thought in this period, and can
14
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help us to understand why he talks about things in the way that he does, and maybe even 
helps to explain some of the conclusions he arrives at. But, as I have said, not only does 
Marx never spell this out in so many words, and at most points to it only fleetingly and 
obliquely, I would not want to claim that this is even necessarily something that he 
consciously entertained or worked through in his own mind at the time. So what, then, 
would be the justification or status of my ascription of this conception to him? There are 
two points to make in response to this question.
Firstly, I think that the chain of reasoning I have sketched does begin to resemble 
some arguments that were accumulated through the course of the development of the 
German Idealist tradition (even if in never so linear a form), and became part of the 
common philosophical heritage that Marx and his generation of thinkers took up, even if 
by this time they were barely conscious, sedimented assumptions in the very language of 
philosophical and political debate. Thus, to pick through this story very quickly, it is clear 
that important elements of Kant’s epistemology carried over into his moral philosophy, 
such that theoretical consciousness and practical freedom were talked about in similar 
and often isomorphic terms, and the ‘unity of reason’ in some way encompassed them 
both.12 Furthermore, it is at least arguable that Kant’s transcendental account of the 
universal and necessary structures of subjectivity and agency has no particular anchorage 
in empirical individuals and can be taken to describe the structure of a supra-individual 
subjectivity that we all, insofar as we are rational beings, participate in;13 certainly this is 
what Kant’s immediate successors quickly began to argue.14 And finally, it has been
12 ‘I require that the critique of a pure practical reason, if it is to be carried through 
completely, be able at the same time to present the unity of practical with speculative 
reason in a common principle, since there can, in the end, be only one and the same 
reason, which must be distinguished merely in its application’. Kant 1785, p. 5, 4:392.
13 As Warren Breckman notes, ‘A tension between the concepts of “subject” and 
“person” began to appear once it was recognized that even if Kant himself conceived the 
subject as a conscious and autonomous human individual, in truth the concept of the 
subject per se says nothing about the particular identity of the subject... Hence the ease 
with which post-Kantian philosophers could extend Kant’s epistemological argument 
about the subject from the conscious human “I” to “God” or “Absolute Spirit”.’ 
Breckman 1999, pp. 11-12.
14 See for example Schelling 1975a, pp. 86-99: There cannot possibly be more than one I 
... the I  is absolutely one ... the pure I is the same everywhere, I is everywhere = I.’ This is 
given a sociological spin in Fichte 1794, p. 159: ‘If all men could be perfect, if they could 
achieve their highest and final goal, then they would be totally equal to each other. They 
would constitute but one single subject.. .’
15
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persuasively argued that Hegel’s philosophies of politics and culture turn fundamentally 
upon an exploration of what might follow from that universal subjectivity’s socio- 
historical embodiment, as what he termed ‘objective Spirit [Geist^  — or, to choose a more 
clumsy but perhaps more iUuminating translation, ‘objectified, socialised, mindedness’. 
Thus Terry Pinkard has described the project of the Phenomenology to ‘shift the basic 
epistemological task away from constructing metaphysical theories about how our 
representations might possibly match up with the world toward one in which the basic 
issue comes to be how we have come to take ourselves as being the agents that we have 
come to be’, so that ‘a wide variety of things, ranging from the rituals involved in Greek 
religious cults to the French Revolution, are in fact best understood as forms of 
knowledge’.15 This extraordinarily imaginative extension of the epistemological analysis 
to a wide variety of social and cultural phenomena means that its original terms quickly 
become buried amid a plethora of legitimate redescriptions, to a point where it is almost 
lost from sight and perhaps should no longer be thought of as privileged. But as 
commentators such as Pinkard have shown, a refreshed awareness of the original role of 
the epistemological inquiry can be essential to rendering the strange idiom of Hegel’s 
concrete socio-historical analyses lucid, and indeed newly plausible.16
This leads on to the second prong of my defence of the notion of a ‘political 
epistemology’ in Marx’s writings. For even if it is not the way Marx might have chosen to 
explain his premises and procedures, I want to suggest that it is the best way into an 
understanding of his thought for us today. This is because it aims to unpack and explain 
tacit premises and conceptual connections which were embedded in the theoretical 
discourse of Marx’s day but which are less familiar to a contemporary readership. The 
path by which German philosophy found its way to this particular and peculiar mode of 
social and political inquiry during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century is also
15 Pinkard 1994, p. 22, p. 20. See also Pippin 1989, p. 80, where it is suggested that 
Hegel’s distinctive philosophical project took off where he translated his original search 
for ‘a way to overcome existentially [the individual’s] alienation or difference from God 
and the religious community’ (set out in the early ‘theological’ writings) into ‘an analysis 
of the implications of Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception’.
16 Pinkard stresses, against hitherto more common readings of Hegel in the English 
literature, this ‘epistemic’ dimension of Geist, which he says ‘denotes for Hegel not a 
metaphysical entity but a fundamental relation among persons that mediates their self- 
consciousness, a way in which people reflect on what they have come to take as 
authoritative for themselves’. Pinkard 1994, p. 9.
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the path by which we now need to find our way back to it. This has particular relevance 
to any readership produced by an Anglophone philosophical tradition which never fully 
took on board the Kantian critique of empiricism, certainly never took very seriously the 
wider uses to which his Idealist successors put it,17 and in consequence has I think never 
really been able to make sense of Marx’s proclaimed ‘materialism’, his notion of ‘human 
nature’, and the status of his critique of political economy as ‘social science’. (I think this 
may also be why many people had such difficulty coming to grips with the schools of 
continental Marxism, who dealt in a philosophical discourse that was in important 
respects built on post-Kantian ideas and arguments, even if these were now transformed 
beyond recognition.)18 So while my headline claim that we need to understand how 
Marx’s early thought was formed by the legacy of German Idealism may sound like 
rather old news, my claim in its boldest form would be that we never really got to the 
bottom of this relationship, nor thought through its far-reaching consequences. 
Confirmation of such a claim might be that a reconstruction along the lines I am 
suggesting does indeed generate some new conclusions about elements o f Marx’s later 
thought that have long seemed contradictory or confusing. I indicate what I think some 
of these might be in the concluding chapter.
But the bulk of my discussion is taken up with those early texts where I think we 
can see this idea come into play in its freshest form, and where I think we can gain a 
clearer view of it relatively free from its entanglements with questions of economics,
17 O f course the ‘Anglo’ vs ‘Continental’ schema is a crude one that admits endless 
exceptions, from the British Idealists to the Austrian positivists, but to the extent that 
there have been broad divisions in the course of modem philosophy, Kant and his 
successors have seemed to many to mark a decisive fork in the road.
18 For an excellent if symptomatic review of these encounters see Callinicos 1985. 
Although showing an insightful awareness of these differences o f philosophical tradition 
(‘Kant to Hegel’ versus ‘Kant to Frege’), and making an enterprising and valuable attempt 
to mediate them, I think this discussion too gets into difficulties when claiming, for 
example, that ‘Marx made it amply plain in Capital that he regarded himself as engaged in 
precisely the same enterprise as natural scientists, namely that of penetrating beneath the 
surface appearances of things to reveal the inner structure of reality’ (p. 101); or that 
historical materialism is ‘concerned with identifying the hidden structures underlying the 
conscious behaviour or individuals’ — structures which must then be understood in non- 
intentional ways (p. 105); or that the notion of commodity fetishism must be rejected 
because it ‘presumes the possibility of immediate knowledge’ and implies a heretically 
non-materialist identification o f ‘social relations with forms of consciousness’ (pp. 131- 
3). I return to some of these issues in the final chapter.
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class, and history. Before proceeding a brief review of what is already known about and 
has already been said of this material is in order.
3. ‘Marx before Marxism’
For most people, ‘the early Marx’ is the Marx of 1844, ‘labour’ and ‘alienation’ and 
communism as ‘the riddle of history solved’. The writings that lead up to this first 
formulation of a recognisably ‘Marxist’ project make up a relatively unknown and under­
examined segment of his corpus. Nevertheless, his historical and international 
significance has ensured that few aspects of his life and work remain wholly unfamiliar 
and have not been subject to some scholarly attention. Many people will know that Karl 
Marx began his university studies with the intention of following his father into law, and 
came out at the end with a doctoral dissertation on ancient Greek atomism; that finding 
the path to an academic career blocked he turned to journalism, and earned a name for 
himself with some sharp writing in defence of press freedom; that following the 
suppression of his newspaper he spent his honeymoon grappling with the final 
paragraphs of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The story of ‘Marxism’ proper then begins with 
his subsequent emigration to Paris that brought him into contact with the French 
workers’ movement, and (via Engels) the writings of the English political economists, 
issuing in the first recognisably ‘Marxist’ synthesis of these elements, the ‘Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts’ of 1844, the centrepiece of what are still customarily thought 
of as ‘the Early Writings’. More generally, most people have an idea that Marx began his 
intellectual life as some kind of ‘Young Hegelian’, and that he eventually arrived at ‘the 
materialist conception of history’ by in some sense ‘inverting’ this philosophical 
paradigm.
The canonical accounts
The first classic account of this period in Marx’s life was provided by Marx himself, in 
the famous and much-quoted Preface to the 1859 Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy, a narrative of the birth of historical materialism that would achieve canonical 
status within the Marxist tradition:
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Although I studied jurisprudence, I pursued it as a subject subordinated to 
philosophy and history. In the year 1842-3, as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung I 
first found myself in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is 
known as material interests. The deliberations of the Rhenish Landtag on forest 
thefts and the division of landed property; the official polemic started by Herr 
von Schaper, then Oberprasident of the Rhine Province, against the Rheinische 
Zeitung about the condition of the Moselle peasantry, and finally the debates on 
free trade and protective tarrifs caused me in the first instance to turn my 
attention to economic questions. ... When the publishers of the Rheinische Zeitung 
conceived the illusion that by a more compliant policy on the part of the paper it 
might be possible to secure the abrogation of the death sentence passed on it, I 
eagerly grasped the opportunity to withdraw from the public stage to my study.
The first work which I undertook to dispel the doubts assailing me was a 
critical re-examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law; the introduction to this 
work being published in the Deutsch-Fran^osische Jahrbucher issued in Paris in 1844. 
My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political 
forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so- 
called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they 
originate in the material conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following 
the example of English and French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces 
within the term ‘civil society’; that the anatomy of this civil society, however, has 
to be sought in political economy.19
Following this account, and perhaps equally influential in shaping the self-understanding 
of the Marxist tradition, was Frederick Engels’ Ludmg Feuerbach and the End of Classical 
German Philosophy (1888),20 which defined the philosophical pedigree of Marxism against 
the dissolution of the ‘Hegelian school’ and the transcendence of Idealism.
... the doctrine of Hegel, taken as a whole, left plenty o f room for giving shelter 
to the most diverse practical party views. And in the theoretical Germany of that 
time, two things above all were practical: religion and politics ... Towards the end
19 Marx 1859, pp. 424-5.
20 Engels 1888.
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of the thirties, the cleavage in the school became more and more apparent... 
when in 1840, orthodox pietism and absolutist feudal reaction ascended the 
throne with Frederick William IV, open partisanship became unavoidable. The 
fight was still carried on with philosophical weapons, but no longer for abstract 
philosophical aims. It turned directly on the destruction of traditional religion and 
of the existing state ... in the Rheinische Zeitung o f 1842 the Young Hegelian 
school revealed itself direcdy as the philosophy of the aspiring radical bourgeoisie 
and used the meagre cloak of philosophy only to deceive the censorship ...
... the main body of the most determined Young Hegelians was, by the 
practical necessities of its fight against positive religion, driven back to Anglo- 
French materialism. This brought them into contact with the system of their 
school... Then came Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity. With one blow it 
pulverised the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed 
materialism on the throne again ... The spell was broken; the ‘system’ was 
exploded and cast aside, and the contradiction, shown to exist only in our 
imagination, was dissolved. One must himself have experienced the liberating 
effect of this book to get an idea of it. Enthusiasm was general; we all became at 
once Feuerbachians.21
But Engels influentially distinguished the trajectory of Marxism (and its superiority to
Feuerbach’s project) by its taking over to ‘the materialist standpoint’ the ‘revolutionary
side’ of Hegel, his ‘dialectical method’.
We again took a materialistic view of the thoughts in our heads, regarding them 
as images of real things instead of regarding the real things as images of this or 
that stage o f the Absolute Concept. Thus dialectics reduced itself to the science 
of the general laws of motion, both of the external world and of human thought 
— two sets of laws which are identical in substance, but differ in their expression 
in so far as the human mind can apply them consciously, while in nature and also 
up to now for the most part in human history, these laws assert themselves 
unconsciously, in the form of external necessity, in the midst of an endless series
21 Engels 1988, pp. 15-17.
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of seeming accidents. Thereby the dialectic of concepts itself became merely the 
conscious reflex of the dialectical motion of the real world and thus the dialectic 
of Hegel as turned over; or rather, turned off its head, on which it was standing, 
and placed upon its feet.22
It is not only because they vividly set the scene for the more detailed investigation to 
follow, that these summaries are worth quoting at such length. They also must be taken 
seriously as first-hand accounts of the development of Marx’s distinctive intellectual and 
political project — so that, even if we judge them to be inadequate or perhaps even 
problematic (as may be the case with Engels’ reconstruction), our own version of events 
must at least be such that we can plausibly imagine how it may have given rise to such 
reconstructions. And this is what I will hope to do in what follows.
The 'mythology of doctrines ’
During the twentieth century more texts of this period became generally available 
(including, crucially, Marx’s critical notes on Hegel from 1843), and more extended 
English language studies, beginning with David McLellan’s Marx Before Marxism (1970),23 
have been concerned with filling out the details of this biographical narrative, and 
providing piecemeal summaries of the extant texts.24 As such they have provided 
invaluable introductory surveys of the terrain and ffequendy throw up important insights, 
some of which are taken up in the discussion that follows.
Where there has been an attempt to form a more overall assessment of their 
political and philosophical content, however, this has often been distorted by an 
overriding concern to determine whether at a given point in his youth Marx was ‘still’ an
22 Engels 1888, pp. 38-9.
23 McLellan 1970.
24 General overviews and discussions of Marx’s pre-1844 writings are found in Adams 
1940; O ’Malley 1967; McGovern 1970; Howard 1972; van Leeuwen 1972 and 1975; 
Hunt 1974; Rubel 1975; Mewes 1976; Draper 1977; Teeple 1984; Kain 1988; Berki 1990. 
Others that focus on specific texts within this period are cited as they arise in the 
chapters that follow.
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idealist or ‘already’ a materialist,25 as having ‘gone beyond’ liberalism or ‘not yet’ come to 
communism.26 The result can be a peculiar variant of what Quentin Skinner diagnosed 
‘the mythology of doctrines’ in the historiography of political thought, whereby a past 
writer is expected to have a definite position on what now seem to us to be the most 
important issues and debates, and their writings are searched for remarks or clues as to 
what that position might be.27 In the case of Marx studies we have often had an 
individualised version of what Skinner describes as ‘the endless debate — almost wholly 
semantic, though posing as empirical — about whether a given idea may be said to have 
“really emerged” at a given time’.28 Quite apart from the problematically teleological 
presumption of such schemas, I suspect that any attempt to periodise Marx’s thought in 
such broad terms (‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’, ‘liberalism’ and ‘communism’) cannot 
begin to accommodate the complexity of the philosophical and political debates in which 
he is enmeshed, and moreover can set us on a false trail of trying to reconstruct an 
underlying philosophical or political ‘position’ or allegiance behind the concepts and 
arguments that are actually deployed in the texts under study.29 It is true that the
25 See especially Teeple 1984. Heinz Lubasz recognises that Marx shows little interest in 
declaring himself a philosophical idealist or materialist in his early articles, but then seems 
to conclude from this that Marx’s philosophical background played little role in his 
empirical inquiries — but the point is that philosophical discussions were not yet being 
conducted in these terms, and the deep involvement of most radical intellectuals, Marx 
plainly included, with what we know now as ‘German Idealism’ did not of itself preclude 
an interest in empirical investigation of nature and society, as Hegel’s lifetime interests 
amply demonstrate. Lubasz 1976, p. 26.
26 Hunt 1974; Draper 1977.
27 Skinner 1969, pp. 32-36. Engels may have been a bad influence here, with his 
insistence that there is only one ‘great basic question of all philosophy’ which splits all 
philosophers in history into the ‘two great camps’ of idealism and materialism, a 
pronouncement that might have been calculated to make Skinner blanch. Engels 1888, 
pp. 19-20.
28 Skinner 1969, p. 35.
29 Though he may seem to many the most notorious offender, I would actually exclude 
Louis Althusser from these strictures. Whatever one may think of his own periodisations 
of Marx’s early thought (and I think we must now find them too simple) his demand of a 
‘symptomatic reading’ of the theoretical ‘problematic’ governing a text and its synchronic 
relations to an ‘ideological field’ were intended precisely to correct against the temptation 
to read Marx’s early works in the ‘future anterior’ by comparing them always against the 
‘goals’ of his subsequent development. See Althusser 1961, pp. 51-71 especially. For his 
classification of Marx’s early texts into a Kantian-Fichtean ‘liberal rationalist’ stage (from
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distribution of labels and the drawing of dividing lines is a practice encouraged by the 
later polemical engagements of Marx and Engels themselves, for whom a clear and 
combative identification as ‘materialist’ and ‘communist’ was an important and politically 
productive gesture. But at the time of writing the texts we are here concerned with (that 
is, up until 1844 at the earliest), it is pretty clear that Marx did not think that whether one 
was an ‘idealist’ or a ‘materialist’, a ‘liberal’ or a ‘communist’, were the most important 
questions of the day; that it was not his primary intention in these texts to work out and 
set forth his position in response to them; and indeed that these questions would barely 
have posed themselves to him in these terms at all. Even if these are questions which in 
part motivate our inquiry, this is precisely because the very nature of Marx’s mature 
‘materialism’ and the ultimate content of his conception of ‘communism’ has remained 
so unclear and contested, so that it makes no sense to return to his early writings with 
these categories in hand as if their meaning were simple and settled.
More difficult questions arise when we consider Marx’s relationships with other 
key thinkers of his generation and of the philosophical tradition he engaged with -  
questions which clearly were of immediate concern to him during the period we will be 
looking at. There is no doubt that it did seem very important to Marx and his 
contemporaries to know where one stood in relation to Kant, Hegel, Plato, Aristotle, and 
all the rest, but despite the fact that these texts are Uttered with expUcit declarations of 
allegiance and opposition and pronouncements on such thinkers’ true significance, the 
question of ‘influences’ on Marx’s early thought remains an area in which there is Httle 
agreement. Here there are two important ways in which the unwitting historical 
parochiaHsm warned against by Skinner can manifest itself. One is the attempt to find in 
Marx statements which resonate with our own model of what another thinker stands for, 
such as Kant’s ‘universaUsm’, or Hegel’s ‘dialectic’, or Aristotle’s ‘essentiahsm’, which 
come nowhere near to accommodating the complexity, diversity and ambiguity of the 
thought of these writers, their relations to one another, and the many ways in which 
these writers might be been read by Marx.30 In drawing such comparisons and 
connections the more cautious route is also the more interesting and productive: 
remaining at the level of specific texts, concepts and arguments, and sticking to cases
1840-42) and Feuerbachian ‘communahst’ stage (from 1843) see Althusser 1964, pp. 223- 
27.
30 This is a practice which particularly hampers the discussion in Kain 1988, for example.
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were it can plausibly be supposed that a reference is consciously intended or a usage 
consciously deployed.31
The ‘tacitdimension’
At the same time, however, I want to suggest that there is another perspectival illusion 
that needs to be checked — that as well as making too much of superficial similarities, we 
may overlook or lose sight of deeper interconnections. I have in mind the key premises 
and paradigms which make up what Albert Hirschmann has called the ‘tacit dimension’ 
in the history of ideas — ‘propositions and opinions shared by a group and so obvious to 
it that they are never fully or systematically articulated’.32 In what follows I will be 
arguing that certain fundamental presuppositions and problems can be seen to frame and 
inform the whole movement of post-Kantian thought in Germany and remain important 
for understanding the construction of Marx’s distinctive ideas. I think a case can be made 
that much of this framework was quite simply taken for granted in the texts and 
discussions we will look at, and that while the elements of this paradigm would most 
naturally strike us as ‘Kantian’ or ‘Hegelian’, it would have been seen by Marx and his 
contemporaries as simply fundamental to modem ‘philosophy’ or ‘science’, at the same 
time as they worked to differentiate themselves from the particular positions at which 
Kant and Hegel arrived. There may indeed be some ‘anxiety o f influence’ at work here,33 
particularly so where we come to the interrelations among various rival Young Hegelian 
writers whose fierce competition for intellectual leadership of their movement produced 
a shrill polemical atmosphere and perhaps a certain narcissism of small differences.34
31 Carver 2000 makes a similar argument specifically with respect to Marx’s relation to 
Hegel.
32 Hirschmann 1977, p. 69.
33 Joe McCamey has suggested, for example, that for circumstantial reasons Marx may 
have overstated or exaggerated the nature of his philosophical break with Hegel, and I 
think we have to at least consider the possibility of such a thing. McCamey 2000.
34 Zvi Rosen, for example, rejects the thought that there is any ‘affinity’ between Bruno 
Bauer’s and Ludwig Feuerbach’s analyses of religion and that their ‘similarity’ is ‘external 
and merely formal’, citing the fact that they publicly repudiated each other’s arguments in 
response to attempts to lump them together. Rosen 1977, pp. 96-102. Certainly Young 
Hegelian critiques of theology differed in important ways but I don’t think that should
24
I N T R O D U C T I O N
But my basic contention in what follows will be that beneath the cacophony of 
sloganeering that characterised the Young Hegelian period there was a common project, 
and that this can be understood as in part a return of the radical Kantian beginnings of 
the German Idealist movement as it was conceived at the turn of the century by its key 
founders, Schelling and Hegel. This recovered critical impulse was targeted against 
Schelling’s turn to ‘positive’ philosophy, and what was increasingly seen as Hegel’s 
(superficial or symptomatic) reconciliation with ‘positive’ religious and state institutions 
in his later career. This is not to presume that this underlying project was simple to 
define or sustain — just as its internal instabilities and ambiguities had led to the 
breakdown of the original Idealist programme into opposed tendencies, so too the 
Young Hegelian formation quickly fragmented into diverse political and intellectual 
campaigns. But all these important philosophical and practical differences can best be 
understood if we bear in mind that they arise from disputes about the adequate 
formulation and realisation of what is at some level an initially shared project, not totally 
disconnected visions created ex nihilo. And this applies to Marx just as much as anyone 
else.35
The young Marx and 'philosophy’
Of course it is Marx who, more than any other, transforms this philosophical project out 
of all recognition, to a point where it appears as explicidy and insistendy anti- 
philosophical. This trajectory has been the topic of a handful of more recent studies of 
Marx’s emergence from the Young Hegelian movement: Harold Mah’s The End of 
Philosophy and the Origin of ‘IdeologyKarl Marx and the Crisis of the Young Hegelians (1987),
blind us to their common basis, recognised by John Toews (1980, p. 287) — a shared 
starting point that moreover remains recognisably part of the German Idealist 
problematic.
35 It is for this reason that I do not follow the common practice of investigating Marx’s 
earliest writings in the context of a wider ‘ensemble’ study of several Young Hegelian 
thinkers — as seen in, for example, McLellan 1969; Mah 1987; Breckman 1999; 
Kouvelakis 2003. For the purposes of this study I am more interested in the continuities 
of Marx’s thought with that of his idealist forbears than its differences with his various 
contemporaries. This, along with the constraints of space, mean that figures such as 
Bauer, Ruge and Feuerbach are largely confined to the margins of this discussion.
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Daniel Brudney’s Marx’s Attempt to heave Philosophy (1988), and, by far the best of these, 
Peter Osborne’s unpublished D.Phil thesis, The Carnival of Philosophy: Philosophy, Politics and 
Science in Hegel and Marx (1988).36
Mah presents an ‘empirical phenomenology’ of the spiritual journeys of Bruno 
Bauer, Arnold Ruge and Karl Marx, and locates the origin o f the modem concept of 
‘ideology’ in their failure to make sense of their personal conflicts and the apparent 
regression of the Prussian state within the terms of their adopted Hegelian worldview. 
The consequences of this are taken to their farthest conclusion by Marx, who effectively 
travels backwards along the road of Hegelian phenomenology to arrive at ‘the immediate, 
sensuous world’ as the standpoint for a critique of all philosophy as compensating for 
and justifying a deficient social reality by ‘creating a fantasy world of unity and 
freedom’.37 Daniel Brudney’s discussion (which concentrates on Marx’s texts of 1844-6, 
beyond our period, but interprets these in the light of a detailed reading of Feuerbach 
and Bauer’s earlier work) is premised on a very similar narrative of Marx’s disavowal of 
philosophy, and diagnoses what he takes to be the deep problems of the resulting 
position. Clearly taking his bearings from recent analytical discussions of Marx’s apparent 
confusion over issues of human nature and normative moral stances, Brudney argues 
that Marx’s anti-philosophical recourse to the empirical, the material, the everyday is in 
conflict with an account of capitalist society as a self-mystifying social reality that can 
only be criticised from the perspective of an independent standard o f the good life for 
humanity.38
Both these studies are led astray, I want to suggest, by a too stark and simplistic 
reading of the rejection by Marx and other Young Hegelians of their Idealist 
philosophical heritage. Osborne’s highly iUuminating discussion fares far better, I think, 
for attending to the continuity in this development, finding in Marx’s oblique discussions 
of the contemporary predicament of philosophy in the notes to his Doctoral Dissertation 
the clue to a more ‘dialectical’ account (the ovemsed word is, in this context, quite
36 Mah 1987; Brudney 1998; Osbome 1988.
37 Mah 1987, pp. 41-2.
38 ‘Marx’s justificatory problem stems from his desire to condemn capitalism while he 
both eschews the kind of abstract theory that claims to penetrate behind the appearances 
(with respect to human nature) of ordinary life and asserts that in ordinary life what 
human nature currently seems to be is quite different from what it actually is’. Brudney 
1998, p. 19.
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appropriate) of how in Marx’s own hands philosophy’s attempt to become ‘worldly’ 
through material mediations results in a fundamental reconfiguration of its own status in 
relation to ‘independent material problems’ and to the project of the empirical sciences. 
He does not, however, home in on the question of political and social forms and 
institutions in the way that I plan to do. And it may even be that he does not fully 
recognise the extent to which the development he describes can be understood within an 
overarching Hegelian narrative. Specifically in this context, I will attempt to show that it 
is precisely through Hegel that we can make sense of the perennially troublesome 
coexistence in Marx’s later writings of a polemical appeal to the material, the empirical, 
the ‘immediate’, and an apparent recourse to ‘idealist’ philosophical figures o f critique, 
essentialism, and teleology.
The young Marx and ‘politics’
While this thesis was in preparation a further group of studies appeared which are 
concerned less with the status of ‘philosophy’ within Marx’s early thought than with that 
of politics. Perhaps most important of these for my own interests and purposes is Warren 
Breckman’s Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the 
Self (1999),39 which situates Marx within a wider debate over ‘personalism’ in its 
theological and political aspects that Breckman takes to be at the heart of the ideological 
struggle between post-Hegelian conservatism and Young Hegelian radicalism in 1830s 
Prussia. Breckman provides one of the richest and most comprehensive pictures of the 
background to Marx’s early intellectual activities to have appeared in English, and 
performs the service of making clear just how much of Marx’s early outlook was held in 
common with others of his generation. Indeed, one of the effects o f Breckman’s work is 
to take down our estimation of Marx’s originality in these earliest years of his intellectual 
career: it was no great revolution to transpose Feuerbachian critique from religion to 
politics, for Feuerbach’s project was already politically directed; nor to attack the 
ideological function of the ‘panlogicism’ of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, already diagnosed 
by Ruge; nor to make a philosophical commitment to communism in 1843, when
39 Breckman 1999.
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Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, Eduard Gans and others were already ‘ethical socialists’ of 
some kind under the impact of Saint-Simonianism and the rise of the ‘social question’ in 
the 1830s. Furthermore, Breckman’s focus on the vicissitudes of the concept of 
‘personality’ picks out a vital strand for understanding how Marx relates to this context, a 
strand which is close to and in many ways intertwines with the one that it is my concern 
to trace, as will become apparent in what follows. But ultimately, as will also become 
clear, I think that ‘personality’ is not the only place one could start — other politico- 
philosophical motifs such as mechanism, formalism, positivity, abstraction, arbitrariness, 
dualism, transcendence, and self-consciousness are, arguably, equally pivotal to the 
intellectual disputes and practical conflicts of this period and could be made the subject 
of a separate study, while my claim will be that all can be better made sense of within the 
broader ‘epistemological’ problematic that it will be my aim to reconstruct. Moreover, I 
think this restricted optic predetermines (or, indeed, has been predetermined by) 
Breckman’s implied conclusion that the true distinctiveness of Marx’s development was 
his illicit extension of the Young Hegelian critique of Christian and neo-feudal 
personalism to secular liberal individualism.40 Though I do not plan to mount a complete 
defence of Marx’s rejection of liberalism within this study, I do think that one of the 
outcomes of my broader reconstruction may be a clearer understanding of exactly why 
Marx felt that modem market society did indeed reproduce important structural features 
of a pre-modern traditional order.
Breckman’s return to the origins of Marxist thought is implicitly framed by an 
equation of the moment of ‘post-Marxism’ with a ‘return of the political’, and means to 
assess what is at stake in such a shift by inquiring into the moment of the alleged 
suppression of the political dimension in Marx’s early thought41 A similar concern with 
what Claude Lefort has influentially designated ‘the lacuna of the political’ in Marxism 
animates two recent French studies with more sympathetic intent, Miguel Abensour’s La
40 See especially pp. 278-308. ‘[I]n 1843, Marx mistook an analogy for analysis. That is, 
his treatment of the modem state depended on a brilliant extension of the structure of 
Left Hegelian politico-theological critique into the secular domain of society and politics. 
Through a curious alchemy, he recast a secular state of affairs, the separation of the 
modem state from civil society, as itself tbeologicat (p. 294).
41 Breckman self-consciously writes against the background of a supposed consensus that 
‘Karl Marx’s total rejection of the concept of civil society is inadequate to the project of 
expanding democratic life within complex societies’. Breckman 1999, p. 2.
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democratic contre I’Etat: Marx etle moment machiavelien (1997)42 and Stathis Kouvelakis’s 
Philosophy and devolution from Kant to Marx (2003).43 Both set out to investigate the now 
widespread view that Marx’s thought in some way effects an overly determinist or 
teleological closure of what is contingent and contested in social life, and for this reason 
cannot be wholly absolved of responsibility for its misuses during the twentieth century. 
The former finds in Marx’s early journalism a neo-republican campaign (analysed after 
Pocock) against the theologico-political legitimations of the Restoration that is 
simultaneously radicalised and submerged in its passage, through a ‘true democracy’ 
upheld against the modem state as such, to an insurgent proletarian politics pitched 
against the alienated structures of modem civil society.44 The latter takes Marx’s 
commitment to revolutionary change and a progressive dialectic of conflict and rupture 
as the crux of his originality and distinction from his contemporaries, and insists that 
Marx’s notion of ‘true democracy’ should be taken as a promise of ongoing and open- 
ended political activity, and not a dangerously naive utopia of social harmony 45 Though 
their analyses take different directions, both pursue the thought that Marx’s vision of the 
end of the political state as an autonomous sphere should not be taken necessarily to 
presage the abolition of the political as such.46 Although the present study is clearly 
written in a different idiom and tradition, and will at various points take issue with the 
detail and direction of these discussions, my intention is to complement rather than 
supplant them. One might say that my own way of approaching the same question of 
‘the political’ in Marx would be to ask after the fate in his thought and practice of what 
Howard Caygill has called the ‘aporia’ of judgement in Kant, a meditation on the
42 Abensour 1997.1 am grateful to Sebastian Budgen for allowing me sight of a draft 
translation by Max Blechman, forthcoming from Verso.
43 Kouvelakis 2003.
44 ‘As Marx’s political writings suggest amply, he was perpetually haunted by the radical 
instituting power of the political sphere, by its heterogeneity. It seems he could never 
stop questioning the riddle of the foundation of political community, or of life held in 
common’. Blechman’s translation, p. 15.
45 ‘. . .the “practice of true democracy” designates an eminently expansive process, the self- 
criticism of civil society understood as inherendy political; it is the threshold above which 
the politicisation of the various social instances and the socialization of the political 
become coextensive’. Kouvelakis 2003, p. 310.
46 Kouvalakis 2003, p. 412, n. 200. Such a reading has also been suggested, again with 
reference to the 1843 critique of Hegel, by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy (1997, pp. 114-15).
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production of order with distinctly modem political ramifications,47 or of the radically 
‘modernist’ problematic of ‘self-determination’ that Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard 
have taken to be definitive of the German Idealist tradition in general.48
If I seem to be insistently dragging everything back to the Tubingen seminary 
where Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel first enthused about the implications of the ‘new 
philosophy’ in the 1790s, this is not because I wish to reduce everything to a reinvention 
of the critical project, nor to portray the Hegelian system as a ‘black hole’ in the history 
of modem thought that subsumes within it all antecedents and, indeed, would-be 
escapees. And I certainly do not mean to reduce Marx’s originality to naught. There are 
important ways in which Marx breaks radically with the project of German Idealism, and 
these may well be best characterised as a shift to a kind of ‘materialism’. But as Marx 
himself stressed as he came to his own ‘settling of philosophical accounts’, this is not 
materialism as we know it — in which ‘the thing, reality, sensibility, is conceived only in 
the form of the object — but a materialism totally transformed by a notion of ‘human 
activity \Tatigkeitj that had been ‘developed abstractly by Idealism’.49 My argument is that 
until we have fully taken the measure of this tradition and its role in forming Marx’s early 
thought — and I note here Terry Pinkard’s recent suggestion that as far as Anglo- 
American philosophical discussions go it may be only now ‘that we are finally in a 
position to begin assimilating what Hegel has to say to us’50 — we will not be able to fully 
appreciate or evaluate Marx’s distinctive theoretical project. The present study is not 
intended as a complete or final account of these issues, but as a corrective and 
prolegomenon.
47 Caygill 1989. ‘In the guise of a statement of the aporia of the aesthetic judgement of 
taste, the third Critique offers a meditation on the metaphysical and political crises of 
modernity’. Caygill 1989, p. 8.
48 See Pinkard 2002, and Pippin 1997a, p. 6, which summarises the ‘ideal at the heart of 
[the] revolutionary aspirations’ of the German Idealists as ‘the ideal o f a wholly critical, 
radically self-reflexive or rationally “self-authorizing” philosophy’.
49 Marx 1845, p. 421. See Carver 1998, p. 27.
50 Pinkard 1994, p. 3.
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4. Organisation of the thesis
The following chapters attempt to throw light on these philosophical interrelationships 
by tracing the inheritance and development of what I have called a ‘political 
epistemology’ in Marx’s writings from 1837 to 1843.
Chapters One and Two attempt to sketch the broad philosophical background to 
this idea, focussing in particular on the parallels and connections between the 
‘epistemological’ crises of the modem period and the political philosophy of the modem 
state. Chapter One begins with the ‘sceptical’ challenge to traditional natural law 
schemas, and the rationalist rehabilitation of the latter in the neo-scholastic ‘Leibniz - 
Wolffian philosophy’ of the eighteenth century. This baroque construction forms the 
towering backdrop to much of what follows, I argue, both in its attempt to marry 
rationalist and Aristotelian categories and in its alliance with the bureaucratic absolutism 
of Frederican Pmssia. Kant’s revolutionary critique of this edifice is then analysed in its 
interrelated epistemological and political dimensions. His radically redrawn analysis of 
human knowledge and agency as founded upon the free spontaneity of self- 
consciousness both imparts the crucial and revolutionary impetus to subsequent German 
philosophy, and sets in place some of the defining political dilemmas which shape its 
developments and debates.
Chapter Two presents a reconstruction of the initial appropriation and immanent 
critique of Kant’s philosophy by Fichte, and the early Schelling and Hegel. It takes 
seriously their claims to be ‘completing’ the Kantian revolution, and attempts to trace the 
path they took through the interstices of Kant’s own system to arrive at a further re­
articulation of its key terms. While often regarded as effecting a reversion to some kind 
of precritical metaphysics, I argue that it should be recognised as, in intent at least, a 
distinctively post-critical and indeed ‘post-epistemological’ attempt to think through the 
full implications of the all-embracing self-determination of human experience and activity 
that Kant’s arguments seemed to point to. But this is not an effort that ever arrived at a 
wholly stable resolution, and the divergent paths of Schelling and Hegel away from this 
initially shared starting point will stake out the philosophical and political terrain upon 
which Marx and his radical contemporaries will begin to work out their own intellectual 
and practical projects.
Chapters Three, Four and Five deal with Marx’s early texts themselves, focusing,
respectively, on the writings of his student years in Berlin from 1837-41; his journalistic
*
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pieces for the Rheinische Zeitung of 1842-3; and his 1843 critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right, and associated contributions to the Deutsch-fran^osische Jahrbiicher. This organisation 
is intended mainly to allow the clearest possible analysis of these writings by grouping 
them according to simple continuity of setting and subject matter. It has not been my 
primary concern to locate ‘breaks’ or ‘turns’ in Marx’s political and philosophical 
development during this period, which often seems to be a priority of commentators on 
these writings. The first and foremost reason why these texts fall into clearly 
distinguishable clusters is that Marx wrote them in different circumstances, about 
different things, for different purposes. Discontinuities and deflections in Marx’s 
philosophical oudook can only emerge once we have sought to understand these writings 
on their own terms.
Chapter Three examines the writings dating from Marx’s period at Berlin 
University from 1837 to 1841 — not to provide a comprehensive account of the state of 
his thought at this stage of development (such an account would simply not be possible 
given the paucity of the extant material), but at least to offer textual evidence for the 
importance of certain issues and themes to him during this time. Early on Marx records 
his frustration with the split between the empirical study of law as a historical institution 
and the more theoretical pursuit of its rational and conceptual interconnections, and 
presents the thought of Hegel as a dynamic reconciliation o f these two opposed 
standpoints. His Doctoral Dissertation on Epicurean atomism strongly suggests an 
interest in and involvement with the issues raised by Hegel’s Logic, particularly the 
‘Doctrine of Essence’ that makes up its pivotal middle section. With this in mind I look 
again at the often-quoted rhetorical declarations, in the margins of the dissertation, of 
opposition to religion and in defence of the sovereignty of ‘self-consciousness’. Rather 
than delve immediately into the details of Marx’s personal and philosophical relationship 
with Bruno Bauer, which this is usually taken as the cue for, I seek to show how far this 
can be made sense of as a continuation of (or perhaps recovery of) the original radical 
Idealist project of recognising the world as ‘a product of the freedom of intelligence’. At 
the same time I warn against assuming that such a standpoint necessarily precludes a 
serious practical engagement with what a later discourse would label ‘the material world’, 
and suggest that such an engagement may already be prefigured in Marx’s qualified 
commitment to the philosophical practice of ‘critique’.
Chapter Four, in many ways the pivotal chapter of the thesis, moves on to a 
study of Marx’s political journalism of 1842-3, in which the interlinking of
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epistemological and political themes is most clearly in evidence. I argue that Marx’s 
concept of a ‘true state’ can be understood by referring back to the original political 
project of the Prussian Enlightenment, of rationally harmonising ‘right’ and ‘function’ by 
clearly defining society’s roles and relationships in a publicly codified system of laws. The 
impact of post-Kantian epistemological debates can then be seen in the way that this 
ideal is rethought by Marx as both inescapably inscribed in any practical interaction 
among free and interdependent beings, yet at the same time always problematic, on account 
of the basic impossibility of ever finally capturing the dynamic interrelations of a ‘living’ 
social whole within the finite conceptual determinations of the ‘legislative 
Understanding’. These issues are followed through into Marx’s diagnosis of the 
increasing political conflict between civil society and the Prussian bureaucracy, which I 
argue can be seen to draw upon the post-Kantian critique of abstract subjectivity 
positioned over and above an inherendy disorganised sensory manifold. Against this 
background I then argue that we can see Marx’s insistence on the foundational role of an 
inclusive and unrestricted public sphere in constituting an authentic political unity as 
paralleling the post-Kantian insistence on the priority of Reason as encircling and 
suspending the limitations and oppositions of the finite Understanding. Finally I suggest 
that in this light we must be careful how we interpret Marx’s appeals to the ‘essence’ of 
human nature and social relationships during this period, which now appear to be a 
strategic and self-critical response to the ‘positivist’ turn of philosophy and political 
theory that accompanies the personalism and religiosity of the new regime in Berlin.
Chapter Five turns, with Marx himself, to the question that is inevitably begged 
by much of the previous discussion — that of Marx’s relation to Hegel’s own political 
philosophy, explored primarily through Marx’s ‘Kreuznach manuscript’ of summer 1843 
and its critical commentary on key sections of the Philosophy of Right. I seek to emphasise 
the extent to which Marx’s critique of Hegel in this text is undertaken from a standpoint 
that is itself unmistakably informed by Hegelian insights and arguments, and that the 
thrust of his argument with Hegel’s philosophy of the constitutional state is that it 
ultimately fails on its own terms. That is to say, Hegel’s constitutional order is diagnosed as 
fatally flawed by its inherent ‘formalism’ and ‘dualism’, terms that strongly echo Hegel’s 
own criticisms of the Verstandesstaat, the state based on the Understanding, that he 
identified with other political philosophies such as those of Kant and Fichte. Moreover, 
Marx’s well known complaints about the ‘mystificatory’ role played by Hegel’s Logic in 
this set up now appear, paradoxically, to turn against Hegel himself his own accounts of
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how the Understanding seeks to ground itself through a spurious metaphysical doubling 
of its own determinations. Thus the effect of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is to bend the key 
terms of the self-determining Concept back into serving as the underlying foundation of 
the ‘essentialising’ activities of the Understanding. It is as an effort to escape this 
philosophical cul-de-sac that I interpret Marx’s turn to the alternative ‘anthropological’ 
and ‘sensible’ paradigm offered by Feuerbach, which I argue should be seen not as a 
retraction of the post-Kantian project but an attempt to relaunch it from a surer 
theoretical and practical footing.
A great many questions remain outstanding at this point, and whether Marx’s 
subsequent intellectual efforts succeed in resolving them cannot be determined within 
the confines of this study. In the concluding chapter I do however seek to give a 
preliminary indication of how I think the preceding discussion may throw light upon 
Marx’s later writings and investigations, and perhaps even suggest revisions in our 
interpretation and assessment of them. Stated briefly, my suggestion is that Marx’s 
‘mature’ social theory may be based in a transposition of the post-epistemological 
orientation of post-Kantian discussions into an analysis of the complex and mediated 
self-determination of society, via the freely purposive and ‘materially’ productive 
activities of the individuals who make it up. If we keep this possibility in mind, then, it 
seems to me, much of what has always seemed most confusing and contradictory in his 
later work begins to make a little more sense. This does not amount to an adequate 
exploration of the details of this crucial ‘transposition’, and certainly not to any kind of 
defence of its ultimate viability. But my hope is that it does at least give some reasons for 
thinking that perhaps Marx did not in his later work betray, or forget, or corrupt, all that 
was most complex, challenging and valuable in the philosophical debates of German 
Idealism; but that, as he had always claimed, he gave them new life by reconceiving their 
application to practical social problems and issues that remain, today, still pressing.
A note on translations
I have made use of mainly standard English translations of primary texts, sometimes 
checking against the German and occasionally modifying where I think a point can be 
drawn out more clearly, stating where I have done so. In most cases this is restricted to 
rendering translations of key German terms consistent across texts and authors, so that
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possible continuities of usage may be noted and considered. Thus Verstand is rendered 
throughout as Understanding (not ‘Intellect’); Begriff as ‘Concept’ (not ‘Notion’); 
Wirklichkeit as ‘actuality’ (not ‘reality’); Sinnlich as ‘sensible’ (not ‘sensuous^. This last 
example provides a good illustration of my purpose — in standard translations Kant and 
Hegel talk about ‘sensibility’ but this suddenly becomes ‘sensuousness’ in Feuerbach and 
Marx. By rendering these consistent again I do not presume that there is no difference in 
the way that the word is used, but I want to guard against acts of translation that may 
prejudge the issue, and obscure important continuities. More controversially, perhaps, I 
have also retained and in some places re-imposed the old practice of capitalising key 
philosophical nouns, like ‘Reason’ and ‘Idea’ and ‘Spirit’. It is true that this can have the 
undesirable effect of bestowing upon German philosophical prose a tone of metaphysical 
grandiosity that inhibits an appreciation of its relevance and applicability. But it does 
have the advantage of drawing our attention to the language within which philosophical 
inquiry is conducted, which for my purpose is important.
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1Epistemology and the state
‘Every society made up of a plurality of individuals is a network coming into effect 
through their actions ... Their activities must interrelate in order to fit into a society, and 
must contain at least a minimum of uniformity if the society is to function as a whole. 
This coherence can be conscious or otherwise but exist it must — otherwise society would 
cease to be viable and the individuals would come to grief as a result of their multiple 
dependencies upon one another. Expressed in very general terms this is a precondition 
for the survival of every kind of society; it formulates what I term “social synthesis”.’
— Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: 
A  Critique of Epistemology (1978)1
‘[W]hat reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring about ... is the 
systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. This unity 
of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of 
cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition o f the parts and contains the 
conditions for determining a priori the place of each part and its relation to the 
others. Accordingly, the idea postulates complete unity of the understanding’s 
cognition, through which this cognition comes to be not merely a contingent 
aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance with necessary laws.’
— Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781)2
1 Sohn-Rethel 1978, p. 5.
2 Kant 1781, pp. 591-2, A645/B674.
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1. Natural law and the sceptical challenge
Politics and knowledge have long been closely interrelated in the Western philosophical 
tradition, ever since Socrates identified the latter with the ‘virtue’ that, in an Athenian 
context, had a primarily civic orientation. But it is in the modem era that this relationship 
has been definitively problematised. It is a problem that first emerges clearly in the 
opposition between rationalism and voluntarism within modem natural law.
For the classical tradition running from Plato, through Stoicism, to the Christian 
natural law of the high middle ages, the problem of political philosophy was conceived as 
the problem of discovering and operationalising an ideal pattern of social interaction in 
which human beings’ interdependent ends, desires, purposes or needs could fit together 
in a single harmonious system. That this ideal pattern was usually given some sort of 
transcendent metaphysical, cosmological or theological status should not distract us from 
the fact that in none of these theories was it fully detached from what were considered to 
be the ‘true’ ends, desires, purposes or needs of the individual human beings concerned, 
but was expected to converge with them. Any conflicts with the empirically immediate or 
explicidy avowed ends, desires, purposes and needs of individuals was always thought to 
arise from a misrecognition, from those individuals in some way not perceiving or 
thinking through the ties of interdependence that bound them to others.
In the Scholastic fusion of Aristotelianism and Catholicism, law is the rational 
expression of the natural inclination each created substance has to its own good, 
inclinations which naturally harmonise into a coherent order in which realises the 
common good of all. ‘The individual is part of a perfect whole that is the community. 
Therefore law must concern itself in particular with the happiness of the community’.3 
God’s governance of the universe takes the form of an eternal law that is ‘imprinted’ on 
all things ‘through their respective inclinations to their proper actions and ends’.4 Human 
reason ‘naturally apprehends’ its precepts ‘as human goods’.5 These include self-
3 Aquinas 1988, p. 44.
4 Aquinas 1988, p. 46.
5 Aquinas 1988, p. 49. ‘[A]ll the things to which man has a natural inclination are 
naturally apprehended by the reason as good and therefore as objects to be pursued, and 
their opposites as evils to be avoided. Therefore the order of the natural law follows the 
order of our natural inclinations.’
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preservation (an inclination shared by all substances), reproduction and rearing of 
offspring (shared by all animals), and, for humanity alone, an inclination to ‘know the 
truth about God and to live in society’. From this last are derived the whole system of 
laws to be followed in pursuit of our ends of knowledge and sociability.6 These must be 
enshrined in ‘human law’, positive law, ‘adopted to bring about peace and virtue among 
men’.7 Like all law, human law ‘has as its first and foremost purpose the ordering of the 
common good’.8 This includes the distribution of private property, which is to be 
understood as the power to ‘make use of external things’ not ‘as his alone but for the 
community’.9 Thus law enshrines and enforces a teleologically structured normative 
understanding of the world, a rational order which defines what different people and 
different things are ‘for’ within a purposive system that unifies their natural goods. That 
the human mind can get in touch with this intrinsic harmony and discover the proper 
balance among the different ‘goods’ of the worlds various beings is presupposed. In 
Howard Caygill’s words, ‘neither the knowing and acting subject nor its judgements are 
of particular interest... speculative and practical philosophy rests on the notion of an 
objective proportion’.10
Serious problems with these schemas begin to emerge with the seventeenth 
century challenge to Aristotelian natural science and the eruption of religiously articulated 
social and political strife. Hobbes is of course customarily taken as the philosophical 
figure symbolising this moment where the philosophical pendulum switches back 
towards an alternative conception of the political, a tradition with precedents set down 
by Augustine and perhaps reaching back to the Epicureans or the Sophists, which takes 
the problem of social unity to be less a question of knowledge and truth, and more an 
issue of will and consent.11 But without denying the fundamental importance of this 
rupture I want to stress its connection to prior models of political theorising, and focus 
on the ways in which it can be seen as stemming from an epistemological questioning of
6 Aquinas 1988, p. 50.
7 Aquinas 1988, pp. 52-3.
8 Aquinas 1988, p. 45.
9 Aquinas 1988, p. 72.
10 Caygill 1989, p. 11.
11 See Riley 1982.
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their objects and presumptions.12 Following recent historical commentary, it is possible 
to read Hobbes’s contract theory as concerned primarily with consequences of sceptical 
and nominalist challenges to the possibility of definitively identifying the ‘common good’ 
of a given multiplicity of individuals, discerning the pattern of interaction that would best 
harmonise their natures and interests. Though Hobbes is today often taken up in terms 
of oppositions between the selfish and the altruistic, the private and the social, his 
argument is formulated as a problem of the application of a ‘moral’ language that all of us 
share. In Richard Tuck’s words, ‘[i]t was conflict over what to praise, or morally to 
approve, which Hobbes thus isolated as the cause of discord, rather than simple conflicts 
over wants.’13 And Quentin Skinner has shown in some detail that what is central in 
provoking Hobbes’s attack is the indeterminacy of Aristotelian virtue terms, whereby the 
right course of action is determined by ‘a mediocrity of the passions’ for which no rule 
can be given.14
Hobbes’s solution to the problem parallels Descartes’s efforts to build a post- 
Aristotelian model for the natural sciences immune to the corrosions o f radical doubt 
(and springs from an original scepticism with similar sources).15 While appearances might 
confuse and deceive, the basic mechanical laws of an external world of ‘matter in motion’ 
can be deduced with all the precision and certainty of geometry. Similarly, in politics, all 
can recognise political and social order as a necessary good, and therefore also the means
12 Thus Patrick Riley portrays the ‘ancient conception of politics’ as ‘dependent on the 
morality of the common good quite foreign to any insistence on the individual will as the 
creator of society and as the basis of obligation’ which itself ‘turned on a view of political 
life as the highest, most all-embracing end of man, and was, moreover, considered both 
natural and prior to, ontologically if not chronologically, the independent existence of 
self-sufficient men’. Riley 1982, p. 3 .1 think that descriptions like this can put too much 
distance between us and the ‘ancients’, or more to the point, obscure the real nature of 
the ‘break’ — not so much an abandonment of the presumption of interdependency but 
an epistemological problematisation of its concrete content.
13 Tuck 1989, pp. 55-6. See also Hochstrasser 2000, p. 4: the issue for Hobbes was that 
there ‘were no objective criteria available by which one man’s judgement of the law of 
nature could preferred to another’s.
14 Skinner 1996. See, for example, Hobbes 1651, pp. 109-10: ‘what one man calleth 
Wisdome, what another calleth feare\ and one cruelty, what another justice, one prodigality, 
what another magaminity; and one gravity, what another stupidty, &c. And therefore such 
names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination’.
15 Tuck 1989, p. 15, p. 53.
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of sustaining it.16 Disagreement arises about what these means are in given concrete 
situations, because c[o]ur passions differ, as do our ratiocinations over the best means of 
satisfying them.17 Accordingly a system of formal or abstract natural law precepts can be 
specified with geometric certainty, culminating in the necessity of their specification 
through application to a given multitude of individuals by a legally constructed sovereign 
who represents them in their unity. Political society is thus conceived as ‘an Artificiall 
Man ... in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the 
whole body ... "Equity and hams, an artificiall Reason and WilF\ an artifice akin to the 
construction of automata (‘Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth 
a watch5), because its movements and unity are not intrinsic to its matter but are imposed 
from without by an external purpose.18 Among its chief tasks is the apportionment of 
what men may do and use — ‘prescribing the Rules, whereby every man may know, what 
Goods he may enjoy and what Actions he may doe5, which men call ‘Propriety5.19 This 
distributive justice, Hobbes stresses, is not to be seen as ‘the distribution of equal benefit, 
to men of equal Merit5 — for merit is known and rewarded by God only. A just 
distribution is, by definition, that which the state determines.20
Hobbes5s rejection of Thomistic natural law is based on his nominalist rejection 
of the idea of an objective form or proportion underlying any act of purposive 
unification — a system of laws, like a Universal Name or a work of art like a watch, is an 
artificial unification of diverse matter. For Aquinas, virtue had been a habitus, an ordered 
disposition of the soul ‘which realizes an objective proportion through action5. With 
Hobbes and modem natural rights theory this is ‘translated into the exercise of 
judgement5.21 Hobbesian contract theory does not banish all teleological forms from its
16 ‘ .. .all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of 
Peace ... are good; that is to say, Morall Vertuei. Hobbes 1651, p. 216.
17 Hobbes 161.
18 Hobbes 1651, p. 81. Hobbes of course saw no important difference here from the 
animals we find in nature — ‘seeing life is but a motion of Limbs, the beginning whereof 
is in some principall part within5 — automata of the original Creator.
19 Hobbes 1851, p. 234.
20 ‘Distributive Justice [is] the Justice of an Arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining 
what is Just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him Arbitrator,) if he performe 
his Trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed Just 
Distribution.. .5 Hobbes 1651, p. 208.
21 Caygill 1989, pp. 17-19.
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constructions, but fixes them by reference to the judgement and purposes of the 
sovereign. All things and all people have ends in the Hobbesian society — only they are 
not given by their natures, but assigned by the sovereign as means to the ends of the state 
itself. The intuition of an immanent order in nature and society has been replaced by the 
necessity of constructing and imposing one from without.
Thus Hobbes represents the first clear unfolding of the political correlates of 
what Charles Taylor has called the ‘epistemological paradigm’ that he takes to be 
definitive of the modem era. Just as a ‘representation model’ of knowledge replaces an 
original Aristotelian account ‘better ... described as participational: being informed by 
the eidos, the mind participates in the being of the known object, rather than simply 
depicting it’,22 a politics of artificial representation replaces one of differentiated 
participation. And comparable to the search for ‘certainty’ based on ‘reflexive clarity’ and 
‘the strong draw towards distinguishing and mapping the formal operations of our 
thinking’23 is the concern for security and political stability founded on sovereignty, clear 
lines of command, and strict procedural rules.
2. Enlightened absolutism and the Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy
In German-speaking Europe the challenge of modem science prompted an extraordinary 
attempt at an Enlightenment-age modernisation of natural law theory which dominated 
intellectual life through the eighteenth century and which in important ways remains the 
intellectual backdrop for the developments that will concern us. This baroque edifice, 
originating in Protestant universities struggling to reconcile their Scholastic inheritance 
with Lutheran notions of faith and grace, came to be known as ‘the Leibniz-Wolffian 
philosophy’, after the great rationalist metaphysician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and his 
influential successor Christian Wolff. It should be noted that this began life as a 
derogatory appellation, coined after Leibniz’s death; and though it soon became the 
accepted wisdom to judge that Wolff had not done justice to Leibniz,24 many scholars
22 Taylor 1987, p. 3.
23 Taylor 1987, pp. 5-6.
24 See for example Hegel 1823-4c, pp. 348-9; and Heine 2000, pp. 184-5.
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would now argue that his reputation as a mere systematiser of Leibnizian ideas did little 
justice to Wolff in any case. Doing justice to either is, however, not my primary concern 
here, but only to sketch some of the features of this theoretical construction that would 
prove important to subsequent philosophical events. As Thomas Saine rightly notes, 
although ‘intellectual historians [have] tended to focus on the emergence o f the critical 
Kant as a radical new beginning ... this way of looking at things has gready obscured our 
understanding of the development of German intellectual life in the eighteenth 
century’.25 German Idealist philosophy is very largely concerned with rearticulating (albeit 
in a radically transformative way) the key elements of Leibniz’s metaphysical 
propositions; while Christian Wolff is universally credited, even if for nothing else, as the 
‘primary creator of a philosophical language that survived in large part into the twentieth 
century’.26
Both Leibniz and Wolff ‘sought a metaphysical foundation for justice in a 
reconciliation of philosophical modernism and scholastic metaphysics’,27 constructing a 
system in which ‘metaphysics, theology and ethics were intimately linked and even 
interdependent.’28 As Susan Neiman has emphasised, the Leibnizian restoration of 
Scholastic metaphysics was driven by an insistence on the world’s comprehensive 
intelligibility and a deep aversion to the arbitrariness that would result from its denial, in 
both theoretical and practical domains. What is offensive to Leibniz is the inadequacy of 
both Cartesian mechanics and Hobbesian voluntarism to explain the actual shape of the 
natural or social world, their insufficiency to determine which among a plethora of logical 
possibilities is in fact the universe which exists.29 His chief complaint against the
25 Saine 1997, p. 122. As Adorno entertainingly puts it, in Kant’s philosophy rationalism 
is ‘the Leibnizian or Cartesian roast, while Hume and English scepticism provide the 
dialectical salt. That is to say, this scepticism is the method through which the critical 
scrutiny is undertaken, but the empirical strand does not play so very great a role in the 
plan of the entire system’. Adorno 2001, p. 30. Adorno’s estimation of course inverts the 
way in which Kant has historically been taken up by English philosophy, and provides a 
useful corrective to such habits of interpretation.
26 Saine 1997, p. 135. See Blackall 1959, pp. 19-48 for Wolffs role in setting up the 
crucial distinctions between terms such as Begrijf (Concept); Vorstellung (Representation); 
Verstand (Understanding); Vemunft (Reason); Grund (Ground); Ursache (Cause); Kraft 
(Force); Vermogen (Faculty).
27 Caygill 1989, p. 135.
28 Hochstrasser 2000, p. 161.
29 Neiman 1994, pp. 12-34.
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Cartesians was that a purely quantitative, mechanical account of matter as extension 
could not explain the observable phenomena of the world we experience, and could not 
satisfy our demand for an explanation of why empirically observed laws were in fact as 
they were:
When one pushes forward his inquiry after reasons, it is found that the laws of 
motion cannot be explained through purely geometric principles or by 
imagination alone. That is why some very able philosophers of our day have held 
that the laws of motion are purely arbitrary.30
As Neiman puts it, ‘explanations containing only statements about efficient causes are 
arbitrary because they operate only in what Leibniz calls “the realm of power”, where 
causal connections are a matter of simply, brute force.’31 This critique is closely paralleled 
in Leibniz’s analysis of voluntarist natural law theory (Pufendorf appeared sometimes as a 
proxy for Hobbes), which was that its minimalist principles of social unity left the 
concrete shape of that unification underdetermined, and so subject to the whim of the 
legislator. ‘Once the basic structures initiated by human sociability had been superseded, 
duties would only exist if there were a superior to extract obligation. In civil society there 
would therefore be no protection against arbitrary and tyrannical behaviour.’32 Leibniz’s 
insistence was a statement of mechanical or efficient causes does not fulfil the principle 
of sufficient reason — intelligibility was teleological intelligibility — in the natural and the 
social worlds, to understand anything, we must know its final cause, we must truly know 
what it is for. Cartesian mechanics under-explains the natural world, and Hobbes’ political 
geometry underdetermines the social. The remainder (why these empirical laws, why those 
civil laws) is inexplicable, arbitrary, a matter of God’s or the sovereign’s unaccountable 
will.
Leibnizian metaphysics filled this empty space with a new account of the universe 
as a single coherent system ordered according to a discemable rational purpose. The 
geometric space and time in which Cartesian mechanics are constructed is itself reduced 
to a mental form, the subjective medium through which we perceive the substances
30 Quoted in Neiman 1994, pp. 20-21.
31 Neiman 1994, p. 21.
32 Hochstrasser 2000, p. 79. See Leibniz 1988, p. 70.
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around us. In themselves, the substances which ground these appearances are not to be 
understood mechanically, as items of inert matter acting externally upon one another, but 
as self-determining entities (or ‘monads’) animated by a God-given ‘force’ to develop 
towards their own ‘perfection’. All was held together by a divinely ordained ‘harmony’, 
because of the many worlds of substances that could exist in accordance with the laws of 
logical consistency, we could assume that God had chosen to create precisely those 
whose perfections could best be harmonised. Every true statement about any substance 
was necessarily contained in the complete ‘concept’ of that substance (known as the 
‘subject-in-predicate’ theory of truth), and expands to take in every detail of its 
relationship to every other substance in the universe. Only God’s reason is powerful 
enough to embrace the reach of the universe in this way, but our inquiries can aspire to 
it, and in doing so attain some perception of the rational order within which every 
substance has its place.33 With these moves Leibniz erected a three-tiered metaphysic that 
would be seminal in framing subsequent philosophical discussions: a quantitative, 
geometric time and space that was the primary mode of the world’s appearance to us; an 
underlying multiplicity of self-determining substances whose ‘concepts’ were in principle 
deducible by our rational faculties; and God, whose wisdom had chosen to create these 
particular substances so as to maximise their harmonious co-existence with one another.
This ingenious reinstating of rational harmony in the universe was carried over 
seamlessly into ethical and political philosophy. As Patrick Riley puts it, ‘Leibniz’ moral 
and political perfectionism ... flows from (or at least is congruent with) his metaphysical 
and theological perfectionism: there is no gap between the theoretical and the practical’.34 
The “best of possible worlds’ thesis licenses a Thomistic conclusion that we can consider 
the universe to be like a well-managed organization, with everyone given a task whose 
execution contributes to the greatest good’.35 Each of us has a natural inclination towards 
our own perfection, and that it to play our role in developing the common good of the 
harmonious perfection of all. God is the manager of this organisation, this ‘most perfect 
republic’ composed of all rational beings, his purpose being to diffuse in it the greatest
33 Thus it has been suggested that Leibniz uses a metaphysically justified correspondence 
theory of truth to validate an epistemologically described coherence theory of truth. 
Rescher 1979, pp. 130-4.
34 Riley 1996, p. 8.
35 Riley 1996, p. 240.
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possible happiness.36 Moreover, contra Hobbes, this harmonious order is in principle 
accessible to human reason, albeit imperfecdy: ‘our own minds give us more direct access 
to God’s plans for us than the indirect reasoning of the empiricists allows. As we 
improve our self-understanding — as we perfect ourselves — we will see ever more clearly 
that we are part of a harmonious whole and can live on harmonious terms with ourselves 
and others.’37 Insofar as rational souls are ‘images of the divinity itself, or of the author 
of nature, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and imitating something of it 
through their schematic representations of it’, our relationship to God is thus as co- 
reasoners and collaborators, not, crucially, merely the passive material of his divine 
artifice:
That is what makes minds capable of entering into a kind of society with God, 
and allows him to be, in relation to them, not only what an inventor is to his 
machine (as God is in relation to the other creatures) but also what a prince is to 
his subjects, and even what a father is to his children ... 38
And this too is the relationship that should hold between individuals. Indeed, in Wolffian 
Ethics c[w]e are obligated to see others as if they were one person with us’, in politics 
others ‘are not to be viewed otherwise than as one person, having accordingly a common 
interest’.39 As Schneewind says, ‘[t]he problematic of conflict is as absent... The real 
perfection of any one person is tied to that of all others’.40 Leibniz’s ‘Rational 
Jurisprudence’ was defined as ‘that science which shows how individuals should give way 
to the good of all if they wish happiness to revert to themselves, increased as by a
36 Leibniz 1991, p. 39: ‘the happy and flourishing state of his empire, which consists in 
the greatest possible happiness of its inhabitants, becomes the highest of his laws ... the 
first intent of the moral world or the City of God, which is the noblest part of the 
universe, must be to diffuse in it the greatest happiness.’
37 Riley 1996, pp. 169-70.
38 Leibniz 1991, pp. 80-81.
39 Schneewind 1998, p. 441.
40 Schneewind 1998, p. 439.
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rebound’. 41 In Christian W olff s own words: ‘whoever seeks to make himself as perfect 
as possible seeks also what others seek and desires nothing at their expense’.42
The Leibnizian notion of a political community is strictly continuous with this 
ethical ideal: a ‘union of different men for a common purpose’ which is ‘the general and 
supreme happiness’.43 A political union is distinguished from other social relationships by 
two defining characteristics: the fact that it is unlimited, concerning ‘the whole life and the 
common good’, and unequal\ in that ‘one rules another’.44 The first stipulation crucially 
distinguishes Leibnizian politics from any more limited conception of the state’s role as 
being restricted to questions of security or order, and that might have been derived from 
the traditional natural law distinction between ‘perfect’ and ‘imperfect’ duties. Leibniz 
argued that such a distinction could not be sustained — no clear line can be drawn 
between forbearing harm to others and actively seeking their good, justice was a 
‘continuum’.45 The second stipulation is a consequence of humanity’s imperfections — an 
‘unlimited and equal’ society would be ideal, but unfeasible.46 So a sovereign must judge 
what will best promote the happiness or welfare of all with the aid of a delegated 
administration of trained officials whose knowledge of society and its multiple 
relationships of interdependency are the basis for a true insight into the harmony of 
interests in which the common good consists. As Hochstrasser says, ‘the doctrine of self- 
perfection of the individual within the state or community is used to breath new life into 
the Aristotelian concept of the potential that lies within the polis for development to 
perfection; but with the difference here that the perfection may be effected through the 
intervention and direction of state officials and bureaucrats enforcing a concept of 
duty’.47
41 Quoted in Caygill 1989, p. 110.
42 Quoted in Schneewind 1998, p. 439.
43 Leibniz 1988, p. 77.
44 Leibniz 1988, p. 79.
45 Riley 1996, pp. 183-9; Schneewind 1998, pp. 248-9; Caygill 1989, pp. 125-6. Leibniz 
can be seen pursuing this argument in Leibniz 1988, pp. 53-57.
46 Similar reasons lie behind the institution of private property -  communism would be 
preferable if feasible. But it is still the case that private property is never absolute -  
distributive justice assigns to each that which it is suitable to assign him for the purposes 
of the common good. Riley 1996, p. 202.
47 Hochstrasser 2000, p. 169.
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The formation of an adequate picture of the social whole is the basis of ‘rational 
jurisprudence’, which holds out the promise of a ‘gapless legal system which would 
foresee all possible cases and remove any possibility of sovereign or judicial arbitrariness’, 
based on a ‘dutch land-chart’ of all possible cases.48 But any such map of society’s system 
of interdependencies remains the possession of the state and its officials, not the people 
at large. As Howard Caygill writes, Leibniz-Wolffian statecraft
transfers the distinction of clear and obscure perception from epistemology to 
political philosophy, mapping the distinction onto state and society. The citizens 
or matter of the state are formed for their common welfare according to the 
rational judgement of the monarch and his bureaucrats.49
According to Wolff, it is the ‘higher faculty’ that can achieve a lucid perception of any 
perfection, while it is the obscure perceptions of the lower faculty that hinder the 
systematic exposition of being from logic. Thus ‘the suppression of the lower faculty by 
the higher in the interest of perfection, has its precise analogue in the suppression of civil 
society by the rational state in the interest of the gemeine Beste\50
Thus an ambitious rationalist epistemology underwrites the ‘well-ordered police 
state’ of eighteenth century absolutism.51 The purpose of government was conceived as 
the ‘legal ordering of social relations’ in rational pursuit of the security and welfare of its 
subjects. Poli^ ei, in Howard Caygill’s account, was the ‘structural principle of the 
absolutist order ... an active interventionist form of social regulation with a new ordering 
principle for social relations based on bureaucratic administration, militarization of social 
relations, and the unity of politics and economics’.52 This non-traditional legitimating 
principle replaced the ‘good old law’ with the ‘common welfare’, and on that basis 
effected a massive centralisation of state power at the expensive of aristocratic and
48 Caygill 1989, p. 110.
49 Caygill 1989, p. 106.
50 Caygill 1989, p. 136.
51 Raeff 1983.
52 Caygill 1989, p. 120.
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municipal privileges.53 Wolffs philosophy has been widely recognised as a key source for 
the allied development of the German administrative science of cameralism.54 Through 
his students his influence pervaded the public institutions of Frederician Prussia even 
while his academic and public reputation was on the wane.55 In Mack Walker’s account, 
‘[b]aroque metaphysics and cameralist administration instersected, visibly and concretely, 
at the German universities’:
Leibniz’ assumption [was] that there was implicit harmony and system among all 
the phenomena of the world, and that all things would fit together despite 
superficial diversity if they were fully and truly understood and were not distorted 
by error and accident. The goal of learning was to attain the grasp and the 
overview from which the harmony among all the parts could be perceived, and 
from which the proper role and nature of each part could be understood.
Thus were launched encyclopaedic studies of law and administration which aimed at 
perfect totalisations of the social world. This linked directly into the administrative 
ambitions of the state, ‘the one secular institution that encompassed the social 
encyclopaedia of diverse parts’.56 Cameralist administration
accepted the existence of all the discrete parts of German civil society, each with 
a set of detailed qualities and rules peculiarly its own, and worked from the 
assumption that if all of them could be comprehended at once an essential 
harmony among them would emerge above their apparent diversity ... the 
medium of harmony among the discrete parts was the state’s fiscal 
administration, analogously a social abstraction composed of men above and 
outside the discrete parts of society.57
53 ‘In eighteenth century Germany rationalism and the jAufklarung were intimately 
connected to the consolidation of a centralized state and the process o f modernization 
and liberalisation “from above” through enlightened absolutism, and thus opposed to the 
interests and values of the traditional estates.’ Toews 1980, p. 22.
54 Hochstrasser 2000, p. 169.
55 Caygill 1989, p. 100.
56 Walker 1971, pp. 146-7.
57 Walker 1971, p. 145.
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As Dorinda Outram notes, this was a crucial political phenomenon of the age of 
enlightenment, because its emphasis on the state as rational and its purposes as socially 
determined moved political discourse away from older religious and personalist 
legitimations of monarchical power.58 Indeed, not only did the rationalism of enlightened 
absolutism undercut the traditional and charismatic sources of state authority upon 
which it rested — the very forces of social, cultural and economic modernisation that it 
sought to guide and harness had a logic of their own that would ultimately outreach its 
powers of bureaucratic recuperation. As Marc Raeff points out,
the well-ordered police state tried to have it [both ways]: to preserve the interests 
of the group, the cohesion of society and the hierarchical structure of the world 
and at the same time encourage the active, enterprising, unfettered, and creative 
individual citizen or subject to promote material wealth and progress as well. 
Perhaps it might have been possible to achieve both goals had the power of the 
ruler and of the elites remained sanctified by transcendent authority. But this was 
precisely the Achilles’ heel of the system, the point at which the system broke 
down and ended in failure on its own terms, for it failed to preserve the social, 
cultural and political status quo of the ancien regime. For us, sub specie historiae, it 
was not a failure, for it released the energies and the dynamic potential of those 
individuals who shaped the world we call modem today.. .59
58 Outram 1995, pp. 103-4: liowever much it emphasised the importance of the strong 
state, it also included social regulation and social welfare among the characteristic and 
legitimate aims of government, not just the dynastic and personal aims with which rulers 
often approached war and territorial acquisition ... while not anti-religious, it certainly 
placed great weight on a view of government, and hence monarchy itself, as a machine 
for producing action and decisions, rather than a location for sacred unifying symbolism’. 
Indeed, Outram argues, ‘[a]t a conceptual level, the premises of rationality and uniformity 
on which many Enlightenment and Cameralist policies were based, was at odds with the 
intrinsically personal nature of monarchical involvement’.
59 Raeff 1983, p. 179.
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3. Kant’s Copemican revolution
If the Wolffian police state represented the ultimate modem rationalisation of the natural 
law tradition, Kant’s ‘transcendence of the whole debate’ between rationalism and 
voluntarism60 effected a revolution that was as much political as it was epistemological.
As is well known, it was the scepticism of Hume which Kant claimed awoke him from 
the ‘dogmatic slumber’ of decades toiling in the interstices of the Leibniz-Wolffian 
system. His response was a radical refoundation of the claims of human reason. Kant 
accepted the sceptical charge that we could not possibly know whether or not there was a 
harmonious order to the universe, and if so what it was. But he went on to contend that 
our very natures as beings of reason impelled us to look for such an order in the universe, 
and, through our actions, to strive to create it. Leibnizian metaphysics was a dogmatism 
that ‘asserted more than it knew’ — presuming that the intimations of order and harmony 
that flickered through our experience evidenced a dim communion with the mind of the 
Creator. ‘[W]e can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them’.61 
Kant argued that the order of our experience was not a given that we passively reflect, 
but a demand of our own, a project we drive forward and for which we are wholly 
responsible.62
The two sources of human knowledge
Kant’s primary point of attack on the Leibniz-Wolffian edifice was its assertion of an 
essential continuity in the sources of human knowledge.63 For Leibniz, our knowledge of 
the substances of the world consisted in an acquaintance with their concept, within 
which all truths about that substance were analytically contained. Only God’s mind could 
immediately encompass the infinite chain of reasons that determined why each individual 
thing was as it was; but we walked in His footsteps as we traced and formulated the
60 Hochstrasser 2000, p. 5.
61 Kant 1781, p. lll,B xviii.
62 On this transition see Neiman 1994, pp. 10—34.
63 Guyer 2000b, pp. 40-46.
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patterns of order and regularity we found in our empirical experience.64 In this way,
Kant charged, the ‘famous Leibniz’ had ‘intellectualized the appearances’. 65 Kant rejected 
that the idea that ‘our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of 
things’, so that the difference between a clearly defined concept and a sensible intuition 
was only a ‘difference between an indistinct and a distinct representation’. Rather ‘the 
distinction between sensibility and the intellectual’ was a ‘transcendental’ distinction 
which ‘does not concern the merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its 
origin and content’.66
This opposition between the ‘two stems of human cognition’ became the 
opening move in the construction of Kant’s new critical philosophy.67 All human 
knowledge was now said to arise from a primal confrontation between a flux of sensory 
input and the a priori structures of knowing subjectivity — ‘sensibility’ conceived as ‘the 
receptivity of impressions’, and the ‘Understanding’ conceived as ‘the spontaneity of 
cognition’.68 The sense impressions given by our faculty of intuition are in themselves 
disorganised, atomistic and unrelated to each other. As Robert Stem puts it, Kant accepts 
‘the empiricist reduction of the object to a bundle of intuitions’.69 But he went on to 
argue that they are unified and organised under concepts by means of self-conscious or 
<2i$ipQ.iQe.iptive> judgements according to the a priori rules of the Understanding [Verstand\.
In Kant’s own words:
Combination does not He in the objects ... and cannot as it were be borrowed 
from them through perception and by that means first taken up into the 
Understanding, but is rather only an operation of the Understanding, which is 
itself nothing other than the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the 
manifold of given representations under unity of apperception.. .70
64 Young 1992, pp. 116-17.
65 Kant 1781, p. 372, A l l  0-1/ B326-7.
66 Kant 1781, p. 169, A44 /  B61.
67 Kant 1781, pp. 151-2, A15 /  B29.
68 Kant 1781, pp. 193-4, A51 /  B75.
69 Stern 1990, p. 14.
70 Kant 1781, p. 248,B134-5.
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This fundamental act of unifying a manifold under rules is at the heart of Kant’s 
epistemology, and is approached via several conceptions so tightly interrelated as to 
render them nearly synonymous: the synthetic judgement, the transcendental unity of 
apperception, self-consciousness [.Selbstbewufitein] or the T think’, the spontaneity of the 
Understanding, even just the unity of a Concept [Begriff\ as such. Each entails or contains 
every other, ‘analytically’, as Kant would say. Experience is constituted by a judgement 
(or series of judgements) that a mental state ‘counts’ as an experience that I  am having of 
an object, conceived as such according to the rules or ‘categories’ of the Understanding.
There are some key points worth emphasising about this original moment in 
cognition — the self-consciousness entailed by the judging activity that turns sense 
impressions into experiences, the knowing subject’s implicit claim that there is an ‘I’, 
unified and constant, that is having these experiences of that object. First, this 
‘apperception’ is ‘pure’, distinguished from what Kant calls ‘empirical self-consciousness’, 
where I direct my attention to my self as an object within experience (as in introspection, 
for example).71 Indeed, it is a judging activity that may not necessarily be explicitly 
articulated as such. But it is necessarily implicit in any experience as something that could 
be articulated — an ‘I think’ which ‘must be able to accompany all my representations’ (my 
emphasis).72 Second, the reason why, even if thus articulated, this self-consciousness 
could never itself be an object of experience is that it is itself the transcendental condition 
of all such objects of experience. To make it an object for me would presuppose a 
further self-conscious judging, and so on to infinite regress — as if I were trying to 
physically stand back from myself in order to take a look at myself looking at the world. 
In Sebastian Gardner’s words, transcendental self-consciousness is thus ‘the 
encompassing ground of the world of objects’, and so not included in that world of 
objects.73 And thirdly, for the same reasons, this moment is conceived not as an object of 
any kind but as act. It is outside the chain of empirical causes that it itself ascribes to 
objects of experience, and so can in no sense be seen as merely a reflection or result of 
the incoming sense impressions. It is for this reason that, in contrast to the essentially
71 Kant 1781, pp. 246-7, B132-33.
72 Kant 1781, p. 246,B132.
73 Gardner 1998, p. 160.
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passive receptivity of intuition, Kant describes the activity of the Understanding as 
spontaneous, ‘unconditioned’ — radically self-determining and without prior foundation.74
This spontaneous act of implicitly self-conscious judging is then the ‘first pure 
cognition of the Understanding ... on which the whole of the rest of its use is 
grounded’;75 ‘the highest point to which one must affix all use of the Understanding’, 
indeed, Kant says at one point, ‘this faculty is the Understanding itself 76 And as Allison 
puts it, the self-identity of the ‘I think’ can thus be seen as ‘the form or prototype of the 
analytic unity that pertains to all general concepts. In fact, it simply is this analytic unity 
considered in abstraction from all content.’77 In Kant’s words, the ‘I think’ is ‘the vehicle 
of all concepts’.78 Primary among these are the ‘categories’, the first pure concepts of the 
Understanding which Kant argues in the ‘metaphysical deduction’ have to be involved in 
any self-conscious unification of a sensory manifold. The fundamental structure of the 
objective world is thus inherent in the nature of the subject-object relationship that 
constitutes it. These categories are, in Hoffe’s words, ‘the necessary building blocks of all 
objectivity’, meaning that, in Gardiner’s, objectivity must ‘assume a particular form, 
namely that of a world of causally interacting substances’.79 The sceptic was right to 
protest that these categories do not arise from sense impressions, nor can they be 
justified by simple appeal to them. Rather they are deduced as universal and necessary 
rules for the understanding, the rules by which a manifold must be unified to sustain the 
transcendental unity of apperception, to make a unified, potentially self-conscious subject 
of experience possible. Hence, famously, Kant furnished a rational deduction of the 
principles underpinning the mechanistic world of modem science.
But this ingenious new justification of the rights of the Understanding was 
limited in its reach. Because rooted in an analysis of what was needed for a unification of
74 ‘. . .the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through 
the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible 
intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one
must call the latter understanding, in distinction from sensibility, all combination is an
action of the understanding’. Kant 1781, p. 245, B130.
75 Kant 1781, p. 249, B137. On this point see Pippin 1989, pp. 20-22.
76 Kant 1781, p. 411, A341 /  B399.
77 Allison 1983, p. 144.
78 Kant 1781, p. 411, A341 /  B399.
79 Hoffe 1994, p. 79; Gardiner 1998, p. 145.
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a manifold of sense impressions under a single self-consciousness, it told us only how 
experience had to be for a finite subject faced with such a manifold. Its results were thus 
‘objective’, because they applied universally and necessarily to any possible object of 
experience. But this deduction told us nothing about how things were in themselves, 
which exist in an unknowable ‘noumenal’ realm that can only be posited as an empty 
space behind the phenomenal realm of appearances. The Understanding ‘wam[s] 
sensibility not to presume to reach for things in themselves but solely for appearances’ by 
thinking of ‘an object in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of 
appearance (thus not in itself appearance)’. This ‘noumenon’ necessarily ‘remains empty 
for us, and serves for nothing but to designate the boundaries of our sensible cognition 
and leave open a space that we can fill up neither through possible experience nor 
through the pure Understanding’.80
This dualism was reinforced by Kant’s critique of what he called the pure ‘Ideas’ 
of Reason [Vemunjt\. In Kant’s system Reason was a distinct faculty with the function of 
unifying and systematising the knowledge produced by the Understanding.81 Reason 
relates empirical concepts (like ‘chair’ or ‘table’) to one another and ordering them into 
hierarchies of genus and species (‘furniture’, ‘chair’, ‘school chair’, ‘this chair’) or 
condition and conditioned (‘all school chairs have chewing gum stuck underneath, so will 
this one’) with the presumption that the world should make up such an ordered whole 
and thus be amenable to organisation in this way.
[W]hat reason quite uniquely prescribes and seeks to bring ab o u t... is the 
systematic in cognition, i.e., its interconnection based on one principle. This unity 
of reason always presupposes an idea, namely that of the form of a whole of 
cognition, which precedes the determinate cognition of the parts and contains the 
conditions for determining a priori the place of each part and its relation to the 
others. Accordingly, the idea postulates complete unity of the understanding’s 
cognition, through which this cognition comes to be not merely a contingent 
aggregate but a system interconnected in accordance with necessary laws.82
80 Kant 1981a, p. 381; A288-9 /  B344-5.
81 Kant 1781, p. 391, A305 /  B362.
82 Kant 1781, pp. 591-2, A645/B674.
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But Kant stressed that this presumption of overarching order was strictly subjective, 
regulating Reason’s inferential activity, not constitutive of objective experience in the way 
that the categories of the Understanding were.83 This was illustrated by the fact that 
Reason was ultimately directed towards84 and in this sense projected the Idea of a ‘totality 
of conditions’, and hence also the unconditioned as the ‘ground of synthesis for what is 
conditioned.85 Kant related this projection to the traditional topics of rationalist 
metaphysics: ‘the soul’ as the subject of all predicates, ‘the world’ in its complete entirety, 
and ‘God’ as the first cause or condition.86 Such Ideas, although inherent in the 
syllogising activity of Reason itself,87 and valid and useful as guiding ideals,88 plainly could 
not themselves ever be part of any experience.89 Indeed, we found that if we attempted 
to conceive them as if they could be, by applying to them the a priori Categories of the 
Understanding, we fell into ‘antinomies’, arriving at statements about them that were 
opposed or contradictory yet equally well-licensed. Kant’s solution to these antinomies in 
every case was a reassertion of the limits he had set on the reach of the Categories, limits 
which these antinomies in their way confirmed, to the realm of phenomena and not of 
things in themselves. Everything within our experience lias an empirically conditioned 
existence’ and no unconditioned necessity can be contained by it, but ‘this is not in any 
way to deny that the entire series could be grounded in some intelligible being (which is 
therefore free of every empirical condition, containing, rather, the ground of the 
possibility of all these appearances).’90 Thus an essential discontinuity between the 
operations of Reason and the operations of the Understanding necessitated and
83 ‘[S]uch a principle does not prescribe any law to objects, and does not contain the 
ground of the possibility of cognising and determining them as such in general, but 
rather is merely a subjective law of economy for the provision of our Understanding’. 
Kant 1781, p. 391, A306 /  B362.
84 The ‘supreme principle of pure reason’ is ‘that the series of conditions ... reaches to 
the unconditioned’. Kant 1781, p. 392, A308 /  B365.
85 Kant 1781, p. 400, A322 /  B379.
86 Kant 1781, p. 406, A334 /  B391.
87 Ideas are ‘not arbitrarily invented, but given as problems by the nature of reason itself. 
Kant 1781, p. 402, A327 /  B384.
88 ‘[I]n a fundamental and unnoticed way, [they] serve the Understanding as a canon for 
its extended and self-consistent use’. Kant 1781, p. 403, A329 /  B386.
89 The Platonic echo was thus conscious and apt — see Kant 1781, p. 395, A313 /  B370.
90 Kant 1781, pp. 547-8, A561-2 /  589-90.
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confirmed their difference of epistemological status. The former referred to 
unconditioned totalities that were essentially unknowable; the latter furnished objective 
knowledge, but only of the world as it appeared to us. The Leibnizian notion of a 
harmonious order of substances, knowable in their concepts, as the ground of all 
appearance is retained, but transfigured, as no longer objectively necessary and rationally 
intuitable but only an ideal of human reason whose reality is unknowable.
The structures of rational agency
Kant’s account of the universal faculties of the knowing subject is carried over into his 
practical philosophy, though with important differences as to their respective standing 
and interrelation.91 A division of labour between epistemologists and moral philosophers, 
and the tendency of the latter to concentrate almost all attention on the various 
formulations and operations of the Categorical Imperative, has often meant that little 
notice is taken of this wider ‘architechtonic’, as Kant liked to call it. But as Susan Neiman 
stresses, ‘theoretical and practical reason possess a unified structure and operate 
according to common principles’ —‘in theory and in practice, reason imposes systematic 
unity by seeking it’.92
Kant himself stresses that ‘the concept of freedom ... constitutes the keystone of 
the whole structure of a system of pure reason, even of speculative reason’.93 In Kant’s 
practical philosophy the self-conscious subject again finds itself confronting a 
disorganised manifold — not of intuitions, but of needs. It is often overlooked that Kant 
has a strong sense of the human being as a being of need, defined by a dependence upon 
external objects that arises from our essential finitude as strongly as does our cognitive 
dependence on externally received sense impressions.94 But just as our sense impressions
91 This is made the central theme of the account of Kant’s thought in Deleuze 1965.
92 Neiman 1994, p. 126; p. 116.
93 Kant 1788, p. 3, 5:4.
94 ‘[Satisfaction with one’s whole existence is not, as it were, an original possession and a 
beatitude, which would presuppose a consciousness of one’s independent self- 
sufficiency, but is instead a problem posed on him by his finite nature itself, because he is 
needy and because this need is directed to the matter of his faculty of desire, that is, 
something related to a subjective feeling of pleasure or displeasure underlying it by which
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do not of themselves constitute knowledge or experience, so our felt needs cannot on 
their own determine a course of action. ‘The rational “being of need” naturally desires 
the satisfaction of those needs and finds in his neediness a ground and guide of action. 
These needs, however, are inadequate as guides of rational action; for finite reason 
cannot adequately comprehend them’.95 This is the fundamental reason why Kant rejects 
all ‘eudaemonic’ moral theories built upon pleasure or well-being, and why his ethics are 
so easily misinterpreted (Schiller was famously the first to do so) as requiring that we act 
always against our own needs and happiness.96 This is not the point — rather, just as 
coherent experience requires that sense intuitions must be actively unified and organised 
under concepts, so directed action requires the unification and organisation of a manifold 
of needs into a conscious conceptual order of maxims (eg ‘when I feel thirsty I’ll have a 
drink’). ‘[E]very volition must also have an object and hence a matter’, says Kant, but this 
matter is not ‘the determining ground and condition of the maxim’.97 Rather I must 
choose to make this matter the object of my action — and this choice must be seen as a 
spontaneous act, in that it is not determined by the object or my need for it. In this way the 
agent confers value on the objects of its choices, rather than responding to value that it 
finds already in them. This is what Henry Allison calls Kant’s ‘incorporation thesis’: an 
act of spontaneity ‘which is the practical analogue of the spontaneity of the 
understanding’ is required for the rational agent ‘to take (or reject) inclinations or desires 
as sufficient reasons for action’.98
is determined what he needs in order to be satisfied with his condition’. Kant 1788, p. 23, 
5:26.
95 Meld Shell 1980, p. 74. Happiness, the secure satisfaction of our needs, is thus 
inescapably elusive — ‘less an end for reason than an insoluble problem’. As Kant says, ‘it 
is a misfortune that the concept of happiness is such an indeterminate concept that, 
although every human being wishes to attain this, he can still never say determinately and 
consistently with himself what he really wishes and wills’. Kant 1785, p. 28, 4:418.
96 Schiller joked that Kant’s theory seemed to mean we could not take pleasure in doing 
the right thing, and that authentically moral acts could only be performed ‘with aversion’. 
See Allison 1990, p. 110.
97 Kant 1788, p. 31, 5:34.
98 Allison 1990, p. 5. For an expansion of the theoretical-practical analogies, see also p.
40: ‘just as sensible intuitions are related to an object only by being subsumed under 
concepts, so too sensible inclinations are related to an object of the will only insofar as 
they are “incorporated into a maxim”, that is, subsumed under a rule of action’.
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Again, just as Kant deduces the pure categories of the Understanding as the 
necessary supports for the transcendental unity of apperception, the Categorical 
Imperative is deduced as intrinsic to the constitution of ourselves as unified, self- 
conscious agents — ‘freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply one 
another’.99 To sustain ourselves as rational agents we need to act on maxims that are 
consistent, lawful, and that means that we must act as we would have others act in relevandy 
similar situations. (A maxim says nothing about the particular identity o f the agent, only 
the situation of the agent — which might include the agent’s felt needs — and the action). 
Thus the law of non-contradiction grounds the demands of morality. ‘The 
determinations of practical reason can take place only ... conformably with the 
categories of the understanding ... in order to subject a priori the manifold of desires to 
the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law, or of a 
pure will’.100 To the idea of a will ‘affected by sensible desires’ we must add the idea of ‘a 
will pure and practical of itself; this, says Kant, is ‘roughly like the way in which concepts 
of the Understanding, which by themselves signify nothing but lawful form in general, 
are added to intuitions of the world of sense and thereby make possible synthetic 
propositions a priori on which all cognition of a nature rests’.101
The crucial difference from the cognitive dimension is that in its practical 
application Reason [Vemunjt\ also is ‘constitutive’, not merely ‘regulative’. This is for the 
simple reason that I should in principle (because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’) be able to act 
wholly in accordance with reason — whereas the external world I experience may or may 
not be a rational one. We will return to this point when we examine the ‘real world’ 
applications of Kant’s practical philosophy. But for know it is important to see that 
Reason’s practical demand is then that the maxims I follow (and so would have others 
follow) must be consistent with one another and add up to a total system that harmonises 
all my (and so others’) ends. Paul Guyer’s account brings this out well: morality 
‘constrains our purposes’ by ‘requiring them to be systematic’, meaning that all agents’
99 Kant 1788, p. 26, 5:29.This interrelationship between the authority of practical reason 
and the necessary structure of any ‘practical identity’ on Kant’s account is vividly brought 
out by the recent reconstructions of Christine Korsgaard. See Korsgaard 1989 and the 
further discussion in Korsgaard 1996.
100 Kant 1785, p. 56, 5:65.
101 Kant 1785, pp. 58-9, 4:454.
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purposes must constitute a ‘systematic sum’ or ‘unity of reason’.102 This systematic unity 
of all purposes is what Kant calls the ‘realm of ends’, defined by Guyer as ‘the condition 
within which all rational finite agents can and do pursue their own happiness within the 
constraint that each not only recognizes the rational agency of all others as a limit on his 
own pursuits but also makes the happiness of all his own end’.103 The realm of ends is 
thus an ideal towards which our moral action is directed, and which would be fulfilled if 
everyone acted according to the moral law. In such a circumstance all would be acting as 
one — ‘all actions of rational beings occur as if they arose from a highest will that 
comprehends all private choice in or under itse lf104 — not sacrificing their own ends or 
happiness for a ‘common good’ that is opposed to them, but pursuing a systematic unity 
of all ends within which their own ends are satisfied harmoniously with all others. 
Morality would become ‘self-rewarding’ — all would find happiness ‘in the same measure 
as he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct’.105 Again, we can see how closely 
Kant is following the contours of the Leibniz-Wolffian system, but on a radically 
different foundation. As John Rawls saw, ‘sometimes Kant takes an idea found in 
Leibniz and uses it in a very different way’; his idea of the highest good can be seen as a 
reworking of the Leibnizian idea of the perfect state, akin to his treatment of ‘the highest 
systematic unity of nature not as a metaphysical truth but as a regulative idea to guide 
speculative reason in ordering the knowledge of the understanding’.106 Kant himself says 
as much:
102 Guyer 1989, pp. 85-6.
103 Guyer 1997, p. 340.
104 Kant 1781, p. 679, A810 /  B838.
105 Kant 1781, p. 679, A810 /  B838.
106 Rawls 2000, p. 108. Rawls, who embraced ‘the secular ideal of a possible realm of 
ends that can be (in good part) realized in the natural world’, viewed ‘the idea of the 
highest good as a Leibnizian element in Kant’s philosophical theology ... which he never 
reworked so as to make it consistent with his moral philosophy’. The inconsistency for 
Rawls arises from the fact that as he sees it ‘the content of the moral law (as specified by 
the Cl [i.e. categorical imperative] procedure)’ does not enjoin ‘that in a realm of ends 
people are to act so as to make happiness strictly proportional to virtue’. Rawls 2000, pp. 
313-17. This seems to me to miss the point that in a fully realised realm of ends (‘in good 
part’ won’t do, of course), on Kant’s account, happiness would be distributed 
proportionately to virtue, simply because all would be equally worthy of happiness 
(realising the realm of ends ‘rests on the condition that eveiyone do what he should’ — Kant 
1781, p. 679, A810 /  B838) and the actions of all would effect the maximum systematic
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Leibniz called the world, insofar as in it one attends only to rational beings and 
thek interconnection in accordance with moral laws under the rule o f the highest 
good, the realm of grace ... to regard ourselves as in the realm of grace, where 
every happiness awaits us as long as we do not ourselves limit our share of it 
through the unworthiness to be happy, is a practically necessary idea of 
Reason.. .107
Thus in both the scientific and the moral domains Kant drives a wedge into the 
continuum of Leibniz-Wolffian perception, transforming the principle of harmonious 
order from a divinely ordained given into self-authorising project of free and rational 
humanity. From this point of view, full blown rationalism is heteronomous — as Susan 
Neiman puts it, ‘Leibniz is stuck with the fact that reason is in the world — to be read off 
of, rather than put into, the objects of experience’.108 For Leibniz, to be rational is to 
submit to a reason that has its seat of authority outside us. Kant’s critical philosophy 
overturns this theodicy and erects in its place a rational autonomy founded in our own 
free self-consciousness.
Deducing the Kechtsstaat
The political implications were indeed revolutionary, but in an important sense double- 
edged. This ambiguity followed dkectly from Kant’s transcendental bifurcation of the 
bases of human knowledge and agency. For the Wolffians our cognition o f the natural 
and moral order was more or less clear and distinct, according to the degree of our 
rational perception. In consequence, the social world was to be ordered by an elite class 
of bureaucrats in whom such perception was most fully developed. The Kantian 
philosophy levelled this epistemological hierarchy because it asserted that the systematic 
order to which Leibniz-Wolffian law attained was a formal projection of rational faculties
sum of happiness. We would not make it our business to administer the right balance of 
rewards and punishments, but that would be the effect of our actions in this circumstance.
107 Kant 1781, pp. 680-1, A812 /  B840.
108 Neiman 1994, p. 33.
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that were equally present in all rational beings. As Scheewind says, Kant ‘does not 
abandon self-perfection as a part of morality ... he transforms it’. Morality depends not 
upon ‘the extent and distinctness of our cognitions’, but upon the committed enactment 
of a moral law that we all find within ourselves.109 In CaygiU’s account ‘[t]he later 
German enlightenment rebelled against what Kant cryptically described as the ‘self- 
imposed tutelage’ of the police-state ... Their insistence on the free political judgement 
of the citizen replaced Wolffs view that judgement is the responsibility of the sovereign 
or Landesvater*.nQ Thus the paternalism of absolutist bureaucracy was replaced by a free 
association of equal citizens. As Patrick Riley sees it, ‘Kant’s radical egalitarianism ... 
leads to a politics not just of “benevolence” but of “universal republicanism” of 
consenting equal citizens.’111 But by the same token the moral reach o f this association 
was limited — it could not penetrate to a systematic unification of its citizens’ 
interdependent needs because any judgement with regard to their satisfaction and 
harmonisation was inherently problematic and provisional. Welfare is then no business of 
the state. ‘Happiness’, says Kant in the famous political essay on ‘theory and practice’, is 
‘unfit to be a principle of legislation’, because from it ‘no universally valid principle for 
laws can be given’.112 It is inherendy contestable and hence politically unstable, a license 
for tyranny and sedition. ‘The sovereign wants to make people happy in accordance with 
his concepts and becomes a despot; the people are not willing to give up their universal 
human claim to their own happiness and become rebels’.113
Far better, then to ask first ‘what is laid down as right (where principles stand 
firm a priori and no empiricist can bungle them)’.114 This is the project of Kant’s 
‘Doctrine of Right’, which aims to construct a standard for laws and political institutions 
that is proof against the essential contestability of human need and happiness. The 
coercive state must be immune from the indeterminacy that afflicts the ultimate ends of 
practical reason and morality.115 Its powers of enforcement must then rest on principles
109 Schneewind 1998, p. 529.
110 Caygill 1989, p. 109.
111 Riley 1996, pp. 263-4.
112 Kant 1793, p. 297-9, 8: 298.
113 Kant 1793, p. 301,8:302.
114 Kant 1793, p. 301,8:302.
115 Meld Shell 1980, p. 154.
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that are universally necessary in their deduction, and empirically determinate in their 
application.‘[T] he doctrine of right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been 
determined (with mathematical exactitude)’.116
As Susan Meld Shell’s commentary brings out in fascinating detail, the elucidation 
of this juridical order ‘replicates with baroque symmetry the categories and laws 
governing theoretical knowledge’.117 Just as the a priori categories of the Understanding 
must make up the basic framework of any unified experience, and are thus legitimately 
presupposed as universal and necessary laws of the phenomenal world, certain practical 
rules can be demonstrated as universally necessary conditions for the external 
coexistence of a number of agents acting in a shared spatio-temporal realm. It is on this 
basis that Kant provides a deduction of the possibility of private property — not as 
inherent in any metaphysical or empirical (as in Locke) relationship between agents and 
the things they use, but transcendentally necessary for external action as such.118 Kant 
holds that ‘we must regard our right to use external objects as the condition of the 
possibility of the inner use of our choice’,119 and from this follows the necessity of 
private property and a ‘complete and determinate’ division of contract law. These 
conditions are logically entailed in any end formed by any individual will — their breach 
would constitute ‘a contradiction of outer freedom with itself120 — entitling us to posit an 
a priori ‘general will’ that these rules be instituted and observed. Indeed, according to 
Meld Shell,
Early drafts of the Doctrine of Right suggest a similarity between the function of the
united will and that of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ discussed in the
Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique. Both the Doctrine of Right and the
116 Kant 1797, pp. 389-90, 6:233.
117 Meld Shell 1980, p. 136.
118 ‘Earlier thinkers associated the right to property with the rational or divine nature of 
things. According to Roman and scholastic jurisprudence, certain things or kinds of 
things were held to belong naturally to certain men or kinds of men. Caste, order, class, 
and all the other divisions of property and society were thought to reflect some natural or 
divine articulation of the world. According to Kant, on the contrary, the only necessary 
relations in nature are those put there by man’. Meld Shell 1980, p. 128.
119 This formulation appears in Kant’s preparatory notes and is quoted in Gregor 1963, 
p. 50.
120 Kant 1797, p. 405, 6:250.
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first Critique ‘deduce’ synthetic unity as necessary to rational possession. By 
‘deduction’, Kant means an argument supportive of a claim to property ... Like 
its epistemological counterpart, juridical possession requires a transcendental 
synthesis. Juridical synthesis entails a unity not of apperception, however, but of 
wills. This unity, which Kant calls also the united or general will, confers on men 
the right to make use of things.121
This united will is expressed and enforced by a sovereign power that in this way 
‘represents’ it: ‘Representation is the outer public reflection through which a people 
comes to be in becoming known to itself.122 But it is essential to keep in mind the limited 
nature of this united will, this representation of the people to itself. It is not a full 
harmony of ends — but only, as Meld Shell puts it, ‘a collaboration over means’, ensuring 
that we do not conflict over space and the external things of use.123 The ultimate ends of 
our association remain hidden. The system of right remains at the observable surface of 
human relations, abstracting from agents’ internal motives and ends, and independent of 
all difficult judgements as to their happiness. Right applies only to ‘the external and 
indeed practical relation of one person to another, insofar as their actions, as deeds, can 
have (direct or indirect) influence on each other’; it concerns a relation among choices, not 
‘the mere wish (hence also to the mere need) of the other’; and ‘no account is at all taken 
of the matter of choice, that is, of the end each has in mind with the object he wants’. 124 
In Meld Shell’s words, ‘[t]he impersonality of mechanics, as (an external) system of body, 
is paralleled by the impartiality of right, as an external system of wills. Both abstract from 
the special experience and perspective of the individual.’125 And the principles of this 
mechanical realm are deducted as the universally necessary precondition for the external 
coexistence of several agents acting in a shared spatio-temporal realm — Ty analogy’, 
Kant says, ‘with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the
121 Shell 1980, pp. 132-4.
122 Meld Shell 1980, p. 166.
123 Meld Shell 1980, p. 131.
124 Kant 1797, p. 387, 6:230.
125 Meld Shell 1980, p. 125.
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equality of action and reactior? .126 The united will yokes us together at the level of our 
Understanding, but not our reason — it ensures that all agree on property rights, who 
owns what, but says nothing about the ends to which anything is turned.
Thus we arrive at a reversal of the Leibnizian definition of the state. For Leibniz, 
as we have seen, the state is ‘an unlimited unequal society’ — unlimited in its purposes, 
unequal in its constitutive relationships.127 For Kant, we might say, the state is rather an 
equal but limited society. He replaces the overweening paternalism of eighteenth century 
absolutism with a bourgeois republic based on the rule of law and liberal free trade. Our 
obligations to perfect ourselves and pursue the welfare of others remain, but are 
transferred to the private sphere, as the ‘imperfect’ duties of self-cultivation and 
benevolence treated in the ‘Doctrine of Virtue’ that forms the second part of the 
Metaphysics of Morals™ In prescribing such duties of virtue the moral law ‘leaves a 
playroom (latitudo) for free choice in following (complying with) the law, that is ... the 
law cannot specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the 
action’. We must make our own judgements about how to limit one such duty by another 
‘e.g., love of one’s neighbour in general by love of one’s parents’.129
This social order does not, then, contrary to some contemporary invocations of 
Kant, as such constitute a ‘realm of ends’, which, as we have seen, would entail a 
complete unification of all purposes into a systematic unity, and a general will that goes 
‘all the way down’. Although Kant stresses the difference between theoretical and 
practical Reason — that the former can only be regulative, while the latter can in principle 
be constitutive — this is not the case where it comes to collective agency. It is the 
Understanding, not Reason, that constitutes the Kantian republic. Reason exercises an 
unenforced social regulation through publicity, culture, and a loose notion of historical
126 Kant 1797, p. 389, 6:233. As Susan Meld Shell writes, ‘[t]he construction o f right as a 
system of external relations resembles that of physics’. Meld Shell 1980, p. 125.
127 Leibniz 1988, p. 79.
128 Thus while Kantian ethics might be seen to furnish a basis for socialism, in his own 
worldview such an orientation sits alongside a restriction of the state to a near laissez 
faire model — as Meld Shell says, Kant is ‘moral communalist and economic capitalist’. 
Meld Shell 1980, p. 135.
129 Kant 1797, p. 521, 6:390. Meld Shell writes: ‘[t]he moral and moralizing function 
which Rousseau assigned to the political community Kant locates in a moral community 
which, springing direcdy from the noumenal personality of the individual, bypasses 
politics altogether.’ Meld Shell 1980, p. 131.
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progress, but is constitutive of our actions only at the point that we leave the Rechtstaat 
behind us. Indeed, in a realised realm of ends the distinction between right and virtue, 
the juridical order and the sphere of private morality, would in a sense drop away, 
transcended as no longer relevant.
This remains the utopian vanishing point of practical reason for Kant — utopian 
though not, strictly speaking, impossible, as the more excitable of Kant’s early followers 
would quickly point out. As Matthew Levinger has written, despite that fact that his 
‘ultimate objective’ should have been ‘a society of free, equal and self-determining 
citizens’, his ‘conviction that human nature possessed elements of radical evil’ meant that 
‘even a fully cultivated citizenry might always need to be constrained by governing 
institutions’. But others under his influence ‘who were more sanguine about the character 
of humanity, expressed more unambiguously optimistic conclusions about the potential 
of this educational process’.130
Despite what a very great man has said ... life in the state is not one of man’s 
absolute aims. The state is, instead, only a meansfor establishing a perfect society, a 
means which exists only under specific circumstances. Like all those human 
institutions which are mere means, the state aims at abolishing itself. The goal of all 
government is to make government superfluous. Though the time has certainly not yet 
come, nor do I know how many myriads of myriads of years it may take (here we 
are not at all concerned with applicability in life, but only with justifying a 
speculative proposition)...
Thus lectured Fichte to excited students in 1794,131 prompting rumours that he had 
made the subversive prediction that ‘in ten or twenty years there will be no more kings or 
princes’.132 An even younger Schelling would write the following year:
It is difficult not to be enthusiastic about the great thought that, while all 
sciences, the empirical ones not excluded, rush more and more towards the point 
of perfect unity, mankind itself will finally realize, as the constitutive law, the
130 Levinger 1998, pp. 247-8.
131 Fichte 1794, pp. 156-7.
132 See Daniel Breazeale’s introduction to Fichte 1794, p. 139.
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principle of unity which from the beginning was the regulating basis of the 
history of mankind. As the rays of man’s knowledge and the experiences of many 
centuries will finally converge in one focus of truth ... just so the different ways 
and by-ways which humans have followed till now will converge in one point 
wherein mankind will find itself against and, as one complete person, will obey 
the law of freedom.133
In the meantime, however, just as our dependence upon externally received sense 
impressions stands between us and our theoretical goal of a completed unity of nature, 
the obscurity of our interdependence at the level of need stands between us and the 
consummation of a comprehensive practical unity.
133 Schelling 1795a, p. 68.
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2Revolution unfinished?
‘By the thing-in-itself, which he introduced into philosophy, Kant has at least 
provided the first impulse which would carry philosophy beyond ordinary 
consciousness ... but he never even considered clearly, let alone explained, that 
this ground of explanation lying beyond consciousness is in the end no more 
than our own ideal activity, merely hypostatised into the thing-in-itself.,
— F. W. J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)1
‘That the world is a product of the freedom of intelligence is the determinate and 
express principle of idealism.’
— G. W. F. Hegel, The Difference Between Fichte’s 
and Schelling’s System of Philosophy (1801) 2
‘Only that which is the object offreedom is called Idea. We must therefore go 
beyond the state! — Because every state must treat free human beings like 
mechanical works... ’
— Anonymous, The Oldest Systematic Program of German Idealism (1797)3
1 Schelling 1800, p. 99.
2 Hegel 1801, p. 130.
3 Anonymous 1797, p. 161.
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1. The ‘determinate and express principle of Idealism’
Reconstructing the relationship between the philosophy of Kant and his German Idealist 
successors can be a treacherous business, plunging us instandy into contests of 
interpretation that began even as Kant’s works were still being published. In their own 
writings, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all seem to alternate between implausibly claiming 
Kant’s authority for their project, then attacking what many consider to be a ‘straw man’ 
of their predecessor. Meanwhile would-be defenders of Kant up to the present day have 
both renounced the illegitimate extrapolations of his thought made by the post-Kantians 
at the same time as countering negative caricatures by claiming to find in his work the 
very themes that his successors made it their task to develop more fully.4
This much at least seems to be clear. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all made a clear 
break with Kant’s philosophy by questioning his cardinal distinction between intuition 
and concept, the respective moments of passive receptivity and active spontaneity in 
cognition. But, crucially, they did so by carrying intuition over to the side of spontaneity. 
Thus Kant’s successors affirmed wholeheartedly his account of the active role of the 
subject in ordering the world cognitively and practically, but felt he had not taken it far 
enough.5 The result was an unsatisfactory half-way house that remained haunted by the 
ghosts of sceptical empiricism and metaphysical dualism. So whilst for Leibnizian- 
Wolffian metaphysics all experience and activity was a passive mirroring of the intrinsic 
order of the universe, and for Kantian epistemology our knowledge arose from an active 
ordering under concepts of the intuitions we passively received, for the later Idealists all 
was actively self-determined. This revision produces results that can look very much like 
some kind of reversion to a Leibniz-Wolffian position — would we not expect such to be 
the effect of revoking the primary move by which Kant broke free of their system, the
4 It is a common feature of attempted defences of Kant against the ‘formalism’ charge 
that they seek to make much of precisely those parts of Kant’s theory that feed directly 
into Hegel’s own thought.
5 The great lesson of Pippin’s commentary is that this is always the most important thing 
to keep in mind when reading these writers. Especially in the case of Hegel, whenever 
one reads something that seems completely off-the-wall or over-the-top (which is 
frequently), it is often worth recalling Kant’s doctrine of the spontaneity of apperception, 
its apparent modesty and plausibility but also its strange and paradoxical nature, and 
asking if this might not be a consequences of taking its implications to their logical 
conclusion.
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transcendental distinction of intuition and concept? But in their own eyes they were 
merely taking Kant’s position to its logical conclusion, by placing the activity of the 
ordering subject centre-stage. So whilst the post-Kantian reunification of thought and 
being is open to interpretation as a regression to the epistemological hubris of pre-critical 
metaphysics, the move can equally be seen from another angle — and this accounts for its 
continuing contemporary interest — as a strikingly modem (perhaps even, in some 
respects, postmodern) project of disarming scepticism, transcending the epistemological 
paradigm, and deconstructing all metaphysical illusions of knowledge as a ‘mirror of 
nature’.6 In the words of John McDowell, ‘a picture in which reality is not located outside 
a boundary that encloses the conceptual’ need not ‘slight the independence of reality’ — 
because it no longer reduces it to mere ‘appearance’ — nor be ‘offensive to common 
sense’.7
For our purposes the most important consequence of this reformulation is the 
way that the dualism pervading Kant’s system is overcome and key elements suddenly 
converge as if they had been products of an optical illusion, like double vision snapping 
into focus. Most dramatically, what for Kant was essentially unknowable — the thing in 
itself, the systematic unity of the universe, God as its ordering principle — now appears to 
be stricdy identical with self-consciousness itself. And in like manner, what in Kant’s 
practical philosophy is the unreachable goal of moral action — the highest good, God’s 
reconciliation of morality and happiness — comes within the grasp of human freedom.
The rejection of the concept-intuition distinction remains a highly controversial 
philosophical move which I cannot go into in depth within the confines of this 
discussion other than to mark its importance in redirecting the Kantian project.8 
Essentially, the claim was that the absoluteness of this opposition could not be rendered 
consistent with Kant’s insistence on the spontaneity of self-consciousness. The most 
obvious anomaly in the Kantian system, highlighted in all textbook introductions, is itself
6 A visible line of philosophical descent can in fact be traced here, through the influence 
o f Wilfrid Sellars’s avowedly Hegelian attack on the ‘myth of the given’. See Sellars 1997, 
and the ‘Introduction’ by Richard Rorty. In a very different way, postmodern and 
poststructuralist appropriations of the later Schelling may also be relevant here — see for 
example Bowie 1993, Zi2ek 1996.
7 McDowell 1996, p. 44.
8 For accounts sceptical of its validity, see Guyer 2000b, and Rosen 1982, pp. 101-121. 
For a defence, see Pippin 1989, pp. 24-35. For a recent articulation of an essentially 
similar argument in a more contemporary philosophical idiom, see McDowell 1994.
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an appearance of this problem — Kant seems to want to say that things-in-themselves 
‘cause’ our sense impressions, but this would violate his own ruling that causality is a 
category of the Understanding that has no remit beyond the interconnection of 
appearances among themselves.9 This issue was indeed pivotal in setting off post- 
Kantian developments, being central to a 1792 critique of Kant’s follower Reinhold 
known as the ‘Aenesidemus’.10 This became a ‘launching point’ for Fichte’s reworking of 
Kant’s account of self-determining subjectivity: if self-consciousness was truly free of 
empirical determination, then the intuited material it confronts as a limitation on its self­
determining activity must itself be ‘posited’ or taken as such as the subject’s own self- 
limitation. Either the subject was the ultimate determinant of all its experience and 
activity, or it was not. This can sound like a bizarre argument that the world of 
experience is some kind of solipsistic dream, but the thought to keep in mind is Kant’s 
own argument that the sense impressions we receive are insufficient in themselves to 
provide a determinate experience or knowledge. The Fichtean argument would be that so 
much is this the case that it really makes no sense to ascribe to them any foundational 
epistemological role in isolation from their involvement in the activity of self- 
consciousness. Our intuitions are ‘always already’ conceptualised. In Robert Pippin’s 
account, this ‘does not at all eliminate the role of the given in knowledge, but it will 
radically relativize to “thought” the ways in which the given can be taken to be given’.11 
For Schelling and Hegel, Fichte’s uncompromising affirmation ‘[t]hat the world is a 
product of the freedom of intelligence is the determinate and express principle of 
idealism’.12
But though Fichte had in this way asserted that the ‘I’ had to be the wholly 
unconditioned ‘first principle’ of all knowledge and philosophy, ‘positing’ both itself as
9 Komer 1955, pp. 41-2; Hoffe 1994, p. 67.
10 See Pinkard 2002, pp. 105-7.
11 Pippin 1989, p. 31. See also Pinkard 2002, p. 119: ‘Fichte does not claim that the 
existence of the world is something created by us’ — we are closer to the spirit of his 
argument if we say that we cannot become self-conscious without recognising an external 
world.
12 Hegel 1801a, p. 130. Schelling affirms in the System of Idealism that self-consciousness is 
the ‘highest principle of knowledge’, the ‘fixed point, to which everything else is attached 
for u f  ‘an absolute that is both cause and effect — both subject and object — of itself. Self- 
consciousness ‘circumscribes the entire horizon of our knowing even when extended to 
infinity’. Schelling 1800, pp. 16-17.
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subject and an object that limits its pure free activity as the condition of its own self- 
consciousness, this relationship of mutual dependence and opposition remained in his 
system as one that could not be overcome. The pursuit o f systematic knowledge and the 
aspiration to moral goodness were then conceived as a necessary but necessarily endless 
labour of Sisyphus, and the further exposition of Fichte’s system from this point forward 
shadowed Kant’s dualism in many respects. In Hegel’s own account, Fichte’s principle of 
an original identity in which subject and object are grounded was ‘the transcendental 
principle at the basis of Kant’s deduction of the categories’, and ‘the authentic principle 
of speculation boldly expressed’. But Fichte’s system, like Kant’s, steps off from this 
original unity ‘and does not come back to it again’, falling into ‘the endless chain of finite 
[acts and objects] of consciousness from which it never reconstructs itself again as 
identity and true infinity’.13 Schelling and Hegel (partly influenced by early Romantic 
thinkers such as Holderlin) felt that this remained an unsatisfactory resolution and sought 
to locate the primary unity of thought and being, subject and object not in a 
retrospectively deduced premise of philosophy but as the immanent hori2on of our most 
everyday cognitive and moral experience.14 The ‘subjectivity of pure consciousness’ 
arising from Fichte’s deduction of the objective world ‘provides the key to another form 
of it, in which the production of the objective is taken as a pure act of free activity’.15
2. ‘Kant’s way out of Kant’16
The clearest way of seeing the course of this immanent critique of Kant and Fichte’s 
subjective idealism is to return to the epistemological architecture of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. It is a well-known consequence of Kant’s absolutisation of the opposition 
between intuition and concept, sensory manifold and spontaneous self-consciousness, 
that nothing much can be said about how the two are brought together. Surely we do not 
want the relationship to be an arbitrary one, in which the Understanding simply imposes
13 Hegel 1801, p. 81.
14 On the Romantic revision of Fichte’s construction of subjectivity, see Pinkard 2002, 
pp. 137-44.
15 Hegel 1801, p. 130.
16 This phrase is borrowed from Pinkard 2000, p. 160.
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its rules on the sensory manifold in one of any number of different possible ways. But 
given their radical heterogeneity, how are we ever able to say that a given intuition is 
‘like’, or ‘fits’, or ‘suggests’, or in any way relates to a given concept? How do we know 
that we even have the right set of empirical concepts to hand, that our very linguistic 
distinctions cut nature at the joints? This is what Robert Pippin has called the problem of 
the ‘guidedness of empirical knowledge’ in Kant: so insistent is he that ‘the senses do not 
represent, and are not immediately differentiated’ that it becomes difficult to ‘describe 
the fact that empirical knowledge of the external world seems to be directly guided by 
sensations, that our interpreting faculties are restrained in a way ... by some feature of 
our sensations’.17 The nearest Kant comes to an answer in the first Critique, in some of 
the most notoriously obscure passages of the book, is that the ‘transcendental 
imagination’ produces ‘schemas’, mediating ‘third things’ that are neither conceptual nor 
intuitive, which somehow relate concepts to the forms of intuition, space and time. Kant 
describes this mysterious process as ‘a hidden art in the depths of the human soul’, 18 and 
his readers have long seen the schematism as an answer that is not answer, an ‘aporetic 
concept’ as Adorno puts it,19 even if necessarily so because of the very dualistic rules 
upon which his system is built. Deleuze points out that Kant’s insistence on the radical 
discontinuity between Understanding and Sensibility effectively transposes the Leibnizian 
problem of the ‘pre-established’ harmony between rational substances and God’s 
harmonious order ‘to the level of faculties of the subject which differ in nature’. ‘|T]n this 
way the problem is merely shifted: for the imagination and the understanding themselves 
differ in nature, and the accord between these two active faculties is no less 
“mysterious”.’20
17 Pippin 1982, p. 44. Adomo highlighted the same problem: ‘if a concept is to be true 
and not just something arbitrary it must necessarily be influenced by the nature of the 
object to which it refers. Thanks to the total separation of spontaneity and receptivity in 
the architecture of the work this element of a relation between these two “pillars of 
knowledge”, as Kant calls them, is utterly lost sight of. Adomo 1959, p. 132,
18 Kant 1781, p. 273, A141 /  B180.
19 Adomo 1959, p. 131.
20 Deleuze 1965, p. 22.
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Schelling and Hegel21 saw this non-solution to the problem of how conceptual 
form and intuited content are related as pointing to a more radical resolution that would 
transform the terms of the system, transcending what Hegel called ‘a formal idealism 
which ... sets an absolute Ego-point and its Understanding on one side, and an absolute 
manifold, or sensation, on the other side’.22 Upon examination Kant’s self-consciousness, 
its Understanding, and its concepts, amount on their own to nothing but sheer unity or 
‘formal identity’, while the manifold of sensible intuitions is by itself utterly 
indeterminate, a ‘formless lump’ of which nothing can be said. ‘Identity of this formal 
kind finds itself immediately confronted by or next to an infinite non-identity, with which 
it must coalesce in some incomprehensible way’.23 Nor is it clear what is to be gained by 
simply bringing the two together, since both are equally without content.24
Their conclusion was that self-consciousness and manifold, Understanding and 
sensibility, conceptual form and intuited content, cannot be seen as our absolute starting 
points, but must derive from a more original unity from which subject and object are 
sundered. Kant himself had tantalisingly suggested that the ‘two stems of human 
cognition’, sensibility and Understanding, ‘may perhaps arise from a common but to us 
unknown root’.25 Hegel insists that an inquiry into this common root cannot be avoided: 
‘[T|he Kantian forms of intuition and the forms of thought cannot be kept apart at all as 
the particular, isolated faculties which they are usually represented as. One and the same
211 am here aiming to sketch what seems to have been the basic response to Kant that 
was shared by Schelling and Hegel in the years around 1800, relying mainly on Hegel’s 
texts of the early ‘Jena period’ when he was widely seen as Schelling’s philosophical 
lieutenant. O f course their differences would later become very important, and may even 
have been presaged even in these early texts, but at a finer level of philosophical detail 
than I am aiming for here. For such an account see Harris 1983, and Pippin 1989, pp. 60- 
88 .
22 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 78, translation modified.
23 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 76. See also p. 93: ‘the bond between the binding activity and the 
manifold, is what is incomprehensible’.
24 Compare Donald Davidson on ‘the very idea of a conceptual scheme’: W e cannot 
attach a clear meaning to the notion of organizing a single object (the world, nature etc.) 
unless that object is understood to consist in other objects. Someone who sets out to 
organise a closet arranges the things in it. If you are told not to organize the shoes and 
shirts, but the closet itself, you would be bewildered. How would you organize the 
Pacific Ocean?’ Davidson 1974, p. 192.
25 Kant 1781, p. 152, A15 /  B29.
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synthetic unity ... is the principle of the intuition and of the Understanding.’26 And this 
original principle is the one that Kant had himself obliquely recognised in positing a role 
for the imagination in mediating the difference between the two. This, says Hegel, must 
be taken as the fundamental moment in cognition:
[W]e must not take the faculty of [productive] imagination as the middle term 
that gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an existing absolute 
world. The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary 
and original, as that out of which the subjective Ego and objective world first 
sunder themselves into the necessarily bipartite appearance and product, and as 
the sole In-itself.27
This may seem to suggest again a ludicrous solipsism, as if the entire world o f experience 
is one we merely ‘imagine’.28 But what Schelling and Hegel are trying to argue is that we 
have to think of the frontier of our experience not as a naked confrontation between 
concepts and sense impressions but as an expansive, productive process or activity which 
cannot be broken down into pre-existing ‘form’ and ‘content’ except by a post hoc 
abstraction.29 ‘The true synthetic unity or rational identity is just that identity which is the 
connecting of the manifold with the empty identity, the I. It is from this connection, as 
original synthesis that the I as thinking subject, and the manifold as body and world first
26 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 70, translation modified.
27 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 73. See also Schelling 1800, p. 12: ‘If we ... suppose ... that the 
same activity which is consciously productive in free action, is productive without consciousness 
in bringing about the world, then our predetermined harmony is real, and the 
contradiction resolved’.
28 Hegel explicitly says we must resist here our customary association of the term 
‘imagination’ with ‘unlawfulness, whim and fiction’. Hegel 1802-3b, p. 73.
29 See also Schelling 1800, p. 135: ‘The question as to how our concepts conform to 
objects has therefore no meaning from a transcendental viewpoint, inasmuch as this 
question presupposes an original difference between the two. In the absence of 
consciousness, the object and its concept, and conversely, concept and object, are one 
and the same, and the separation of the two first occurs with the emergence of 
consciousness. A philosophy which starts from consciousness will therefore never be 
able to explain this conformity, nor is it explicable at all without an original identity, 
whose principle necessarily lies beyond consciousness.’
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detach themselves.’30 This ‘organic Idea’ of productive imagination is at the heart of the 
processes Kant attempts to analyse but he is diverted into ‘the mechanical relation of a 
unity of self-consciousness which stands in antithesis to the empirical manifold’.31 Kant’s 
‘truly speculative idea’32 seems to have gone unrecognised by its own author, passed over 
— ‘[productive imagination has been allowed to get by easily in the Kantian philosophy’ — 
because he had mistakenly identified the spontaneous, self-determining moment in 
experience with only the Understanding conceived in an absolute opposition to its 
material — in this way making it ‘the absolute of the human spirit’.33
Kant’s blind spot has a further important consequence for the design of his 
system. For once this vital function of resolving the opposition of the Understanding to 
Sensibility has been left to the dark arts of the productive imagination, ‘nothing remains 
for Reason \VemunJf\ but the pure emptiness of identity’.34 Reason’s role in Kant’s 
system seems to be one of adding together the results of the Understanding in the 
pursuit of a completed whole of experience.35 Again there seems to be nothing to this 
operation other than the simple pursuit of unity itself — as Pippin puts it, Kant ‘seems to 
assume that, armed with these general “simplicity” and “unity” rules, “nature”, as 
investigated determinately by the understanding, will simply “fall into line”, that we will 
just tend toward some unified, single comprehensive account of the world’.36 Reason in 
this way adds nothing to the work of the Understanding, and is indeed nothing other 
than the same principle of formal identity — one infinite totality instead of one finite 
object. ‘Kant is quite correct in making this empty unity a merely regulative and not a
30 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 71, translation modified.
31 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 92.
32 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 71. Hegel says that Kant’s ‘merit’ is to be found ‘in his having put 
the Idea of authentic a priority in the form of transcendental imagination’. Hegel 1802-3b, 
p. 79.
33 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 77.
34 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 80.
35 Theoretical Reason ... lets the Understanding give it the manifold which it has only to 
regulate’. Hegel 1802-3b, p. 81. See Kant 1781, pp. 590-1, A643 /  B671: ‘Reason never 
relates direcdy to an object, but solely to the Understanding and by means of it to 
Reason’s own empirical use, hence it does not create any concepts (of objects) but only 
orders them and gives them that unity which they can have in the greatest possible 
extension’.
36 Pippin 1982, p. 214.
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constitutive principle’, says Hegel, ‘for how could something that is utterly without 
content constitute anything?’37 But his ultimate argument is that if this seems to be a 
straightforward procedure, this is because on Kant’s own terms the important and 
difficult work of fashioning a coherent world of objects has already been done by the 
productive imagination, which gives us a conceptualised experience that already fits 
together, like the cut pieces of a child’s jigsaw.
Hegel thus rearranges the labels and orders of priority in Kant’s system, 
forgetting the redundant layer of Reason as the post hoc ordering of empirical cognitions 
into a coherent unity, and instead identifying true Reason with what Kant obliquely 
acknowledged as the crucial synthetic activity of the productive imagination. This is, 
Hegel says, simply ‘nothing but Reason itself... as it appears in the sphere of empirical 
consciousness’.38 Hegel, then, puts Reason to work right at the ground floor of 
knowledge and experience, ‘as the one and only a priori, whether of sensibility, of 
Understanding, or what have you’,39 whereas Kant had ‘turned the true a priori back into 
a pure unity, i.e., one that is not originally synthetic’.40 Reason is now seen as the original 
unity of the Understanding and Sensibility, prior to any analysis of them into distinct 
operations.
One of the reasons why it can be difficult to decide whether or not these 
criticisms hit home is that Kant seemed to have come at least some way to recognising 
these issues himself, certainly by the time of the 1790 Critique of Judgment.41 There Kant 
looked in detail at the structure of ‘aesthetic’ judgements of beauty and ‘teleological’ 
judgements of natural organisms, but developed out of these analyses a more general 
account of ‘purposiveness’ as the principle of <z//‘reflective’ judgements by which we seek 
to form or identify a concept under which a given sensible manifold is to be subsumed.
In the process Kant seemed to concede that the Idea of systematic unity that in the first 
Critique guided Reason’s ordering of the empirical knowledge delivered by the
37 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 80.
38 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 73.
39 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 73. See also p. 82: ‘The Idea of Reason occurs in the Deduction of 
the Categories as original unity of the one and the manifold’.
40 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 73.
41 On the role played by readings of this text in the arguments of later Idealists see 
especially di Giovanni 1992; Pippin 1996.
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Understanding in fact was involved in the very production of that knowledge — in the sense 
that it guided the very formation and application of the empirical concepts which were its 
necessary currency. Reflective judgement, in seeking a universal for a given particular, 
expects that particular to be part of a wider class of things for which rules can be given, 
and that the world form a systematic whole that our faculties can indeed grasp. This ‘is a 
principle of Reason ... [that helps us] merely to apply Understanding generally to 
possible objects of experience, namely, in those cases where we cannot judge 
determinatively but can judge merely reflectively’.42
Kant develops this thought by reference to the notion of an ‘intuitive 
Understanding’. Kant had already raised this idea in the first Critique precisely to contrast 
with it what was particular about our own ‘finite’ Understanding — an intuitive 
Understanding would be one ‘through whose self-consciousness the manifold of 
intuition would at the same time be given, an Understanding through whose 
representation the objects of this representation would at the same time exist’. But ‘the 
human Understanding ... merely thinks, but does not intuit’, and so must passively 
receive its material through the senses.43 But in developing his account of the role of 
Reason in reflective judgments, Kant seems to be saying that we have to somehow aspire 
to achieving this type of Understanding. For cognition to be possible, the ‘particular in 
nature’s diversity must (through concepts and laws) harmonize with the universal in 
order that the particular can be subsumed under the universal’. The harmonisation of our 
own Understanding with nature was ‘contingent’, which is what ‘makes it so difficult for 
our understanding to unify the manifold of nature so as to [give rise to] cognition’. There 
can be no determinate principle for achieving this harmony, but we conceive its possibility 
on the model of an ‘intuitive Understanding’ for which the thought of a thing’s 
possibility (through its universal concept) would at the same time be the intuition of its 
particular existence.44
42 Kant 1790, p. 289, 5:405. On Guyer’s reading, here ‘theoretical reason’s positive even 
if only regulative ideal of systematicity is reassigned to reflective judgment’. Guyer 2000a, 
p. 64.
43 Kant 1781, p. 250, B138-9.
44 Kant 1790, p. 291,5:406-7.
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[T]t is at least possible to consider the material world as mere appearance, and to 
think something as [its] substrate, as thing in itself (which is not appearance, and 
to regard this thing n itself as based on a corresponding intuitive Understanding 
(even though not ours). In that way there would be for nature, which includes us 
as well, a supersensible basis of its reality, though we could not cognke this basis. 
Hence we would consider in terms of mechanical laws whatever is necessary in 
nature as an object of sense; but the harmony and unity of the particular laws of 
nature and of the forms based on them are contingent in terms of mechanical 
laws, and [so] this harmony and unity, as objects of Reason, we would at the 
same time consider in terms of teleological laws (as, indeed, we would consider 
the whole of nature as a system).45
Thus Kant sails even closer than he had before to the Leibnman idea of an underlying 
conceptual order to the universe that our own conceptualised experience must make as if 
to mimic or mirror. Our cognitive faculties cannot work other than by projecting such an 
order which they make it their goal to reproduce. We must reflect on the world as i f  this 
were the case, but of course, Kant always comes back to insist, we cannot possibly know 
or have any knowledge of such a thing. But, say Schelling and Hegel, all the key features 
Kant has ascribed to this unknowable intuitive Understanding are in fact features of the 
productive imagination that his own analysis identifies as the true basis of our experience: 
‘the Idea of this archetypal intuitive Understanding is at bottom nothing else but the same 
Idea of the transcendental imagination that we considered above’,46 which is to say again, 
that it is what they have designated Reason in its true form.47 Kant would resist such an 
identification — he would have to say that the transcendental imagination works by 
somehow mirroring the activity of an intuitive intellect which in fact it knows nothing of, 
or even if such a thing could exist.
45 Kant 1790, p. 293, 5:409, translation modified.
46 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 89, translation modified. Schelling similarly claimed that Kant was 
led to the idea of an intuitive Understanding as the overcoming of the ‘utter separation of 
the Understanding and sensibility’. Quoted in Pippin 1996, p. 142, n. 28.
47 ‘These positions adopted in the critical philosophy are on a most subordinate, non- 
rational plane because they posit human Reason in strict opposition to absolute Reason. 
All the same, they do rise to the Idea of a sensible Understanding, and sensible 
Understanding is Reason’. Hegel 1801, p. 163, translation modified.
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But it is now becoming far less clear why this principle of purposive 
systematicity, of a world ordered as if by an intuitive Understanding, must have a weaker 
epistemological status than the finite and mechanical categories of the Understanding 
that Kant had deduced as holding ‘objectively’ because they are necessary for any 
experience to occur at all. Even in trying to hold this line Kant says that this ‘subjective 
principle that Reason has for our judgment’ is ‘necessary for human judgment in dealing 
with nature’ and ‘holds just as necessarily for our human judgment as it would if were an 
objective principle’.48 It now seems that most of what we think of as everyday 
experience, and indeed the most basic procedures of scientific inquiry, is in this way 
radically underdetermined by immediate sensible intuitions, and depend for their 
conceptual organisation on the intervention of such problematic judgements of 
‘purposive wholes’ and systematic order.49 Whereas previously it had seemed that the 
empiricism of the Understanding underpinned and restrained the speculations of Reason, 
now it seems that Reason itself is what conditions the unification of the Understanding 
and Sensibility. Intuitions are not anchoring our experience in the way that we might 
have thought they had done. The Understanding does not deliver ‘knowledge’ that 
reason then has to organise — we never get hold of anything that is not always already 
permeated by reason’s judgements of systematicity.50
The radical conclusion that Hegel and Schelling drew from this is that we must 
rethink the whole ‘two worlds’ structure of Kant’s transcendental epistemology. For 
Kant the ‘thing-in-itself, as a substance within an overarching systematic unity of the
48 Kant 1790, pp. 287-8, 5:404.
49 So when Susan Neiman writes that for Kant Reason’s idea of the unconditioned 
‘presents the possibility of the systematization of the very basic observation-statements 
that understanding produces’, in fact we now see that there are no such ‘basic 
observation statements’ prior to the intervention of Reason — Reason’s idea of the 
unconditioned is a condition of the possibility of the production of such statements. 
Neiman 1994, p. 70. Thus Pippin argues that Kant’s objective deduction of the 
Categories ‘looked at closely, really does not go very far toward explaining many of the 
aspects of knowledge which we would normally be interested in in a comprehensive 
epistemology’ — among them theory formation, the determinate system of empirical 
concepts or ‘natural kinds’, and the relation among various theories in different sciences. 
Pippin 1982, p. 211.
50 In the words of F. H. Jacobi, an important anti-idealist philosopher who concluded 
from this that Kant’s system collapsed back into absolute subjective scepticism, Kant 
‘wanted to underpin reason with the understanding, and then pin the understanding on 
reason’. Quoted in di Giovanni 1992, p. 422.
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universe, is an unknowable entity existing in an empty ‘Beyond’ (Jenseits), a ‘noumenal’ 
space beyond our powers of cognition. At the same time in some obscure way it grounds 
or causes the sense impressions we receive, which we then bring under concepts that 
gesture towards this thing-in-itself but which must not presume identity with it. Hegel 
and Schelling regard this as a poindess and empty ‘doubling’ of the moments of 
cognition, that results from the treatment of the Understanding-Sensibility opposition as 
essential. Kant designates the world we know as mere ‘appearance’, while insisting that 
we know nothing and can say nothing of the ‘real’ world that it is the appearance of This 
extra noumenal realm adds nothing to the account, say the post-Kantians. There is only 
the world that we experience, the world that we know. Therefore, they argued, we should 
recognise the ‘thing-in-itself as internal to our own processes of cognition, as nothing 
other than the principle of our own discriminating activity: ‘the in-itself o f the empirical 
consciousness is Reason itself.51 Kant’s great failure was that Tie never even considered 
clearly, let alone explained, that this ground of explanation lying beyond consciousness is 
in the end no more than our own ideal activity, merely hypostatised into the thing-in- 
itself.52 Our most basic experiences turn on the confident designation of what appears to 
us as the appearances of essential substances which we can grasp conceptually. ‘The 
assumption that things are just what we take them to be, so that we are acquainted with 
them as they are in themselves, underlies the possibility of all experience’.53 Absolute 
Idealism thus appeals in some respects (not all, of course) to a kind of everyday common 
sense.54 And upon this recognition, of course, it instantly makes no sense to call it 
‘internal’, because this is a process without an ‘outside’. What we are describing is the 
irreducible role of self-consciousness, or conceptualisation, or Reason, in organising, 
shaping, forming, and permeating every detail of the world we experience — ‘our’ world, 
perhaps, but one we cannot step outside and which it makes no sense to think of as 
anything other than the world. ‘In the transcendental intuition [of the unity of subjectivity
51 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 73.
52 Schelling 1800, p. 99.
53 Schelling 1800, p. 10.
54 We have ‘confidence in the truth’ of the ‘single items drawn out of the Absolute into 
consciousness’ because we ‘have a feeling of the Absolute’ attending them; it is only 
when epistemologists ‘take these truths of common sense by themselves and isolate them 
as cognitions of the Understanding [that] they look odd and turn into half-truths’. Hegel 
1801, p. 99.
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and objectivity] all opposition is suspended, all distinction between the universe as 
constructed by and for the intelligence, and the universe as an organisation intuited as 
objective and appearing independent, is nullified’.55
The danger at this point might seem to be of a cognitive complacency taking 
hold, of what from a Kantian point of view would seem a too hubristic identification of 
thought and being which means we lose the critical vantage point that Kant’s 
epistemology seemed to have given us.56 For did not the opposition of concept and 
intuition serve a vital function in Kant’s account of Reason, requiring us to be forever 
open — ‘receptive’ — to the impact of new experience that challenges anything we may 
think we know? But it now seems that this critical vantage point was an illusion — for 
experience is never directly determined by sense impressions in the way that we thought 
it was, but is always already mediated by pre-existing conceptualisations and theories. 
From a Kantian perspective that might mean that we are ‘locked in’ conceptuality. But 
from the new perspective this just means that the ‘critical’ moment is transferred into a 
process internal to the ongoing activity of conceptualisation and reconceptualisation, and 
transposed from the opposition of concept and intuition to the permanent generative 
tension between the ‘finite’ Understanding and ‘infinite’ Reason.57 It is the function of 
the former to fix the world as a stable series of identities and oppositions, as Kant’s 
account of the categories had suggested — ‘the quite correct meaning that the 
Understanding expresses the principle of opposition and the abstraction of finitude’.58 
Reason complements the activity of the Understanding precisely by cutting across and 
against its work of objectification, forever ‘suspending’ its definitions and limitations. 
Kant’s antinomies provide a demonstration of this process in abstract form — ‘the
55 Hegel 1801, p. 111.
56 O f course we will later go on to consider the possibility that the development of 
Absolute Idealism does indeed terminate in an ‘uncritical positivism’; my purpose here is 
to suggest that this is not necessarily predetermined by its revisions to Kant, to help 
explain why our main protagonists could have, at least initially, taken it up as a 
philosophically radical project.
57 For a reconciliatory reading of Kant and Hegel that makes a similar equation, see 
Adomo 1963, which suggests that the dualist ‘discontinuities’ in Kant’s system perform a 
parallel function to the ‘negative’ moment of Hegel’s dialectic that he wishes to preserve. 
Adomo seems to have thought that Hegel was right to warn against the potential for a 
priori formalism to collapse into an ideological affirmation of the positive; but warns 
against a similar corresponding danger in Hegel’s confident reach for totality.
58 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 79.
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application of Reason as mere negativity to something reflection has fixed’.59 But we 
now see that any particular ‘fixed’ conceptualisation will presuppose a wider network of 
concepts that ultimately amounts to a provisional idea of the systematic totality of the 
world. O f course any such idea is incomplete, inadequate — as Kant says, contradictory. 
But this inadequacy, this contradictoriness, then infects any particular empirical concept 
that we might want to make use of -  the critical opposition of intuition and concept is 
thus transposed into the contradictory unity of any determinate object of experience. 
‘Once antinomy is acknowledged as the explicit formula of truth, Reason has brought the 
formal essence of reflection under its control’.60 Thus Kant is right to restrict these 
determinations of the Understanding to mere ‘appearance’ in that ‘they are nothing in 
themselves’, but he is mistaken in suggesting that Reason can only add them together and 
speculate vacuously about the unknowable greater ‘reality’ behind them.61 Rather, 
Reason’s pursuit of an unconditioned totality is equally necessary and constitutive of the 
world we experience, its orientation to the infinite immanent within it no less than are 
the limitations of the Understanding.
ITlhe Absolute ... is the goal that is being sought; but it is already present, or 
how otherwise could it be sought? Reason produces it, merely by freeing 
consciousness from its limitations. This suspension of the limitations is 
conditioned by the presupposed unlimitedness.62
It is very easy to misread this kind of philosophical rhetoric as an attempt to relaunch the 
kind of unrestrained, abstract metaphysical speculation that Kant had sought to cut off in 
the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ that makes up the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
‘freeing’ consciousness from the ‘limitations’ of the empirically knowable. But it is crucial 
to see that this is precisely not about reopening an abstract realm ‘beyond’ empirical
59 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 83.
60 Hegel 1801, p. 108.
61 ‘The things, as they are cognised by the Understanding, are only appearances. They are 
nothing in themselves, which is a perfecdy truthful result... B u t ... Kant regards 
discursive Understanding, with this sort of cognition, as in itself and absolute. Cognition 
of appearances is dogmatically regarded as the only kind of cognition there is, and 
rational cognition is denied’. Hegel 1802-3b, p. 77.
62 Hegel 1801, p. 93.
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knowledge, but the dynamic search for systematic unity immanent in the experiential 
process. Cognitive progress is on this account driven forward not by the unmediated 
intrusion of new sensible intuitions, but by Reason’s undermining of all fixed identities 
and permanent demand for an ongoing revision of our conceptual schemes in pursuit of 
a deeper unity and coherence of experience. Indeed, the strong claim for this alternative 
account would be that it is Kant’s theory that is more in danger o f slipping into an 
uncritical valorisation of any existing state of empirical knowledge, because it restricts 
Reason to a secondary and superficial unification of taken-for-granted empirical 
conceptualisations that it should be its job to problematise at root.
3. The immorality of ‘morality’
The Schellingian-Hegelian analysis of Kant’s practical philosophy takes aim at the same 
abstract opposition at its heart: the basic structure of ‘formal identity being confronted 
absolutely by a manifold’:
the formal identity is freedom, practical Reason, autonomy, law, practical Idea, 
etc., and is absolute opposite is necessity, the inclination and drives, heteronomy, 
nature, etc. The connection that is possible between the two [formal identity and 
the manifold] is an incomplete one within the bounds o f an absolute antithesis ... 
This formal cognition only brings about impoverished identities, and allows the 
antithesis to persist in its complete absoluteness. What it lacks is the middle term, 
which is Reason; for each of the two extremes is to exist within the opposition as 
an Absolute, so that the middle, and the coming to nothing of both extremes and 
of finitude is an absolute Beyond.63
The suggestion mooted above that Kant’s dualism and relegation of Reason to a 
secondary, regulative role may in fact act to suppress the critical potential of his 
commitment to free self-determination is explicit in Hegel’s famous critique of the 
‘formalism’ of Kantian ethics. As we have seen, Hegel regards Kant’s initial depiction of
63 Hegel 1802-3b, pp. 93-4.
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Reason’s theoretical use as inadequate, on its own terms redundant and ultimately illusory. 
In Kant’s account ‘Reason’ refers only to a call for unity as such, an adding together of 
empirical cognitions delivered to it by the Understanding, but in fitting them together 
into a systemic order it is on Hegel’s description essentially trading on the work that has 
already been done by the productive imagination. Hegel comments that it would be 
interesting ‘to see how this empty unity, as practical Reason, is nonetheless supposed to 
become constitutive again, to give birth out of itself and give itself content’.64 The answer 
is that content arises in the very same way.
The fullest and most suggestive account of this process is found in Hegel’s early 
essay on Natural Law, in which Schelling’s ‘methodological corrective to Kant and Fichte’ 
provides ‘a point of departure for [the] development of his own conception of 
philosophy’s relation to the problems of Sittlichkeit [ethical life]’.65 Famously, Hegel here 
alleged that Kant’s Categorical Imperative that ‘a maxim of your will must simultaneously 
count as the principle of universal legislation’ delivered no moral content — for ‘there is 
nothing which could not be made into a moral law in this way’.66 Defences of Kant 
usually object that the Categorical Imperative was never meant to deliver content of 
itself, but be applied as a test to the maxims that we put before it.67 But this misses the 
point of Hegel’s critique, which turns on the fact that it is the form o f lawfulness or 
consistency that takes the full weight of making any maxim a moral one for Kant. ‘[S]ince 
pure unity constitutes the essence of practical reason, a system of morality is so much out 
of the question that not even a plurality of laws is possible’.68
The most important and overlooked aspect of Hegel’s argument is its implicit 
explanation of why Kant’s rule seems to work — because it trades on the fact that our 
maxims are always already formulated in a moralised language. In theory we could always 
redescribe our rule of action such that the contradiction does not arise,69 but on the
64 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 81.
65 Dickey 1987, p. 90.
66 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 124.
67 See, for example, Neiman 1994, pp. 122-5.
68 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 122. See also p. 172: ‘In the pure reason of formal thinking, all 
multiplicity and all possibility of discrimination must disappear, and it is impossible to 
imagine how such thinking could ever arrive at even a minimal number of rubrics and 
chapter headings... ’
69 For a classic formulation of this objection, see MacIntyre 1966, pp. 197-8.
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whole we don’t, since we naturally use the language of our community. Right and 
morality are always already woven into the very fabric of our lives, setting the very terms 
in which we first understand practical situations. Just as any single empirical concept has 
no direct or self-sufficient relationship with raw intuition but is already implicated in a 
wider systematisation of the whole of experience, so there is no description of a situation 
or act that does not carry with it a whole web of interrelated practical concepts that 
amount to an operative account of the practical world and our place in it.70 In 
characterising a deposit entrusted to me as ‘property’ I have already presupposed a moral 
system which includes the notion of property, and identified the deposit as a particular 
instance of it. It is someone’s property, therefore I must treat it as someone’s property. 
‘In truth, the sublime capacity of pure practical reason consists in the production of 
tautologies’.71 To the formally absolute tautology, ‘A’ is ‘A’, is ‘falsely attributed’ the 
meaning that ‘the material [content] of this proposition, namely property, is absolute’.72 
This illusion, Hegel stresses, is morally pernicious, because it positively facilitates Tad faith’ 
rationalisations of our actions because taking for granted the initial maxim as 
unproblematic, a ‘subterfuge’ transforming ‘the conditioned and unreal into something 
unconditioned and absolute’.
The analytic unity and tautology of practical reason is not only superfluous, 
however, but — in its present application — false, and it must be recognised as the 
principle of immorality ... [TJhrough this confusion of the absolute form with 
the conditioned material, the absoluteness of the form is imposed by stealth on 
the unreal and conditioned character of the content, and this inversion and 
sleight of hand lies at the heart of the practical legislation of pure reason.73
The Categorical Imperative grants absolute status to the moralised conceptualisation of 
the practical situation contained in the original maxim, and diverts us from the real moral
70 Slavoj Zizek calls this ‘the spontaneous ideological narrativization of our experience 
and activity: whatever we do, we always situate it in a larger symbolic context which is 
charged with conferring meaning upon our acts’. Zizek 1993, p. 126.
71 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 123.
72 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 126.
73 Hegel 1802-3a, pp. 125-6.
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question about whether the system of moral terms it invokes is itself justified, or whether 
the conceptualisation upon which our maxim is based is an adequate one. The emptiness 
of practical reason is thus filled in an arbitrary way by particular and partial content upon 
which is bestowed a bogus moral authority.74
Indeed, it seems that Hegel wants to say that no maxim can ever be absolutely or 
finally adequate, just any particular empirical conceptualisation, any finite determination 
of the Understanding, must be partial and subject to suspension by the true operations of 
Reason. ‘[B]efore this formalism can pronounce a law, it is necessary that some material 
[aspect], some determinacy, should be posited to supply its content; and the form that is 
conferred upon this determinacy is that of unity or universality ... But every determinacy 
is particular in itself, and is not a universal; it is confronted by an opposite determinacy, 
and it is determinate only in so far as it has such an opposite’.75 But if one determinacy is 
raised to the absolute, it is merely a particular set off against other particulars as a false 
universal; ‘matter and form contradict one another (inasmuch as the former is 
determinate and the latter infinite)’.76 A determinate ruling of the Categorical Imperative 
thus has the same status as any attempt to objectify an idea of Reason; it falls into 
undecidable antinomies just as did the parallel theoretical claims that Kant rejected in the 
first Critique. The real ‘interest [at stake]’, the question we ‘are solely concerned with’, is 
‘deciding which of the opposing determinacies must be posited’, and this ‘lies outside the 
competence of this practical legislation of pure reason’.77
Interestingly, this argument seems to be unwittingly conceded by one of Kant’s 
most persuasive defenders, Onora O’Neill, who has suggested that the real problem 
identified by Aristotelian and Hegelian critiques of ‘abstract’ moral theories is not that
74 See again MacIntyre 1966, p. 198: ‘The logical emptiness of the test of the categorical 
imperative is itself of social importance. Because the Kantian notion of duty is so formal 
that it can be given almost any content, it becomes available to provide a sanction and a 
motive for the specific duties which any particular social and moral tradition may 
propose’. Similar issues lie behind G. A. Cohen’s more recent complaint that the 
Kantianism of Christine Korsgaard might license the idealised mafioso’s consistently 
upheld ‘code of strength and honour’ — though he I think does not appreciate the 
strength of Kantian arguments that mean there is no going back to simple empiricism. 
See Cohen in Korsgaard 1996, pp. 167-188.
75 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 124.
76 Hegel 1802-3a, pp. 126-7.
77 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 125.
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‘principles’ as such are a problem, but that they are insufficient, and ‘nearly all writers, 
whether or not they advocate ethical principles, have offered too meagre and cursory an 
account of deliberation’.
Situations have no unique descriptions ... Ways of reasoning that assume that 
‘the facts’ of human situations can be uncontroversially stated are likely to be 
dominated by established and often by establishment views. Without a critical 
account of the selection of minor premises, ethical reasoning may avoid 
formalism only to become hostage to local ideology ... Outside closed circles 
there are real and deep controversies about the articulation of cases and 
examples; even well-established descriptions may be evasive, self-serving or 
ideologically contentious ... Every articulation of a situation privileges certain 
categories and descriptions, and is incomplete and potentially controversial even 
among those who inhabit the same circles.78
O ’Neill puts this forward as a critique o f ‘situational’, Aristotelian phronesis-based 
alternatives to principle-based moral theories, but the Hegelian charge is that abstract 
formalism runs the risk precisely of too easily raising contingent, local, partial or self- 
serving maxims to the level of absolute principle and blocking just such a critique.
Fascinatingly, the alternative O ’Neill offers at this point — the critical 
interrogation of particular moral vocabularies that on her account must supplement the 
appeal to universal principle — is itself strikingly Hegelian, invoking a process of 
intersub jective horizon-fusing in terms of the sensus communis of Kant’s third Critique™ To 
engage in this process seriously, Hegel would say, is again to overcome the very 
opposition of form and content, abstract self-consciousness and indeterminate manifold, 
that repeats itself in Kant’s practical philosophy. Indeed, Kant’s sensus communis is most 
clearly realised in the appreciation of beauty, a moment in which ‘the form of opposition 
between intuition and concept falls away’.80 It was for essentially similar reasons that 
Schelling argued that the state, as a historical ‘realisation of an objective order of
78 O ’Neill 1987, pp. 65-6.
79 For the importance of this notion for the development of Hegel’s philosophical 
project see Pippin 1996, pp. 145-153, and Pinkard 2000, pp. 167-9.
80 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 87.
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freedom’, should be ‘like a work of art’, a freely achieved harmony of universal and 
particular, necessity and freedom.81 ‘In his own account of practical rationality’, says 
Franco, ‘Hegel tries to bring universal and particular, form and content, into closer 
conjunction with one another and thus avoid the arbitrariness and subjectivism he 
associates with the standpoint of reflection’.82 Nothing can come of a notion of practical 
reason that ‘abstracts completely from all material [aspects] of the will’.83
Absolute ethical life would be the definitive transcendence of these dualisms — 
not in a simplistic or oppressive holism but a conception of social life that expects the 
negotiation of the relationship between the individual and whole to be an ongoing 
process that cannot be simplistically resolved, and will on the contrary be fatally 
interrupted, by a crude and unsustainable segregation of Understanding and Reason, 
right and virtue, security and happiness. The aim, then, for Schelling and Hegel was 
initially ‘to suspend this endless determination and domination in the true infinity of a 
beautiful community where laws are made superfluous by customs, the excesses of an 
unsatisfied life by hallowed joys, and the crimes of oppressive forces by the possibility of 
activities directed towards great objects’.84 We thus approach the seemingly utopian 
suggestion of a secular harmonisation of morality and happiness — but which we now see 
is based on a not implausible rejection of any morality defined in abstraction from 
questions of happiness as the matter of the will, and equally of any notion of happiness 
seen as in opposition to or indeed in any way accessible apart from one’s sense of one’s 
place and one’s actions in a wider system of morality or ‘ethical whole’.85
And Hegel is clear that the separation of Right and Virtue is logically connected 
to the abstract opposition of morality and nature, practical rationality and felt human 
need, an opposition that permanently cuts off the kind of comprehensive intersubjective 
harmonisation of ends that a full ethical community would require. It is precisely because 
practical reason is reduced to ‘the negative meaning of annulling the determinate’ that
81 Schelling 1802, pp. 109-10.
82 Franco 1999, p. 61.
83 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 124.
84 Hegel 1801, p. 146.
85 ‘If Reason were to arrive at intuition and knowledge that Reason and nature are in 
absolute harmony and are in themselves blissful, it would recognize its wretched 
happiness which does not harmonize with morality, as the nothings that they are’. Hegel 
1802-3b, p. 95.
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‘infinity becomes fixed and divorced from the absolute’ and gives rise to ‘a difference and 
multiplicity’. The result is that of two separate sciences — ‘one concerned with the 
oneness of the pure concept and the subjects (or the morality of actions), the other with 
their non-oneness (or legality)’. But for Hegel ‘neither legality nor morality is absolutely 
positive or truly ethical’;86 this is a distinction that must be ‘demolished’.87 As Franco 
says:
Hegel emphatically rejects the distinction between legality and morality that 
undergirds the political philosophies of Kant and Fichte. Natural law is not 
simply a system of external security, protecting individual rights through the 
imposition of coercive duties. Nor is morality something purely internal and 
individual, divorced from the social or political totality. It is against this 
opposition of a purely external and coercive system of natural law and a purely 
internal and formal system of morality that Hegel’s own understanding of natural 
law based on the idea of absolute ethical life is primarily directed.88
Thus a ‘system of legislation’ must be the presentation of absolute ethical life ‘in the form 
of universality and cognition ... so that this system perfecdy expresses reality, or the living 
customs of the present’.89 The ‘form of the law’ is ‘conferred on a specific custom [JV/te]’, 
which thus takes on ‘the universality or the negative absolute of identity’.90 And the 
critique of the Kantian-Fichtean Kechtstaat is of a piece with the epistemological critique 
of their reduction of Reason to the Understanding.
86 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 130-31.
87 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 163.
88 Franco 1999, p. 195.
89 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 162. Montesquieu is praised for recognising that the content of laws 
arises not from a priori reason nor through unmediated empirical intuition but from ‘the 
living individuality of a people [Volk\\ Hegel 1802-3a, 176-7, translation modified.
90 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 176.
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4. The state of the Understanding
The critique of the ‘machine state’ had become a widespread trope of German 
philosophical discourse at this time.91 Hegel’s earlier essay on The German Constitution had 
noted the
basic prejudice of those recent theories which have been partially translated into 
practice that a state is a machine with a single spring which imparts movement to 
all the rest of its infinite mechanism, and that all the institutions which the 
essential nature of a society brings without it should emanate from the supreme 
political authority and be regulated, commanded, supervised, and directed by it.92
The primary target of such passages is usually taken to be the influential eighteenth 
century cameralist Johann von Justi, who had argued that ‘A properly constituted state 
must be exactly analogous to a machine, in which all the wheels and gears are precisely 
adjusted to one another, and the ruler must be the foreman, the mainspring, or the soul — 
if one may use the expression — which sets everything in motion’.93
The ‘Oldest System Programme of German Idealism’ of 1797, variously 
attributed to Hegel, Schelling and Holderlin but safely taken to be a fair representation of 
the philosophical outlook they originally shared, took aim at this conception, arguing that
there is no Idea of the state because the state is something mechanical’ just as little 
as there is an Idea of a machine. Only that which is the object offreedom is called 
Idea. We must therefore go beyond the state! — Because every state must treat free 
human beings like mechanical works.. .’94
91 For a fascinating account of the development of the organism-mechanism opposition 
in the political thought of the period — one which, indeed, played a significant part in 
suggesting the present study’s line of inquiry — see Rosen 1996.
92 Hegel 1798-1802, p. 22.
93 Quoted in Outram 1995, p. 96.
94 Anonymous 1797, p. 161. For a recent sample discussion of the attribution issues 
raised by this fragment, see Pinkard 2000, pp. 136-137 and note 33.
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The distinction at work here is between systematic wholes whose purpose is immanent 
and self-determined, and mechanical orders in which matter is organised as means to an 
end which is external to and independent of it. The difference between a watch and a 
tree is that while a watch is indeed organised, its parts related to one another in a 
purposive system, a tree organises itself, its parts actually produce each other as parts.
This argument is now given a new philosophical precision — the mechanistic state 
is the embodiment of a collective practical subjectivity locked into the limitations and 
oppositions of the Understanding, externally confronting its ‘content* of material 
interdependency and unifying it under mechanical laws:
Reason is bound to find itself most explicitly in its self-shaping as a people, which 
is the most perfect organization that it can give itself. But the State of the 
Understanding is not an organization at all, but a machine; and the people is not 
the organic body of a communal and rich life, but an atomistic, life-impoverished 
multitude. The elements of this multitude are absolutely opposed substances, on 
the one hand the rational beings as a lot of [atomic] points, and on the other 
hand a manifold of material beings ... The unity of these elements is a Concept; 
what binds them together is an endless domination.95
We have already seen above how apt the connection is, given the tight interrelations 
between Kant’s political theory and his conception of the Understanding as universally 
and necessarily constitutive of the empirical determinacy of externally related objects. 
Similar conceptual equations are implicit in Fichte’s construction o f Natural Right, which 
Hegel more usually takes as his prime target in his early attacks on abstract right. Like 
Kant, Fichte conceives the system of rights as a model for the external coordination of 
outer wills according to necessary and universal laws of freedom. Its necessity and 
universality is deduced as the logical condition of external agency as such, an individual 
conscious will acquiring ‘determinacy’ as a person through an act o f transcendental 
enclosure that ‘draws a line’ to mark a ‘fixed and unchanging’ sphere of free action.96 
Securing this sphere requires a unification of wills into a common power that can enforce
95 Hegel 1801, pp. 148-9 /  p. 114, quoted at Rosen 1996, pp. 147-8, translation modified.
96 Fichte 1796a, pp. 55-6. Revealingly, for Fichte the ‘act of drawing a line’ is ‘the original 
schema for activity in general’.
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a system of positive laws. Any system of such laws must follow with mathematical 
necessity from the original concept of right to which all are transcendentally bound.97 
They arise from its application to a people’s material circumstances and interrelations just 
as automatically as do empirical cognitions from the application of the categories to the 
sensory manifold.98 Likewise, the application of the law to particular cases leaves no room 
for indeterminacy or contestation.99 This rigid determinacy is essential to political 
stability: ‘the slightest influence of arbitrary choice upon law the law makes it unjust and 
brings the seed of discord and the ground of future dissolution into this union’.100 But 
the maintenance of this determinacy necessitates a restriction of the domain of right and 
the reach of its unification of wills to the material domain of external relations. ‘[Ilhe 
concept of right concerns only what is expressed in the sensible world: whatever has no 
causality in the sensible world — but remains inside the mind instead — belongs to another 
tribunal, the tribunal of morality’.101 Thus although the state effects a practical 
reunification of the reason that nature disperses into separate individuals,102 this 
unification cannot be a comprehensive one — ‘[t]he individual’s entire being and essence’ 
does not ‘become fully intertwined with the whole’, only ‘partly so’. He ‘does not entirely 
alienate himself or what belongs to him. For if he did, what would he still possess that 
the state, for its part, would promise to protect?’103
Hegel’s rejection of such an account of political association follows his rejection 
of the account of experience and knowledge with which it is allied. It is based on an
97 ‘All positive laws stand, either more or less directly, under the rule of right. These laws 
do not and cannot contain anything arbitrary. They must exist precisely as every 
intelligent, informed person would necessarily have to prescribe them.’ Fichte 1796a, p. 
95.
98 A people’s law ‘is given to them by the rule of right and by their particular physical 
situation, just as a mathematical product is given by the two factors being multiplied; any 
intelligent being can attempt to find this law.’ Fichte 1796a, p. 99.
99 ‘The civil judge has nothing to do other than to decide what happened and to invoke 
the law. If legislation is clear and complete, as it should be, then the judge’s verdict must 
already be contained in the law’. Fichte 1796a, p. 95.
100 Fichte 1796a, p. 99.
101 Fichte 1796a, p. 51.
102 ‘[I]n the state, nature re-unites what she had previously separated when she produced 
several individuals. Reason is one, and it is exhibited in the sensible world also as one; 
humanity is a single organized and organizing whole of Reason.’ Fichte 1796a, p. 176.
103 Fichte 1796a, pp. 177-8.
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abstract separation of individuals’ outer and inner, material and rational aspects which 
cannot ultimately be sustained. Once this distinction ‘has, in all its unnaturalness, been 
made basic, there is no longer the possibility of a pure mutual connection in which the 
original identity could present and recognize itself.104 Moreover, this absolute opposition 
results in a doubling of the founding moment of the political unity, just as the abstract 
self-consciousness of Kantian or Fichtean apperception is projected into the ghostly ‘in­
ks elf of the noumenal realm that it takes to ground appearances. The limitation of the 
harmonisation of wills to the external aspect only means that the individual’s own 
transcendental involvement in the united will which grounds the state power is split off 
as an external force — ‘the fixed abstraction of the general will must here subsist apart and 
far from the individual, and have coercive authority over him’.105 But in fact the notion 
that we could in this way be ‘coerced’ by the state, as itself the unified ground of our own 
activity, is as incoherent as the notion that our representations could be ‘caused’ by a 
noumenal object behind them, when in fact our own self-conscious activity is the ground 
of all possible causal relationships as well as all particular conceptual determinations. The 
notion of coercion therefore has no place in any comprehensive account of political 
association, since once it is ‘conceived of [vorgestelli\ as part of a system within a totality’, it 
‘immediately cancels [aujhebt\ itself and the whole’.106
Most practically, the supposed determinacy that this restriction buys is a false one 
— the relation of the Understanding to intuitions cannot be presumed to be automatic and 
unproblematic, nor can the application of the concept of Right to particular societies and 
situations be expected to be uncontroversial and secure against arbitrary deviations. Thus 
he charges that under Fichte’s rule ‘the Understanding is bound to fall into the making of 
endless determinations’, for in fact an infinite series of actions may be judged necessary 
for the simple end of maintaining the security of right — ‘there is simply no action at all 
from which the State could not with abstract consistency calculate some possible damage 
to others’.107 Thus the Rechtstaat by its own nature falls into its putative opposite, the 
Police state — ‘Fichte wishes to see the entire activity and being of the individual as such 
supervised, known, and determined by the universal and the abstraction to which he
104 Hegel 1801, p. 144.
105 Hegel 1801, p. 149.
106 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 167. See also pp. 132-6.
107 Hegel 1801, p. 146.
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stands opposed’.108 Kant, it will be remembered, insisted on the distinction between right 
and virtue, and the a limitation of the functions of any public coercive power to the 
former, on the basis that the latter involved imperfect duties and indeterminate notions 
of perfection and happiness that provided an unstable and potentially tyrannical basis for 
legislation. Hegel’s denial of the ability of the Understanding to relate to the manifold of 
sensibility in a direct or unproblematic way without the involvement of reason applies 
equally here — the denial of welfare and happiness as a public function is no guard against 
the indeterminacy and arbitrariness of the state’s application of even its more restricted 
function of maintaining right.109 Here, indeed, is the source of the confusion that is often 
aroused by the authoritarian strains in Kant’s political philosophy — once the 
indeterminacy of judgements as to right and security is admitted, Kant’s Rechtstaat begins 
to look distinctly Hobbesian.110 Again the problem is the attempt to represent the fluid 
unity of the social by a fixed particular relating externally to the rest — the relation is a 
necessarily unstable and arbitrary one.
Thus Hegel’s rejection of any attempt to limit state power through a right-welfare 
distinction should not be seen as necessarily illiberal — rather it is based in a persuasive 
argument that such a distinction does not erect the barriers to tyranny it might pretend 
to. Right and welfare are inextricably intertwined, just as are the Understanding and 
Reason — their active articulation is an inescapable and ongoing process in which there
108 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 171.
109 This remains a live issue — while the classic liberal argument has always been that the 
license of tyranny (and in the twentieth century, totalitarianism) is the over-extension of 
the state’s remit from the protection of (negative) freedom and security to the pursuit of 
its citizens’ happiness and moral development, the reality of contemporary ‘neo­
liberalism’ has furnished ample examples of how the supposedly ‘minimal’ state can 
pursue a potentially limidess extension of its internal and external power in the name of 
‘liberty’ and ‘stability’. See, for example, the ‘war on terror’, or arguments that have been 
made in the UK for the introduction of a compulsory ‘identity card’ system as a 
necessary defence, not restriction, of ‘civil liberties’. Entertainingly, Fichte’s demonstration 
of the minutiae of passport regulations from the pure concept of right is precisely what 
Hegel draws out as an example to prove his general point. Hegel 1801, p. 147, footnote.
110 See, for example, Kant’s notoriously absolute refusal of a right to rebellion: ‘such 
procedures, if made into a maxim, make all lawful constitutions insecure and produce a 
state of complete lawlessness (status natural!s) where all rights cease at least to be 
effectual.’ Kant 1793, pp. 81-2.
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are no guarantees.111 Indeed there is more danger in attempting to banish the 
interference of Reason’s drive for systematic completeness in the illusion that the 
determinations of the Understanding are themselves proof against arbitrariness. For 
Hegel, just as the finite cognitive determinations of the Understanding cannot be 
absolute and must be subject to a recurrent suspension by the activity of Reason, any 
rigid system of laws and personal entitlements could never be the true habitat of 
freedom, for £[i]n a living connection there is only freedom in the sense that it includes 
the possibility of suspending itself and entering into other connections’. But ‘when 
limitation by the common will is raised to the status of law and fixed as a concept, true 
freedom, the possibility of suspending a determinate connection, is nullified’.112 Indeed, 
nothing could more clearly mark Hegel’s distance from both the apriorism of Kant and 
Fichte and the rational jurisprudence of the Leibniz-Wolffian than his declaration that
a perfect legislation, together with true justice in accordance with the determinacy 
of the laws, is inherendy impossible in the concrete realm of judicial authority ... 
in order that the unity of the judicial view of right and judgement may become 
organised as a genuine unity and whole within this multiplicity, it is absolutely 
necessary that each individual determinacy should be modified — i.e. pardy 
superseded as an absolute determinacy with being for itself, which is precisely 
what it professes to be as a law — so that its absoluteness is not respected; and 
there can be no question of a pure application, for a pure application would 
involve positing some individual determinacies to the exclusion of others. But by 
their existence, these others also demand to be taken into account, so that the 
interaction [of them all], determined not by parts but by the whole, may itself be 
a whole. The empty hope and formal conception both of an absolute legislation
111 This will remain Hegel’s position through to the Philosophy of Right, where he makes 
clear that the tendency of the state’s ‘police’ to overreach itself is an inescapable fact of 
political life that must be dealt with according to circumstances — ‘however troublesome 
this may be, no objective boundary line can be drawn’. Hegel 1821a, p. 261, § 234. On 
the general inseparability of ‘right’ and ‘well-being’ in the Philosophy of Right see 
Neuhouser 2000, pp. 238-9.
112 Hegel 1801, p. 145.
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and of a jurisdiction unconnected with the inner disposition of the judge must 
give way to this clear and definite knowledge.113
Thus the laws of a people must be seen as the conscious conceptualisation and 
systematisation of their felt relationships of need and interdependence, an infinite totality 
that cannot every be finally grasped in finite legal determinations but which must be seen 
as immanent in and driving forward the ongoing process of formulation and 
reformulation. In an extraordinary passage, the critical moment is finally transposed into 
history.
... if the whole does not keep pace with the growth of the [people], law and 
custom become separate, the living unity which binds the members together 
grows weak, and there is no longer any absolute coherence or necessity in the 
present state of the whole. In these circumstances, therefore, the [people] cannot 
be understood on its own terms, for its determinacy lacks the life which explains 
it and makes it comprehensible; and as the new custom likewise begins to express 
itself in laws, an internal contradiction between the various laws must inevitably 
arise.114
We can now see that the ‘Understanding-State’ now denotes not only the inadequacies of 
Kant’s and Fichte’s theorisations, but diagnoses the real condition into which actual 
historical states must fall once their structures and determinations become fixed and 
ossified, recalcitrant to Reason’s suspension of its necessarily finite and partial 
articulation of the ethical whole. The forward movement of ethical life is manifested in 
the conflicts that arise between a people and the laws and institutions which no longer 
adequately comprehend its real unity. In such a situation the ‘laws which organise a 
whole ... refer to a shape and individuality which were cast off long ago as a withered 
husk’. Their ‘interest extends only to [individual] parts and they consequently have no
113 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 144.
114 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 176. In reproducing this passage I have inserted ‘people’ in place of 
Hegel’s potentially confusing use of the word ‘individual’ — by which he means, as the 
context makes clear, ‘individuality’ of a Volk.
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living relation [Betfehun^ to the whole, but constitute an authority and rule which are 
alien to it’.115
Hegel’s claim is now that conventional approaches to the study of law and the 
state cannot ‘distinguish correctly between what is dead and devoid of truth and what is 
alive’, and thus run the risk of ‘mistaking the rule of inherently negative laws for the 
living existence of the organization’.116 The epistemological strangeness of this 
predicament becomes clear as we begin to consider why. Hegel’s presentation of the 
possibility of a gap opening between a people and its laws is of a society out of step with 
itself, in some sense internally dislocated. This is an object which cannot be taken at face 
value — ‘the [people] cannot be understood on its own terms’. At such a time ‘it is 
impossible to recognise what is right and what has actuality within a people by looking at 
its laws’.117 Hegel even says at this point that ‘this fundamental untruth of the whole ensures 
that there can be little truth left in the science of philosophy in general’ (my emphasis).118 
The representation of the ‘whole’ through the state and its system of laws is no longer 
adequate; it is not truly the whole but partial, one-sided, a particular alongside other 
fragmented particulars. But note that there is not at this moment a ‘real’ whole that we 
can easily point to — on Hegel’s terms, the people is at this moment hidden from itself, 
indeed, parts of it may ‘falsely’ identify themselves with partial representations of the 
whole. And it would run wholly counter to the direction of Hegel’s philosophical critique 
to suppose that he thinks he can erect an abstract standard of ‘the people’ in their 
pristine organic life against which the present social reality can be judged. Rather it seems 
— and this would be the logical implication of his Schellingian anti-epistemology — that 
Hegel proposes to take the appearance of ‘an internal contradiction between the various 
laws’ as the oblique and strictly immanent sign of the confrontation between the 
Absolute self-determining unity of a people and its fragmentation into externally 
opposed parts. The more we ponder the implications of operationalising such an account 
of social conflict and historical change, the more puzzling and fascinating it becomes, 
paradoxical and perhaps ultimately incoherent, but certainly a radically new
115 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 178.
116 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 177.
117 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 162.
118 Hegel 1803-3b, p. 178. Compare Adorno’s famous ‘the whole is the false’, usually 
taken to effect a clear break with Hegelian orthodoxy. Adomo 1951, p. 50.
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methodological approach that will take us a long way from the empiricist and formalist 
targets of Hegel’s initial critique.
5. Beyond Reflection
Schelling and Hegel believed that with their new philosophical standpoint they had 
superseded not just Kant and Fichte, but the modem entire epistemological paradigm, a 
mode of thought and relation to the world they diagnosed in general terms under the 
notion of ‘Reflection’. Such thought took as its premise the opposition of mind and 
world, subject and object, knowledge and reality, reflexively examining the former in the 
attempt to established the possibility of its adequately mirroring, or grasping, or 
commanding the latter. But its own dualistic foundation meant that no non-arbitrary 
relationship could ever be established. The endlessly reproduced effect of such a 
problematic is a separation of the world into two levels, the world as it ‘appears’ to us, 
and the world as it ‘really’ is, and it is asserted either (sceptically) that we can know only 
the world’s appearances and nothing of its reality, or (dogmatically) that we can gain 
knowledge of the world’s reality by some route other than its appearance to us. Kant’s 
critical philosophy gives the problem its penultimate twist by being dogmatic about the 
world’s appearances and sceptical about its reality — the appearances are held fast to as 
rigid and unbending, ‘objective’, yet still only ‘appearance’, somehow belied by a ‘reality’ 
o f which we know nothing, only ‘subjectively’ projected into an unreachable ‘beyond’ 
(jenseits).n9
In place of this dualistic scenario whereby ‘subject’ and ‘reality’ stood on either 
side of a realm of ‘appearance’, Schelling and Hegel were boldly asserting an 
identification of the principle of subjectivity with the principle of reality. The projection 
of a reality ‘behind’ appearances was meaningless — there is nothing that can be known 
about it, by definition. Anything that one might say, or deduce, or guess, or posit, or 
dream about it can only be a transference of something from the world of appearance 
over into that world of non-appearing reality. On the other side, the positing o f an 
absolute opposition between the subject and what appeared made no sense either. It was
119 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 56.
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a gap that could not be mediated or understood. It downgrades the role of the subject in 
organising its own experience — this is not to be seen as a hopeful reaching after a real 
world beyond experience, but simply the movement by which the real world is 
constituted. Thus the intervening ‘veil’ of appearances is dissipated into an all-encircling 
subject-determined reality, ‘the Absolute’.120 Hopefully the forgoing discussion will have 
given at least a sense that behind such off-putting language there is a serious and at least 
potentially cogent argument: developed carefully from Kant’s analysis of the 
unconditioned act of self-consciousness judgment as the transcendental condition of all 
experience, and all the paradoxes consequent upon the impossibility of ever containing 
this moment within experience, pushed through to the radical conclusion of a 
spontaneous and in some sense rational activity as originally ‘productive’ of, and actively 
and subversively immanent in, all possible objectivity. As Andrew Bowie says, the 
Schellingian ‘Absolute’ should not Te thought of in mystical terms: it is initially just the 
result of the realisation of the relative status of anything that can be explained causally’; 
and ultimately can be seen as exercising a very similar philosophical function as the 
differance of today’s philosophies of ‘deconstruction’.121 And as Charles Taylor recognises 
in the case of Hegel, this project represents one of the first great attempts (he cites also 
Heidegger, Merlau-Ponty, and the later Wittgenstein) to overcome ‘the epistemological 
construal’ by showing that within its own terms the ‘central phenomenon of experience’ 
simply cannot be ‘made intelligible’, and in consequence advancing a ‘new conception by 
reference to ‘what we show to be the indispensable conditions of there being just 
anything like experience or awareness of the world in the first place.’122
It is crucial to my argument that we begin to see in this philosophical effort at 
overcoming theoretical reflection the suggestion of a logically allied political programme 
that relativizes and points beyond the modern state form as it is normally understood. 
The political analogue of a post-epistemological theory of subjectivity and experience is 
thus a kind of post-procedural, post-institutional politics of collectivity and the common 
life. Any political theory that is premised on an initial assumed disunity of individuals can
120 ‘When Reason recognizes itself as absolute ... philosophy begins where reflection and 
its style of thinking ends, that is, it begins with the identity of Idea and Being’. Hegel
1801, p. 112.
121 Bowie 1993, pp. 20-21; pp. 69-75.
122 Taylor 1987, p. 9.
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never make sense of the real possibility of political unity, and is doomed to collapse into 
unstable antinomies of arbitrary tyranny versus rule-less rebellion. Whatever their 
ultimate role or status, the legal rules and formal institutions of modem political life 
cannot be doing all the work of maintaining or unifying a social whole, they must at the 
very least be decentred, reconceived as the expression or reflection or maybe even 
restriction of a more fundamental ground of self-determining social unification and 
organisation. For a more recent (and similarly theoretically adventurous) example of an 
attempt to formulate such an idea we might look to Antonio Negri’s distinction of 
‘constituent’ from ‘constituted’ power, the latter as fixed in the top-down restrictions of 
legal and constitutional structures, the former as the immanent flux of dispersed social 
activity upon which all juridical forms are ultimately based, a dependence which it is in 
their nature to attempt to constrain and deny.123 Constituent power is ‘a productive 
source of rights and juridical arrangement that refuses to close and stubbornly repeats its 
claims in the face of juridical theory’s and political philosophy’s attempts to fix it in a 
final form’;124 Negri links it historically with the forces of radical democracy and 
revolution. And it certainly seems that something like this stood at the centre of the 
German Idealists’ initial shared sense of philosophical and historical mission in the 1790s 
(formed, of course, under the impact of events in France). Schelling, Hegel and Holderlin 
identified themselves as an ‘invisible church’ committed to the historical actualisation of 
the Kant’s ‘realm of ends’ on earth, anticipating a cultural revolution in which, by John 
Toews’ account, ‘the ethic of rational self-determination was to become the collective 
ethos of an immanent historical community’, reconstituting humanity as a ‘community of 
self-legislating moral subjects who would not require the coercive control o f political 
government’.125
But to set a task of moving ‘beyond reflection’ is not to achieve it, nor is it to say 
how it is to be done, nor is it even to say that it can. Charles Taylor says of the primary 
‘experience of the world’ that must be appealed to as we attempt to step out of the 
epistemological snare, ‘[j]ust how to characterize this reality, whose conditions we are
123 See Negri 1992.
124 Negri 1992, p. 25.
125 Toews 1980, pp. 32-7; see also Pinkard 2000, p. 37.
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defining, can itself be a problem, of course.’126 For Schelling and Hegel the problem is 
quite how we are to become conscious or aware or in touch with the Absolute, given that 
by definition it is prior to and outside all acts of consciousness and awareness. And this 
problem will quickly lead them in divergent directions. Most revealingly, perhaps, the 
post-Kantian Idealist movement seems to split exactly down the line it had sought to 
heal in Kant’s own philosophy — with Schelling following a wider Romantic tendency to 
look for the Absolute in intuition, immediacy, art, myth, religion, history, and the Volk\ 
and Hegel finally arriving at his distinctive position with his decisive identification of the 
Absolute with the Concept, and a seemingly correlated political project mediated through 
legalism, constitutionalism, and rational bureaucracy.127
‘From the Kantian philosophy and its highest completion, I expect a revolution 
in Germany’, Hegel had written to Schelling in 1795.128 Almost 50 years later Bruno 
Bauer would write in the Posaune (a text in which Marx is thought to have had a hand) 
that for all its latter found respectability and moderation, at heart Hegel’s philosophy ‘was 
revolution itself.129 In the meantime the radical philosophical project that Schelling and 
Hegel had conceived had, by very different routes, returned both of them to some kind 
of accommodation with the political and social realities of Restoration Prussia. The 
attempt of the Young Hegelians to break out of this circle by recovering the subversively 
critical impulse of the original Idealist programme provided the philosophical context 
within which Marx would conceive his own theoretical ‘revolution in the revolution’.
126 Taylor 1987, p. 9. The most strident of today’s anti-epistemologists such as Richard 
Rorty will insist that we should give up the attempt to say anything about ‘conditions of 
possibility’ at all. But see Bowie 1993, pp. 75-82 for a discussion of the feasibility of such 
a self-denial, and whether Rorty himself manages to maintain it.
127 Toews writes that Hegel soon began to distinguish himself with his ‘overwhelming 
emphasis on the state proper, on law, administration and constitutional structures’, while 
the Romantic strand represented by Schliermacher ‘saw the state simply as the external 
organizational form of the organic communality of a people (Volk) sharing the same 
language and cultural traditions’. Toews 1980, p. 54; p. 57. On the Hegel-Schelling split 
see also Lukacs 1954, pp. 423-47; Harris 1983; and Hofstadter 1984.
128 Pinkard 2000, p. 55.
129 Quoted in Rosen 1977, p. 118.
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3Marx’s student writings 
Berlin, 1837-1841
‘The mistake lay in my belief that matter and form can and must develop 
separately from each other, and so I obtained not an actual form, but something 
like a desk into which I then poured sand.’
— Karl Marx, ‘Letter from Marx to his Father in Trier’ (1837)1
‘ ... the practice [Praxis] of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique that 
measures the individual Existence by the Essence, the particular Actuality by the 
Idea. But this unmediated realisation [unmittelbare Realisirunf\ o f philosophy is in its 
deepest essence afflicted with contradictions.. .’
— Karl Marx, Difference between the Democritean and 
Epicurean Philosophy of Nature (1841)2
1. Law and philosophy
In November 1837 Karl Marx, then a nineteen-year-old undergraduate at the University 
of Berlin, wrote a long letter to his father which survives today as the first substantial 
document of his early intellectual development. Obviously such a fragment cannot be 
made to bear an excess weight of interpretative significance. Nevertheless the letter has 
proved a useful source of information on Marx’s student days as, written at the beginning 
of his second year in Berlin, it recounts the course of his work and ideas during the
1 Marx 1837b, p. 15 /  p. 11, translation modified.
2 Marx 1841, p. 85 /  p. 68, translation modified
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previous 12 months. Moreover, the year under review is a pivotal one: for the letter 
seems to record the moment of Marx’s conversion to some form of Hegelianism. As 
Toews describes, the first Hegelians saw themselves as ca spiritual community of 
individuals who had attained a state of being and knowledge that elevated them above 
the merely finite standpoint of the perceptions, cares, and desires of the empirical ego’; to 
become a Hegelian was to ‘undergo an existential transformation, a philosophical 
“rebirth”.’3 The purple prose in which Marx records this moment customarily opens 
biographical accounts of his life: ‘There are moments in life which are like frontier posts 
marking the completion of a period but at the same time clearly indicating a new 
direction’.4
But what concerns us is the extent to which Marx’s new philosophical identity is 
formed by and articulated with respect to precisely the kind of epistemological and post- 
epistemological issues we have been discussing; issues that, moreover, are brought to a 
head for Marx direcdy through his immersion in the methodological problems of 
studying law.5 Marx’s father, Heinrich, was a prominent practising lawyer in Trier, for 
many years president of the city lawyer’s association, so one can presume that a legal 
career was a natural choice for his eldest son. However, after spending a year in the Law 
Faculty at the University of Bonn and transferring to Berlin in October 1836, the young 
student’s evident preference for ‘jurisprudence’ (Jurisprudent) over ‘administrative science’ 
(Verwaltungswissenschaft)6 had led his father to accept that his best line of advancement 
would be academic.7 This burgeoning intellectual curiosity is described in Marx’s letter as 
he recounts his first semester at Berlin.
3 Toews 1980, pp. 89-90.
4 Marx 1837b, p. 10 /  p. 9.
5 As far as I am aware the only substantial discussion of the methodological and 
philosophical issues raised by Marx’s letter is Kelley 1978, which usefully contextualises it 
within jurisprudential debates of the time. For a general account of the centrality of legal 
debates to the philosophical and cultural life of Germany in this period, a result of the 
centrality of the profession to the development of a public intelligentsia, see Ziolkowski 
1990, pp. 68-80.
6 Marx 1837b, p. 20 /  p. 17.
7 See Heinrich Marx’s letters to Karl dated 28 December 1836, and 3 February 1837, in 
Marx and Engels 1975, Volume 1.
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I had to study law and above all felt the urge to wresde with philosophy. The two 
were so closely linked that, on the one hand, I read through Heineccius, Thibaut 
and the sources quite uncritically, in a mere schoolboy fashion, thus, for instance, 
I translated the first two books of the Pandect into German, and, on the other 
hand, tried to elaborate a philosophy of right covering the whole field of right.8
In Germany during the nineteenth century, as across much of the continent, ‘common 
law’ (gemeines Rechi) consisted in the application of Roman law principles derived from the 
Corpus Juris Civilis, the legal compendium produced in the sixth century on the basis of 
the writings of the great Roman jurists. These comprise the ‘sources’ to which Marx 
refers in his letter, including the ‘Pandects’ on which J. G. Heineccius and A. F. Thibaut 
had both authored standard commentaries. Immersion in such ancient texts was 
considered necessary — and, indeed, almost sufficient — for a career in Prussian law.9 At 
Berlin, Roman Law was taught by Professor Friedrich Carl von Savigny — Marx attended 
his lectures on the Pandects throughout the winter semester, from October 1836 to March 
1837. Savigny was by this time a towering figure in German jurisprudence, as the 
recognised leader of the ‘historical school’ descended from Gustav Hugo. The Roman 
jurists thought of themselves as transcribing the ratio iuris, or law of reason,10 and this is 
how they were read in Europe for much of the medieval and early modem period — it is 
from this basic conception that the natural law tradition stems. But the historical school 
was in general a reaction to the lofty ratiocinations of natural law theory, the 
revolutionary implications of which were still fresh in conservative German minds,11 and
8 Marx 1837b, pp. 11-12 /  p. 10, translation modified.
9 In The Uses of the Study ofJurisprudence J ohn Austin reported of the German universities 
where he had prepared his seminal lectures in the late 1820s, only a few years before Marx 
arrived at Berlin, that ‘litde or no attention is given by the Law Faculty to the actual law 
of the country. Their studies are wholly or almost entirely confined to the general 
principles of Law; to the Roman, Canon, and Feudal Law, as the sources of the actual 
system.’ Austin 1832, p. 381.
10 See Schulx 1936, pp. 34-6, and d’Entreves 1970, pp. 36.
11 This agenda is made explicit in the preface to Savigny’s O f the Vocation of Our Age for 
legislation and the Science of Right, which criticises proposals for codification in Germany 
which Savigny ties to the ‘many plans and experiments of this kind’ put forward ‘since 
the middle of the eighteenth century. During this period the whole of Europe was 
actuated by a blind rage for improvement. But this has provoked a ‘new and more lively 
love for what is permanent ... An historical spirit has everywhere been awakened, and
104
3. BERLIN 1837-41
took its lead, from Hugo’s groundbreaking History of Roman Haiv, which re-situated the 
definitions and propositions of the Corpus in the social and economic life of the Roman 
civilisation in which they had their meaning.
It seems, however, that Marx was incapable of simply accepting law as a body of 
positive knowledge to be learned by rote — somehow, in order to make sense of it, he felt 
he had to think it through from first principles. Marx is not content to trawl through the 
sources ‘uncritically, in a mere schoolboy fashion’ — which remains Savigny’s final 
prescription. Marx’s interest in philosophy may already indicate the influence of Eduard 
Gans, the protege of Hegel lecturing at the same time in Berlin on criminal law. In 1839 
Gans would publish a pamphlet attacking Savigny’s empiricism and uncritical historicism, 
charging that he had attempted to derive the right of property from the mere fact of 
possession.12 This basically Kantian argument13 against Savigny may have then motivated 
Marx’s attempt to devise his own philosophy of right in the winter of 1836-7, and which 
he explicidy aligns with the approach of Kant and Fichte. This ‘opus’, which according to 
Marx ran to three hundred pages, is not extant; all we have is Marx’s own report of it in 
his letter of November 1837. It began with an introduction consisting solely of 
‘metaphysical propositions’ — ‘what I was pleased to call the metaphysics of right, i.e., 
basic principles, reflections, definitions of concepts, divorced from all actual right and 
every form of right; as occurs in Fichte’.14 The aim was ‘the formation of the concept of 
right’. Marx’s description of the main part, which he calls the philosophy of right itself, is 
more confusing: an examination of the development of ‘positive Roman right’. This was 
divided into a ‘formal’ and ‘material’ section. The theory of formal right presented ‘the 
pure form of the system in its sequence and interconnections, its subdivisions and scope’,
leaves no room for the shallow self-sufficiency above alluded to’. Savigny 1814, pp. 20- 
22.
12 See Kelley 1978, p. 48; Hoffheimer 1995, pp. 42-6.
13 See Kant 1797, pp. 386-7, 6:229-30: ‘the question “what is right?” might well 
embarrass the jurist'll he does not want to ... refer to what the laws in some country at 
some time prescribe. He can indeed state what is laid down as right {quid sit iurus), that is, 
what the laws in a certain place and at a certain time say or have said. But whether what 
these laws prescribed is also right, and what the universal criterion is by which one could 
recognize right as well as wrong (iustum et iniustum), this would remain hidden from him 
unless he leaves those empirical principles behind for a while and seeks the sources of 
such judgments in reason alone...’
14 Marx 1837b, p. 12 /  p. 10, translation modified.
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that is, ‘the necessary architectonics of conceptual formations’. The second ‘described the 
content, showing how the form becomes embodied in its content’, or, ‘the necessary 
quality of these formulations’.15 Marx compares this distinction to that maintained by 
Savigny in the Treatise on Possession (which he had read subsequendy), and indeed the 
project itself sounds not unlike Savigny’s System of Modem Roman Law (which was 
published in 1840, but may be a good indicator of the style of the lectures which Marx 
heard Savigny give on the subject).16 Marx illustrates his approach by laying out his 
division of contracts, ‘the basic plan of which borders on that of Kant’, which indeed it 
does.17
But by the time of recalling this in his letter Marx has renounced the entire effort, 
having seen, he says, the ‘falsity of the whole thing’. ‘[I]t became clear to me that there 
could be no headway without philosophy’, and he returns again to metaphysical first 
principles, but soon gives this up completely and seeks comfort in his poetry. The verses 
which Marx compiled at this point are still with us, and although short on literary merit, 
do contain an interesting Epigram on Hegel’ which portrays the philosopher as 
pompous and obscurantist.18 At this point, according to his letter, Marx liad read 
fragments of Hegel’s philosophy, the grotesque and craggy melody of which did not 
appeal to me’.19 The lines,
Kant and Fichte soar to heavens blue 
Seeking for some distant land,
But I seek to grasp profound and true 
That which — in the street I find
15 Marx 1837b, pp. 12-17 /  pp. 11-15, translation modified.
16 Savigny 1804, pp. 3-4; p. 71. The System of Modem Roman Law seems to retain the 
distinction — see Savigny 1840, p. 2-3.
17 See Kant 1797, pp. 433-4, 6:285-6.
18 ‘Since I have found the Highest of things and the Depths of them also/Rude am I as a 
God, cloaked by the dark like a G od/ ... Words I teach all mixed up into a devlish 
muddle, /  Thus, anyone may think what he chooses to think ... Now you know all, since 
I’ve said plenty of nothing to you!’ Marx 1837a, p. 576 /  p. 644.
19 Marx 1837b, p. 1 8 / p .  16.
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have been interpreted as an early formulation of Marx’s materialism,20 but as David 
McLellan points out, this portrayal of Hegel as short-sighted and prosaic can only be 
negative in intent given Marx’s continuing commitment to an idealist romanticism.21 It is 
interesting nevertheless that they suggest that Marx is aware of the Hegelian critique of 
the Kantian-Fichtean projection of a ‘beyond’ (Jenseits),22 and indeed that he goes along 
with the lumping together of the two thinkers -  it is between Kant and Fichte on the one 
side, and Hegel and Schelling on the other, that the important philosophical batde lines 
are drawn.
In fact these verses, written around March 1837, probably give us Marx at the last 
moment before the decisive ‘break’ — in the letter of November he is critical of their 
pervasive ‘idealism’.23 Soon afterwards he falls ill, and moves to the outskirts of the city, 
and it is here that he falls ‘into the arms of the enemy’. It is now that the definitive 
inversion of heaven and earth, transcendent and immanent takes place.
A curtain had fallen, my holy of holies was rent asunder, and new gods had to be 
installed. From the idealism which, by the way, I had compared and nourished 
with the idealism of Kant and Fichte, I arrived at the point of seeking the Idea 
[die Idee] in actuality [im Wirklichen] itself. If previously the gods had dwelt above 
the earth, now they became its centre.24
It is telling that these lines have confused some commentators into suspecting that Marx 
here already is looking for a ‘materialism’ beyond Hegelian idealism. For it is true that they
20 Johnston 1967, p. 261.
21 McLellan 1970, pp. 65-6. One needs only to recall Kant’s opposition of eyes that ‘scan 
the heavens’ to the ‘mole-like gaze’ of the practical empiricist to realise that the same 
image can be employed with opposite evaluations. Kant 1793, p. 63.
22 See Hegel 1802-3b, p. 56, on Kant, Fichte and Jacobi: ‘Reason, having in this way 
become mere Understanding, acknowledges its own nothingness by placing that which is 
better than it in a faith outside and above itself, as a beyond [to be believed in]’.
23 Marx 1837b, p. 1 7 / p .  15.
24 Marx 1837b, p. 18 /  pp. 15-16, translation modified. Marx also makes the important 
association of idealism with a ‘beyond’ in describing his earlier romantic poetry: ‘owing to 
my attitude and whole previous development it was purely idealistic [idealistisch]. My 
heaven, my art, became a world beyond [jenseits], as remote as my love’. Marx 1837b, p.
11 /  p. 10.
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do seem to point Marx in what would subsequently be seen as a ‘materialist’ direction — 
away from the construction of abstract principles and for the concrete investigation of 
society and history. And it is also clear that Marx at this point seems to reserve the term 
‘idealism’ for the subjective idealism of Kant and Fichte. But at the same time we must 
recognise that this turn to the immanent is wholly in accordance with the project of both 
Schelling and Hegel’s post-Kantian project.25
The impact of Hegel’s vision of Reason’s immanence in the legal forms of the 
social world is clear as Marx renounces his earlier attempts to draw up a pure 
metaphysics of right.
[I]n the concrete expression of a living world of ideas, as exemplified by right, the 
state, nature, and philosophy as a whole, the object itself must be studied in its 
development; arbitrary divisions must not be introduced, the rational character of 
the object must develop as something imbued with contradictions in itself and 
find unity in itself.26
Marx’s earlier separation of ‘the formation of the concept of right’ from the examination 
of ‘positive right in its conceptual development’ now seems to him hopelessly wrong­
headed, as does his analytical separation of the latter into its formal structure and material 
content:
The mistake lay in my belief that matter and form can and must develop 
separately from each other, and so I obtained not an actual form, but something 
like a desk into which I then poured sand. The concept is indeed the mediating 
link between the form and content. In a philosophical treatment of right, 
therefore, the one must arise in the other; indeed, the form should be only the 
continuation of the content.27
25 Teeple contends, implausibly I think, that ‘[i]f Marx had actually adopted Hegel’s 
idealism he would not be able to say that he intended to “seek the idea in reality itself”. 
Teeple 1984, p. 8.
26 Marx 1837b, p. 11 /  p. 12, translation modified.
27 Marx 1837b, p. 15 /  p. 11. Compare Donald Davidson ‘On the Very Idea of a 
Conceptual Scheme’: ‘We cannot attach a clear meaning to the notion of organizing a 
single object (the world, nature etc.) unless that object is understood to consist in other
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Marx identifies the fundamental cause of his problems in the terms of a well-known 
Hegelian slogan: ‘the same opposition between what is [des Wirklicheti[ and what ought to 
be [Sollendet^ , which is characteristic of Idealism, stood out as a serious defect and was 
the source of the hopelessly incorrect division of the subject-matter’.28
It is striking that Marx appears to triangulate his new position retrospectively as 
an overcoming of both the empiricism of conventional legal studies and the Kantian- 
Fichtean formalism of his initial idealism, in this way echoing the narrative of Hegel’s 
Natural Law essay.29 Thus empiricism seems to be regarded by Marx as philosophically 
insufficient, unable to give an account of its own or its object’s status. Kantian idealism is 
ultimately rejected as turning on an incoherent opposition of conceptual ‘form’ and 
material ‘content’ that restricts theoretical and practical success to an impossible ‘ought’. 
And his new oudook is set forth in terms that foreground the abolition of any notion of 
a ‘Beyond’ and its replacement with a new principle of immanence.
O f course, we cannot claim to know much of how Marx read Hegel in 1837 on 
the basis of a few pointed declarations such as this. But even at this stage we can see the 
broad parameters of Marx’s intellectual course being laid down in this dual critique of 
empiricist historicism and formal idealism. First of all, law itself is decentred. Relations of 
right and their positive codification are no longer seen as the foundation and truth of the 
social, but a formalised expression of real human relationships, merely one ‘moment’ in a 
larger ‘totality’. Secondly, this totality is not static, but assumed to undergo a continual 
‘development’. If the totality is a complex one, we may assume that this development will 
be uneven, creating the possibility of spheres and relationships that are out of step with 
one another. Finally, and most crucially, rational criticism of what exists cannot proceed 
from a timeless normative ideal against which reality is measured. Any such ideal must be
objects. Someone who sets out to organise a closet arranges the things in it. If you are 
told not to organize the shoes and shirts, but the closet itself, you would be bewildered. 
How would you organize the Pacific Ocean?’ I think the similarity of the metaphors is 
not fortuitous — a very similar philosophical point is being made. Davidson 1974, p. 192.
28 Marx 1837b, p. 10 /  p. 11, translation modified.
29 Marx claims in his letter to have ‘got to know Hegel from beginning to end, together 
with most of his disciples’ while recovering from his illness in spring 1837, and it seems 
plausible that, as a law student, this would be natural text for Marx to turn to for a 
possible solution to his problems. The salience of Hegel as a solution to the 
methodological dilemmas of jurisprudence may also have been a key message in the 
lectures of Gans, who ‘thought he found a way of overcoming the gap between existing 
law and the philosophical study of law.’ Hoffheimer 1995, p. 21.
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fundamentally empty, gaining an illusory substantiality only from an assumed content 
that fills it arbitrarily — a carefully carpentered desk with its drawers full of sand. 
Opposition of the rational to the real must be seen in terms of immanent contradictions 
within that developing reality, grounded in and expressing new forms of life appearing 
within the dead shell of the old. The old paradox of classical jurisprudence, so offensive 
to positivism — lex injusta non est lex, an unjust law is no true law — is embraced by Marx as 
the revolutionary dynamic of history itself.
2. Epicurean atomism: objectifying the contradiction
Karl Marx’s doctoral dissertation of 1841 on the Difference between the Democritean and 
Epicurean Philosophy of Nature is without out a doubt one of the most difficult texts to 
understand in his entire corpus. The reasons for this are multiple: the text itself is 
incomplete, with some chapters and most of an important appendix missing completely; 
although some of Marx’s notebooks are extant, beyond this very little is known about 
Marx’s life and intellectual activities during the period of its preparation; the dissertation 
itself concerns the teachings of thinkers of antiquity, Democritus and Epicurus, whose 
own teachings have come down to us only in fragmentary, uncertain, and often 
inconsistent second hand reports and reconstructions; and the discussion is couched in a 
dense, intricate and firequendy obscure conceptual terminology. Moreover, in addition to 
the formidable challenges attending any attempt to work out just what Marx is trying to 
say in this work, further questions then arise as to the assessment of what he might have 
been trying to do in saying what he says — given that any explicit setting out of his 
purposes might have been ruled against by considerations of both academic and political 
propriety.
For these reasons, accounts of Marx’s early writings usually focus on marginal 
elements of the document whose import seems clearer — some highly rhetorical attacks 
on religion, and some passing comments on the situation of the ‘Young Hegelian’ school 
and their relationship to Hegel. Insofar as the main argument of the dissertation itself has 
been explored, it has given rise to an extraordinarily diverse array of differing 
interpretations, one might even say, a near-exhaustive matrix of just about every logical 
possibility. Commentators have produced direcdy opposed accounts of whether Marx 
means to uphold the arguments of Epicurus or criticise them, and given reasons (on both
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sides) that he sees Epicurus as essentially a materialist, an idealist, an anti-Aristotelian 
atomist, a crypto-Aristotelian anti-reductionist, a proto-Kantian, a proto-Hegelian, or a 
proto-Young Hegelian. Thus it has been suggested that Marx sees Epicurus’s emphasis 
on free will as providing a philosophy of self-consciousness analogous to that of Young 
Hegelians such as Bruno Bauer, and that he for this reason praises Epicurus,30 or 
criticises him from a more conventional Hegelian standpoint;31 that Marx sees in 
Epicurus an anti-essentialist, anti-teleological materialism that provides an attractive 
alternative to Democritus’s ultimately idealist teleological determinism,32 or that Marx 
sees the contradictions in Epicurus as demonstrations of the inadequacy of atomism, 
compared to an Aristotelian essentialism that Marx prefers,33 or that he sees Epicurus as 
attempting to devise a non-reductionist materialism that is akin to Aristotle’s and so can 
be weilded against Hegelian idealism;34 that Marx sees Epicurus as essentially a Kantian 
whom he criticises from a Hegelian standpoint,35 or that the contradictions in Epicurus 
are Hegelian rather than Kantian and so for this reason to be welcomed,36 or that 
Epicurus is an idealist and for this reason preferred by Marx to the materialism of 
Democritus and Aristotle.37 I do not claim to present here a final resolution to these 
debates, nor to answer every question that might be asked about Marx’s dissertation, and 
certainly not to provide elucidation of its every aspect or passage. I do however think 
that if we keep a clear view of what Marx actually does and claims to do in the text, and 
particularly suspend our demands for answers to questions that it may not have been 
Marx’s intention to provide, then we can draw out some themes and lines of argument 
that, even if they may not get to the bottom of what Marx was trying to achieve with this 
piece of work, do at least give evidence of some of the issues and ideas that he was 
concerned with during his time in Berlin.
30 McLellan, 1970, pp. 83-5.
31 Browning 2000; Kouvelakis 2003, pp. 241-2.
32 This seems to have been the basis of Althusser’s interest in Epicurus during his later 
years. See Suchting, forthcoming.
33 Meikle 1985, pp. 8-9,15.
34 Bums 2000
35 McCarthy 1997, pp. 27-40.
36 Fenves 1986.
37 Pike 1999, pp. 21-30.
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Marx states explicitly at the outset of his study that it falls broadly in line with 
Hegel’s account, and works within the same general approach.38 But Marx will be able to 
go into more detail, and as a result bring out the importance of these systems for the 
overall history of Greek thought in a way that the ‘giant thinker’ may have overlooked. 
Given Marx’s situation of his text in this way, then Hegel does indeed seem to be the 
most obvious point of comparison for gaining a perspective on both the presuppositions 
and the innovations of Marx’s contribution. But for these purposes our most useful 
starting point will not be what we take to be Hegel’s positions on ‘idealism’ versus 
‘materialism’, ‘essentialism’ versus ‘atomism’, ‘contradiction’ versus ‘non-contradiction’ 
(and as we shall see, such categories simply cannot capture the complexities involved), 
but what Hegel actually said about the subject at hand: the philosophies of Democritus 
and Epicurus.
Hegel's history of atomism
Hegel presents the atomistic theory of Leucippus and Democritus as part of the cycle of 
early Greek philosophy which traces a dialectic of ‘pure thought’, moving through the 
opening categories of his own Logic: ‘Being’ (Parminedes), ‘Becoming’ (Heraclitus), and 
‘Being-for-self [.Fiirsichsein] which with Leucippus ‘became the absolute determination’.39 
As with all such conceptual staging posts in the historical development of philosophy, 
the atomic principle ‘must from this point of view always exist; the being-for-self must in 
every logical philosophy be an essential moment’; and yet at the same time ‘it must not be 
put forward as ultimate’ as the atomists did.40
This limitation is enacted historically by the failings of Leucippus and Democritus 
to deploy their theory of atoms in explanatory accounts of any actual natural phenomena. 
The atoms may be thought of materially, but Hegel stresses that the atom is 
‘supersensible, purely intellectual... an abstraction of thought’. They are not observable,
38 Marx 1841, pp. 29-30 /  pp. 13-14.
39 Hegel 1832-4a, p. 302
40 Hegel 1823-4a, p. 302. In the Logic, atomism makes an appearance to illustrate the 
point at which Being-for-self issues into the category of ‘Quantity’, through the positing 
or repulsion o f ‘many Ones’. Hegel 1830a, p. 155, § 98.
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and the philosophy is consequently ‘not at all empirical’ — ‘the atom and the vacuum are 
not things of experience’.41 It is ‘the instinct of Reason to understand the phenomenal 
and the perceptible’;42 but it is clear that there is no possibility of ‘getting any further’ on 
this basis.43 From these two abstract and ultimately empty principles — atoms and the 
void — we cannot derive anything concrete and determined: ‘Whence comes the 
determinate character of plants, colour, form?’ All we can ever say is that the atoms 
arrange themselves in such a way as to produce such effects -  this is no explanation but 
‘tautological’ redescription. Leucippus and Democritus attempted to resolve this problem 
by ascribing different shapes and qualities to the atoms,44 but this development was 
‘inconsistent’ with the atomic principle ‘for as the entirely simple One, the atoms are 
perfecdy alike, and thus any such diversity cannot come into the question’.
Standing at the end of a historical process that the pre-Socratic philosophers 
mark the beginnings of, Epicurus takes up this theory again, but this time within the 
general form of the post-Aristotelian systems, with their symptomatic emphasis on moral 
and theoretical epistemology (‘the criterion’) and its instantiation in the individual subject, 
resulting in the signature ideal of the sophos or ‘wise man’.45 This reshaping of the agenda 
of philosophical thought is an effect of the break-up of the original Greek unity of the 
individual with their ethical community and natural environment — now inquiry is 
devoted not to nature as it is in itself, and its reflection in the organisation of the polis, 
but concerns how we come to have knowledge of the true and the good, and how this 
principle is realised in the scientific or ethical practice of specific individuals.46 As is often 
pointed out by commentators, the metaphysical principles of Epicureanism are neatly 
paralleled by what is seen as one of the earliest explicit developments of a ‘social 
contract’ theory of the origins of political society, and the general recommendation of
41 Hegel 1832-4a, p. 303.
42 Hegel 1823-4a, p. 308.
43 Hegel 1823-4a, p. 306.
44 Hegel 1832-4a, p. 307.
45 Charles Taylor ascribes to the Epicureans and Sceptics of late antiquity a harbinger of 
the ‘self-defining subject of modem epistemology’ and the modem self ‘defined in 
abstraction from any order’. Taylor 1975, p. 7.
46 Hegel 1823-4b, pp. 234-5. See also Hegel 1823-4a, pp. 474-5. Marx sets down his own 
version of this narrative in his ‘preparatory notebooks’ — see Marx 1839, pp. 432-441 /  
pp. 39-47.
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privatism and political quietism as the way to true happiness and fulfilment. This is seen 
as the basis for their popularity amid the instabilities and disappointments of late 
republican Rome.47 For Hegel, this is part of the transition to the abstract individualism 
of the Roman Empire48 — indeed, with Epicurus we are really dealing not with Greek 
thought but with a ‘philosophy of the Roman world’.49
Epicurus thus stands at a more advanced stage in the historical development of 
spirit, for Hegel, who has much to say about his ethical principles; but his reversion to 
the philosophical atomism of Democritus and Leucippus is at this point in time an even 
more impoverished metaphysical standpoint, and he falls into the same problems. When 
the time comes to ‘indicate the relation of atoms to sensuous appearance, to allow 
essence to pass over into the negative’, Epicurus ‘rambles amidst the indeterminate 
which expresses nothing ... All particular forms, all objects, light, colour, &c., the soul 
itself even, are nothing but a certain arrangement of these atoms’.
... there is no bridge from this to that, or what results is simply empty tautology, 
according to which the parts are arranged and combined as is requisite in order 
that their appearance may be what it is. The transition to bodies of concrete 
appearance Epicurus has either not made at all, or what has been cited from him 
as far as this matter is concerned, taken by itself, is extremely meagre.50
For Hegel ‘the determination of the atoms, as originally formed in this or that fashion, 
and having original magnitude of such and such a kind, is a purely arbitrary invention’ 
making any attempt to apply the Epicurean principle utterly ‘wearisome’. Epicurus’s most 
famous innovation, the deviation of atoms from the straight line, seems to be regarded 
by Hegel as just another inconsistency into which he is forced by these problems, along 
with the ascription of different qualitative properties. ‘Atoms, as atoms, must remain 
undetermined; but the Atomists have been forced to take the inconsistent course of
47 See Godwin 1994, pp. xxiv-xxv.
48 For this narrative see Hegel 1956, especially pp. 278-280. For its take-up by Bauer, 
usually seen as a key influence on Marx’s choice of subject, see Rosen 1977, pp. 149-151.
49 Hegel 1823-4b, 234-5.
50 Hegel 1823-4b, p. 291.
114
3. BERLIN 1837-41
ascribing properties to them: the quantitative properties of magnitude and figure, the 
qualitative property of weight’.51
Overall Hegel’s complaint is that Epicurus’s system is ultimately ‘devoid of 
thought’ and by definition unable to ‘reach the Concept’, for ‘the philosophic activity of 
Epicurus is ... directed towards the restoration and maintaining of what is sensuous’.52 
At a less developed stage in philosophical history, the earlier atomism of Democritus and 
Leucippus is credited with giving the ‘ideal principle’ of ‘being-for-self its first clear 
expression in the form of pure thought.53 But Epicurus’s primitive empiricism ‘banishes 
thought as implicit, without its occurring to him that his atoms themselves have this very 
nature of thought; that is, their existence in time is not immediate but essentially mediate, 
and thus negative or universal’.54
Marx’s correction
It is this assessment of Epicurus, as a dogmatic and unsophisticated empiricist who 
cannot reflect on the status of his atomic principle as a construction of consciousness, 
that Marx seems to want to take issue with. Marx opens his thesis by drawing attention to 
the outstanding ‘riddle’ that while Democritus and Epicurus ‘teach exactly the same 
science’, an atomistic metaphysics, they ‘stand diametrically opposed’ on epistemological 
issues — that is, ‘all that concerns truth, certainty, application of this science, and all that 
refers to the relationship between thought and reality in general’.55 Having posed this 
problem of epistemological discontinuity, Marx returns to the atomistic theories of both 
thinkers, and argues that the differences between them are not marginal and contingent 
but of the utmost importance. The interest of Epicurus lies in the fact that his very 
paradoxes written into his metaphysical model embody or enact the fact that, as Hegel
51 Hegel 1823-4b, p. 288.
52 Hegel 1823-4b, p. 279. See also p. 277: ‘[Tjf existence for sensation is to be regarded as 
the truth, the necessity for the Concept is altogether abrogated, and in the absence of 
speculative interest things cease to form a united whole’.
53 Hegel 1823-4a, p. 302.
54 Hegel 1823-4b, p. 292.
55 Marx 1841, p. 38 /  p. 25.
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had pointed out, no ‘bridge’ can be made from his atomistic principles and the realm of 
sensible of appearance.56 In doing so, Marx says, Epicurus’s atom ‘objectifies’ 
{yergegenstandlicht) a contradiction between ‘essence’ and ‘existence’, or matter and form,57 
or the movement by which the atom is necessarily ‘alienated’ (entfremdet) from its 
‘concept’. It is in the declination of the atom from the straight line that ‘the contradiction 
inherent in the concept of the atom is realised’, and the ‘essence of the repulsion’ is 
grasped ‘in sensible form’.58 Similarly Epicurus confronts and squarely affirms the 
paradox that the atom in its concept must be without qualities, and yet it must take on 
qualities if it is to acquire an ‘externalised existence’.59 ‘[Ojnly the atom with qualities is 
the complete one, since the world of appearance can only emerge from the atom which is 
complete and alienated \entfremdeteri\ from its concept’.60 The Epicurean distinction 
between atomic ‘principles’ (Atomoi archai) and ‘elements’ (atoma stoicheia) marks 
opposition between the atom as the indeterminate basis of appearance and as the 
qualitative element of appearance.61 And in making time the ‘absolute form’ of 
appearance despite its definitional exclusion from ‘the world of essence’, Epicurus
56 Warren Breckman suggests that an influence here may be Feuerbach’s 1833 History of 
decent Philosophy, which argued that ‘atomism cannot provide a basis for a metaphysical 
system, because he could see no way to proceed from the quantitative enumeration of 
atoms to qualitative universal concepts’. Breckman 1999, p. 266. Certainly this is possible 
(we know from his notes that Marx did study Feuerbach’s History), but as we have seen 
this is a standard Hegelian (and, indeed, Leibnizian) argument against pure atomism and 
mechanism. Hegel explicitly endorses Leibniz’s criticism of modern mechanism along 
these lines at Hegel 1830a, p. 190, § 121, Addition.
57 ‘[T]he whole Epicurean philosophy of nature is pervaded with the contradiction 
between essence and existence, between form and matter’. Marx 1841, p. 71 /  p. 56.
58 Marx 1841, p. 53 /  39, translation modified. It is notable that Marx himself here
dismisses Bayle’s argument that Epicurus posits the declination in order to explain the 
phenomenon of human freedom, as ‘superficial’ and ‘disconnected’. Marx 1841, p. 48 /  
p. 35. Therefore I think we must conclude that David McLellan’s account misses the 
point where it states that Marx ‘unfavourably contrasts the mechanistic determinism of 
Democritus with the Epicurean ethic of liberty’ and that ‘Marx’s preference seems to be 
arrived at solely by comparing their two respective moral philosophies; as philosophers 
and natural scientists, Democritus is by far the more profound and original thinker’. 
McLellan 1972, p. 83.
59 Marx 1841, p. 54 /  p. 4.
60 Marx 1841, p. 62 /  p. 48.
61 Marx 1841, p. 62 /  p. 48.
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‘makes the contradiction between matter and form the characteristic of the nature of 
appearance’.62
I think that if we stand back from the detail of Marx’s commentary and focus on 
what he explicidy presents as the central argument, it is impossible to avoid the 
conclusion that we are being presented with a variant of the two-tiered structure of 
‘Reflection’ and its paradoxes that Schelling and Hegel had diagnosed and that we 
discussed in the previous chapter. This is already implicit in Hegel’s original account of 
the atomism of both Democritus and Epicurus, who are seen to posit atoms and the 
void as the principles ‘behind’ sensible appearances, and, in Hegel’s account, get into 
similar difficulties when it comes to accounting for their knowledge of such principles or 
their connection with the appearances they are said to explain or ground. Marx’s strong 
interest in this issue is suggested by the fact that he seems here to be raising the 
discussion to a more rigorous level by translating it into the terms of Hegel’s ‘Doctrine of 
Essence’,63 the middle section of the Logic that is precisely concerned with the analysis of 
‘reflective’ forms of consciousness and experience. According to Hegel this part of the 
Logic deals with ‘the categories of metaphysics and of the sciences generally’ as ‘products 
of the reflecting Understanding’.64
The ‘Doctrine of Essence’ thus provides the canonical reformulation of the 
critique of ‘reflection’ and the ‘Understanding’ in Hegel’s mature system, and can be seen 
as the primary location for the central anti-epistemological and indeed post-metaphysical 
argument that drives his whole philosophical project. Thus Stephen Houlgate presents it 
as Hegel’s central anti-foundationalist text: Hegel ‘believes that the concept of essence itself 
undermines the illusion (which it generates) that there is a foundation to being, and so 
prepares the way for the non-foundational insight that being is itself self-determining 
reason’.65 And as Pippin reiterates, ‘contrary to many popular interpretations of Hegel 
(the ones with world spirit behind the scenes, pulling the historical strings), it appears
62 Marx 1841, pp. 63-4 /  pp. 48-9.
63 For Marx ‘the concept of the atom’ is ‘the world of essence’. Marx 1841, p. 63 /  p. 48. 
Compare Hegel 1812, p. 483: ‘essence has passed over into Existence; Existence is 
essence’s absolute emptying of itself or self-alienation’.
64 Hegel 1830a, p. 179, § 114. See also Hegel 1830a, p. 176, § 112, addition: ‘The 
standpoint of essence is in general the standpoint of reflection’.
65 Houlgate 1999, p. 28.
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that the major point of this section is to argue that there is literally nothing “beyond” or 
“behind” or responsible for the human experience of the world of appearances’.66
I do not propose here to embark on a detailed tour of the intricate structure of 
this construction, only to emphasise the general argument that seems to me to be the 
unmistakable framework of Marx’s analysis of Epicurus. The ‘Doctrine of Essence’ is 
premised upon the lesson of the previous, first section of the Logic, the ‘Doctrine of 
Being’, that for reality or experience to be determinate it cannot be a matter of simple 
immediacy (as, for example, given in pure sensible intuition or abstract speculation) but 
must be organised (in itself, or by us)67 into ‘essences’ of which the simple ‘immediacy’ of 
appearance is the ‘mediation’.68 A salient example of this move from simple immediacy 
to necessary mediation would be Kant’s demonstration of the insufficiency of sense data 
to determine a coherent experience. And indeed this is the section of the Logic that most 
closely corresponds to the activity of the Understanding as analysed by Kant, whose 
account of our self-conscious organisation of sensible intuitions into determinate 
interacting substances (behind which lurk mysterious ‘things-in-themselves’) is a prime 
case of ‘external’ reflection or ‘essence-positing’ for Hegel. But the same can be said for 
Descartes’ argument for ‘matter’ as the permanent substance beneath the flux of 
changeable phenomena, or Leibniz’s argument for the necessity of supplementing simple 
Cartesian materialism with a higher order of teleological ‘forces’ — the positing of 
‘essence’ behind the simple and immediate is a basic move that we find rehearsed in an
66 Pippin 1989, p. 206. See also Zizek 1993, pp. 125-161, for a discussion which, in a 
similar vein, endeavours to show how the ‘Doctrine of Essence’ provides a critique of 
just the kind of metaphysical ‘essentialism’ that Hegel is often assumed to be 
propounding himself.
67 The discussion of Hegel’s Logic is necessarily equivocal about whether it is describing 
the possible ways in which we as subjects might conceptualise our experience (the ‘path 
of knowing’), and the necessary interconnections between them, and the possible ways in 
which the ‘reality’ might be organised in itself (the ‘movement of being’). This is because 
the post-epistemological conclusion it arrives at and is seeking to demonstrate is that 
there is no meaningful distinction to be drawn between the two. If we don’t keep this 
end-point in mind, however, it can along the way easily look like either a Kant-style 
epistemology of necessary categorical determinations or (more notoriously) a divine or 
metaphysical master plan of everything that exists or happens.
68 ‘[W]hen we say ... that all things have an essence, what we mean is that they are not 
truly what they immediately show themselves to be. A mere rushing about from one 
quality to another ... is not the last word; on the contrary, there is something that abides 
in things, and this is, in the first instance, their essence’. Hegel 1830a, p. 176, § 112.
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extraordinary variety of complex and sophisticated ways in the history o f modem 
philosophy. In all cases, however, a two-tiered structure is set up, which Hegel follows 
through some familiar modulations: ‘essence’ as the timeless substrate of a thing, 
persisting through its temporal changes; or as the real truth of a thing set apart from its 
mere ‘semblance’ \Scheiri\\ or as what is ‘expressed’ by its necessary ‘appearance’ 
[Erscbeiningj; or as the essential core of a thing amid its contingent ‘accidents’ or 
inessential ‘properties’ or ‘qualities’; or as the explanatory ‘ground’ or ‘reason’ for 
observed or external ‘existence’.
There is a sense in which Hegel is here describing the necessary moves or 
structures by which experience, or the world, is organised, conceptually determinate, the 
way in which the identities of things are fixed: ‘an absolute determination of essence 
must be present in every experience, in everything actual, as in every concept’.69 But, as 
we already saw in the initial early discussion of the ‘finite’ reflective Understandings, this 
take on, or aspect of, the world is also necessarily partial, insufficient, problematic. And, 
again as we saw in the previous chapter, the basic way in which this emerges is when we 
come to find the contradiction inherent in any attempt to fix a thing’s identity in this way, 
to say what anything ‘really’ is:70 ‘every determination, every concrete thing, every 
Concept, is essentially a unity of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which, by 
virtue of the determinate, essential difference, pass over into contradictory moments’.71 This 
becomes clear once we look at this basic structure or activity at the generalised and 
abstract level that Hegel is drawing us to. Dividing any particular thing into an ‘essence’ 
and ‘appearance’ leaves us no way of confidently accessing its essence because it is, by 
definition, not what appears to us. If to overcome this scepticism we attempt to set up a 
concept of a thing’s essence that we arrive at independendy of its appearance, then we 
have no way of relating the former to the latter, of explaining why it nevertheless appears 
the way it does, unless we somehow restate the content of the appearance in different 
terms as the essence, thus producing an empty tautology. Looked at from the point of 
view of the thing-in-itself, it seems that there is some reason why it cannot simply remain 
‘in itself, but has to go out of itself, into something that it is not. The relationship 
between essence and appearance, or essence and existence, is thus always arbitrary or
69 Hegel 1812, p. 440.
70 Pippin 1978.
71 Hegel 1812, p. 442.
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contradictory. But it is important to recognise that this is not where Hegel leaves things; 
this is a contradiction that must indeed be resolved, in the realisation that there cannot be a 
direct, one-to-one relationship between essence and its appearance or existence, between a 
‘concept’ and its ‘object’, but that any ‘positing’ or ‘expression’ of essence presupposes or 
responds to the appearance or existence of other essences. This is the conclusion of the 
‘Doctrine of Essence’ — that an account of the world as a set of essences that we posit 
behind appearances or that express themselves in existence cannot ultimately be made 
sense of on its own terms; rather, we have to see essence-appearance and essence- 
existence relationships not as independent but as always related to one another within a 
reciprocal and indeed circularly self-undermining process of conceptual identification or 
expression. This all-encompassing, unanchored interdependence is what Hegel calls 
‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit) as ‘the perfect interpenetration’ of ‘reflection-into-otherness’ and 
‘reflection-into-self ,72 the point at which we see essence not as ‘behind’ or ‘beyond’ 
appearance and existence but in them, ‘at one with’ them, as the immanent principle of 
the discerning and organising activity by virtue of which the world has determinacy.73
The overall lesson of the Doctrine of Essence, then, is that ‘essentialism’ — which
must be understood as taking in the whole array of possible two-tiered ontologies,
epistemologies, identificatory and explanatory structures — is a necessary but also
necessarily inadequate moment in the conceptualisation or determination of the world by
self-consciousness or Reason.74 The sign of its inadequacy is the contradictions,
antinomies, paradoxes and arbitrariness that it falls into if it takes its determinations as*
absolute — that is, if it sticks to the view that the world or experience ‘really is’ finally and 
independendy ordered according to the essences it has posited. And these contradictions
72 Hegel 1812, p. 480.
73 See again Pippin 1989, p. 211: ‘there are no “essences” beyond or behind the 
appearances, at least none that can do any cognitive work. There are just the appearances; 
but the necessary determinacy of these supposedly immediate appearances indicates that 
essence, or some fixed structure that will allow identification and so determinacy, already 
“shines through” such appearances, is an inherent, necessary characteristic for illusory 
being just to be, and so requires its own account. That is, illusory being, immediate 
appearances, themselves can be said to be determinate only as a moment of the subject’s 
^^determining’.
74 ‘Only the Concept is what is true, and, more precisely, it is the truth of Being and of 
Essence. So each of these, if they are clung to in their isolation, or by themselves, must be 
considered at the same time as untrue — Being because it is still only what is immediate, and 
Essence because it is still only what is mediated.’ Hegel 1830a, p. 134, § 83, Addition.
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are resolved, or suspended, in the realisation that this distinction of things into two 
aspects is itself nothing other than Reason’s aU-determining activity, a realisation that we 
might then even say was drivenforwardby the unfolding of these contradictions.
A full appreciation of the centrality of this ‘lesson’ for understanding Hegel’s 
thought has a number of important consequences, some of which we will return to. My 
concern for the moment is to bring home my suggestion that its articulation is the central 
issue in Marx’s discussion of Epicurus. If this is tight, then we would have to conclude 
that Marx’s interest in Epicurus has very little to do with an opposition of ‘materialism’ 
and ‘idealism’ simply conceived;75 that any critique of ‘atomism’ is directed less at its 
mechanistic, anti-organicist assumptions, as Marx’s readers usually expect, and more at its 
implication in a wider problematic of ‘reflective’ dualist ontologies and epistemologies 
that would take in all ‘essentialisms’, including simple Aristotelianisms;76 and that the 
interest of Epicurus’s ‘contradictions’ will be in the way they make explicit the necessary 
aporias and insufficiencies of such accounts, and mark or prefigure their suspension.
We have seen clearly that for Hegel, both the early atomism of Democritus and 
Leucippus and the later version propounded by Epicurus fall down in their failure to 
make sense of the relationship between the atomic principles of the world and the 
diversity of experienced phenomena. Hegel is forgiving in the former case, for the early 
atomists are at least credited with formulating the atomic idea in a pure and clear form, in 
a way analogous to a moment in the Doctrine of Being, and though they themselves 
recognised the insufficiency of this formulation in their efforts to relate it to phenomenal 
experience, the time was not yet ripe for any more developed form of thought and 
scientific investigation to take hold. By the time we come to Epicurus, however, we have
75 Teeple concludes from a discussion of Marx’s dissertation that ‘[i]n discovering [the 
source of human self-consciousness] in the materiality of existence, he situates himself 
well outside the camps of idealism and Hegelianism ... the salient characteristics of his 
philosophy in this his earliest piece of work would appear to be directly opposite to those 
he is commonly assumed to hold’. Teeple 1984, p. 17. But it is clear that insofar as 
‘matter’ appears in Marx’s dissertation it is, as it is in Hegel, the abstract opposition of 
form. See Hegel 1812, pp. 450-1.
76 Scott Meikle suggests that Marx’s dissertation is about ‘the opposition between 
essentialism and atomism’, without mentioning that Marx presents Epicurean atomism 
precisely in terms o f ‘essence’. Meikle 1985, pp. 8-9, p. 15. More tellingly for the overall 
plausibility of his attempt to understand Marx through the lens of Aristotelian 
essentialism and organicist teleology, Meikle later acknowledges, parenthetically, that 
‘Aristotle considers essences as unities, whereas Hegel and Marx consider them as unities 
in contradiction’, and that ‘[wjhere this leaves us I am not sure’. Meikle 1985, p. 37.
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seen the accomplishments of Plato and Aristotle, a sophisticated theorisation of the 
relationship between the inner truth of the world and its deceptive appearance, and a 
response to it that rearticulates the two sides in an extraordinarily productive paradigm 
for the scientific empirical investigation — both, in their different ways, advanced 
instantiations of an ‘essence’ logic. Accordingly Hegel seems to view Epicurean atomism 
as a falling away from this complexity, perhaps on account of its involvement in a general 
disintegration of the great philosophical and scientific syntheses of the peak of Greek 
thought into the partial, fragmented, and individualised principles of the post-Hellenic 
era. Hegel’s presentation of Epicurus as a philosopher who refuses to think seriously 
about the difference between his atomic principles at what appears suggests that he 
would view his thought as a regression to a simplistic logic of immediate Being, one that, 
moreover, asserts that Being is sensibility (not thought, as had the earlier atomists), and 
incoherendy attempts to reduce his atoms to such a form.
Against this background Marx’s partial rehabilitation of Epicurus and argument 
for his philosophical and historical significance, I would suggest, involves a far more 
modest revision to the Hegelian narrative than many people have tried to assert, but 
which is all the more interesting for that. For Marx seems to be suggesting that 
Epicurus’s very insistence on the objective being of both his atomic principles and the 
world of appearance means that the strange dances that he puts his atoms through in 
order to sustain this connection effectively dramatises or embodies the necessary 
contradiction of essentialism, the paradox that on its own terms an essence can neither 
be detached from nor the same as its appearance or existence. Thus while Democritus 
had stalled at the point of relating his atoms to the phenomenal world, and equivocated 
as to the epistemological status of the latter, Epicurus sees clearly the contradiction 
inherent in positing atoms as the essence of what exists and so has his atoms act out this 
contradiction through their abrupt swerves from their defining course and inexplicable 
transmutation from abstract, eternal principles into the material substrate of qualitative, 
temporal existence. It is as if you had asked for a physical demonstration or metaphorical 
illustration of the conceptual arguments of Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence’, in what Hegel 
would have called ‘picture thinking’, or as Marx puts it, ‘in sensible form’. In explaining 
his system Marx calls attention to what he describes as ‘a procedure typical of Epicurus’:
He likes to assume the different determinations of a concept as different
empirical existences ... Every moment of the development is at once
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transformed in his hands into a fixed reality which, so to say, is separated from its 
relations to other things by empty space; every determination assumes the form 
of isolated individuality... 77
Epicurus then does constitute a clear advance on earlier atomism, and perhaps even in 
some respects on Plato and Aristotle, because of the way he confronts the necessary 
contradictoriness of all essentialism. Marx’s suggestion is that insofar as Democritus came 
up against the contradiction inherent in his determination of atomic principles as the 
essence of what appears, he equivocated sceptically on the status of those appearances, 
or weakened his atomic theory to the status of a hypothesis subject to their further 
empirical investigation 78 Epicurus is repeatedly distinguished by his insistence on the 
necessity of the atoms’ appearance, and on the equal necessity that it is contradictory. 
‘Epicurus was the first to grasp appearance as appearance \Erscheinung als Erscheinung\, that 
is, as alienation of the essence’,79 and ‘the contradiction between existence and essence, 
between matter and form, which is inherent in the concept of the atom’.80
77 Marx 1841, p. 60 /  p. 46.
78 Marx 1841, p. 58 /  p. 44.
79 Marx 1841, p. 64 /  p. 49.
80 Marx 1841, p. 61 /  p. 47. O f all the commentators Peter Fenves focuses most clearly
on this explicitly central theme of Marx’s dissertation. But he confuses this by attempting
to resolve Democritus and Epicurus into ‘proto-Kant’ and ‘proto-Hegel’ respectively, on 
the basis that the former pursues empirical science and the latter ‘affirms contradiction’. 
This seems to me an unsustainable equation — it is surely only a distorting prejudice of 
unsympathetic Anglo-Saxon commentary that Hegel renounces any interest in ‘the 
investigation of material conditions and the determination of specific laws which govern 
matter’ in the way that Epicurus does, and whose ‘science’ consists solely in the 
construction of a pure ‘dialectical logic’. Fenves 1986, p. 433-4. Indeed, Hegel’s own 
comments on Kant’s antinomies in the Introduction to the Science of Logic suggest that, if 
anything, Marx is presenting Epicurus as closer to Kant: ‘the general idea on which he 
based his expositions and which he vindicated, is the objectivity of the illusion and the necessity 
of the contradiction which belongs to the nature of thought determinations ... This result, 
grasped in its positive aspect, is nothing else but the inner negadvitiy of the 
determinations of their self-moving soul, the principle of natural and spiritual life’. Hegel 
1812, p. 56. But there are of course numerous irreconcilable differences as well, and it 
would be wholly contrary to the whole premise of Hegelian history of philosophy to 
assume that the entire Dissertation is a ‘drama Marx creates among the German 
philosophers as they wear the masks of the ancient Greek atomists’. Fenves 1986, p. 434. 
I think we do much better by taking seriously what Marx says he is doing in the 
Dissertation rather than searching insistently for hidden correspondences with debates 
with which we think we may be more familiar.
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But this does not mean that with this affirmation of contradiction we have 
reached a final resting point. For there remains the symptomatic anomaly in the 
Epicurean system in which Marx finds confirmation of his overall interpretation: the 
‘meteors’. The heavenly bodies give rise to superstitious astrological speculation, arousing 
popular fears and disturbing the subject’s atara>y. Epicurus wants to resist this but cannot 
account for the meteors within the terms of his own atomistic theory; his response is to 
insist on a range of possible explanations for the meteors, none of which are pre­
eminent. ‘The great number of explanations, the multitude of possibilities, should not 
only tranquillise our minds and remove causes for fear, but also at the same time negate 
in the heavenly bodies their very unity, the absolute law that is always equal to itself.81 
Marx argues that the reason the meteors threaten the Epicurean system is precisely 
because, as matter endowed with individual substantiality, they represent a resolution of 
the contradiction inherent in the atomic principle. ‘In them all antinomies between form 
and matter, between concept and existence, which constituted the development of the 
atom, are resolved; in them all required determinations are realised’.82 ‘Matter; having 
received into itself individuality, form, as is the case with the heavenly bodies, has ceased to 
be abstract individuality; it has become concrete individuality, universality Epicurus recognises 
that ‘here his previous categories break down’, but he also recognises that any resolution 
of this contradiction would mean an abandonment of the principle of abstract individual 
self-consciousness (abstract-ein^elen Selbstbewujltein) — and this is why he must dissolve the 
meteors into a multitude of indifferent possible explanations.84
In the meteors, therefore, abstract-individual self-consciousness is met by its
contradiction, shining in its materialised form, the universal which has become
81 Marx 1841, p. 69 /  p. 54.
82 Marx 1841, p. 70 /  p. 55. See also p. 71 /  p. 56: ‘we have seen how the whole 
Epicurean philosophy of nature is pervaded with the contradiction between essence and 
existence, between form and matter. But this contradiction is resolved in the heavenly bodies, the 
conflicting moments are resolved.’
83 Marx 1841, p. 71 /  p. 56.
84 ‘We must avoid the prejudice that investigation into these subjects cannot be 
sufficiently thorough and subtle if it aims only at our own ataraxy and bliss. On the 
contrary, it is an absolute law that nothing that can disturb ataraxy, that can cause danger, 
can belong to an indestructible and eternal nature. Consciousness must understand that 
this is an absolute law’. Marx 1841, pp. 69-70 /  p. 54.
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existence and nature. Hence it recognises in the meteors its deadly enemy, and it 
ascribes to them, as Epicurus does, all the anxiety and confusion of men. Indeed, 
the anxiety and dissolution of the abstract-individual is precisely the universal. 
Here therefore Epicurus’ true principle, abstract-individual self-consciousness, 
can no longer be concealed. It steps out from its hiding place and, freed from 
material mummery, it seeks to destroy the reality of nature which has become 
independent by an explanation according to abstract possibility.. .85
It is at this point, then, that we can see the full force of the connection between the 
contradictions of atomism and the contradictions of abstract individuality. It is not 
simply that the atoms provide a vivid metaphor for the atomisation of society into self- 
sufficient individuals — it is that its dualistic conceptualisation of the world is internally 
connected to the historical fact of societal fragmentation and alienation from nature. This 
is ultimately what Marx seems to find so fascinating and exciting in Epicurus — not just 
that he sees most clearly the contradictory nature of essentialism, but that he sees the 
need to hold fast to and defend the necessity of this contradiction ifh.& is to preserve the 
ataraxy or independent self-satisfaction of the individual self-consciousness.86 ‘If abstract- 
individual self-consciousness is posited as an absolute principle, then, indeed, all true and 
real science is suspended inasmuch as individuality does not rule within the nature of 
things themselves’.87 The reverse corollary, of course, is that any genuine overcoming or 
suspension of the dualistic consciousness of reflection and the contradictory logic of the 
world of essence entails a similar transcendence of the principle of abstract individuality 
and an attainment of ‘concrete individuality, universality. But for Epicurus, for whom abstract 
individuality and atomism are given as absolute, a resolution of their contradiction haunts 
the system as a threatening ‘Beyond’, posing a challenge to their status that he must seek 
to dissolve.
85 Marx 1841, p. 72 /  p. 56.
86 Marx 1841, p. 70 /  pp. 54-5.
87 Marx 1841, p. 72 /  p. 57, translation modified.
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3. Religion and self-consciousness
As the embodied resolution of the contradictions of essentialism, the Epicurean meteors 
exhibit what for abstract-individual self-consciousness is the unacceptable conclusion of 
the ‘Doctrine of Essence’: that matter and form, essence and appearance, individuality 
and universality are ultimately part of an interconnected whole whose ultimate 
foundation is the Concept, the all encompassing self-determination of thought itself. As 
we saw in the last chapter, the basic philosophical platform upon which this famous 
construction has been erected is Kant’s account of the spontaneous activity of self- 
consciousness (Selbstbeivufitein) in organising experiences under a conceptual order, minus 
his insistence on the primary role of sense intuition as in some way providing an external 
basis for this organising activity. Hegel clearly confirms this continuity in the Science of 
ljogic as he introduces his ‘Doctrine of the Concept’, closely recapitulating the immanent 
critique of Kant that we previously considered:
The Concept, when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is 
none other than the I  or pure self-consciousness. True, I have concepts, that is to 
say, determinate Concepts; but the I  is the pure Concept itself which, as Concept, 
has come into existence ... It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be 
found in the Critique of Pure Reason that the unity which constitutes that nature of 
the Concept is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the 
I  think,, or of self-consciousness ... Thus we are justified by a cardinal principle of 
the Kantian philosophy in referring to the nature of the I  in order to learn what 
the Concept is.88
If we are right that this is broadly the direction in which Marx is facing in his discussions 
of Epicurus, then his more commonly quoted declarations against religion in the
88 Hegel 1812, pp. 583-5, translation modified. Compare this presentation of the Kantian 
doctrine of apperception by Henry Allison (who holds no brief for Hegel): ‘this identical 
“I think” ... can be regarded as the form or prototype of the analytic unity that pertains 
to all general concepts. In fact, it is simply this analytic unity considered in abstraction 
from all content. Consequently, the consciousness of the “I think” is itself the thought of 
what is common to all concepts ... the doctrine of apperception ... is most properly 
viewed as a formal model or schema for the analysis of the understanding and its 
“logical” activities’. Allison 1983, p. 144.
126
3. BERLIN 1837-41
Dissertation acquire new clarity and force. We see that they arise from a conviction of, 
not only the incompatibility of religious belief with human self-determination, but from a 
precise logical analysis of religious belief as itself a necessary function of humanity’s 
misrecognition of its own theoretical and practical determinations as manifestations of an 
external ‘beyond’.
Marx’s comments on religion arise in relation to the Appendix to the 
Dissertation, a critique of Plutarch’s attack on Epicurus. Plutarch’s argument against 
Epicurus was that by removing the force of divine reward and sanction from the world, 
he had left moral men without expectation of reward, and the wicked unrestrained by 
fear of punishment.89 Marx devoted an extra chapter to the argument because ‘this 
polemic is by no means isolated, but rather representative of an espece, in that it most 
strikingly presents in itself the relation of the theologising Understanding \des 
theologisirenden Verstandes\ to philosophy’.90 The chapter is lost, but a flavour is given by 
the preview given by Marx in his Foreword and by some of the notes to the chapter 
which remain. In his Foreword Marx argues against the practice of bringing ‘philosophy 
before the forum of religion’, and quotes Hume on the ‘sovereign authority’ of reason,91 
Epicurus against popular superstition, and Aeschylus’ Prometheus’ explicit hatred of ‘the 
pack of gods’. The first, in this context, we might take as similar in thrust to Kant’s 
insistence on the autonomy of reason.92 The interest of the second is that it rejects 
superstition not as irrational but as itself impious. The third, Marx himself holds up as an 
‘aphorism against all heavenly and earthly gods who do not acknowledge human self- 
consciousness [das menschliche Selbstbewuftteiri\ as the highest divinity’.93 Only a couple of 
pages of the Appendix itself are extant, along with a few endnotes, but they are highly 
suggestive. It is clear that Marx’s target is Plutarch’s justification of ‘the terrors of the 
underworld’ as ‘the means to reform the evil-doers’,94 which Marx rejects as essentially a
89 See Jones 1989, p. 91.
90 Marx 1841, p. 30 /  p. 14, translation modified.
91 ‘ ... Tis certainly a kind of indignity to philosophy, whose sovereign authority ought every 
where to be acknowledged, to oblige her on every occasion to make apologies for her 
conclusions and justify herself to every particular art and science which may be offended 
at her.. .’ Hume 1739-40, p. 298.
92 Compare Kant 1781a, p. 643 (A738/B766).
93 Marx 1841, p. 30 /  p. 14.
94 Marx 1841, p. 74.
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conjured mechanism of external coercion (the first section is entitled Tear and the Being 
Beyond \dasjenseitige Wesen]\95 But most revealing is a long endnote which cites two of 
Schelling’s earliest essays, ‘O f the I as a Principle of Philosophy’ and ‘Philosophical 
Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism’, in arguing against the notion of an external, 
objective God, and an extraordinary discussion of the ontological proof which subverts 
Kant’s famous refutation at the same time as arguing that proofs of the existence of God 
in fact prove the opposite.
Fragmentary as all this is, I think it does give us some important clues as to 
Marx’s thinking beyond his evident antipathy to religion in all its forms. In particular, 
Marx’s appeal to the early Schelling has barely, if ever, been commented upon. Clearly 
there was easy polemical sport to be had in attacking the most prominent philosophical 
apologist for theological orthodoxy and political restoration by raising the ghost of his 
radical youth.96 But Marx’s usage of these texts seems to imply a deeper identification 
with the early project of German Idealism, and, moreover, with that project’s 
understanding of itself as a radicalisation of the Kantian theory of self-determining 
apperception.97 As Robert Pippin has most of all emphasised:
For Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, it was Kant’s characterization of the subject as 
spontaneously apperceptive that, more than anything else, convinced them that 
Kant had not simply destroyed the classical metaphysical tradition, but had begun
95 Marx 1841, p. 102 /  p. 88. Marx again cites a key text of the Enlightenment, Holbach’s 
System of Nature: ‘Nothing ... could be more dangerous than to persuade man that a being 
superior to nature exists, a being before whom reason must be silent and to whom man 
must sacrifice all to receive happiness’.
96 Marx quips that ‘Herr Schelling ... should be advised to give again some thought to his 
first writings’. ‘When the time had already come in 1795’ to — as Schelling then put it — 
‘proclaim to the better part of humanity the freedom of minds’, Marx asks rhetorically, 
‘how about the year 1841?’ Marx 1841, p. 103 /  pp. 89-90.
97 This is reinforced by a letter Marx wrote to Feuerbach in late 1843, urging him to 
publish a direct attack on Schelling’s stand of that time, because, Marx says, Feuerbach is 
‘Schelling in reverse’. Quite what Marx means by this in relation to Feuerbach is not wholly 
clear but it is notable how positively Marx speaks of Schelling’s earlier philosophy: ‘[t]he 
sincere thought... of thz. young Schelling for the realisation of which however he did not 
possess the necessary qualities except imagination’. Marx 1843k, pp. 350-1 /  pp. 59-60.
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a new kind of ‘philosophy of subjectivity’, and the a priori restrictions set by such 
an apperceiving subject for what could count as an object of knowledge.98
It is usually assumed that we must look to Bruno Bauer for an understanding o f Marx’s 
appeals to ‘self-consciousness’ in this period, and no doubt his thought is Marx’s most 
immediate influence and reference point here; but my suggestion is that we cannot 
understand its real import unless we keep in mind the extent to which Bauer’s 
‘philosophy of self-consciousness’ was not a suigeneris creation from nothing but a 
deliberate and explicit attempt to recoup the subversive potential of German Idealism.99 
Detached from this background, quotations of Bauer’s pronouncements in the 
commentaries often end up sounding like exaggerated slogans in celebration o f some 
vague ideal of individual liberty and freethinking. But I think it is clear that at the root of 
Bauer’s proclamations that self-consciousness is ‘the all-powerful magician, who creates 
the world and all its differences’, and so ‘the sole force of the world and history’100 is the 
original Kantian idea of self-consciousness as spontaneous, outside and unrestricted by 
the empirical world we experience, and in some sense the ground or organising principle 
of that world. Obviously Bauer had his own things to say about this and his own 
particular uses and developments of it,101 but my attempt to trace these commitments 
back to source here is offered as a corrective to the common way of dealing with Young 
Hegelian writers which I think often fails to see the wood for the trees.
This is made clear, I want to argue, by Marx’s treatment of the ‘proofs of the 
existence of God’. These, he says, can be taken in two ways. Either
1 they are ‘mere hollow tautologies amounting to a statement: ‘that which I 
conceive for myself in a real way, is a real concept for me’; or
98 Pippin 1987, p. 32.
99 As is most obviously the objective of his ‘Trumpet of the Last Judgment’ pamphlet, 
with its mock-outraged insistence that ‘Hegel is not only set against the state, the Church 
and religion, but opposes everything firm and established, for — as he asserts — the 
philosophical principle has in recent times become general, all-encompassing and without 
limit’. Bauer 1841, p. 185.
100 Quoted at Rosen 1977, pp. 77, 73.
101 For useful accounts of Bauer’s writings at this time see McLellan 1969; Rosen 1977; 
Moggach 1996; Leopold 1999; Moggach 2003.
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2 or they are ‘proofs of the existence of essential human self consciousness [des msentlichen 
menschlichen Selbstben>uflteins\, logical explanations of it.
An attempt to reconstruct what Marx may have in mind here will be easier if we take 
these in reverse order.
God as the reality of self consciousness
Marx’s claim that the classic rationalist proofs for the existence of God boil down to a 
proof for the essentiality of human self-consciousness invokes a central premise of the 
whole German Idealist movement, which, particularly in its more radical expressions, saw 
this as one of the most important achievements of Kant’s first Critique,102 Though we 
may not be in the habit of formulating the point in this way, it is clear that the effect of 
Kant’s critique of rationalist theology is to re-construe the notions of unconditioned 
totality upon which its proofs of God were based as ‘ideals of reason’ projected by our 
own self-conscious theoretical relation to the world.103 Especially if we join the post- 
Kantians in dropping the distinction between the organisation of our own experience 
according to Reason and the organisation of the world as it is ‘in itself then we arrive at a 
direct identification of self-consciousness and Reason (and in Hegel’s final formulation, 
the ‘Concept’) with what we had always thought of as ‘God’. This was, wrote Schelling in 
the first of the essays quoted by Marx (both date from 1795), ‘a philosophy which asserts 
as its highest principle that the essence of man consists of freedom and only freedom, 
that man is not a thing, not a chattel, and in his very nature no object at all’,104 but in this 
‘languid age’ its full implications had yet to be clearly developed and pushed forward by 
those who, like he, identified themselves as ‘true friendfs] of critical philosophy’.105
102 In the words of Heinrich Heine’s History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany of 1834,
‘[t]his book is the sword with which deism was executed in Germany’. ‘As a result of his 
argument, this transcendental ideal being which we have hitherto called God is nothing 
but a fiction’. Heine 1834, p. 203, p. 208.
103 See especially Kant 1781a, pp. 551-563, A567-91/ B595-619.
104 Schelling 1795a, p. 68.
105 Schelling 1795b, p. 156.
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‘O f the I as a Principle of Philosophy’, sets out to provide ‘an exposition of 
Kant’s philosophy based on superior principles’ to those advanced by those less 
imaginative followers who ‘have comprehended the letter but not the spirit of their 
teacher’.106 Schelling sets out to identify the self-evident starting point of all human 
knowledge — that which ‘should reign — in the entire cosmos of our knowledge — as 
original ground \Urgrund\ of all reality’. This principle must be wholly independent, and in 
no need of any other principle to be known — therefore ‘the principle of its being and the 
principle of its being known must coincide ... Its assertion must be contained in its 
thought; it must create itself through its being thought’.107 It must be outside the usual 
chain of conditions or experienced objects, or otherwise it would be dependent and so 
not furnish the ultimate ground that is sought:108
The chain of our knowledge goes from one conditional [piece of] knowledge to 
another. Either the whole has not stability, or one must be able to believe that 
this can go on ad infinitum, or else there must be some ultimate point on which 
the whole depends. The latter, however, in regard to the principle of its being, 
must be the direct opposite of all that falls in the sphere of the conditional, that 
is, it must be not only unconditional but altogether unconditionable ... whatever is a 
thing [Dinj>\ is at the same time an object of knowing, therefore a link in the chain 
of our knowledge. It falls into the sphere of the knowable. Consequently it 
cannot contain he basis for the reality \R£algrund\ of all knowledge and 
knowing.109
106 Schelling 1795a, p. 67.
107 Schelling 1795a, pp. 71-2.
108 Andrew Bowie has suggested that this core insight of German Idealism can be 
compared to ‘the initial thesis of Thomas Nagel’s The View from Nowhere ... namely, that 
subjectivity cannot be understood in the same manner as the world of objects, because 
that which understands objects cannot have the same cognitive status as what it 
understands’. Bowie 1993, p. 15. Bowie presents this as a Fichtean idea but of course its 
basis lies in Kant. Thus Sebastian Gardiner (with no thought of trying to read the 
stronger theses of later idealism back into Kant) says that in the first Critique self- 
consciousness appears ‘as the encompassing ground of the world of objects’, though not 
included in it. Gardiner 1998, p. 160.
109 Schelling 1795a, p. 72-3.
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It is for this reason that Schelling rules out ‘God, insofar as some define Him as an 
object’ since as object God ‘would fall into the sphere of our knowledge; therefore He 
could not be for us the ultimate point on which the whole sphere depends.’110 It is this 
argument that Marx quotes as a decisive argument against the notion of an objective 
God. Ruling out also the subject conceived as an item within empirical consciousness, 
Schelling concludes that only the ‘absolute I’ can serve this epistemological function, as 
‘that which furnishes validity in the entire system of my knowledge’:111 ‘My I contains a 
being which precedes all thinking and imagining. It is by being thought, and it is being 
thought because it is ... It produces itself by its own thinking — out of absolute 
causality*.112
This essay thus presents a seminal statement of the Kantian account of 
transcendental apperception and its role in providing the basis for the ‘determinate and 
express principle’ of German Idealism that ‘the world is the product of the freedom of 
intelligence’. 113 The absolute is that which binds all such particulars together into a 
unified experience, and so cannot be any one of those particulars, is indeed related 
negatively to them. Schelling goes on to note that were we to equate this absolute I with 
God, then indeed would could say that God was ‘the real ground of my knowledge’, but 
only insofar as God is denied as an object, and identified with human self-consciousness. 
And he goes on to observe in a footnote that for this reason the ‘ontological proof of 
God’s existence’ is not a ‘deceptive artifice’ but a deception that is ‘quite natural’ — ‘For, 
whatever can say I  to itself, also says I  am? Thus the ontological proof is correct insofar 
as it is taken to prove the absolute I, but not insofar as it is intended to prove ‘an 
objective God’ — for ‘an ontological proof for the existence of an object is a 
contradictory concept’.114
Though this radical identification of God with the ‘absolute I’ would become less 
prominent in the further development of German Idealism, a clear continuity can be 
traced, such that it is quite possible to see why it might be seen to remain as its
110 Schelling 1795a, p. 73.
111 Schelling 1795a, p. 76.
112 Schelling 1795a, p. 75. Hence Schelling’s famous declaration few pages later: ‘The 
beginning and the end of all philosophy is freedom!’ Schelling 1795a, p. 82.
113 Hegel 1801a, p. 130.
114 Schelling 1795a, p. 76.
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subterranean principle. Thus in the introduction to Hegel’s Science of Logic we are told that 
‘logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought.
This realm is truth as it is without veil and in its own absolute nature. It can therefore be 
said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the 
creation of nature and a finite mind’.115 Clearly there is an essential ambiguity here, an 
instability that will in due course become important to us, as to whether the effect of this 
move is to turn God into human reason or turn human reason back into God. But it is 
clearly open to being pushed in a humanist, anti-theological direction in the way that the 
Young Hegelians sought to. Later on in the Logic it becomes clear that the Concept at the 
heart of this ‘system of pure reason’ is ‘none other than the I or pure self-consciousness’, 
which, after we have corrected the abstraction with which Kant initially formulated this 
idea (in the manner set out in the Jena writings and discussed in the previous chapter), 
we can see is ‘the ground and source of all finite determinateness and manifoldness’.116
My suggestion, then, is that in making this equation of ‘God’, as constructed by 
rationalist theology, with ‘essential human self-consciousness’, Marx aligns himself very 
clearly with the radical Idealist identification of spontaneous apperception as the most 
fundamental ordering principle of our world, and so the ‘truth’ of all theological and 
metaphysical speculations as to the absolute ‘beyond’ or ‘behind’ phenomenal 
appearances.
God as practical reality
Marx’s other interpretation of the proof for the existence of God, as a tautologous 
assertion that what I take for reality has a real effect on me, is ‘something that works on 
me’, can be seen as returning to the other side of Kant’s treatment of religion — his 
reinstatement of its principles as ‘postulates of practical faith’. This was seen by many 
radical thinkers of the period as Kant’s ironic betrayal of his original critique of theology. 
As Heine has it, with the distinction of practical from theoretical reason, ‘as with a 
magician’s wand, he revived the corpse of Deism, which theoretical reason had killed’.117
115 Hegel 1812, p. 50.
116 Hegel 1812, p. 589.
117 Heine 1834, p. 212.
133
3. BERLIN 1837-41
And this precisely was the initial reaction of Schelling and Hegel to what they saw as the 
compromising of Kant’s initial programme of subordinating everything to the immediate 
consciousness of freedom during their student days at the Tubingen seminary.118 
Schelling famously wrote to Hegel in 1795 that although ‘[w]e expected everything from 
philosophy and believed that the shock it imparted ... would not fade so soon’, now 
£[e]very possible dogma is now stamped a postulate of practical reason’.119 As Dieter 
Henrich has set forth, the attempt by theologians at the Tubingen seminary to 
accommodate Kantian philosophy with orthodox church doctrine was accelerated with 
the publication in 1792-3 of Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone, which 
accepted a role for religious belief and institutions in strengthening humanity’s resolve to 
live up to the demanding requirements of the moral law of pure practical reason. Gottlob 
Storr, who taught Schelling, Holderlin, and Hegel, used this as a basis for arguing that 
this logically extended to a general moral duty to uphold religious belief as the means by 
which the moral law gained practical force, and that this meant supporting and 
participating all the institutions and rituals of the Church and seeking to strengthen 
conviction in the truth of its revealed doctrines.120
Heine’s History of Religion and Philosophy in Germany records that this ‘proof of the 
existence of God which Kant allowed to stand, namely, the so-called moral proof, was 
overthrown with great eclat by Mr. Schelling’.121 Schelling’s argument can be found in the 
other essay quoted by Marx, the ‘Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism’, 
which attacks those ‘who can believe that Kant could deem any knowledge which he 
though impossible in theoretical philosophy possible in practical and thus, in practical 
philosophy, could again place the supersensible world (God, etc.) as something outside the 
I, as an object.121 Marx quotes Schelling’s insistence that ‘if you assume the idea of an 
objective God, how can you speak of laws brought forth by reason from itself whereas 
autonomy can pertain only to an absolutely free being?’ Schelling’s text continues from this 
point:
118 See Pinkard 2000, pp. 33-38, and Heinrich 1986.
119 Quoted at Henrich 1986, pp. 48-9.
120 Henrichl986, p. 47.
121 Heine 1834, p. 235.
122 Schelling 1795b, pp. 99-100.
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In vain you imagine that you can save yourself by postulating that idea merely 
practically. Because you assume it merely practically it threatens your moral 
existence all the more certainly with extinction. You indict reason for not 
knowing anything of things in themselves, of objects of a supersensible world. 
Has it never occurred to you, ever so dimly, that it is not the weakness of your 
reason but the absolute freedom in you which makes the intellectual world 
inaccessible to every objective power; that it is not the limitation of your knowledge 
but your unlimited freedom which has relegated the objects of cognition to the 
confines of mere appearances?123
Thus it seems that for Schelling the argument for positive religion on the basis of Kant’s 
practical postulates could not go through, because its effect was to objectify the intrinsic 
morality of human self-consciousness as an external force outside human freedom. This is 
the very precise sense of Kant’s argument that the institutions of the church might give 
‘practical force’ to the moral law — it becomes a practical force in the empirical world, and 
hence a force that acts upon us, not, as it should he, from within us. It is essential to see that 
this involves no departure from Kant — the extra ‘practical force’ that positive religion 
gives to the moral law is not a force that comes from God or from any other source 
outside humanity itself — it is, strictly on Kant’s terms, nothing but our own moral 
commitment imagined as a force from outside. Since with Kant ‘we enter the 
supersensible world only through the reestablishment of the absolute I, what can we 
expect to find there other than the I? therefore, no God as an object, no not-I at all, no 
empirical happiness, etcetera, but only pure, absolute I!’.124 Thus Schelling attempts to 
bring Kant’s argument back to its original radicalism: the content of all religious belief is 
only the mistaken objectification of humanity’s own inner morality.
Humanity ... has long carried all the fetters of superstition, and she might after 
all find in herself what she has sought in the objective world. She might thus 
return, from a boundless straying in an alien world, to her own, from lack of self 
to selfhood, from the vagrancy of reason to the freedom of will.125
123 Schelling 1795b, p. 195.
124 Schelling 1795b, p. 100.
125 Schelling 1795b, p. 195.
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This is the liberation that Kant’s philosophy of self determination promises: ‘glad to have 
penetrated the mystery of our spirit ... the just becomes free by himself, while the unjust 
trembles by himself in fear of a justice which he did not find himself and had to assign to 
another world’.126
Further evidence that this may be the inner sense of Marx’s rejection of 
Plutarch’s arguments for religious belief may be gained from his preparatory notebooks, 
where he argues that such a belief is nothing other than an externalisation of our own 
moral sense, an identification of it with a being outside us, which entails that we identify 
only with our immoral part, and moreover that this part only acts morally for the selfish, 
immoral reason of avoiding punishment. ‘[T]he essence of the empirically evil’, says 
Marx, is that ‘the individual shuts himself off from [verschliefli\ his eternal nature in his 
empirical nature’, but this is precisely what happens when the individual cshut[s] his 
eternal nature out of himself, to apprehend it in the form of persistent isolation in self, in 
the form of the empirical, and hence to consider it as an empirical god outside self; and 
henceforth is only ‘concerned with what is evil and what is good for him’ as such an 
empirical individual.127 But as he stresses in his Foreword, this recognition of religious 
belief as the misplaced effect of our own moral freedom does not mean that, in its 
practical reality, it is any less of a real force, just as Kant had suggested it needed to be. ‘In 
this sense’, says Marx, ‘all gods, the pagan as well as the Christian ones, have possessed a 
real existence. Did not the ancient Moloch reign? Was not the Delphic Apollo an actual 
power in the life of the Greeks?’128
The extraordinary twist that Marx puts on this argument is to turn it back against 
Kant’s classic argument against the ontological proof using the example of money, that 
while ‘a hundred actual talers does not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible 
ones’, he would rather have ‘a hundred actual talers’ than ‘the mere concept of them’.129 
Marx points out, in effect, that this is a poorly chosen example, because in fact ‘talers’ are 
themselves only concepts that are represented by the pieces of paper Kant is counting.
126 Schelling 1795b, p. 196.
127 Marx 1839, pp. 448-9 /  p. 56.
128 Marx 1841, p. 104 /  p. 90, translation modified.
129 Kant 1781a, p. 567, (A599 /  B627), translation modified.
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Kant’s example might have enforced the ontological proof. Actual talers have the 
same existence that the imagined gods have. Has an actual taler any existence 
except in the imagination, if only in the general or rather common [allgemeinend 
oder vielmehrgemeinschcftlichen] imagination of man?130
In fact, it has to be said, Kant himself elsewhere recognises that money is not a 
straightforward empirical object but a concept of practical reason; indeed, he will come to 
say, money is a necessary and a priori concept of Right, something that can cbe resolved 
into pure intellectual relations’ as that which erepresents all goods’ and is ‘the universal 
means by which men exchange their industriousness with one anotherV 31 Clearly some fascinating 
parallels and interconnections are here suggested, between Kant’s deduction of the 
system of right from pure practical reason, and Marx’s later critique of the fundamental 
categories of political economy. But there is no reason for supposing this is yet high on 
Marx’s agenda, and this is not the place to explore them .132 Marx’s point here is simply 
that practical concepts or ideas, whether or not they are illusory or ungroundable from a 
‘theoretical’ point of view, such as Moloch or money, have their ‘actuality’ in their 
practical force, and particularly at the point at which they become collectively 
institutionalised and so beyond the powers of any single individual to revise or challenge.
Bring paper money into a country where this use of paper is unknown, and 
everyone will laugh at your subjective imagination. Come with your gods into a 
country where other gods are worshipped, and you will be shown to suffer from 
fantasies and abstractions. And jusdy so.133
Thus although Marx here again affirms that ‘That which a particular country is for particular 
alien gods, the country of reason is for God in general, a region in which he ceases to exist, the 
important effect of this argument to explain the apparent plausibility of proofs of the
130 Marx 1841, p. 104 /  p. 90, translation modified.
131 Kant 1797, pp. 434-6.
132 I have begun to do so elsewhere, in ‘Kantian right and the Marxist theory of 
exploitation’, unpublished paper presented at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, 
February 2001.
133 Marx 1841, p. 104 /  p. 90.
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existence of God is precisely that in a country that is not the country of reason, the 
illusory hypostatisations of our own free and rational nature do indeed have an ‘actual 
existence’ in the social institutions through which we give them practical force. We begin 
to see, then, that there is a very precise sense in which Kant’s critique of rationalist 
theology has to be translated into practical critique — even after we have recognised the 
ontological proof as a miscrecognition of our own activity in constituting the world in the 
theoretical domain, God quite literally continues to exist in the practical domain until in the 
same way we have recognised that the practical ordering of the world is our own activity 
and task. And this, crucially, is something that can only be realised collectively, by 
reclaiming the common agency that we have deposited in institutions such as religion and 
that each of us as individuals faces as an actual practical force acting on us from the 
outside. Recognising this illogicality in the structure of our practical world will not be 
enough. The point is now to change it.134
4. Young Hegelian criticism
These then seem to be the most important influences on Marx’s thought at this stage in 
his life: a reading of Hegel’s doctrine of the immanent rationality of the real that is 
brought back to its most radical origins in the early Idealists’ transformative development 
of the Kantian theory of the self-determining apperceptive subject. The target of his 
critical energy are the dualisms and contradictions that ensue from our misrecognition of 
our own role in determining our world, both epistemologically and practically, and the 
superstitions and mystifications that follow from the placing of its determination of the 
world in an external principle beyond our own experience and activity.
The strong indications that Marx’s interest in Epicurus is framed by the post- 
Kantian critique of reflection and its contradictory logic of ‘essence’ throw a new light on
134 My point is not that even in this earliest of texts Marx was already a Marxist, and had 
already seen the way through to what is customarily taken as the moment of his decisive 
break with his philosophical heritage, the Theses on Feuerbach. Rather I want to point out 
that this project is already clearly inscribed at the very heart of this heritage, in Kant’s 
own arguments for the necessity of the practical postulates, which precisely define the 
nature of this project even if as a kind of photographic negative. My suggestion would be 
that this is pretty close to what Marx means when he says that it fell on ‘Idealism’ to 
develop the ‘active side’ of the true outlook, although ‘abstractly’.
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those marginal notes to the Dissertation where he discusses the contemporary 
predicament of philosophy.135 Many commentators have sei2ed upon these lines because 
they seem to provide an unusually clear and simple methodological statement from Marx, 
setting out his commitment to a philosophical praxis of ‘critique’. But the simplicity here 
may be misleading.
As has been widely noticed, Marx seems to be suggesting an analogy between the 
dissolution of Greek philosophy after Aristotle and the fragmentation of German 
philosophy after Hegel’s own systematic resolution of reason and reality. An ‘inner self­
contentment and completeness’ is broken as ‘naive uncritical trust’ in the ‘ready-made 
science’ bequeathed by ‘The Master’ becomes impossible. Science is once again (as it was 
for Hegel) ‘not something received, but something in the process of becoming’. Hegel’s 
final statement may indeed have been the supreme philosophical expression of its time 
(Marx refuses to account for its shortcomings as cynical ‘accommodations’), but history 
is on the move again. The separation of ‘philosophy’ and ‘the world’ appears subjectively 
in the ‘individual self-consciousnesses’ of philosophy’s ‘intellectual carriers’, as a ‘double- 
edged demand, one edge turned against the world, the other against philosophy itself -  
the familiar dilemma between critical distance and grounded practicality. But this 
‘diremption of individual self-consciousness in itself in turn produces ‘two opposed 
philosophical trends’. The first Marx calls ‘the liberal party’, whose act is ‘critique, hence 
precisely that turning-towards-the-outside of philosophy’, seeing ‘an inadequacy in the 
world which has to be made philosophical’. The second side is ''positivephilosophy, which 
‘knows that the inadequacy is immanent in philosophy’ and seeks to uphold the realities 
of the world against it.
It is clear that Marx’s allegiances are with ‘critique’, the progressive philosophical 
practice which he counterposes to the brute empiricism of positive philosophy.
It is a psychological law that the theoretical mind, once liberated in itself, turns 
into practical energy, and, leaving the shadowy empire of Amenthes as will, turns 
itself against the reality of the world existing without it ... But the practice [Praxis]
135 Marx 1841, pp. 84-7 /  pp. 66-70.
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of philosophy is itself theoretical It is the critique that measures the individual 
Existence by the Essence, the particular Actuality by the Idea.136
But it must be noted right away that Marx immediately goes on to say that ‘this unmediated 
realisation of philosophy is in its deepest essence afflicted with contradictions, and this its 
essence takes form in the appearance and imprints its seal upon it’.137 Marx’s 
identification with the standpoint of ‘critique’ is clearly not a straightforward one. There 
has been a tendency of commentators to simply uphold this definition of critique as a 
handy statement of Marx’s philosophical method, and either ignore or downplay his 
immediate qualification of it.138 Peter Osbome has shown, however, that it is precisely 
this consciousness of the contradictory dynamic of the Young Hegelian project that sets 
the scene for Marx’s subsequent theoretical and political entanglements. Osbome notes 
that in general Young Hegelian criticism ‘exploited the distinction within Hegel’s 
ontology between the essence or concept (Begriff) of a particular historical phenomenon, 
and the phenomenal fullness of its concrete historical existence (Existen3)’ and in this way 
‘reaffirmed the anticipatory function of philosophy’ against Hegel’s ‘Owl of Minerva’.139 
But Marx sees here that the simple assertion of Idea against reality attempts a ‘realisation 
of philosophy’ that is too immediate — it is his distinctive awareness of the need for 
philosophy to become ‘worldly’ and so ‘seek out material mediations for the process of 
its realisation’ that opens the way to his subsequent adventures.140
136 Marx 1841, p. 85 /  p. 68, translation modified
137 Marx 1841, p. 85 /  p. 68, translation modified
138 See, for example, O ’Malley 1969, pp. xxi-xxii. Another clear case is Teeple 1984, 
where it is claimed that the whole approach of Marx’s thought is just this notion of 
‘critique’, which is then distinguished from the ‘idealist’ versions of Plato or Hegel in that 
while for idealists ‘essence’ is ‘metaphysical’, ‘transcendent’, ‘a priori’, ‘hypostatised ideal’, 
for Marx it is based in the ‘mental activity of abstraction’ from the ‘empirical examination 
of existence’. It seems to me that this immediately begs all those questions that Hegel’s 
‘Doctrine of Essence’ opens up, and that Marx must at least have been aware of. Teeple 
1984, pp. 23-4, p. 263.
139 Osborne 1989, p. 114.
140 Osbome 1989, p. 139. See also Kouvelakis 2003, p. 239: ‘it is here that we find Marx a
the furthest possible removed from any Young Hegelian temptation to take a narcissistic
pleasure in the critical act. The transition towards philosophy’s “truth”, the realization of 
that “truth”, entails an experience of its loss: philosophy is dissolved into the network of 
its mediations’. Heinz Lubasz has presented the socio-economic concerns of the 
journalism of the subsequent year as evidence that ‘Marx set out from a problematic at
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The only qualification to be made to Osborne’s account is that, despite its 
emphasis on dialectical continuity, it may yet underplay the extent to which these moves 
are already prefigured in Hegel’s own thought. In this context it is noteworthy (and has, 
so far as I am aware, never been noted) that Hegel himself characterised the standard 
practice of ‘philosophy’ in terms very similar to Marx:
... our usual view of the task or purpose of philosophy is that it consists in the 
cognition of the essence of things. By this we understand no more than that 
things are not to be left in their immediate state, but are rather to be exhibited as 
mediated or grounded by something else. The immediate being of things is here 
represented as a sort of rind or curtain behind which the essence is concealed.141
These lines appear near the beginning of the Encyclopaedia version of the ‘Doctrine of 
Essence’. And as we have seen, and as Hegel’s language here again suggests, the image of 
going beneath the appearances to dig out their hidden essence is one that, ultimately, 
Hegel will suspend, with the discovery that there is nothing and no one ‘behind the 
curtain’ but our own selves.142 The implications of this principle will become clear as we 
see that the object upon which Marx will train his ‘critical’ sights after he leaves university 
is the state.
once empirically grounded and rooted in the practical, socio-political issues of the day ... 
he worked out his own concepts and methods by bringing empirical inquiry, theoretical 
analysis and value premises to bear on one another from the first. This is about right I 
think, but the fact that this orientation is implicitly signalled in Marx’s Doctoral 
Dissertation means that Lubasz’s conclusion from this was ‘an attempt from the first to 
found an empirically grounded and practical science of society, rather than a speculative 
inversion of a ready-made philosophical world-view’ sets up a false opposition. Lubasz 
1976, p. 25.
141 Hegel 1830a, p. 176, § 112, addition.
142 Later Osbome seems to simply identify the method of Hegelian philosophy with the 
measurement of ‘reality’ against ‘the Idea’, which suggests that he has not recognised the 
extent to which Hegel presents this as a partial perspective to be superseded. Osbome 
1989, p. 203.
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4Marx’s journalism 
The Rhineland, 1842-3
‘Every nation in course of time makes such alterations in its existing constitution 
as will bring it nearer to the true constitution. The nation’s mind itself shakes off 
its leading-strings [its childhood shoes], and the constitution expresses the 
consciousness of what it is in itself — the form of truth, of self-knowledge. If a 
nation can no longer accept as implicitly true what its constitution expresses to it 
as the truth, if its consciousness of Concept and its actuality are not at one, then 
the nation’s mind is tom asunder.’
— G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (1823-4); 
quoted in Anonymous, The Trumpet of the Last Judgement 
over Hegel the Atheist and Antichrist (1841)1
‘Hegel read the Greeks with too much intelligence and lived through his times, 
the age of the Revolution, with too clear a consciousness not to attain ... the 
demand for the state in the form of a public, self-determining structure ... Thus, 
in order to have the state in the form of the state, it is necessary to have all those 
great institutions, national representation, juries, and freedom of the press — 
institutions that we Germans still almost totally lack — that raise humans in their 
total worth and in the full light of public consciousness to creators of their own 
freedom. At any rate, even if they were somewhat tainted and faded, Hegel 
assumed all these institutions into his theory of the state ... Hegel knew very well 
where our German shoe pinched... ’
— Arnold Ruge, ‘Hegel’s Philosophy of Light and the Politics of our Times’ (1842)2
1 Hegel 1823-4b, p. 97; quoted at Bauer 1841, p. 184.
2 Ruge 1842, pp. 216-8.
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1. Politicising epistemology
An account of Marx’s journalistic writing on the current affairs of the Rhineland for the 
Rheinische Zeitung through 1842-3 will be pivotal for the development of the overall 
argument I am here trying to make. For it is here, most of all, that Marx takes forward 
what I have argued are the recognisably post-Kantian philosophical concerns of his 
student days as the theoretical and methodological framework for his engagements with 
the political and social conflicts of the Prussian Vormdr^. At the heart of this 
development, I want to suggest, is an implicit and indeed sometimes explicit equation of 
political questions about the relations between law and citi2en, state and society, with the 
epistemological questions of the relation between conceptual form and material content, 
free subjectivity and determinate objectivity, that are the definitive concerns of German 
Idealism.
The most intriguing and challenging aspect of these texts has always been the 
unusual way in which the languages of organicism and right, holism and individualism, 
communitarianism and rationalism run side-by-side throughout. This strange concoction 
pervades all Marx’s articles of this period, which switch from recognisably "liberal’ 
assertions of individual freedoms and formal legality to rhetorical appeals to the ‘spirit’
(Geist) of the ‘people’ (Volk) and the inner ‘life forces’ (Lebensmachte) of its internal 
relations. Thus in addition to his well known campaign against censorship and appeals to 
the principle of publicity, we find Marx in these articles arguing rigorously for the clear 
separation of church and state and the universal power of human rights discourse;3 for a 
restriction of the reach of legislation to the sphere of external actions and relations;4 for 
the rule of law and absolute equality before it;5 for public trial by an independent
3 ‘Ask the Catholic inhabitants of “poor green Erin”, ask the Hugenots before the 
French revolution; they did not appeal to religion, for their religion was not the state 
religion; they appealed to the “Rights of Humanity”, and philosophy interprets the rights 
of humanity and demands that the state should be a state of human nature’. Marx 1842f, 
p. 199 /  p. 187.
4 ‘Only insofar as I manifest myself externally, enter the sphere of the actual, do I enter the 
sphere of the legislator. Apart from my actions, I have no existence for the law, am no 
object for it’. Marx 1842a, p. 120 /  p. 107.
5 ‘I do not at all believe that persons can be a guarantee against laws; on the contrary, I 
believe that laws must be a guarantee against persons ... no one, not even the most
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judiciary before open courts of law;6 for a strictly non-consequentialist understanding of 
punishment,7 to be conducted according to a rigid legal tariff.8 And then he will say 
things like ‘the law can only be the ideal, self-conscious image \Abbild\ of actuality, the 
theoretical expression, made independent, of the practical vital forces \derpraktischen 
Lebensmachte\ , 9 and is given to metaphorical flourishes such as the following:
In the living organism, all trace of the different elements as such has disappeared. 
The difference no longer consists in the separate existence of the various 
elements, but in the living movement of distinct functions, which are all inspired 
by one and the same life, so that the very difference between them does not exist 
ready-made prior to this life but, on the contrary, continually arises out of this life 
and as continually vanishes within it and becomes paralysed. Just as nature does 
not confine itself to the elements already present, but even at the lowest stage of 
its life proves that this diversity is a mere sensible phenomenon that has no 
spiritual truth, so also the state, this natural realm of the spirit, must not and 
cannot find its true essence in a fact apparent to the senses.10
This has led to divergent and sometimes confused characterisations of Marx’s thought in 
this period, as partaking of either of a ‘Kantian-Fichtean’ rationalist liberalism,11 or some
excellent legislator, can be allowed to put himself above the law he has made’. Marx 
1842k, p. 243 /p p .  217-8.
6 ‘The independent judge belongs neither to me nor to the government... The judge 
judges my act according to a definite law. Marx 1842d, p. 166 /  p. 154 See also Marx 
1842k, p. 260 /  p. 234: ‘just as torture has a place in the medieval criminal code as a form 
of trial, so the public, free trial, in accordance with its own nature, necessarily has a public 
content dictated by freedom...’
7 ‘. .. expedients are the most active agents in the argumentative mechanism of private 
interest... Interest knows how to denigrate right by presenting a prospect of harmful
results due to its effects in the external world... ’ Marx 1842k, p. 248 /  p. 222.
8 ‘The problem is to make the punishment the actual consequence of the crime. It must 
be seen by the criminal as the necessary result of his act, and therefore as his own act. 
Hence the limit of his punishment must be the limit of his act’. Marx 1842k, p. 229 /  p. 
204. Compare Kant 1797a, p. 473, 6:332.
9 Marx 1842m, p. 273 /  p. 259.
10 Marx 1842u, p. 295 /  p. 275.
11 See for example Althusser 1964, pp. 223-27, and in similar vein Hirst 1970.
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kind of mysterious regression to classical natural law theory,12 or an implausible attempt 
to bind together Kant and Aristode.13
In what follows I want to offer a reconstruction of the political theory and 
methodology of Marx’s writings from this period that I believe can better make sense of 
these fragmentary and seemingly muddled elements. In sum, my suggestion is that we 
can see a ‘political epistemology’ at work in these writings that underpins a close 
interrelation of the themes of post-Kantian philosophy to the more practical concerns of 
1840s Rhenish liberalism. At the centre of this constellation o f analyses and arguments is 
an insight that can perhaps best be pinpointed as an insistent assertion of the 
simultaneous necessity and inadequacy of the finite determinations of the Understanding, 
that is to say, the organisation of the world of experience and practice under fixed 
concepts or rules. In political terms, this amounts to a commitment to the necessity of law 
and right, understood as the clear public and institutional demarcation of social roles and 
relationships; and at the same time an awareness of the insufficieny of legal form as such 
for securing the adequay of any such demarcations to the necessarily dynamic and 
multidimensional nature of the social roles and relationships they refer to. The different 
directions in which Marx’s articles seem to argue may, then, be bom not of philosophical 
incoherence or a tactical eclecticism, but a highly sophisticated awareness of this 
irreducible tension at the basis of social and political life. Thus Marx’s insistence on the 
importance of legality is an insistence on the necessary mediatedness of social relations, 
and a campaign against the naive and dangerous notion that political unity could ever be 
reduced to a matter of simple feeling, blind trust, instinctive harmony. But he is 
simultaneously critical of any tendency to think that such an assertion is on itself enough, 
and identifies the inherent tendency of any fixed system of laws and institutions to 
degenerate into a Verstandesstaat, a dead structure that relates externally, mechanically and 
arbitrarily to the society which it unifies and organises.
This danger is resisted by Marx through the mobilisation of a vitalist and 
organicist language that remains the most controversial and, for contemporary readers, 
indigestible aspect of these texts. I have no wish to downplay the importance of this 
element in these writings, nor the seriousness with which Marx intended to express it; 
nor do I expect to be able to finally resolve or dispose of all the problems it raises. But I
12 Adams 1940, pp. 64-5.
13 See Kain 1988, pp. 16-33; and Kain 1992.
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do think that we can at least make it somewhat less alien andprimafacie preposterous if 
we recover a sense of the role of such language in German Idealism in signalling the 
problematic nature of the relationship between any finite conceptualisation and the ‘whole’ 
of experience to which it must necessarily but provisionally gesture.14 This problematic 
relationship is opened up by Kant precisely in his investigation of the teleological 
judgements by which we conceptualise natural organisms in the third Critique, and, as we 
have seen, the implication of his analysis is that it is a problem inherent in all reflective 
conceptualisations of empirical objects insofar as they necessarily presuppose a 
provisional estimation of the systematic whole of which they are a part.15 Hegel 
reinforces this association in a closely related way when, in the Science of Logic, he refers us 
to our ascriptions of ‘livingness’ and ‘instinctive urge’ in things as an illustration of the 
way in which ‘ordinary thinking everywhere has contradiction for its content’.16 What I 
think we have to keep in mind when reading this kind of language in these writers is that 
their intention is not so much to assert, against all common sense and empirical evidence, 
that inanimate objects and supra-individual collectivities simply are organisms in the 
direct and simple sense that is obviously false. Rather their aim is to point out that careful 
reflection upon our own structures of judgment would make clear that our ‘estimations’ 
of them according to determinate concepts are subject to the same difficulties, 
instabilities, ‘contradictions’, even, as is more clearly and obviously the case in our 
analyses of ‘living beings’, which according to Kant’s argument are always guided by 
intimations of ‘intrinsic purposiveness’ and can never be wholly reduced to purely 
atomistic or mechanical accounts.17
14 ‘[T]he particular can be seen spritually and freely only in connection with the whole 
and therefore not in separation from it’. Marx 1842d, p. 176 /  p. 164, translation 
modified.
15 Kant 1790, pp. 283-94, 5:401-410.
16 Hegel 1812, pp. 440-41.
17 On this point see also Kolb 1986, p. 62: ‘Sometimes Hegel uses images suggesting that 
the universal is some vaporous force or energy or life circulating through things. Hegel 
never entirely shook off the rhetorical influence of the romantic images he used in his 
youth, but he demands that such images be rethought through the logical categories, and 
not vice versa’. My only qualification to this would be that we remember that, as we saw 
in Chapter Two, even at the earlier point of Hegel’s most wholehearted embrace of the 
Schellingian fusion of Idealism and Romanticism the epistemological analyses of Kant 
were never far from the surface.
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Kant himself remarks on the validity of using the category of organism to 
‘symbolise’ the notion of a society’s immanent political order: ‘a monarchy ruled 
according to its own constitutional laws would be presented as an animate body, but a 
monarchy ruled by an individual absolute will would be presented as a mere machine 
(such as a hand mill) ... though there is no similarity between a despotic state and a hand 
mill, there certainly is one between the rules by which we reflect on the two and on how 
they operate’.18 If it is then also the case that there is an important similarity between the 
‘rules by which we reflect on’ animate bodies and the way in which we might conceive 
the possibility of a collective self-determination, this would mean that the intended force 
of this language is thus quite the opposite of what is often feared. For, against this 
background, the effect of an insistence on the organic nature of society is precisely to pose 
its positive institutionalisation as a problem. It is to assert that human relationships are 
inherently dynamic and open-ended, and that their reciprocal and all-encompassing 
interrelation is always ultimately beyond our normal powers of cognitive capture, even as 
we cannot help attempting to project it in any conscious and purposive engagements 
with others. The fact that we would not today use the language of vitalism and 
organicism to express such thoughts should not lead us to mistake the potentially 
subversive intent of their usages in this very different historical and philosophical 
context.19 To make this point is not of itself to automatically acquit Marx of the 
problematic emphasis on collectivity over individuality that some suspect him of. But it is 
to say that the mere appearance of such language in these texts is not of itself enough to 
convict him.
18 Kant 1790, p. 227, 5:352.
19 In fact it is increasingly being realised today that the problematisation of language and 
representation that is taken to be a definitively ‘post-modern’ turn of thought can be 
traced back through the European tradition to the seminal critique of Enlightenment 
thought found in early German Idealism and Romanticism. See, for example, the 
discussions in Seyhan 1992, Heifer 1996, Hartley 2003.
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2. The ‘true’ state
The immediate circumstance of Marx’s interventions is the crisis in Prussian liberalism 
that accompanied the long-awaited accession of Frederick William IV to the throne in 
1840.20 An intellectual and reformer, the heir was hailed by many on the Hegelian left as 
leading protagonist for the next great chapter in the modernisation of the Prussian state. 
But the new King’s prescription for the reinvigoration of the nation turned out to consist 
in a programme of sentimental paternalism, orthodox religiosity, and medievalist 
romanticism, and it was anti-Hegelians such as Stahl, Schelling and Savigny who were 
given academic and administrative promotion while radicals such as Marx had to 
abandon hope of following university careers. This, combined with an ambivalent and in 
the event short-lived move in the direction of a more relaxed censorship regime, 
prompted Marx’s turn to journalism in 1842.
The recurrent argumentative motif appearing throughout Marx’s articles of the 
period is an assertion of the ‘concept’ of the state against its less-than-perfect realisation 
in the new regime in Berlin, and less-than-adequate comprehension in the theories of its 
conservative ideologues.21 A ‘true’ state, ein wahrer Staat^  in Hegelian terms, would be a 
state fully ‘in accordance with its concept’, like a ‘true’ friend or a ‘true’ man.22 Critique, 
as we saw in Marx’s dissertation, ‘measures the individual Existence by the Essence, the 
particular Actuality by the Idea’.23 So, he argues against his orthodox opponents, ‘[y]ou 
must judge the rightfulness of the state not on the basis of Christianity, but on the basis 
of the state’s own nature and essence’. Moreover, this identification of the state’s real 
essence does not seem to be subject to straightforward empirical rebuttal: ‘if some 
European states are in fact based on Christianity, do these states correspond to their 
concept and is the “pure existence” of a condition the right of that condition to exist?’24
20 For this context see Brazill 1970, pp. 85-9; Mah 1987, pp. 36-41; Heilman 1990; 
Breckman 1999, pp. 134—148.
21 Stressed by Teeple 1984, pp. 29-31.
22 See, for example, Hegel 1830a, p. 250, § 172, Addition: ‘Truth ... consists in the 
agreement of the object with itself, i.e., with its concept’.
23 Marx 1841, p. 85 /  p. 68. See also Marx 1842d, p. 154 /  p. 142: W e m u st... take the 
essence of the inner idea as the measure to evaluate the existence of things’.
24 Marx 1842f, p. 200 /  p. 188. Elsewhere Marx similarly argues against ‘making the 
particular essence of a religion the measure fMafl] of the state\ Marx 1842a, p. 117 /  p. 105.
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In fact, he notes at one point, ‘world history decides whether a state has so gready 
departed from the idea of the state that it no longer deserves to exist’.25 And when his 
newspaper is finally threatened with suppression Marx pleads, somewhat audaciously but 
not entirely disingenuously, that ‘far from intending to attack the basis of the Prussian 
constitution ... the Rheinische Zeitung, on the contrary, was convinced that it was attacking 
only deviations from that basis [Basts]’. While its understanding of that basis ‘of course 
may differ from the current view of the government’, it ‘nevertheless can quote in its 
favour both Prussian history and many elements of the present day life of the state as 
definitively high authorities’.26
Clearly this polemical practice of upholding an ideal standard against which 
political realities are to be judged raises all kinds of philosophical and methodological 
questions. As I have already indicated, I think we need to be careful about assuming that 
we can see easily what Marx is up to here, and that the presumptions at work in this 
practice of philosophical ‘critique’ are as simple, or simplistic even, as they may appear to 
be on the surface. This is an issue I will return to; in the meantime I think we can best 
make a start by attending to that standard, and examining just what that ‘concept of the 
state’ is that sits at the centre of Marx’s discourse:
Whereas the earlier philosophers of constitutional law proceeded in their account 
of the formation of the state from the instincts, either of ambition or 
gregariousness, or even from reason, but the reason of the individual, the more 
ideal and profound view of recent philosophy proceeds from the idea of the 
whole. It looks on the state as the great organism, in which legal, moral, and 
political freedom must be realised, and in which the individual citizen in obeying 
the laws of the state only obeys the natural laws of his own reason, of human 
reason.27
What is most important and distinctive in this vision of the ‘true state’ is its dual 
insistence on the organic unity of the Volk and the legal form of the Rechtsstaat.
25 Marx 1842u, p. 309 /  pp. 288-9.
26 Marx 1843c, p. 362 /  p. 350.
27 Marx 1842f, p. 202 /  p. 189.
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As already indicated, I want to suggest that the holistic and organicist vocabulary 
need not carry the mystical, metaphysical, or spuriously naturalistic connotations which 
are often assumed to consign it to the dustbin of premodem philosophical history. All it 
invokes, in the first instance, is the initially straightforward and, I think, uncontroversial 
premise of dynamic interdependence — that human beings, as we find them at any given point 
in history, have specific, particular complexes of needs and abilities which intermesh in 
an overall pattern of differentiated activities through which they reciprocally sustain one 
another. This is simply what social life is — it need not entail problematic claims about 
‘society’ as an entity over and above the individuals who make it up, or about human 
beings having some pre-ordained collectivist destiny beyond the particular needs and 
purposes they have acquired in the course of their historical development. It is true that 
Marx will often express this basic premise of interdependence in terms of assertions 
about human beings’ real or true ‘nature’ or ‘essence’, and I will be returning to the 
possible significance of his using this sort of language. But for now I just want to suggest 
that we at least entertain the possibility that despite this unfamiliar mode of expression 
Marx might not actually mean to assert here anything more than we would quite happily 
assent to about the basic predicament of social and political life, his own variant, even, of 
what the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political theory knows as ‘the circumstances of 
justice’.
It also needs to be stressed that Marx’s organicism betrays no nostalgia for any 
pre-modern collectivity, nor a dangerous wish to reimpose it. The historicity and 
dynamism of Marx’s conception of interdependence is made clear by the fact that his 
language of organism is employed in direct opposition to the static immediacy of traditional 
community: under feudalism, he says at one point, ‘people are put in separate boxes 
[Kasten], and the noble, freely interchanging \frei in einander iibetflieJSenderi\ members of the 
great sacred body, the holy Humanus, are sawn and cleft asunder, forcibly torn apart’.28 
And it is manifested more generally as the permanent tendency for human activities to 
break out of any imposed order of rules or demarcations — Marx’s organicist language in 
these texts is used always to mark not only the interdependence of all society’s members, 
the ‘nerves’ that bind them together, but also equally the fluidity of their social roles and 
relations and the resistance of these freely formed linkages to any attempt to control or
28 Marx 1842k, p. 230 /  p. 205, translation modified.
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shape them from outside. Organisms, we sometimes have to remind ourselves, are messy 
things, living and dying, consuming and secreting, unruly and a law to themselves — it is 
this that these writers meant to appeal to in opposition to the forced unifications and too- 
neat systematicity of the ‘machine state’.29
‘In itself, as Hegel might have put it, we can say that the true state is precisely 
this self-determining system of functional differentiation that expresses the mutual 
interdependence of each upon all. But human beings act not on the basis of instinct, 
habit or immediate desire but on representations, concepts, understandings of 
themselves and their place in the world. Their sociality is not mere gregariousness — their 
ongoing production and reproduction of each other’s conditions of existence in society 
must be carried forward on the basis of internalised conceptualisations of their 
interdependence, specifying the particular activities they must undertake to sustain the 
social whole which sustains them. I f  an adequate knowledge on the part of individuals of 
their concrete interdependencies could be assumed, we would have an ideally smooth- 
running system of interaction, and all the understandings which the individuals have of 
themselves as social individuals would seamlessly knit together into a collective 
understanding of society itself as a differentiated whole. This collective self­
conceptualisation by society of its own internal relations, a coherent and accurate 
understanding of itself on the basis of which it acts to reproduce itself, is what Marx 
means by law in its most ideal sense:
Laws, therefore, cannot prevent a man’s actions, for they are indeed the inner 
laws of life of his action itself, the conscious reflections of his fife. Hence law 
draws into the background in the face of man’s life as a life of freedom, and only 
when his actual behaviour has shown that he has ceased to obey the natural law 
of freedom does the law in the form of state law compel him to be free.30
29 On this point see also Rosen 1996, pp. 136-7, who shows that this transformation of 
the motif originates with Herder, whose ‘use of the organic analogy represents an almost 
complete inversion of its traditional meaning: while in earlier uses ... the point of the 
organic analogy was to vindicate the hierarchical subordination of society to s superior 
directing principle, for Herder, the characteristic of a living being is its internal unity and 
its free and uncoerced cooperation’.
30 Marx 1842d, p. 162 /  p. 151. The echo of Rousseau is clear and surely deliberate, but it 
is also worth noting how resonant such rhetoric is of the early utopianism of Fichte and 
Schelling. See Fichte 1794, pp. 156-7; Schelling 1795a, p. 68.
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This defines the ‘true state’ at the most abstract and utopian level — the social organism 
as self-reflexive, the relations of organic interdependence amongst its members brought 
to collective self-consciousness.31
Accordingly, Marx places great emphasis upon what we might call the cognitive 
content of law. Law must be ‘the universal and authentic exponent of the rightful nature 
of things’, 32 ‘the ideal, self-conscious image of actuality, the theoretical expression, made 
independent, of the practical life forces [Lebensmdchte\’.33 The legislator, says Marx,
‘should consider himself as a naturalist. He does not make the laws, he does not invent 
them, he only formulates them, expressing in positive laws the inner laws of spiritual 
relations’.34 As my earlier comments will have indicated, I don’t think this needs to be 
taken as a regression to pre-modem versions of natural law as somehow pre-social, 
ahistorical, and cosmically ordained. I suggest that we interpret Marx’s talk of the ‘nature’ 
or ‘spirit’ of things and relations as referring to the place that they hold within an ideally 
integrated system of collective activity in pursuit of the needs and purposes that 
individuals, as a matter of historical fact, actually have at any one time,35 in the same way 
that Hegel — at one level at least — regards a thing’s inner teleological purpose not as
31 As Breckman puts it: ‘Marx’s idealist republicanism, like Feuerbach’s and Ruge’s, 
synthesized Rousseauian and Hegelian elements by identifying the general will with 
philosophical comprehension of this rational, collective spirit’ immanent in society. 
Breckman 1999, p. 276. Lubasz also says, ‘fusing Rousseau and Hegel, Marx identifies 
political rationality with the truly general interest’. Lubasz 1976, p. 30. But see Neuhouser 
2000 for an account of Hegel’s social and political theory as already a sophisticated 
elaboration of the basic Rousseauian project of reconciling interdependence with 
freedom through the realisation of a self-conscious collective agency.
32 Marx 1842k, p. 227 /  p. 202; translation modified.
33 Marx 1842m, p. 273 /  p. 259, translation modified.
34 Marx 1842n, p. 308 /  p. 288.
35 I am not sure that Philip Kain makes this sufficiently clear when he claims that Marx 
sees a ‘normative criterion of civil law as rational and rooted in nature’, differing only 
from the classical natural law tradition in holding that such criteria ‘change through 
history’ (pp. 29-30). Marx is clear on this in his attacks on pre-modem fetishisations of 
pre-social nature: ‘Feudalism in the broadest sense is the spiritual animal kingdom, the world 
of divided mankind, in contrast to the human world that creates its own distinctions and 
whose inequality is nothing but a refracted form of equality’ — Marx 1842k, p. 230 /  p. 
205, last emphasis my own. This is made clear in Howard 1972, p. 44: ‘Marx is suggesting 
that the instinctual traditional rights point to the place which the poor occupy in society; 
the dialectic demands that what is positively rational in the traditional customs be 
developed and shown as in fact rational and therefore amenable to being considered a 
law of freedom.’
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something given by some grand cosmological scheme but as defined simply by the use to 
which it is put within human projects: ‘The thing ... becomes mine and acquires my will 
as its substantial end (since it has no end within itself), its determination, and its soul’.36 
So if it is right that the ideal of the true state can be understood in terms of an aspiration 
towards collective self-consciousness; it follows that the problem of law is a problem of 
knowledge. Hegel had been wholly explicit in making this equation:
To posit something as universal — i.e. to bring it to the consciousness as a universal 
— is, as everyone knows, to think ... Thus, the process of legislation should not be 
represented merely by that one of its moments whereby something is declared to 
be a rule of behaviour for everyone; more important than this is the inner and 
essential moment, namely cognition of the content in its determinate universality.37
But as soon as we examine further the place of law in the true state, Marx’s normative 
ideal is simultaneously problematised as a utopian goal, while at the same time opens out 
into a potential framework for theorising real worldly states. Take another example of 
Marx’s repeated lyrical exaltations of this ideal function for law: ‘Laws are the positive, 
clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired an impersonal, theoretical existence 
independent of the arbitrariness of the individual. A statute-book is a people’s bible of 
freedom.’38 Here we see law as positive, codified law, an authoritative public inscription of 
society’s roles and relationships. It is clear from such paeans where Marx stands on the 
codification question. But his very language also points to the possible tensions in this 
moment and the new dynamic it unleashes. Law now begins to take on its own 
materiality and inertia, independent of the ‘arbitrary’ will of any single ‘individual’. 
Elsewhere Marx lays great stress on the state’s educative function:
The true ‘public’ education carried out by the state lies in the rational and public 
existence of the state; the state itself educates its members by making them its 
members, by converting the aims of the individual into general aims, crude 
instinct into moral inclination, natural independence into spiritual freedom, by
36 Hegel 1821a, pp. 75-6, §44.
37 Hegel 1821 a, p. 241.
38 M arxl842d,p. 1 6 2 / p .  150.
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the individual finding his good in the life of the whole, and the whole in the 
disposition [Gesinnun^ of the individual.39
The implication, then, is that individuals will look to positive law for the knowledge of the 
whole that they cannot attain alone.
This is the point at which it becomes possible to see how Marx’s concept of the 
‘true’ state might offer real cognitive purchase on actually existing states — that it is not 
simply a matter of measuring what exists against an abstract ‘ought’ or standard, but 
makes possible to, as Kouvelakis puts it, ‘restrict criticism to the plane of immanence, 
and to take part in the self-transformation of the real’.40 Given that, as a matter of 
empirical fact, human beings are practically interdependent, and that as language-using 
beings they do attempt to coordinate their activities through a shared set of rules and 
definitions, then Marx’s formal definition might be said to be teleologically immanent in 
the interactions of all actually existing societies. ‘State’ thus refers more generally to the 
shared structure of meanings through which any group of human beings understand, and 
on the basis of which they attempt to realise, their ‘natures’ as practically interdependent 
social individuals. It has some claim to be a descriptive or analytic concept that contains 
its own norm of practical evaluation, since it allows us to conceive of ‘states’ that 
perform this function more or less adequately. And in turn this degree of adequacy will 
have its own immanent effects. For, given the above presuppositions, the main way in 
which actual states fall short of this internal ideal is not by completely failing to integrate 
the activities of their members and disintegrating into some pre-social chaos. If it is the 
case that the individual human beings concerned are interdependent and broadly ‘rule- 
following’, they can be expected to submit themselves to whatever rules and patterns of 
coordination are in fact available. The greater the mismatch between these existing 
structures and the real needs that underlie this centripetal force, the more will that state 
be experienced as oppressive and alien, and the more will the social whole be prone to 
crises of reproduction.
In fact a very similar set of issues to those with which Marx is here concerned has 
been more recendy raised by James C. Scott’s extraordinary book Seeing Like a State, 
which identifies ‘legibility’ as the central problem of modem statecraft.
39 Marx 1842f, p. 193 /  p. 181; translation modified.
40 Kouvelakis 2003, p. 239.
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The premodem state was, in many crucial respects, partially blind; it knew 
precious little about its subjects, their wealth, their landholdings and yields, their 
location, their very identity. It lacked anything like a detailed ‘map’ of its terrain 
and its people. It lacked, for the most part, a measure, a metric, that would allow 
it to ‘translate’ what it knew into a common standard necessary for a synoptic 
view ... much of early modem European statecraft seemed ... devoted to 
rationalizing and standardizing what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and 
administratively more convenient form at... These state simplifications, the basic 
givens of modem statecraft, were ... rather like abridged maps.41
Scott, whose first interests are in contemporary human geography and development, 
argues that this self-understanding of early modem statecraft ‘can provide a distinctive 
optic through which a number of huge development fiascos in poorer Third World 
nations and Eastern Europe can be usefully viewed’, by relating them to epistemological 
questions of the difference between schematic and practical knowledge and ‘the limits, in 
principle, of what we are likely to know about complex, functioning order’.42 My 
argument is that this is precisely the optic through which Marx will ultimately transform 
the terms of German Idealist philosophy into a historic analyses of what he would see as 
the developing fiasco of modern European capitalism.
3. Law and conceptuality
Marx’s view of law as ‘the ideal, self-conscious image of reality, the theoretical expression, 
made independent, of the practical vital forces’ will be much clearer if we keep in mind 
the legal realities of Germany and the Rhineland in particular at the time he is writing. 
Historically, German law had been a confused intermingling of local custom with Roman 
and ecclesiastical canon law. The idea that the historical evolution of this institutional 
fabric represented in some sense the organic self-articulation of a society’s 
interdependence was, we should note, the shared premise of a number of diverse
41 Scott 1998, pp. 2-3.
42 Scott 1998, pp. 6-7.
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theoretical and political currents, on ‘left’ and ‘right’ and drawing from both Romantic 
and post-Kantian philosophical sources. Thus it was precisely this conception that took 
pride of place in the legal theory of the Historical School, which saw its historical 
development as the reflexive objectification of the ‘powers and activities’ (Kraften und 
Tatigkeiteri) of the people as collective subject, their unity and interrelation that is initially 
experienced as strong immediate feelings towards ones family and patrimonial property 
but which require ‘bodily existence’ in rituals and symbols to ‘fix their meaning’.43 The 
development of positive law is thus driven by the need for constant cooperation under 
shared rules, and can thus be seen as amounting to an immanent and accumulated 
expression of society’s implicit collective agency. ‘If we seek the subject in which and for 
which positive law has its existence, we find the people \Volk\. Positive law lives in the 
common consciousness o f the people and we must therefore call it people’s law 
\Volksrech^
The enlightened absolutism of the eighteenth century had set itself the task of 
raising this dense network of legal relations to a clear, systematic and rational form. The 
long-awaited outcome was the Prussian Legal Code of 1794, in Mack Walker’s words, ‘a 
kind of climax of baroque legal theory, Prussian variant’:
an effort to capture in coherent legal form all the elements of a whole society, 
recognizing almost interminable differences of occupation, birth, privilege (that 
was the baroque part of it); but it founded its categories not on local corporations 
and clusters of social relations, but on social and legal types marked out and 
recognized by the sate (that was the Prussian part) ... individuals were identified 
not as community members but as members of the state orders into which the 
whole society was divided.. .45
This order, in Koselleck’s words, ‘survived as the basis of the Prussian social constitution 
until at least the year 1900’46 and is worth quoting directly for the clarity and focus it 
brings to the basic interrelation of ‘right and function’ that remains at the heart of all
43 Savigny 1814, pp. 24-5 /  pp. 5-6, translation modified.
44 Quoted in Toews 1989, p. 141.
45 Walker 1971, p. 159.
46 Quoted at Walker 1978, p. 249.
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philosophical discussion of law and the state in Germany during the period we are 
concerned with. The Introduction sets out the Code’s most basic principles:
§ 22 The laws of the state bind all its members, without distinction of estate 
\des Standes\, rank, or sex...
§ 73 Every member of the state is obliged to support the well-being and
security of the common weal, in accordance with his estate \Stand\ and his 
means \Vermogeri\ ...
§ 82 The rights of a person derive from his birth, his estate \Stand\, and from 
transactions or circumstances with which the laws have associated certain 
effects. . .47
The rest of the Code sets out the various estates of civil society, defined by their function 
in advancing the common good of the state, and specifying the entailed rights accorded 
to any individual member of the estate: the peasants; the Biirgerstand, broken down into 
artisans, manufacturers, merchants, etc.; the nobility; civil servants; clergymen; 
schoolmasters; even the Crown. In each case a functional role is described and the 
corresponding rights defined, amounting to ‘a full depiction, in positive law, of a 
functionally integral society in all its parts’.48
Though the most jarring aspect of this scheme to modem readers will be its 
hierarchical and hereditary structure, it is essential to keep in mind its more formal 
objective of interrelating legally enshrined individual rights with an overall system of 
activities harmonised for the greatest furtherance of the common good. In Walker’s 
description it formulates ‘a functional distribution of positive rights and status within a 
system where elaborately differentiated rights of groups and individuals were aligned with 
their elaborately differentiated roles and functions in the whole society and state’.49 As 
Toews says, ‘most of the privileges of the traditional estates were reaffirmed, but they 
were systematically codified according to general, rational principles; given a functional
47 Quoted at Walker 1978, p. 247-8.
48 Walker 1978, p. 249.
49 Walker 1978, p. 247.
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rather than a customary basis; and relativized within the broader context of the general 
welfare of the state’.50 Indeed, the political force of this act of codification was widely 
seen even at the time as double-edged. Alexis de Tocqueville mocked the construction as 
a ‘monstrous ... compromise between two creations’ — the traditional fabric of social 
privileges and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.51 Walker notes that ‘[rjeform 
was implicit in system and generalization’.52 As Theodor Ziolkowski puts it, its 
promulgation
constituted a challenge to tradition simply by the fact of codification, which in 
effect took the interpretation of law out of the hands of established authority and 
handed it over to the people. Written in a clear, crisp German — with only one 
sentence for each of its more than 19,000 paragraphs — the Allgemeines Landrecht 
rapidly permeated the consciousness of Prussian citizens.53
It was this effect that captured the imagination of those who subsequently argued for a 
rationalisation of Germany’s entire legal system, sparking the famous ‘codification 
controversy’ of 1814. The key exponent, Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut, argued that ‘[a] 
simple national code of law, executed with German vigour in the German spirit, will be 
accessible in all its parts to every mind, even the average one, and our lawyers and judges 
will finally be in a position where the law will be available to them for every case’.54 And 
it was for the very same reason opposed by the jurists, most famously Savigny himself in 
his 1814 pamphlet O f the Vocation of our Age for legislation and Jurisprudence,55 most 
obviously because of its direct attack on their own role as the authoritative interpreters of 
the Volk’s spirit to itself, but also, it needs to be realised, because of a fear that such a 
project would encourage abstract, ahistorical and overly formal understandings of law 
and right that become detached from what should be the animating spirit of the people.56
50 Toews 1980, p. 16.
51 Quoted at Levinger 1998, p. 253.
52 Walker 1971, p. 202.
53 Ziolkowski 1990, pp. 79-80.
54 Quoted at Ziolkowski 1990, p. 82.
55 Savigny 1814.
56 See Toews 1989, pp. 152-53.
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Hegel, of course, had more confidence in the ability of the ‘universal class’ to keep in 
touch with the ethical life of the community, and the Philosophy of Right is peppered with 
rebuttals of Savigny on this issue, to the effect that to deny this moment in the self- 
understanding of a people is in effect to deny the possibility and desirability of thinking at 
all.57
This picture is further complicated for Marx’s writing by the fact that still 
operative in the Rhineland at the time a version of the Napoleonic code, a legacy of its 
subsumption within the post-revolutionary French empire during the early part of the 
century. As is usually noted, this had advanced the development of a strong culture of 
modernising liberalism in the province, and had accustomed many to the civil and 
political rights and freedoms embodied in what were known as the ‘Rhenish 
Institutions’.58 In his indispensable history of the region during this period Jonathan 
Sperber characterises these as ‘in effect, a codification of the achievements of the French 
Revolution’:
They included the abolition of the guilds, feudal tenures, and other restrictions on 
a free market in land, labour, and capital; equality before the law and the abolition 
of any special privileges of the nobility; a uniform communal administrative 
system making no distinction between town and country; and civil registration of 
vital events. Above all, there was ‘Rhenish law’ \Remenisches Rechi}, a 
circumlocution for the Napoleonic Codes of civil, commercial, and criminal law. 
The first, with its regulation of property relations, confirmed the social and 
economic transformations of the revolution ... the last, with its guarantee of
57 See for example Hegel 1821a, p. 242-3, § 211: ‘To deny a civilized nation, or the legal 
profession [demjuristischen Stande] within it, the ability to draw up a legal code would be 
among the greatest insults one could offer to either; for this does not require that a 
system of laws with a new content should be created, but only that the present content of 
the laws should be recognized in its determinate universality — i.e. grasped by means of 
thought— and subsequendy applied to particular cases’.
58 See McLellan 1973, p. 2: ‘during the Napoleonic wars, together with the rest of the 
Rhineland, [Trier] had been annexed by France and governed long enough in accordance 
with the principles of the French Revolution to be imbued with a taste for freedom of 
speech and constitutional liberty uncharacteristic of the rest of Germany’. Marx himself 
notes that ‘[t]he sense of right and legality is the most important provincial characteristic of the 
Rhinelander’. Marx 1842k, p. 262 /  p. 235.
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public, oral, and jury trials for felony charges, was a major prop of civil liberties in 
an age with few other supports for them.59
The time in which Marx was writing was consequently filled with ‘endless wrangling over 
law codes and local government’, as the administration in Berlin sought to replace 
Rhenish law with the 1794 Prussian code and harmonise the administration of the region 
with that of the rest of the kingdom, and Rhenish lawyers (such as Marx’s father) 
spearheaded a movement ‘to defend the use of the Napoleonic Code in the Rhineland 
and to expand its use to all provinces of the German states’.60
between Wolff and Kant
The case for a close interrelation between these practical legal and political realities and 
the more abstract philosophical issues with which have up till now been primarily 
concerned is made by Marx himself, in a polemical defence of the philosophical tenor of 
his own newspaper’s interventions. He points out that
the Prussian Code was derived from the philosophical school of ‘this [Christian] 
W olff, and that the French Napoleonic Code was derived ... from the school of 
ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, Condoret, Mirabeau, and Montesquieu, and from the 
French revolution.61
So how does his relation to these philosophical traditions inform Marx’s engagement 
with these more immediate practical controversies?
Marx draws from the surrounding philosophical tradition a central conception of 
law and the state as the positive inscription and institutionalisation of a social order that 
must aim to harmonise right and function, determinate individuality and systematic 
totality. But the epistemological problematisation of any such conceptual organisation of
59 Sperber 1991, pp. 37-8.
60 Sperber 1991, p. 71.
61 Marx 1842f, pp. 201-2 /  p. 189, translation modified.
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a whole that has been opened and explored by the philosophy of German Idealism 
informs a complex awareness of the inherent tensions and instabilities in such an ideal.
We can see this clearly in the way Marx positions himself as a straightforward 
adherent of neither the Prussian nor the ‘Rhenish’ (read French) legal traditions in his 
discussion of proposed reforms of laws concerning marriage and divorce. This revision 
of the 1794 Prussian General Code was Savigny’s first major task after being appointed 
Minister of Justice in charge of legislation in Spring 1842; a new law was drafted by Ernst 
Ludwig von Gerlach, who sought to reverse what he saw as the excessive liberalisation of 
the eighteenth century by ‘restricting legitimate grounds for divorce to those allowed by 
sixteenth century Lutheran theology’.62 The draft was leaked to the Rhenische Zeitung 
which published it in October 1842, initiating a vociferous public discussion which 
ultimately forced abandonment of the Bill (this was one of the crimes cited as 
justification for the forced closure of the paper in spring 1843).63 Marx wrote an 
‘Editorial Note’ on the topic after the newspaper had already published two criticisms of 
the proposed Bill, one from the standpoint of ‘the old Prussian jurisprudence’, 
presumably defending the existing provisions of the 1794 Code against von Gerlach’s 
restrictions, and one from the standpoint of ‘Rhenish jurisprudence’, presumably 
defending the law that had been bestowed by the French. Both, Marx notes, ‘agree in 
condemning the interference of religion in matters of law’, but it is not enough in Marx’s 
view to simply insist on ‘the secular nature of marriage’ in opposition to the ‘religious 
legislator’, for this only begs the question of the status of the secular in opposition to the 
spiritual.64
The ‘epistemological’ dimension of Marx’s critique of these standard secular 
positions is explicit and striking in his explanation of the insufficiency of the ‘old 
Prussian jurisprudence’, which, we should remember, he has elsewhere already explicitly 
identified with the school of Wolffian philosophy:65
The general code [Das Landrecht] is based on an abstraction of the Understanding
[einer Verstandesahstraktion] which, being in itself devoid of content, conceived the
62 For this background see Toews 1989, pp. 160-1.
63 See the note to Marx 1842n at p. 746.
64 Marx 1842n, p. 275 /  p. 263.
65 Marx 1842f, p. 201 /  p. 189.
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natural, rightful, ethical content as external matter which itself knows no laws and 
then tried to model, organise and arrange this spiridess and lawless matter in 
accordance with an external purpose. It treats the objective world not in 
accordance with the latter’s inherent laws, but in accordance with arbitrary, 
subjective ideas and an intention that is extraneous to the matter itself.66
Thus Marx rehearses through the epistemological vocabulary of post-Kantianism the 
standard criticism, made by traditional and liberal elements, of the Prussian Legal Code — 
that it was the product of a bureaucratic apparatus, external to the social life it sought to 
map, effectively imposing its structures on this society from the outside.67 As Walker 
recounts,
implicit was the assumption that all the particulars really fit together in some 
overview. The framers of the Code almost certainly knew better, at least by the 
time they were done: knew that all the elements of Prussian society would fit 
together as the Code contemplated only if the state obliged them to, or at least 
broke existing social patterns in the interests of the Code’s. For although the 
Code was posed as a static legal snapshot of Prussian society, avoiding any 
suggestion of social or even civil reform, its effort to encompass every aspect of 
life gave to every general statement, every accommodation of one legal practice 
to another, the effect of reform if given the force of law and truly administered. 
For everything to fit the Code, the Prussian civil service had to govern everything 
so it would fit; and the contradiction of cameralism, between the 
acknowledgement of diversity and the determination that all must be a piece, 
lurked in every clause.68
But Marx does not in consequence simply transfer allegiance to the ‘standpoint 
of Rhenish jurisprudence’, which is characterised in his view by ‘dualism’ and a ‘double 
worldview’:
66 Marx 1842n, p. 275 /  p. 263, translation modified.
67 Walker 1971, p. 159.
68 Walker 1971, p. 159.
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It is inadequate to divide the essence of marriage into two parts, a spiritual 
essence and a worldly one, in such a way that one is assigned to the church and 
the individual conscience, the other to the state and the citizens’ consciousness of 
right \R.echtsbewuftsteiri\. The contradiction is not abolished by being divided 
between two different spheres; on the contrary, the result is a contradiction and 
an unresolved conflict between these two spheres of life themselves ... This 
reveals the basic defect of Rhenish jurisprudence, its dual worldview \ywiespaltige 
Weltanschauung which, by a superficial separation of conscience and the 
consciousness of right, does not solve but cuts in two the most difficult conflicts, 
which servers the world of right from the world of the spirit, and therefore right 
from spirit, and hence jurisprudence from philosophy.69
The connection here must be asserted more tentatively, but I want to point out that this 
critique of what is basically French revolutionary law is broadly similar to what we have 
seen was the later Idealist critique of Kant’s strict separation of right and morality and 
attempt to control the tyrannical incursions of legislation by defining virtue as beyond its 
remit. The ubiquitous association by German writers of the time of Kant’s philosophy 
with the principles of the French Revolution70 would lead us to expect such a similarity; 
this would follow the pattern in identifying the limitations of that revolution with the 
limitations of Kant’s subjective, dualistic, quasi-secularised philosophy.71
Marx’s point here seems to be, as was Hegel’s point against Kant and Fichte, that 
a simple secularism that merely shunts all difficult questions of ‘spirit’ into the sphere of 
individual morality and religion in fact solves no problems — in fact the formulation of 
law is inseparable from such matters. The alternative ‘philosophical’ point of view Marx 
is proposing would not shy away from ‘expounding the essence of marriage in and for 
itself and hence ‘explain how the consistent legislator must necessarily proceed if he is 
guided by the essence of things and cannot be at all satisfied with a mere abstraction of
69 Marx 1842n, p. 275 /  p. 263, translation modified.
70 Marx himself refers to what was by then a standard linkage in philosophical 
discussions of the time at Marx 1842g, p. 206 /  pp. 193-4: ‘If ... Kant's philosophy must be 
rightly regarded as the German theory of the French revolution.
71 For this reason I think we must slightly qualify Stathis Kouvelakis’s implication that 
Marx shows a total (even if strategic) commitment to ‘the achievements of the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution’. Kouvelakis 2003, p. 247.
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the determination of this essence’.72 My suggestion is that in making such assertions 
Marx is insisting on the inextricable entanglement of right and function, individual 
freedom and the common welfare, and the impossibility of satisfactorily enshrining legal 
protection for vital activities and forms of relationship without inquiring into their place 
within the wider social whole 73 As Hegel says, ‘welfare [Wi)hl\ is not a good without right. 
Similarly, right is not the good without welfare’. 74 The reason for this insistence in Hegel, 
in the words of Frederick Neuhouser, is that
only a state of affairs in which the demands of right are in systematic harmony 
with general well-being can be fully satisfying to reason and hence affirmable by 
it as good without reservation ... modem moral subjects can recognize as good 
only what unifies right and well-being in a specific way, namely, by systematically 
reconciling the personal freedom of all with the well-being of each individual... 
given their ineradicably sensuous character, human beings could never be fully 
reconciled to a morality that claimed supreme authority over their wills and yet 
made no, or merely a fortuitous, contribution to human well-being.75
A system of right, we begin to see, cannot be something that regulates us from the 
outside, as the rule of our rational part over our lower faculties or an imposition of 
empty form upon a manifold of felt need. It must be beyond such dualism, 
simultaneously constituting and raising to clear conceptual form the inherent concrete 
systematicity of those needs, as the mediation of our interdependence and the means by 
which we negotiate its constant change and development. This is the practical and 
political correlate of the epistemological rejection of an absolute opposition of 
conceptual form and intuited content: no one’s ‘happiness’ or ‘well-being’ can never be 
reduced to the sheer satisfaction of their ‘material’ needs and ‘sensible’ pleasures -  it is
72 Marx 1842n, p. 274 /  p. 260, translation modified.
73 As James C. Scott recognises: ‘the administrative ordering of nature and society’ via 
‘transformative state simplifications’ are ‘as vital to the maintenance of our welfare and 
freedom as they are to the designs of a would-be modem despot. They undergird the 
concept of citizenship and the provision of social welfare just as they might undergird a 
policy of rounding up undesirable minorities’. Scott 1998, p. 4.
74 See Hegel 1821a, p. 157, § 130:
75 Neuhouser 2000, pp. 238-9.
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always inextricably bound up also with our conceptual sense of ‘who we are’, which itself 
always involves some sense of ‘our place in the world’.76
And, again, Marx poses this necessary ideal of harmonious legislative integration 
not as a complacent assumption of state infallibility, but precisely as a problem. This point 
can be seen more clearly if we look at Marx’s famous discussion of the debates over 
woodtheft.
The legislative Understanding
As we have seen, the system of positive laws in a state must adequately reflect the ‘spirit’ 
of its members’ social life. Again, Hegel’s formulations provide the starting point: 
legislation must be ‘cognition of the content in its determinate universality'\ that content exists in 
the first instance as custom, the settled rules and patterns of interaction which coordinate 
our interdependent needs.77 Clearly Marx envisages a similar procedure:78 a society’s 
customs must be ‘formulat[ed] and rais[ed] to a universal level’,79 clearly defined and 
knowable by all. Custom thus provides the material content that must be organised into 
legal form. 80 But it is not thereby sanctified — ‘no one’s action ceases to be wrongful
76 This is surely plausible — how ever much disingenuous rationalisation might be 
involved in practice, there is no doubt that we all like to think that in some sense we 
‘deserve’ or ‘have earned’ our pleasures, and those pleasures in turn, even if solitary, 
‘mindless’ and formally within the domain of ‘private consumption’, are rarely wholly 
independent of some kind of ‘self-image’, an enjoyment of a social status or cultural 
identity.
77 Hegel 1821a, pp. 241-2, § 211.
78 ‘At a time when universal laws prevail, rational customary right is nothing but the 
custom of legal right, for right has not ceased to be custom because it has been embodied in 
law, although it has ceased to be merely custom. For one who acts in accordance with 
right, right becomes his own custom, but it is enforced against one who violates it, 
although it is not his custom. Right no longer depends upon chance, on whether custom 
is rational or not, but custom becomes rational because right is legal, because custom has 
become the custom of the state’. Marx 1842k, p. 231 /  p. 206. Compare Hegel 1821a, p. 
241: ‘the valid laws of the nation do not cease to be its customs merely because they have 
been written down and collected’.
79 Marx 1842k, p. 232 /  p. 207.
80 ‘While right comes into existence [Dasein] primarily in the form of being posited, it also 
comes into existence in terms of content when it is applied to the material of civil society —
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because it is his custom, just as the bandit son of a robber is not exonerated because 
banditry is a family idiosyncrasy’.81 Inconsistencies and injustices which have become 
embedded in the life of a nation that cannot pass the bar of reason are filtered out in the 
process. At the time, the notion of ‘customary right’ played a key role in conservative 
defences of aristocratic status — a ‘philosopher’s stone for turning every sordid claim into 
the pure gold of right’, discovered by ‘the learned and would-be learned servility of so- 
called historians’.82 Marx wants to resist this, on the grounds that ‘the fact that their 
content is contrary to the form of law — universality and necessity — proves that they are 
customary wrongs.’ As with Hegel, it is not entirely clear how he thinks he can make this 
distinction, but the implication seems to be that the ‘customary rights’ of the aristocracy 
cannot be raised to the form of law because of their attachment to particular individuals 
in an arbitrary way, primarily birth.83 This is an essentially Kantian operation, testing 
maxims against the criterion of their fitness to become universal law. But, crucially, the 
direct application of legal form is not sufficient to get from custom to a system of laws 
that is the realisation of rational freedom. This is because what is involved cannot be a 
literal translation but a judgement among a range of equally possible interpretations. It is 
rather like turning a three dimensional object into a flat, two-dimensional representation 
— everything depends on perspective.
The ‘woodtheft’ issue was a ‘staple of public discussion’ in the Rhineland and one 
of the crucial slow-burning social questions of Vormar\ era, a consequence of both the 
increasing commercialisation of land and fuel and the increasing pauperisation of upland 
peasants. Foresters ‘cast an ever more sceptical eye on peasants’ traditional rights’ to 
gather fallen deadwood from the forest floors for domestic fuel; while peasants resisted
to its relationships and varieties of property and contracts in their endlessly increasing 
diversity and complexity.. .’ Hegel 1821a, p. 244.
81 Marx 1842k, p. 231 /  p. 206.
82 Marx 1842k, p. 230 /  pp. 204-5.
83 Elsewhere Marx remarks those who ‘regard freedom as merely an individualproperty of 
certain persons and social estates’ are forced to resort to a ‘mystical religious theory of 
the imagination’ because it is ‘in itself incomprehensible ... how internal, essential, 
universal determinations prove to be linked with certain human individuals by external, 
fortuitous, particular features, without being connected with the human essence, with 
reason in general, and therefore common to all individuals...’ Marx 1842d, pp. 151-2 /  
pp. 139-40.
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by taking direct action, ‘insisting on exercising their traditional rights’.84 Sperber warns 
that in the standard historical versions of this dispute as a straight ‘conflict between 
modernity and tradition’, however those terms are loaded, may be a misleading one -  the 
peasants themselves were looking to cash in on rising wood prices, and despite the claims 
of the landowners to be scientifically enlightened opponents of deforestation, ‘[t]he 
peasants’ insistence on a mixed-use forest with varied vegetation may well have been 
environmentally sounder’.85 But this would only strengthen our expectation that, despite 
his following the terms in which the debate is being conducted, Marx has no interest in 
defending custom for custom’s sake, but as, in this case, a mediation of individual and 
social welfare, an expression of the life of the social organism: ‘In these customs of the 
poor class ... there is an instinctive sense of right; their roots are positive and legitimate’; 
‘. .. this class feels an urge to satisfy a natural need, but equally ... it feels the need to 
satisfy a rightful urge’.86
But at the same time the landowners are accustomed to being lords of their 
manor — why should they not withdraw their permission for the peasantry to take away 
timber that can now fetch a decent price on the emerging raw materials market? Nor can 
the formal requirements of a legal order help the peasants, since under a universal system 
of private property rights there is now nothing from a legal point of view that prevents 
their acquiring forests of their own.87 But this only demonstrates the insufficiency of 
formal universalism as such for the adjudication of such conflicts, and for Marx reveals a
84 For this historical background see Sperber 1991, pp. 74-7.
85 On this basis Sperber also questions in passing what he takes to be Marx’s 
interpretation of the conflict as ‘a struggle of peasants clinging to subsistence agriculture 
and precapitalist property rights against the incursion of the capitalist market economy’. 
But this is to read into Marx’s article what we might expect him to think given his later 
social and economic interests. There is nothing in his discussion to suggest that he sees 
the issue as one of defending traditional communities against the forces of capitalism, 
which would be bizarre for an editor of an organ of progressive bourgeois liberalism. 
Marx’s analysis is conducted in the rather different terms an opposition between narrow 
private interest and an expansive notion of the common welfare — the latter being 
presented as the authentic principle of social and economic modernisation.
86 Marx 1842k, p. 233-4 /  p. 208.
87 Hegel famously ruled that from the point of view of abstract right, ‘the rational aspect is 
that I possess property ... What and how much I possess is ... purely contingent as far as 
right is concerned’ (1821a, pp. 79-80) and Marx seems to accept this: ‘the state cannot 
and must not say: a private interest, a particular existence of property ... is guaranteed 
against all contingencies’. Marx 1842k, p. 257 /  p. 230.
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dangerous bias that can creep into the process of legal systematisation — ‘litde thought is 
needed to perceive how one-sidedly enlightened legislation has treated and been compelled 
to treat the customary rights of the poor1.
Marx presents the social world of the ‘Middle Ages’ as a fabric of ‘arbitrary 
pretensions’ and ‘accidental concessions’, the poor benefiting from property forms that 
were ‘indeterminate’ and ‘ambiguous’, ‘a mixture of private and public right’. In the 
transition to a modem system of rights, the ‘arbitrary pretensions’ are converted into 
‘legal claims, insofar as some rational content of right was to be found in those 
pretensions’ — it is not that legislation ‘abolishes the privileges of property under 
constitutional law’, but rather that it ‘divests them of their strange [abenteurlichen] character 
and gives them a civil character’. Similarly, then, the poor’s ‘accidental concessions’ should 
have been converted into ‘necessary ones’, but legislation ‘abolished the hybrid, 
indeterminate forms of property by applying to them existing categories of abstract civil 
right, the schema for which was made available in Roman right’. This meant that the 
‘dualistic’ and ‘contradictory’ nature of feudal property was resolved to the benefit of one 
side only (the landlord’s) without compensation for the other (the peasantry).88 Marx 
gives another example in the confiscation of church lands: ‘The monasteries were 
secularised, and it was right to do so. But the accidental support which the poor found in 
the monasteries was not replaced by any other positive source of income’.89
Here, perhaps, is a first sketch for a theory of the transition from tradition to 
modernity, or feudalism to capitalism -  an early draft, perhaps, of the story of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ presented in the famous final chapter of the first volume of Capital. But 
the key issue for Marx here is the danger of pursuing rigid one-to-one translations of 
customary privileges into legal rights without regard for the wider social context in which 
these practices gain their meaning. Legislation must resolve the vague informalities of 
feudalism into clear juridical categories and legal entitlements — this is a condition for 
free, rational subjectivity to become fully developed. But at the same time the legislator
88 According to Pinkard this was a recognised problem of liberal reform in Prussia: ‘The 
result of emancipating the peasants from feudal ties — a reform originally opposed by 
many elements of the nobility -  was that large wealthy landowners simply swallowed 
peasant land and thereby in many cases rendered the peasants even worse off then they 
had been before’. Pinkard 2000, p. 423.
89 Marx 1842k, pp. 232-3 /  pp. 207-8.
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must view particular customs not as simple and discrete, but in the light of their complex 
role in maintaining the well-being of the whole.90
This dilemma expresses, at a specifically political level, the question at the very 
heart of the Idealist project. And it is here that Marx invokes this philosophical legacy by 
identifying this problem of ‘one-sidedness’ as one inherent to ‘the legislative 
understanding’ \der gesetygebende Verstand]:
For the purpose of legislation, such ambiguous [^ weideutige] forms could be 
grasped only by Understanding \Verstand\, and Understanding is not only one­
sided, but has the essential function of making the world one-sided, a great and 
remarkable work, for only one-sidedness can extract the particular from the 
unorganised mass of the whole and give it shape. The character of a thing is a 
product of Understanding. Each thing must isolate itself and become isolated in 
order to be something. By confining each of the contents of the world in a stable 
determinacy and as it were petrifying the fluid essence of this content, 
understanding brings out the manifold diversity of the world, for the world 
would not be many-sided without the many one-sidednesses.91
Understanding, says Marx, is what gives the world its determinacy, but in doing so is 
always partial and atomising. The echo of Hegel is unmistakeable:
Thinking as Understanding stops short at the fixed determinacy and its 
distinctness vis-a-vis other determinacies; such a restricted abstraction counts for 
the Understanding as one that subsists on its own account, and [simply] is ... the
90 Heinz Lubasz writes that £[t]he notion ... that the state must embrace the whole of a 
nation’s people, which was crucially important to Marx, was no Hegelian notion at all. 
Hegel was content simply to exclude all those of no estate’. Lubasz 1976, p. 33. Though 
Marx certainly seems more concerned than Hegel is with the fate of the propertyless, this 
does seem a bit harsh on Hegel, and, moreover, surely does not permit us to draw the 
conclusion that ‘the whole’ is not a ‘Hegelian notion’!
91 Marx 1842k, p. 233 /  pp. 207-8, translation modified. Marx’s clear reliance on the 
post-Kantian critique of the Understanding in this passage been remarked on only once, 
so far as I am aware, and that only very briefly, in Howard 1972, p. 47: ‘The legislators ... 
ignore the human relations which compose the object of their legislation, treating that 
object as a givenness to be analyzed by the Understanding and not by (dialectical) 
Reason, which could deal with the political content of the material forms.’
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thinking of the Understanding must unquestionably be conceded its right and 
merit, which generally consists in the fact that without the Understanding there is 
no fixity or determinacy in the domains either of theory or practice.92
And yet, continues Hegel, ‘it is usually said also that the Understanding must not go too 
far. This contains the valid point that the Understanding cannot have the least word’.93 
The determination of the content of legislation must be guided by reference to purposes 
and wholes. If we proceed by converting particular social facts into legal concepts one by 
one, we are simply applying the abstract universal of pure legal form to material particulars 
as we come across them, creating a series that is arbitrary and inherendy boundless.94 We 
will never arrive at the concrete universal of a legal system that reflects the social organism 
as a whole. Legislation must not be anchored in the self-interest of the landowner who 
fails to appreciate that what links him to the peasant is much bigger than the peasant’s 
momentary intrusion into his private sphere:
Private interest makes the one sphere in which a person comes into conflict with 
this interest into this person’s whole sphere of life ... But the state must regard 
the infringer of forest regulations as something more than a wood-pilferer ... Is 
not the state linked with each of its citi2ens by a thousand vital nerves, and has it 
the right to sever all these nerves because the citizen has arbitrarily severed one of 
them? Therefore the state will regard even an infringer of forest regulations as a 
human being, a living member of the state, one in whom it’s heart’s blood flows, 
a soldier who has to defend his Fatherland, a witness whose voice must be heard 
by the court, a member of the community with public duties to perform, the 
father of a family, whose existence is sacred, and, above all, a citizen of the 
state.95
92 Hegel 1830, pp. 125-6; §80.
93 Hegel 1830, p. 128, §80.
94 Marx 1842k, p. 233 /  p. 208. Compare Hegel: ‘That logical consistency which Leibniz 
praises is certainly an essential characteristic of the science of right, as of mathematics 
and every other science of the understanding; but this logical consistency of the 
understanding has nothing to do with the satisfaction of the demands of reason and with 
philosophical science.’ Hegel 1821a, p. 34. See also p. 244.
95 Marx 1842k, p. 236 /  p. 210-11.
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Elsewhere Marx writes: ‘the particular can be seen spiritually and freely only in 
connection with the whole and therefore not in separation from it’.96
Clearly, then, the formal rules of the legislative Understanding are an ambiguous 
achievement of modernity — necessary, but not sufficient, for the adequate cognition of 
social reality that must be enshrined in legislation. Marx urges his fellow jurists to ‘devote 
their main attention to the content of the law, so that we should not be left in the end with 
only an empty mask. The form is of no value if it is not the form of the content’.97 This 
content must be determined in accordance with a sense of the place of every particular 
element within a wider systematic totality, thus framing a legal formulation that truly 
harmonises right and function. This orientation to the whole Marx sometimes describes 
as the Gesinnung des Staats, the state ‘disposition’ or ‘frame of mind’, a standpoint that is as 
much cognitive as it is moral.
4. The state and subjectivity
According to the dominant political discourse of his time it was precisely the role of the 
government, the ‘state’ in its narrower sense, to embody this perspective. But for Marx, 
as we shall now see, any attempt to fix the ‘state disposition’ institutionally erects an 
impassable dualism, and can only fall into the same repeated antinomy where an abstract 
universal simply enwraps what is only one particular opposed to other particulars. The 
degeneration of Prussian rationalism thus dramatises at a macro-political level the moral 
pathology Hegel had diagnosed as the secret of Kantian formalism: through its confusion 
of ‘absolute form’ with ‘conditioned material’, the ‘absoluteness of the form is imposed 
by stealth on the unreal and conditioned character of the content’. At the heart of the 
practical legislation of pure reason lies ‘inversion and sleight of hand’.98 But though 
Marx’s analysis of Prussia’s state institutions and political life is unmistakably conducted 
through the terms and motifs of post-Kantian philosophy, it is here that we begin to see
96 Marx 1842d, p. 176 /  p. 164, translation modified.
97 Marx 1842k, p. 261 /  p. 235.
98 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 126.
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Marx part company with Hegel’s prescriptions for the constitutional embodiment of the 
‘true state’.99
The ‘social abstraction’ of the universal class
At the time he is writing, of course, it was widely considered one of Enlightenment 
Prussia’s great achievements to have given the ‘state frame of mind’ a clear sociological 
and institutional location, in the bureaucratic class or ‘universal estate’. The self­
conception of Prussia’s official elite as the ‘universal estate’ is familiar to us from its 
presentation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right™ but which was formed by longstanding 
practices of training and professionalism that had continued through from the rationalist 
cameralism of the eighteenth century.101 The 1794 Prussian General Code gave civil 
servants a status only just below that of the traditional nobility, specified their systems of 
examinations, pensions, protection against dismissal, and special tax status, and ‘expressly 
commissioned [them] to maintain and further the state’s security, good order, and 
welfare’.102 In the words of one historian of the period, the Beamten ‘saw themselves as ... 
as representatives of the universal, of the public interests, as against all the particular self- 
interests. They regarded themselves as advocates of objective truth, even of reason’.103
This cognitive perspective was closely bound up with the very sociological 
formation of such a ‘class’. As Toews suggestively phrases it,
99 ‘That Marx shared Hegel’s ideal of the state ... does not mean very much, since he 
conceived of the institutions of the state and their interrelationships in a very different 
way’. Lubasz 1976, p. 34. This again seems overstated — I think it does matter quite a lot 
that Marx conceives ‘the concept of the state’ in a Hegelian way, for it means that his 
critique of its actualisation in Prussia, while differing from Hegel’s assessment, is 
conducted in Hegelian terms — indeed, not only is Marx’s idea of a state a Hegelian one, 
but more interestingly and importantly, his idea of what it is to be a fallen or degenerated 
state, a Verstandesstaat, is utterly Hegelian too.
100 James Sheehan writes that while ‘[o]ne may well wonder how many people worked 
their way through the complex skein of arguments and analysis out of which Hegel’s 
Philosophie des Rechts is woven’, Hegel’s text ‘captures the assumptions upon which the 
bureaucracy’s claim to power rested’. Sheehan 1989, p. 432.
101 Sheehan 1989, pp. 435-7.
102 Sheehan 1989, p. 428.
103 Nipperdey 1996, p. 282.
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The geographic and social mobility that characterized the experience of these 
modern elements in the social order was reflected in social attitudes and 
perceptions that emphasized ... rational detachment from, and active 
manipulation of, a world whose concrete totality could be divided into uniform 
abstract parts and ordered according to universal categories.104
In Walker’s description, ‘the medium of harmony among the discrete parts was the state’s 
fiscal administration, analogously a social abstraction composed of men above and 
outside the discrete parts of society’.105 Its interventions in society were conceived as acts 
necessary to sustain a natural harmony which only it could adequately perceive.
But this project was a troubled and increasingly unstable one. And the 
contradiction that historians generally identify as the root of its problems is the 
epistemological one that twentieth century writers like Hayek put before the ideologues 
of state planning: how can an overview of the whole possibly be reconciled with the 
necessary intimacy of acquaintance with the infinite diversity of the parts. In Walker’s 
diagnosis, ‘Prussian administration posed two imperatives: first, that public officials know 
their districts thoroughly enough for their oversight to be genuine, accurate, and 
inescapable; and second that they be detached from and immune to local influence and 
obstacles. The two did not fit together well’.106 The practical consequence is an increasing 
contestation of the bureaucrats’ understandings and interventions from elements within 
civil society itself. This was the issue of increasing political conflict by the time Marx is 
writing, and in the Rhineland relations between the bureaucracy and civil society were 
particularly fraught.107
104 Toews 1980, p. 15. See also Nipperdey 1996, p. 282: ‘They lived in the world of 
systematic order and logic, the world of principles and rational reflection, which they had 
learned at the university. This elevated them above the world of particularist traditions. 
They lived, not on their background, but through their jobs. The civil servant found his 
identity in his occupation, his activity and achievement, his intelligence and his insight... 
and in his place in the hierarchy of the state service. The civil servant did not inhabit the 
familiar little world of local everyday life, but the big abstract world of the state, the 
merciless world of hard law’.
105 Walker 1971, p. 145.
106 Walker 1971, p. 158.
107 Otto Camphausen, a civil servant closely acquainted with the Rhenish business elites 
who funded the Kheinische Zietung, described a ‘fanatical’ hostility to the Prussian 
bureaucracy in the region. Sheehan 1989, p. 616. See also Sperber 1991, p. 39.
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Marx analyses these conflicts in terms that exhibit exactly the same logic as the 
post-Kantian critique of any dualist epistemology that places subject and object, form 
and content, conceptuality and sensibility in absolute opposition, a division of the 
original unity of experience into two halves that can only be empty and indeterminate in 
abstraction from one another, and whose reunification can only be arbitrary and 
coercive.108 According to Hegel, Kant’s absolutisation of the abstract ‘I’ assumes that
the manifold of sensibility, empirical consciousness as intuition and sensation, is 
in itself something unintegrated, that the world is in itself falling to pieces, and 
only gets objective coherence and support, substantiality, multiplicity, even 
actuality and possibility, through the good offices of human self-consciousness 
and Understanding.109
In place of this scenario Hegel offers an account of immanent concrete universality that, 
in Robert Stem’s words,
frees the unity of the object from the synthesising activity of Kant’s 
transcendental subject; for, on Hegel’s account ... the object does not need to be 
organized or unified by us, because, as the exemplification of a substance- 
universal, it is no longer treated as reducible to the kind of atomistic manifold 
that requires this synthesis. . .110
Similarly, in the Rhineland the Prussian bureaucracy found itself confronted by ‘a 
bourgeoisie that saw itself as part of the advanced society of western Europe and
108 Kouvelakis approaches this central theme of Marx’s articles from the point of view of 
the Philosophy of Right, as an investigation of the problem of the ‘transition’ from civil 
society to the state. Kouvelakis 2003, pp. 251-6. This is certainly implicit in Marx’s texts, 
and may even have been more to the forefront of his mind than the epistemological 
issues I am concerned with. But I think that an exploration of these parallels of Marx’s 
political critique with Hegel’s critique of epistemology may be one way to help us to see 
more clearly how it is that, as Kouvelakis says, Marx will ultimately criticise Hegel’s 
political theory for not being Ylegelian enough. Kouvelakis 2003, p. 265, p. 290.
109 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 74.
110 Stern 1990, p. 41.
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regarded itself as perfectly capable of running its own — and society’s — affairs without 
bureaucratic direction’.111
Marx’s description of these problems is prompted most centrally by the failure of 
the bureaucracy to respond adequately to a worsening famine in the Mosel region 
following a collapse in wine prices. But he is emphatic in relating this not to any 
contingent failing on the part of any particular individuals or groups — the problem 
would arise for ‘a government with the best intentioni — but as an inevitable outcome of the 
very structure of bureaucratic rule — as he puts it, £the principle that the state possesses 
conscious and active existence in the administration \der Staat sein bewuftes und thdtiges 
Dasein in der Venvaltunj^. This produces a dualistic outlook — ‘to the official only the 
sphere of activity of the authorities is the state, whereas the world outside this sphere of 
activity is merely an object of state activity’, with the consequence that ‘there are two 
categories of citi2ens \einem doppelten Staatsbiirgerthum\ — the active, knowledgeable citizens 
in the administration, and the passive, uninformed citizens who are the object of 
administration’.112 What this means, crucially, is that the administration is inherently 
incapable of being guided by any information received from the ‘passive’ component of 
society, of building up an accurate picture of the actual conditions of life of those it rules 
over.
Presented with memoranda and petitions, officialdom is unreceptive and 
defensive of its own activities — because any such inputs are by definition a product of 
private interests, foreign to ‘the official under standing’, while the state’s officials ‘consider 
they are in the best position to judge how far the welfare of the state is endangered and 
that they must be presumed to have a deeper insight into the relation between the whole 
and the part than the parts themselves have’.113 The official on the frontline has 
conscientiously performed his duties in accordance with the administrative ‘principles 
and institutions’; these latter are not up for question because ‘[wjhether the 
administrative principles and institutions are good or not is a question that lies outside 
his sphere, for that can only be judged in higher quarters where a wider and deeper
111 Sperber 1991, p. 39.
112 Marx 1843b, p. 345 /  p. 310. The young Bismarck complained in 1838 that ‘in order 
to take part in public life, one must be a salaried and dependent servant of the state, 
belong completely to the bureaucratic caste’. Quoted by Sheehan 1989, p. 433.
113 Marx 1843b, p. 348 /  pp. 312-3.
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knowledge of the official nature of things, i.e., of their connection with the state as a whole, 
prevails’.114
Precisely because these administrative principles are taken as given, 
unquestionable, the source of the social distress is displaced into a realm beyond the state’s 
own domain of responsibility: ‘[t]he administration ... owing to its bureaucratic nature, is 
capable of perceiving the reasons for the distress not in the sphere administered, but only in 
the sphere of nature and the private citizen, which lies outside the sphere administered’. So 
it attempts to mould civil society to better fit its principles and institutions: ‘[t]he 
administration, which considers that the distressed state of the Mosel region is incurable 
and due to circumstances lying outside the scope of its principles and its activity, advises 
the Mosel inhabitants so to arrange their life that it is adapted to the present 
administrative institutions and they are able to exist in a tolerable fashion within them’. 
The government’s response to the crisis, then, is restricted to advice on developing other 
forms of cultivation and a proposal to limit parcellation of landed property.
An absurd inversion has occurred, through no one’s fault. The Mosel inhabitant 
understandably feels aggrieved:
He feels, sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously, that the 
administration exists for the sake of the country and not the country for the sake 
of the administration, but that this relationship becomes reversed when the 
country has to transform its customs, its rights, its kind of work and its property 
ownership to suit the administration.115
Conscious of their own industriousness and genuine suffering, the private citi2ens feel 
‘that reality itself has been distorted under the influence of a one-sided and arbitrarily 
established point of view.’ They demand ‘that the official who is supposed to be the sole 
creative force of the state \der allein staatsschopferische Macht] should put an end to his 
distress and ... prove his ability to remedy the bad situation by his activity, or at least 
recognise that institutions which were suitable at a certain time have become unsuitable 
under completely changed circumstances’.116 But the epistemological duality which draws
114 Marx 1843b, p. 345 /  p. 309.
115 Marx 1843b, p. 347 /  pp. 311-12.
116 Marx 1843b, p. 344 /  p. 309.
176
4. THE R H I N E L A N D  1842-3
an absolute line between the public understanding of officialdom and the private 
interests of society has resulted in a breakdown of practical freedom and responsibility — 
the administration is incapable of recognising the source of social distress in its own 
principles and institutions, and always ascribes them to the recalcitrance of private 
interests in society. Meanwhile the private members of society are themselves incapable 
of doing anything other than railing against these institutions because ‘the sole creative 
force of the state’ has been placed on the side of the bureaucracy.
This problem of the government’s entrapment in a closed epistemological circle 
is dramatised even more starkly by Marx’s battles with the censor, who also, in Marx’s 
own words, is ‘entangled in this dialectic’.117 In presuming to judge the loyal or disloyal 
‘disposition’ of journalists and writers, the government de facto renounces its own state 
disposition, because by this very adjudication it defines itself as one partial perspective 
opposed to others in the state:
in a society in which one organ imagines itself the sole, exclusive possessor of 
state reason and state morality, in a government which opposes the people in 
principle and hence regards its anti-state frame of mind as the general, normal frame 
of mind, the bad conscience of a faction invents laws against tendency, lam of 
revenge, laws against a frame of mind which has its seat only in the government 
members themselves.118
In its very application of such a law the government reduces itself to that which it claims 
to prohibit: ‘it forms as it were the inverted world to its laws [die verkherte Welt t(u ihren 
Geset^ en], for it applies a double measuring-rod [doppeltem M af\. What for one is right, the 
other side is wrong’.119
Thus is the true state dissolved by the presumption of its administrators:
The government hears only its own voice, it knows that it hears only its own voice, 
yet it harbours the illusion that it hears the voice of the people, and it demands 
that the people, too, should harbour this illusion. For its part, therefore, the
117 Marx 1842a, p. 121 /  p. 109.
118 Marx 1842a, p. 120 /  p. 108.
119 Marx 1842a, p. 121 /  pp. 108-9.
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people sinks partly into superstition, partly into political disbelief, or, completely 
turning away from the life of the state, becomes a rabble of private individuals 
\Privatpdbe/J.120
The manifold of private interests
The abstract opposition of state and society reduces the latter to a chaotic mass of 
conflict and privatism that separates all individuals from the collective self-determination 
that the ‘true state’ should offer. In consequence, they remain at the level of immediacy, 
sensibility, material property, which they fail to penetrate beyond to their own 
involvement in a wider social unity.121
The child, of course, does not go beyond sensible perception, it sees a thing only in 
isolation, and the invisible nerve threads which link the particular with the 
universal, which in the state as in everywhere make the material parts into soul- 
possessing members of the spiritual whole, are for the child non-existent. The 
child believes that the sun revolves around the earth; that the universal revolves 
around the particular. Hence the child does not believe in the spirit, but it believes 
in spectres)11
120 Marx 1842d, pp. 168-9 /  p. 156, translation modified.
121 This critique o f ‘private interest’ seems also to have been a key theme of Bruno 
Bauer’s contributions to the Rhenische Zeitung at this time. See Moggach 2003, p. 127; and 
the summary of Bauer’s general argument on p. 12: ‘The universal is dispersed into 
multiple points, at which predatory private interests, both individual and corporate, 
cluster and oppose each other in order to secure additional advantages. Arrogating 
universality to itself, the authoritarian state that arises over these rigidly exclusive 
particulars thwarts and denies the self-activity of its people, and conceals the source of its 
authority behind a veil of religious sanctification.’
122 Marx 1842d, pp. 135-6 /  p. 124, translation modified.
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We see this misrecognition played out in the debates over woodtheft.123 In the legislative 
body, ‘the Rhinelander ought to have been victorious over the estate, the human being 
ought to have been victorious over the forest owner’,124 recognising the ‘invisible nerve 
threads’ that connect their welfare to that of the peasants, but instead the ‘law-giving 
forest owner confused ... his two roles, that of legislator and that of forest owner’.125 In 
holding fast to their identity as forest owners, they abdicate their very humanity, 
‘enthroning ... the unethical, irrational and soulless abstraction of a particular material 
object and a particular consciousness which is slavishly subordinated to this object... ’126 
‘How could the selfish legislator be human when something inhuman, an alien material 
essence, is his supreme essence?’127 The peasants, on the other hand, are described as 
‘those whose property consists of life, freedom, humanity, and citizenship of the state, 
who own nothing except themselves’.128 There is thus an internal structural link between 
the atomism of civil society and the false identification with the immediate, the ‘material’, 
upon which it rests.
It is notable, however, that Marx always describes the pathology of private 
interest as not so much a withdrawal from totality as a fixation upon a false totality. There 
is no form of consciousness or activity that does not in some way entail an interrelation 
with one’s social and natural context — the problem of being excluded from the self- 
conscious activity of the true state is that the gap will be filled by dangerously distorted 
and partial estimations of this whole and one’s place in it that lead the individual into 
conflict with others. ‘Private interest considers itself the ultimate purpose of the 
world’.129 This is exacdy what occurs in the provincial assembly, where the landowning 
representatives’ failure to legislate with a sense of the purposiveness of the whole results 
in laws that are designed to suit their own particular purposes. The gap left by the
123 As Breckman righdy says, Marx treats inherited private property as ‘paradigmatic’: ‘the 
essence of private property is its abstraction from the community as a presocial right of 
individuals’. Breckman 1999, p. 276.
124 Marx 1842k, p. 262 /  p. 235.
125 Marx 1842k, p. 252 /  p. 226, translation modified.
126 Marx 1842k, p. 262 /  p. 236.
127 Marx 1842k, p. 236 /  p. 211.
128 Marx 1842k, p. 256 /  p. 230.
129 Marx 1842k, p. 249 /  p. 223.
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absence of a critical teleological reasoning is filled by a reasoning that is brutally 
instrumental.130 Like the child who thinks that the universe revolves around his own 
physical position in it, the interested legislator judges everything with a view to his own 
material possessions.
The antinomies of representation
The woodthefts issue demonstrates that the opposition between bureaucracy and civil 
society will not be solved by representative bodies constituted according to material 
corporate interests. Marx views the fatal ‘introduction of material interests into the law’ at 
the hands of the Prussian forest owners as a logical consequence of the very structure of 
estates representation in Prussia. As we have seen, it allows the emptiness of an abstract 
universal — legal form as such — to be substantiated by making one particular — the 
material possessions of the legislator — the fixed point from which all others are 
measured: ‘[I]n accordance with its function, it represented a determinate particular interest 
[ein bestimmtes Sonderinteresse\ and treated it as the final goal [End%weck]’.u l Representation 
based on private interest can only fall into mechanical externality, because
for a determinate element [ein bestimmtes Tilemeni\ like landed property everything 
is external that is not landed property itself. Hence not only the composition of 
the Provincial Assembly, but its activities also are mechanical' for it must treat all 
general interests and even particular interests different from itself as things 
extraneous and alien [Ungehorigen undFremden].152
13° cThe utilitarian [niit%liche\ intelligence which fights for its hearth and home differs, of 
course, from the free intelligence which fights for what is right despite its hearth and 
home. There is a particular kind of intelligence which serves a particular purpose, a 
particular matter [Stojfe\> and there is another kind of intelligence which masters ever 
matter and serves only itself. Marx 1842u, p. 301 /  p. 281. See also 1842k, p. 249 /  p. 
224: ‘Interest does not think, it calculates’.
131 Marx 1842k, p. 261 /  p. 235.
132 Marx 1842u, p. 305 /  p. 284.
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Marx does not oppose the principle of functional differentiation as such — £no one 
would want to eradicate the difference between the estates’, rather this difference ‘consists 
in ... the living movement of distinct functions, which are all inspired by one and the 
same life’.133 But in explicidy constituting them as particular interests distinct from the 
state, can only mean that the life of the state does not infuse them, and indeed that it is 
dysfunctional, ‘because it fosters particular elements which do not find their legitimate 
satisfaction in the state, and therefore become organised as special bodies alongside the 
state and have to enter into a contractual relation with the state’.134 As soon as the state is 
seen as something opposed to private interests it itself is just reduced to another particular 
in the play of oppositions. What appear to be private interests should rather be moments 
in the state’s organisation which lose their distinct objectivity once one takes the state as 
a whole.
In a true state there is no landed property, no industry, no material thing, which 
as a crude element of this kind could make a bargain with the state; in it there are 
only spiritualforces, and only in their state form of resurrection, in their political 
rebirth, are these natural voices entitled to a voice in the state.135
But just as a concrete universal can never be attained by adding together more 
and more particulars, the general interest cannot be arrived at by simply introducing 
more private interests to the decision-making process. Marx makes a mockery of a liberal 
proposal to include the ‘learned estates’ alongside ‘industry’ and ‘landed property’, 
because it only reduces what should be the determining universal to just another particular. 
‘Not only is intelligence not a particular element of representation, it is not an element at 
all; it is a principle which cannot take part in any compound of elements, but can only 
produce a division into parts based on itself.136 ‘For intelligence nothing is external, because
133 Marx 1842u, p. 295 /  p. 275.
134 Marx 1842u, p. 304-5 /  p. 283
135 Marx 1842u, p. 306 /  p. 285.
136 Marx 1842u, p. 304 /  p. 284.
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it is the inner determining soul of everything [die innere bestemmende Seele von allentf ,137 Here 
again we see the self-conscious activity without which representation will always be a 
dead mechanism. Particulars can only ever be external to each other, but the true 
universal must be the inner determinant of them all.
Marx proposes an alternative model of representation based not on the four 
estates but on the basis of local and regional geographical constituencies — these are now 
the ‘true spheres, in accordance with which the state is ruled, judged, administered, taxed, 
trained and schooled’, these ‘distinctions, which owing to their very essence are dissolved 
at every moment in the unity of the whole, are free creations of the spirit of the Prussian 
state’.138 But even this, it seems, would not dispose entirely of the general paradox of 
representation that Marx elsewhere raises:
If, in accordance with the constitution, the province appoints estates to represent its 
general intelligence, it thereby totally renounces all its own judgement and 
understanding, which are now solely incorporated in the chosen representatives 
... the political reason of the province falls on its own sword as soon as it has 
made its great invention of the Assembly, but of course to rise again like the 
phoenix for the next elections.139
Still the question raises itself: which is the state? The assembly which determines the 
universal interest in opposition to the particular interests outside? Or the people which 
elect the assembly, charging it with legislating on their behalf? The question is not a 
frivolous one when there is a real conflict between the people and the assembly, on an 
issue such as freedom of information. Marx diagnoses ‘the old fatal antithesis of the 
Assembly as something internal and the province as something external as the source of 
the assembly’s ‘independent ossification in opposition to the province’.140 Again, a perverse 
inversion has occurred under the cover of a spurious universalism: ‘the rights of the
137 Marx 1842u, p. 305 /  p. 284. Compare again Hegel 1801a, p. 130: ‘That the world is a
product of the freedom of intelligence is the determinate and express principle of
idealism’.
138 Marx 1842u, p. 296 /  p. 276.
139 Marx 1842d, p. 150 /  p. 138.
140 Marx 1842d, pp. 150-51 /  pp. 138-9.
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Provincial Assembly are no longer rights of the province, but rights against the province, and the 
Assembly itself would be the greatest wrong against the province but with the mystical 
significance of being supposed to embody its greatest right’.141
5. Reason and the public sphere
A universally recognised hallmark of German life in the decades between the Restoration 
and the revolutionary outburst of 1848 was the official stranglehold on the development 
of any kind of public or political life. The notorious ‘Carlsbad Decrees’ of 1819 had 
instituted prior censorship of the press, denied any right of peaceful assembly or 
collective petition, sanctioned the breaking up of unofficial meetings by the police or 
even the army, prohibited all political associations and subjected all voluntary association 
to state approval.142 In Thomas Nipperdey’s account,
The fact that all free movements were suffocated and suppressed meant that no 
political life, no public life and accountability could come about, no large-scale 
objectives and no concrete tasks could be undertaken, and there was no free 
interplay of different forces ... German life was turned in upon itself, into 
Biedermeier philistinism, into cosiness, sometimes into indolence and resignation, 
or into crank religions, science, the empire of thought, history and apolitical 
attitudes. . . 143
James Sheehan, also, notes that
Throughout the 1820s and 1830s ... the free and easy flow of news, the clash of 
opinions about everyday events, and circulation of ideas about politics — all 
essential elements in the formation of a politically informed public -  were 
severely restricted ... Those interested in current affairs often had to be content
141 Marx 1842d, p. 146 /  p. 134.
142 Sperber 1991, p. 53.
143 Nipperdey 1996, p. 249.
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with studying theoretical treatises, reading accounts of politics in other countries, 
or enjoying ... empty gossip.144
The very development of a liberal movement in the Rhineland was rendered almost 
impossible by such restrictions, which, as Sperber says, meant that ‘conflicts tended to 
remain individual, isolated events without broader implications, as public knowledge of 
them was limited, and public discussion of them abortive or nonexistent’.145
This is precisely what Marx identifies as the obstacle to the development of a 
‘true state’. It is of the utmost importance to give full recognition at this point to the fact 
that Marx is identifying the ultimate principle of his political criticism with an activity 
that, on his own account, is both driven towards systematicity and completeness and yet 
which is equally inherently open-ended and always unfinished.146 In this respect it is 
powerfully resonant of Kant’s emphasis on the political functions of publicity, and his 
general conception of the sovereignty of public reason and its central role in the advance 
of scientific progress as the always self-revising development of systematicity and 
completeness.147 Marx emphasises throughout the distinctive features of the public 
sphere created by a free press: the discussion can not be controlled from any one point, 
there are no barriers to anyone entering it, the door is always open to new ‘facts’ and new 
‘judgements’ that might suggest a revision of our previous systematisations, and therefore 
no such systematisation can every be taken as final, but always subjected to an ongoing 
cycle of hypothesis and falsification. The contradiction of censorship is precisely its 
effort to shut down this process, instantly raising questions as to the status of the 
presumed knowledge upon which it is based. ‘The true censorship, based on the very 
essence of the press, is critique. This is the tribunal which freedom of the press gives rise
144 Sheehan 1989, p. 445.
145 Sperber 1991, p. 53.
146 ‘Thus, with a lively press movement, the whole truth will be revealed, for if the whole 
appears at first only as the emergence of a number of different, individual points of view 
which — sometimes unintentionally, sometimes accidentally — develop side by side, in the 
end, however, this work of the press will have prepared for one of its participants the 
material out of which he will create a single whole. Thus, gradually, by means of a division 
of labour, the press arrives at the whole truth, not by one person doing everything, but 
by many doing little.’ Marx 1843b, p. 333 /  p. 297.
147 For an attempt to draw out the political implications of this conception in Kant, see 
O’Neill 1989, pp. 3-50.
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to of itself. Censorship is criticism as a monopoly of the government. But does not 
criticism lose its rational character if it is not open but secret, ... if it only exercises 
criticism but will not submit to it?’148
Publicity as constitutive
But I think there is good evidence that we should go further than this and assert that 
Marx seeks to grant to public reason not just the regulatory role that Kant sees it as having, 
in both the epistemological and political domains, but a more radical and primary role in 
constituting the very systematicity of the state. This is suggested both by the emphasis 
Marx places on the role of public reason in overcoming or suspending the distinction 
between ‘state’ and ‘society’, and his implication in numerous places that ultimately it is 
pubic reason itself, and not any fixed institution or legal entity, that is the ‘true state’.149 
Kouvelakis puts this point very strongly:
The free press becomes the organizing centre of the national/popular historical 
bloc in its struggle for cultural and political hegemony against the forces 
supporting the ancien regime. Accordingly, the aporias of Kant’s conception of 
Publiffiat vanish all by themselves: the expansiveness of the public sphere, the 
moving spirit behind the democratisation of the social totality, is inseparable
148 Marx 1842d, p. 159 /  p. 147, translation modified. See also Marx 1842a, p. 109 /  p.
97: ‘Censorship is official critique; its norms are critical norms, hence they least of all can be 
exempted from critique, being on the same plane as the latter’ (translation modified); 
Marx 1842f, p. 188 /  p. 176: ‘Who is to decide on the limits of scientific research if not 
scientific research itself?’ Compare Kant 1781a, p. 643, A738 /  B766: ‘Reason must 
subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique 
through any prohibition without damaging itself and drawing upon itself a 
disadvantageous suspicion... The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom, 
which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the 
agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed 
even his veto, without holding back.’
149 Breckman recognises that ‘Marx’s political journalism in 1842 rehearsed in Idealist 
terms the critique of the modem separation of state and civil society that was to emerge 
forcefully in his major works of the next year’ — though by ‘Idealist terms’ he seems to 
mean simply Marx’s rejection of ‘materialism’, rather than the implicit post- 
epistemological framework to which he pays litde attention. Breckman 1999, p. 277.
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from the ‘becoming-state’ of the historical bloc, and poles apart from anything 
resembling the subordination of politics to an external/transcendent principle. At 
the same time, this expansiveness is a manifestation of the spirit and life of the 
people as such, of the self-constitution of the people as people: any empirical 
restriction of this process that would reproduce the distinction between the 
passive and active citizens becomes inconceivable, and radically incompatible 
with the very foundations of the sittliche state.150
My suggestion then would be that we can deepen our understanding of what is involved 
here by relating the role of the free press in breaking through the impasse of Prussian 
politics to the Hegelian account of the interaction of Reason and the Understanding. 
Thus it is in the public sphere created and sustained by a free press that the mystifying 
dualisms and fixed oppositions of the Verstandesstaat are overcome and a people recovers 
its powers of collective self-determination. The free press thus realises a kind of ‘intuitive 
Understanding’ by which a people simultaneously knows and creates itself as a people.151
Marx proposes publicity as the solution to almost every political aporia and 
impasse that he diagnoses. The knowledge of the inner essence of social relations that 
must be inscribed in our legal definitions is to be found in public consensus, ‘in 
accordance with the level attained by science and with the generally accepted views’.152 
The unabridged publication of the Landtag’s debates would mean that ‘the Assembly, 
having become an immediate object of the public spirit [;unmittelbar Gegenstand des 
offentlichen Geistes\, would have to decide to be an objectification of the latter’.153 It is 
participation in the public sphere that dissolves the fixity of all personalist and possessive
150 Kouvelakis 2003, pp. 264-5.
151 The discussion in Pippin 1996 is especially relevant here: Hegel’s interest in the 
appearance of this notion in Kant is shown to be related to his interest in Kant’s 
discussion of the sensus communis invoked in aesthetic judgements as in fact the principle 
of all cognitive and practical ‘orientations’ to the world.
152 ‘Certainty that the conditions under which the existence of an ethical relationship no 
longer corresponds to its essence are correctly registered, without preconceived opinions, 
in accordance with the level attained by science and with the generally accepted views — 
this certainty, of course, can only exist if the law is the conscious expression of the 
popular will, and therefore originates with it and is created by it’. Marx 1842u, p. 309 /  p. 
289. translation modified.
153 Marx 1842d, p. 148 /  p. 136, translation modified.
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individualist identifications, for ‘private interest... cannot bear the light of publicity’.154 
Publicity is the mediating ‘third element’ that can resolve the contradictions of 
bureaucracy, which pits the administration against the administrated as two abstract 
universals with only a particular content, independent of both ‘bureaucratic 
presuppositions [ Vorausset^ ungen\’ and ‘private interests’: ‘The free press ... brings the 
people’s need in its real shape, not refracted through any bureaucratic medium, to the 
steps of the throne, to a power before which the difference between rulers and ruled 
vanishes \verschmnde/] and there remain only equally near and equally far removed citizens 
of the stated5 It is the discourse of the free press, indeed, that overcomes the opposition 
between the dry, procedural formality of the bureaucracy and the felt passions and needs 
of civil society, just as true Hegelian Reason overcomes the abstract opposition of 
conceptual form and intuited content.156
In the public sphere, then, the opposition of state and society is effectively 
dissolved, just as the epistemological opposition of the Understanding and its matter is 
dissolved in the primary and immanent productivity of Reason: ‘[i]n the realm of the 
press, rulers and ruled alike have an opportunity of criticising their principles and 
demands, and no longer in a relation of subordination, but on terms of equality as citizens
154 Marx 1842k, p. 261 /  p. 234. See also Marx 1842d, p. 177 /  p. 165: ‘The press ‘knows 
no respect for persons, but only respect for intelligence’; Marx 1842m, p. 269 /  p. 256: 
the ‘calling of a Rhineland paper ... is to represent the spirit of the Rhineland, disregard 
personal considerations’.
155 Marx 1843b, pp. 348-9 /  p. 313. Compare Habermas 1962, p. 24 on the development 
of the public sphere in the ‘zone of constant administrative contact’ between the 
bourgeois economy and the mercantilist state. Lubasz says here: ‘It is not impossible that 
he had at the back of his mind Hegel’s notion of the role of the estates as mediator 
between civil society and the state ... But the notion of mediation between two estranged 
parties is at least as likely to have been familiar to him from his study of the law, and was 
— as it still is — a commonplace enough idea in any case’. Lubasz 1976, p. 38. I would 
have to suggest in response that the epistemological terms in which Marx sets out this 
notion of ‘mediation’, and particularly his idea that differences and oppositions ‘vanish’
(Vershmnderi) within it, points us to a Hegelian reading.
156 Marx 1843b, p. 349 /  p. 313: ‘The attitude of the press to the people’s conditions of 
life is based on intelligence [Intelligent, but it is equally based on feeling [Gemiith]. Hence it 
does not speak only in the clever language of judgment that soars above circumstances, 
but the passionate language of circumstances themselves, a language which cannot and 
should not be demanded of official reports’. The English edition obscures this point by 
translating Intelligent as ‘reason’, which, according to my argument, Marx would never 
have opposed to ‘feeling’.
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of the state', no longer as persons, but as intellectualforces’} 51 This is why it stands in direct 
opposition to the ossification of the Prussian state. ‘Prussia cannot introduce publicity 
and publicising, for free courts and an unfree state are incompatible. Similarly, Prussia 
should be highly praised for its piety, for a transcendental state [ein transcendenter Staafond. 
a positive religion go together’.158 To dissolve the opposition of state and society, ruler 
and subject, in the all-embracing and all-inclusive activity of public reasoning would be to 
free the social order from all its false objectification and illusory sanctification, collapsing 
all transcendent and religious principles in the people’s recovery of its own free self- 
determination. The press has set itself ‘the task of transforming the mysterious, priesdy 
essence of the state into a clear-cut, secular essence accessible to all and belonging to all, 
and of making the state part of the flesh and blood of its citizens’.159
The press is then, more than anything else, the privileged medium of a collective 
self-consciousness. It is ‘the ruthless language and manifest image of the historical spirit 
of the people [des historischen Volksgeistes\ ... the tactless, indiscreet speech of the people 
addressed to itself.160
The free press is the ubiquitous vigilant eye of the popular spirit, the embodiment 
of a people’s faith in itself, the eloquent link that connects the individual with the 
state and the world, the embodied culture that transforms material struggles into 
spiritual struggles and idealises their crude material form. It is a people’s frank 
confession to itself, and the redeeming power of confession is well known. It is 
the spiritual mirror in which a people can see itself, and self-examination is the 
first condition of wisdom. It is the spirit of the state [der Staatsgeist], which can be 
delivered into every cottage, cheaper than coal gas. It is all-sided, ubiquitous, 
omniscient. It is the ideal world which always wells up out of the actual world 
and flows back into it with ever greater spiritual riches and renews its soul.161
157 Marx 1843b, p. 349 /  p. 313, translation modified.
158 Marx 1842c, p. 384 /  p. 24.
159 Marx 1842w, p .3 1 8 / p .333, translation modified.
160 Marx 1842d, pp. 144-5 /  p. 133.
161 Marx 1842d, pp. 164-5 /  p. 153, translation modified.
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It becomes clear that in a sense the press is ‘the true state’. Marx describes it as ‘the freest 
manifestation of the spirit in our day’;162 ‘a bond uniting the people’.163 It is the all- 
encompassing activity of self-examination and self-determination that suspends and 
encircles all finite legal and institutional determinations in just the way that the operation 
of Hegelian Reason or the Concept surrounds and permeates the world of experience.
Publicity as self-development
But if it is right that Marx deploys a conception of publicity that is radicalised along 
Hegelian lines, we should not conclude from this that thereby presumes some sort of 
closure or attainable finality that Kant’s conception clearly precludes. For Marx, we 
remember, the science of legislation must be orientated towards the discovery of a 
system of laws under which the individual nature of each member of the state can fits 
together to form a coherent whole. But it is clear from everything he has said that this 
can never be regarded as a completed project.164 This was indeed the inescapable reality 
of cameralist practice: in Tribe’s description,
harmony within the state was ... a condition which was to be permanendy and 
deliberately under construction, an ever-extending and never-ending task ... both 
present and future are established in a finitude of decrees, actions, and agents; 
this orientation itself generates the requirement that information on such actions 
and agents be systematically gathered and collated.165
162 M arxl842d,p. 143 /  p. 132.
163 Marx 1842d, p. 176 /  p. 164, translation modified.
164 Again Marx seems to be close to Bauer here, who identified the ‘true state’ of self- 
consciousness as a permanent process of self-suspension and re-instantiation — in 
Moggah’s account, ‘[t]he state’s universality is its ability to concretize itself in the forms 
of Sittlichkeit or ethical life, but never to rest content with the realization of freedom it 
has thus secured. It constandy rescinds its products, as mere particularity which cannot 
manifest the plenitude of its creative power, of its consciousness of freedom’. Moggach 
2003, p. 148. See also McLellan 1969, pp. 66-9; Rosen 1977, pp. 110-124.
165 Tribe 1984, p. 274.
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This bad infinity is now transposed into the free and ongoing expansion of public 
knowledge and debate. For Marx the press must be allowed to develop freely and 
organically, ‘it should be accorded the recognition that is given even to a plant, namely, 
that it has its own inherent lawi;166 the ‘newspaper correspondent can only consider 
himself as a small part of a complicated body, in which he freely chooses his particular 
function’.167 This organic development is a never-ending process of assertion, 
contestation, refutation, revision, controlled by no one and open to all.
The press is, and should be, nothing but the public ... Like life itself, therefore, it 
is always in a state of becoming, and never of maturity. What it has learned by 
listening in hope and fear, it proclaims loudly, and it delivers its own judgement 
on it, vigorously, passionately, one-sidedly, as prompted by is feelings and 
thoughts at the given moment. What is erroneous in the facts or judgements it 
puts forward today, it will itself refute tomorrow.168
One of the interesting things that emerges from Marx’s articles on press freedom is a 
curious phenomenon whereby state censorship was creating a complete imbalance in the 
newspaper’s coverage of foreign and domestic affairs. Heavy restrictions placed on the 
reporting of Prussia’s social problems and internal administration did not apply to 
developments outside its border, creating a bizarre sense of living in an island of eternal 
stability surrounded by a maelstrom of unpredictable events. Conservatives were explicit 
about this ideological effect — it seems that the very notion of ‘news’ appeared to them 
disloyal. Marx quotes one German critic of France’s comparatively open publication 
regime: ‘Sympathy for the constitution and freedom of the press must necessarily be 
weakened when it is seen that they are bound up with eternally changeable conditions in 
that country and with an alarming uncertainty about the future’.169 But for progressives
166 Marx 1842w, p. 314 /  p. 329.
167 Marx 1843b, p. 333 /  p. 297.
168 Marx 1842w, pp. 311-12 /  pp. 291-2. See also p. 314 /  p. 329, where Marx reiterates 
the need for the elements of the press to be given the opportunity ‘of unhampered, 
independent and one-sided development’.
169 Marx 1842d, p. 170 /  p. 158. This provokes one of Marx’s most entertaining 
variations on his recurring astronomical metaphor: ‘When for the first time the discovery 
in the science of the universe was made that the earth is a mobileperpetuum, many a
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like Marx, this can only have increased the frustrating sense of winds of change sweeping 
through Europe that were leaving Germany behind:
... for German newspapers there should exist only a French, English, Turkish, 
Spanish time, but no German time, only a German timelessness. But should not 
those newspapers be praised, and praised from the state point of view, which wrest 
from foreign countries and win for the Fatherland the attention, the feverish interest 
and the dramatic tension which accompany every coming into being, and above all 
the coming into being of contemporary history]110
Pocock has claimed that the necessity for a knowledge and understanding of human 
history arises in ‘the moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as 
confronting its own temporal finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically 
stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially destructive of all systems of 
secular stability’.171 The political origins of historical materialism would seem to be a case 
in point. But the crucial message of Marx’s thought in this period is that this 
confrontation with temporality must be a permanent one — for the stability achieved by 
identifying the universal republic with any particular historical moment can only be 
illusory. The ‘true state’ is not a thing; it is a project. It is the ongoing codification of our 
understanding of a human ‘essence’ that is itself infinite because always freely developing. 
The same interest of reason that makes it impossible ever to say that science is complete 
rules against any declaration that history is ever at its end.
6. ‘Critique’ revisited: the polemic of essence
The fact that all his arguments lead inexorably to the necessity of an ongoing open 
contestation of all legal and institutional forms and determinations in an inclusive and
phlegmatic German must have taken a tight hold of his nightcap and sighed over the 
eternally unchangeable conditions of his Fatherland, and an alarming uncertainty must 
have made him dislike a house that turned upside down at every moment.’
170 Marx 1842w, p. 317 /  p. 332-3.
171 Pocock 1975, p. viii.
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unrestricted public sphere means we must think again about what we might have 
assumed Marx meant with his notion of a ‘critique’ that penetrates to the ‘essence’ of 
things.
There is no denying that, as has been clear in the foregoing discussion, this is the 
language that is constantly deployed in these articles. To offer another example:
[TJhe modesty of genius does not consist in what educated speech consists in, in 
the absence of accent and dialect, but rather in speaking with the accent of the 
matter [Sache\ and in the dialect of its essence. It consists in forgetting modesty 
and immodesty and getting to the heart of the matter. The universal modesty of 
the mind is reason [Vremunjt\i that universal liberality of thought which reacts to 
each thing according to the latter'!r essential nature}12
But we must pause to wonder what Marx really means in describing such an approach if 
it is the case, as we have previously suggested, that his thinking is fundamentally 
informed by a Hegelian account of ‘essentialism’ as a moment of cognition that is 
necessary but always also contradictory and hence never final. The lesson of the Science of Logic 
is that we must go beyond the immediacy of Being to attain a determinate experience; 
but this means that what we take to be ‘immediate experience’ is itself always already 
mediated, always already premised upon a prior essentialism that we must suspend and 
go beyond as the very movement by which our experience and knowledge expands. For 
Hegel the distinction between appearance and essence, the thing as it is for us and as it is 
in itself, is a distinction that we make within our own experience, a distinction that we 
make precisely in order to overcome it, as the repeated cognitive manoeuvre by which we 
extend our world, searching for what is really going on beyond what we had initially taken 
to be going on but which we now designate mere ‘appearance’. In the social and political 
domain with which Marx is here concerned, the implication is that what appears to us as 
‘immediate’, ‘given’ and straightforwardly empirical, is in fact the product of a prior 
organisation of our collective life, an institutionalised conceptualisation of our social 
interdependence, that must be critically reflected upon.173 That Marx sees newspapers as
172 Marx 1842a, pp. 112-13 /  p. 100.
173 See Pinkard 1994, pp. 221-2 for a gloss on Hegel that suggests just this dynamic: ‘A 
form of life ... becomes Geist, “spirit”, by developing the practices whose function is to
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the privileged medium for this reflection demonstrates that this process is not about 
asserting some purely abstract or philosophically derived standard of ‘human nature’ or 
‘organic society’ but precisely about looking again at what human beings are actually 
doing, how their needs are developing and interacting, in all its concrete and ‘empirical’ 
detail.174 The ‘discovery’ of this new reality will always takes the form of a new 
essentialism, a new attempt to determine the ‘real’ behind the standing conceptualisation 
that has resulted from of any prior positing. But to ‘grasp the reality’ is always to 
conceptualise again, to ‘petrify the fluid essence’ by making a further determination that 
itself will be ‘one-sided’ and in need of suspension.175
This may seem an obscure and perhaps tenuous interpretation of Marx’s insistent 
use of the language of essentialism to describe what he is doing and what we all must do 
if we are to realise the true ‘concepts’ of law and the state — certainly he never explicitly 
explains himself in this way. But I think it begins to make more sense if we consider the 
philosophical and ideological context of these writings, against which it may look much 
more like a plausible theoretical strategy mounted in response to the ‘opposite tendencies’ 
in the dissolution of post-Kantian thought. By the time of Marx’s entry into these 
debates, the philosophical fault-line between Hegel and Schelling that was first publicly 
opened up with the publication in 1807 of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit has widened into 
the outright and total opposition between the young radicals who still claimed Hegel’s 
mantle and the appointed ideologues of the new regime in Berlin who included Savigny,
reflect on what that form of life takes to the “essence” for itself (to be authoritative for 
it). This type of reflection thereby introduces “negativity” into the form of life in that this 
type of reflection discovers within the terms that ht form of life has set for itself certain 
contradictions and incoherences that engender a scepticism about what it had up until 
then simply taken for granted’.
174 O ’Malley writes that Marx’s ‘approach to criticism is characterized by his apparent 
conviction that social reform could be achieved by educating the public, and especially 
the regime, about the shortcomings of the existing socio-political order by appealing to a 
philosophical understanding of the nature and purpose of political society’. This might 
suggest that Marx sees his role as simply lecturing from his philosopher’s chair about his 
theory of the ‘human essence’ and the ‘true state’. But it is clear from the actual practice 
of his journalism that such notions frame and drive forward an investigation and public 
airing of the actual social conditions, which are not measured against a timeless standard 
but are themselves the standard against which institutions are to be measured. O ’Malley 
1967, p. xvi.
175 Marx 1842k, p. 233 /  pp. 207-8.
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Stahl and Schelling himself.176 To summarise, we might say that the conclusion of such 
thinkers was that the inherent instability of subjectivity, the impossibility of its ever 
attaining a stable unification with its object, could never be escaped and so had in the end 
simply to be affirmed. We always remain at the level of the Understanding, they implied, 
with all its inadequacy and arbitrariness, but such was the way of the world and to 
attempt to deny it was dangerous hubris. This realisation was exemplified at its highest 
point by Schelling’s philosophically motivated turn to theological orthodoxy, which saw 
the order of the world as a creation of God’s inscrutable will, whose operations in the 
world we could only intuit through the non-conceptual, non-rational medium of 
mythology and religious revelation.177 And it found its political correlate in Stahl’s 
insistence on the necessity of accepting the role of a personal sovereign in ordering the 
social world,178 an acceptance that Savigny himself had gravitated towards as he lost 
confidence in the capacity of the Volk to organise itself spontaneously.179 The immense 
value of Warren Breckman’s study of the emergence of the Young Hegelian movement is 
the clarity with which it brings out this ideological constellation:
Just as Schelling believed that the order of the universe depends on the self­
constraint of the spontaneous divine will, so Stahl maintained that the entire 
institutional and constitutional form of the state is both created and sustained by
176 In a letter to Feuerbach in late 1843 Marx would describe Schelling’s later doctrines as 
‘Prussian policy sub speciephilosophiae\ Marx 1843k, p. 350 /  p. 59. Heine’s History of 
"Religion and Philosophy in Germany presents a similar verdict: ‘if one sees in Kant the 
terrorist convention and in Fichte the Napoleonic Empire, in Mr. Schelling one sees the 
reaction of the Restoration which followed’. Heine 1834, p. 239.
177 See especially Schelling 1809, and Schelling 1933-7. For useful accounts of Schelling’s 
later period see White 1983, pp. 93-192; Bowie 1989 pp. 91-177.
178 On Stahl, see Berdahl 1988, pp. 348-71, and Breckman 1992.
179 For a fascinating account of Savigny’s trajectory along these lines see Toews 1989, p. 
161: ‘The question Savigny faced in 1842 was whether legislation should simply articulate 
the guiding principles of the common w ill... as an “organ” of the Volksgeist or rather 
construct normative standards ... based on transcendent principles, and impose these 
standards on a recalcitrant population through the power of the state ... Savigny’s 
historical disillusionment and his loss of confidence in the spontaneous operations of the 
collective communal consciousness had gradually led him to an accommodation with the 
principles of the new prophets’. Stahl, meanwhile, had no qualms in insisting that ‘[l]aw 
was not the articulated letter of the communal spirit, the conscious structuring of 
spontaneous life-relationships, but a command, backed by punishing, coercive power, to 
regulate human relations in accordance with absolute norms’. Toews 1989, p. 166.
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the sovereign will. The monarch’s authority permeates all political and social 
institutions but transcends these insofar as monarchic will remains unbounded.
In times of conflict, Stahl insisted, the maxim In dubiopro rege takes precedent 
over all norms. Like Schelling, Stahl could account for law only in its creatio ex 
nihilo from a chaos that has no intrinsic order itself.180
Slavoj Zixek is one contemporary thinker who has suggestively characterised the 
nominalist radicalism that lies behind this hard-headed political realism: ‘the late 
“reactionary” Schelling is ... not to be easily dismissed: he clearly perceived how, owing 
to man’s original Fall — owing, that is, to his constitutive “out-of-jointedness”, loss of the 
primordial organic unity — the State is a contingent substitute-formation, not a “natural”, 
authentic form of social unity’.181
It would be quite wrong to write off the philosophical interest of these thinkers 
and the force of their critiques of eighteenth century rationalism and mature Hegelianism 
which, as is being increasingly recognised today, can be seen as an important starting- 
point for a whole host of contemporary criticisms of the modem urge to conceptual and 
teleological closure.182 Indeed, we can now see clearly how close Marx is to their analysis 
of political realities — both drawing from the same philosophical sources and 
vocabularies, and differing only that what ‘positivism’ affirms as the necessary state of 
things, Marx presents as a critical analysis of a condition to be overcome.
But we can also see why Marx’s notion of the ‘true state’ in some ways does 
involve a qualified and strategic return to and reassertion of the core political ideal of the 
Prussian Enlightenment, the harmonisation of right and function through a publicly 
codified system of shared laws. This is not because Marx is unaware of the problems and 
dangers inherent in this rationalist utopia — it is clear from these writings how 
sophisticated an understanding of these he has. Rather we have to keep in mind that at 
this particular moment in time — the moment of Frederick William IV’s accession — Marx 
is confronted with a conscious and deliberate retreat from this ideal into a wholly
180 Breckman 1999, p. 88.
181 Zizek 1996, pp. 41-2.
182 In addition to Zizek’s exploration (1996), see also Bowie 1993, pp. 127-77 especially. 
The classic account of the pivotal role played by Schelling’s later thought in opening out 
some of the central themes and problems of subsequent European thought is in Lowith 
1967, pp. 114-19.
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repressive form of mystically sanctified personalism.183 At the time Marx is writing these 
texts the new Prussian ideology of Schelling and Stahl is declaring: of course positive law 
is one-sided and coercive; of course society is atomised and conflictual; of course 
government is manipulative and arbitrary. Such is the human condition as God, and the 
King, have ordained it, in their mysterious and unaccountable way. Marx wholly concurs 
with the ‘realism’ of this description; but he refuses the political closure it entails.184 In 
such a political circumstance, the most politically productive act is to demand the 
impossible. As he had written in his Doctoral Dissertation, while positivism ‘knows that 
the inadequacy is immanent in philosophy’, ‘only the liberal party achieves real progress’, 
because it ‘is, despite its inner contradiction, conscious of both its principle and its 
goal’.185
This also, I think, brings us closer to what Marx is trying to achieve with his 
insistence on the moment of ‘essentialism’. Positivism recognises that we can never arrive 
at a final, real, ultimate essence of things, the ultimate reality must always remain hidden 
from us, the world will never be fully transparent, that whatever rationale it may have, it 
will always for us retain an element of contingency and arbitrariness. But the 
consequence of this acceptance is an abdication of responsibility for the world’s 
organisation to a mysterious and transcendent principle of the ‘Beyond’, and a deadening 
sanctification of the given that tries to call a halt to the ongoing movement of experience 
and knowledge. But as Hegel liked to say of Kant’s supposed caution in restricting his 
claims to ‘appearance’ alone, this self-denying ordinance itself equates to a stubborn 
assertion that what we have before us is in fact the absolute, that what the Understanding
183 See Nipperdey 1996, p. 281 for confirmation of the historical specificity of this 
conjuncture: the general tendency of bureaucratisation had meant that ‘the sovereign was 
no longer simply an absolutist ruler. His reign was no longer primarily dynastic and 
patriarchal, and it was no longer legitimised by tradition and religion alone, but was 
functional. He was an instrument of the state’. But Nipperdey notes that Frederick 
William IV’s ‘very personal style of rule’ was an attempt (if ultimately unsuccessful) to 
break with this trend.
184 Stathis Kouvelakis also presents Marx as deliberately and self-consciously mobilising 
the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment against ‘the new face of Wilhelmine 
absolutism, which had characteristically abandoned rationalist principles (since these 
might serve as reminders of Prussia’s reformist traditions) for the ideal of the Christian 
state’. Kouvelakis 2003, pp. 248-9. My suggestion is that this is complicated by the fact 
that both Marx and the new conservatives share to some degree a critique of eighteenth 
century rationalism developed through and from post-Kantian idealism.
185 Marx 1841, p. 86.
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is itself the ‘essence’.186 What seemed like a mature downgrading of our cognitive 
ambitions in fact issues in precisely the kind of dogmatic closure that we might have 
wanted to avoid. This is why the renunciation of cognitive ambition can easily be the ally 
— not always, perhaps, but certainly in the situation Marx faces — of political 
conservatism.187
Marx explicitly sets out this complicity of sceptical transcendentalism with 
dogmatic empiricism (or, as he will later call it, the couplet of ‘abstract spiritualism’ and 
‘abstract materialism’) in an article that deals direcdy with the Historical School of Law, 
which he traces back to the pseudo-Kantianism of its founding father Gustav Hugo:
Hugo misinterprets his teacher Kant by supposing that because we cannot know 
what is true, we consequendy allow the untrue, if it exists at all, to pass as fully valid. 
He is a sceptic as regards the necessary essence of things, so as to be a courtier as 
regards their accidental appearance ... Hugo’s reasonings like his principles is positives i-e-> 
uncritical. He knows no distinctions. Everything existing serves him as an authority .. .188
Marx describes this as a ''base scepticismy which, insolent towards ideas but most 
subservient to what is palpably evident, begins to feel clever only where it has killed the 
spirit of the positive, in order to possess the purely positive as a residue and to feel 
comfortable in this animal state’.189 The force of this characterisation is precisely to 
undercut the pretensions of contemporary conservatives (Marx refers to Savigny only 
obliquely but names Ludwig von Haller, Friedrich Julius Stahl, and Heinrich Leo),190
186 ‘Kant regards discursive Understanding, with this sort of cognition, as in itself and 
absolute. Cognition of appearances is dogmatically regarded as the only kind of cognition 
there is.. .’ Hegel 1802-3b, p. 77.
187 Pinkard suggests that something similar would have motivated Hegel’s hostility to 
Savigny’s historicism: ‘Hegel ... had to be struck by the “positivity” of Savigny’s views: 
Expressions of a people’s identity simply have to be accepted; there was not going 
behind them for something deeper or more critical’. Pinkard 2000. In the words of 
Toews, Hegel’s Berlin Inaugural Address of 1818 ‘insisted that the methodological stance 
of the Historical School necessarily led to the subjective fantasies of intuitive divination 
and the impotence and superficiality of passive empiricism’. Toews 1980, p. 62.
188 Marx 1842g, pp. 204-5 /  pp. 192-3.
189 Marx 1842g, p. 206 /  p. 194.
190 Marx says his unmasking of Hugo’s philosophical depravity should ‘suffice for 
deciding whether Hugo’s successors are jit to be the legislators of our time’ — Savigny had just
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whose mysticism, romanticism and speculation, ‘fragrant modem phrases’ and 
‘extravagant unctuosity’ shroud the fact that their position derives from the very same 
unedifying immersion in sensible immediacy.191 The essential point is that “base’ 
empiricism and pious religiosity amount to exactly the same thing:
If Hugo says that marriage and other moral-legal institutions are irrational\ the 
modems say that these institutions are indeed not creations of human reason, but are 
representations of a higher positive’ reason, and so on in regard to all the other 
articles. Only one conclusion is voiced by all with equal crudity: the right of arbitrary 
powerP1
I think that if we keep in mind the way Marx draws the philosophical battle-lines of the 
time the strategic political force of his methodological pronouncements against 
‘appearance’ and in pursuit of ‘essence’ emerge with new clarity:
I must abandon the standpoint which shows me the world and human relations 
only in their most external appearance [ihrem auferlichsten Schein], and recognise 
that this standpoint is unsuitable for judging the worth of things ... We must ... 
take the essence of the inner idea as the measure to evaluate the existence of 
things. Then we shall less allow ourselves to be led astray by a one-sided and
been appointed Minister of Justice with responsibility for legislation. Marx 1842g, p. 209 
/  p. 198. The inclusion of the other names makes clear that Marx’s target is a wider 
ideological constellation than the ‘Historical School’ narrowly defined: Haller was an 
independent conservative political theorist not normally seen as part of the School; Stahl 
was by this time espousing a political theory much more Schellingian than historicist; and 
Leo was a former Hegelian who had renounced philosophy for orthodox Protestantism. 
For fuller accounts of such figures see Toews 1980, Berdahl 1988, and Breckman 1999.
191 ‘At all events, in the course of time and civilisation, this crude genealogical tree of the 
historical school has been shrouded in mist by the smokescreen of mysticism, fantastically 
wrought by romanticism, and inoculated with speculation.. .’ Marx 1842g, p. 209 /  p. 198. 
According to Breckman, ‘where Hugo had merely defended the crude force of 
historically given facts, the modern Positive Philosophers attempted to legitimise these 
facts by embracing a transcendent political theology’. Breckman 1999, p. 274.
192 Marx 1842g, p. 209 /  p. 198.
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trivial experience, since in such cases the result is indeed that all experience 
ceases, all judgement is abolished [<aufgehoben], all cows are black.193
Thus Marx deliberately invokes the terms of Hegel’s break with Schellingian immediacy, 
as an ultimately empty conception of the Absolute which itself collapses into a formalism 
that is arbitrarily applied to the given.194 Even more striking in this context is his attack, a 
few lines after this passage, on official censorship as ‘the polemic of a worldview of 
semblance [Schein\ against the worldview of essence’.195 If Marx has taken anything from 
Hegel, he must surely see these two worldviews as interdependent, that there will always 
be an appearance against which the worldview of essence will have to polemicise.
Two important and interrelated points seem to arise from this discussion, one 
epistemological or methodological, the other political. The first is that Marx’s frequent 
deployment of essence-appearance or essence-existence dichotomies should not be taken 
to mean that he ultimately subscribes to the dualist ontology this would seem to entail. 
Rather, just as Hegel sees such a distinction as a necessary and recurrent moment in the
193 M arx 1842d, p. 154 /  p. 142. See also Marx 1842u, p. 295 /  p. 275, translation 
modified: ‘one would have to demand of the author that he should make a more 
thorough study of nature and rise from the first sensible perception of the various 
elements to a rational perception of the organic life of nature. Instead of the spectre of a 
chaotic unity, he would become aware of the spirit of a living unity...’
194 Hegel 1977, p. 9: ‘. . .this formalism maintains that such monotony and abstract 
universality are the Absolute ... Dealing with something from the perspective of the 
Absolute consists merely in declaring that in the Absolute everything is the same, against 
the full body of articulated cognition, which at least seeks and demands such fulfilment, 
to palm off its Absolute as thee night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black — 
this is cognition naively reduced to vacuity. The formalism which recent philosophy 
denounces and despises, only to see it reappear in its midst, will not vanish from Science, 
however much its inadequacy may be recognized and felt, till the cognising of absolute 
actuality has become entirely clear to its own nature...’ There is a long story concerning 
whether or not Hegel actually meant to target Schelling with these lines or, as he 
subsequendy claimed, only his less sophisticated ‘followers’; but the important point for 
us is that this is how it was generally seen at this time. See for example Strauss 1837, pp. 
10-12: ‘In this opposition of his system to Schelling’s, especially in that point of contrast 
which is designated by the Phenomenology, Hegel’s system moves in the direction of 
critique ... the denial of the Phenomenology is the most decisive mark of Schelling’s 
standpoint ... Since from the Schellingian perspective, the absolute is a philosophical 
immediate, it follows that the immediately given must also be an absolute for it 
theologically ... As a consequence, philosophy must not take a step above and beyond 
sacred history and dogma in order to find the truth.’
195 Marx 1842d, p. 154 / p .  142.
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ongoing process of Reason’s self-determining organisation of a world of experience,
Marx sees it as a necessary moment in our own self-determined organisation of our social 
world. An orientation towards essence is precisely how we break the hold of the given, 
the immediate, the array of finite conceptual determinations which are only ever the 
result of a previous round of essence-positing. And in penetrating to the essence we are 
never deferring to the authority of something beyond our world but rediscovering our 
own self-determined authorship of its order. This circular dynamic is dramatised by the 
practical importance of countering the fixity of any particular institutional determinations 
by confidently reaching beyond them to the ‘truth’ they may occlude or obstruct. A 
retreat from this ongoing project is what paradoxically results in the closing down of 
political possibility and a treatment of our institutions as if they had been decreed by 
some force above and outside of us.
The more straightforwardly political consequence of this is that, as Marx’s 
commitment to press freedom makes clear, we should not assume that his invocations of 
‘the people’, its ‘spirit’, and the immanent social order that our institutions must reflect, 
mean that he thinks one could ever arrive at a final identification of this ‘absolute’ of 
social life that would bring this process to a close. His insistence that we keep up the 
pursuit is precisely what keeps the process open — an abandonment of the search brings 
with it all the negative consequences that would follow from presuming that we had 
found it. Such an argument is so out of step with today’s theoretical climate that we tend 
to assume that Marx’s references to essences and totalities, human natures and social 
organisms, is a problem, at best an embarrassment,196 at worst the philosophical seed of 
twentieth-century totalitarianism.197 Huge issues are raised here and I do not claim to
196 This was obviously the attitude of Althusser, but even Stathis Kouvelakis, whose aim 
is to rescue the Young Marx from Althusser’s condemnation, assumes that he must work 
against the grain of this philosophical discourse: ‘All things considered, we can only 
affirm that Marx, although he falls back on the dialectic of existence and the human 
essence, nevertheless consistently avoids (although his recourse to this dialectic would 
normally lead him to do precisely the opposite) anything resembling a systematic 
treatment, full-scale depiction or positive representation of the concrete universality that 
he now projects beyond the horizon of civil society and the political state’. Kouvelakis 
2003, pp. 313-4.
197 This is plainly Warren Breckman’s worry: ‘in challenging the sovereign discourse of 
their day, in aiming to dethrone the self, the left-wing Hegelians faced the constant 
temptation to substitute one form of “embodiment” for another, to replace democracy’s 
indeterminate and contestatory interactions with a more certain form of unity. For the
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have settled anything definitively in this regard. All I wish to indicate at this point is some 
generally overlooked circumstantial evidence — a bit of philosophical context which could 
be relevant, and the known facts about Marx’s actual political practice at this point in his 
life — that might lead us to reconsider this assumption, and entertain the possibility that 
just maybe Marx’s polemicising on behalf of the ‘worldview of essence’ has a political 
function that is precisely what many of today’s theorists hope to achieve by renouncing 
i t 198
Young Hegelians were quick to identify a human essence in which all humans share and 
to posit a vision of radical collectivisation that would secure both ... the conditions for 
individual self-realization and the perfectibility of the species’. Breckman 1999, p. 302.
198 To take just one of many possible examples, see Laclau and Mouffe 1985, pp. 95-6:
‘In order to place ourselves firmly within the field of articulation, we must begin by 
renouncing the conception of “society” as founding totality of its partial processes. We 
must, therefore, consider the openness of the social as the constitutive ground or 
“negative essence” of the existing, and the diverse “social orders” as precarious and 
ultimately failed attempts to domesticate the field of differences. Accordingly, the 
multiformity of the social cannot be apprehended through a system of mediations, nor 
the “social order” understood as an underlying principle. There is no sutured space 
peculiar to “society”, since the social itself has no essence’. I think that if we look past 
the terminology then it is at least arguable that, paradoxically, this describes something 
very close to the political-theoretical stance that the young Marx wants to maintain, 
precisely through his orientation to essence, organism, and totality. The key difference 
would be his questioning of his desirability of ‘placing ourselves firmly within the field of 
articulation’, as Laclau and Mouffe understand it, rather than keeping open its necessary 
and productive tension with the possibility of ‘mediation’. In Marx’s times the theorists 
who had abandoned this idea and placed themselves ‘firmly within the field of 
articulation’ were precisely those who sought to suppress the precariousness of the social 
order and secure its ‘domestication’ of ‘the field of differences’.
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5.
Marx contra Hegel 
Kreuznach, 1843
‘The origin of the supreme authority is, from the practical point of view, not 
open to scrutiny by the people who are subject to it; that is, the subject should 
not be overly curious about its origin ... these are poindess questions that 
threaten the state with danger if they are asked with too much sophistication by a 
people who are already subject to civil law ... A law that is so wholly inviolable 
that it is a crime even to doubt it or to suspend it for an instant is represented as 
coming, not from human beings, but from some kind of highest perfect 
legislator. That is the meaning of the statement, “All authority comes from God”, 
which is not a historical explanation of the civil constitution, but an Idea that 
expresses the practical principle of reason that one ought to obey the legislative 
authority that now exists ... ’
— Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797)1
‘To be radical is to grasp the root of the matter. But for man the root is man 
himself.’
— Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Taw: Introduction (1844)2
1. The ‘demiurge’ reading
Hegel’s Philosophy ofPJght is a notorious exemplification of his claim in the Encyclopaedia 
that ‘Logic’ is the ‘animating soul’ of ‘all other philosophical sciences’, whose concern is 
‘only to [re]cognise the logical forms in the shapes of nature and spirit, shapes that are
1 John Ladd translation, Kant 1797d, pp. 123-4, 318-9.
2 Marx 1844a, p. 182/ p .  177.
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only a particular mode of expression of the forms of pure thinking’.3 It is extremely 
difficult to decide how to take this claim and the many like it that run through the text of 
the Philosophy of Right. Certainly language like this can give the impression that Hegel’s 
speculative logic functions for him as the pre-existent divine blueprint into which all the 
world must be seen to fit, an ‘underlying’ metaphysical order or ontological principle 
from which everything emanates, and whose ‘dialectical’ conceptual transitions are the 
inner force driving the development of everything towards its final reconciliation with 
the Absolute in the Idea.4 And this, in fact, is how Marx here characterises Hegel’s 
philosophical operation in his critical notes on the Philosophy of Right.
Hegel’s purpose is to narrate the life history of abstract substance, of the Idea, 
and in such a history human activity [Thatigkeit] etc. necessarily appears [erscheineti] 
as the activity and product of something other than itself ... it is very easy to 
fasten onto what lies nearest to hand and prove that it is a real moment of the 
Idea.5
This is the diagnosis that Marx held to throughout his career. It may even be that our 
own ways of approaching Hegel have been definitively shaped by statements such as the 
following, from the much-quoted 1873 Postface to the Second Edition of Capital.
For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an 
independent subject, under the name of ‘the Idea’, is the creator [Demiurgos] of
3 Hegel 1830a, p. 58, § 24.
4 Charles Taylor tends to present Hegel like this: ‘absolute idealism is related to the 
Platonic notion of the ontological priority of rational order, which underlies external 
existence, and which external existence strives to realise ... Because he sees the world as 
posited rational necessity, as the external manifestations of the Idea, the concepts which 
are true of i t ... provide the ground plan according to which it was posited’. Taylor 1975,
p. 110.
5 Marx 1843h, p. 98 /  p. 40, translation modified. See also Marx 1843h, pp. 64 /  p. 11: ‘It 
is always the same categories which are made to supply now one sphere and now another 
with a soul. The problem is merely to discover the appropriate abstract determinants to 
fit the individual concrete ones’.
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the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the 
Idea’.6
Marx indeed refers in this passage to having ‘criticised the mystificatory side of the 
Hegelian dialectic nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion’. This 
would seem to point us toward the 1843 critique of the Philosophy of Right? and the 
‘Introduction’ to it published in 1844. It is possible that Marx may also have had in mind 
the critical discussion of the Phenomenology that can be found in the ‘Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts’, but this in any case can plausibly be seen as a continuation 
and development of the same basic argument.8 And though we should not necessarily 
take this as absolutely the final and only word on the matter, it does confirm that Marx, 
at least, continued to regard his critiques of the early 1840s as definitive of the relation of 
his later thought to that of Hegel.
Despite the canonical status and undoubted seriousness of these charges, I want 
to suggest that, ironically, we cannot really understand the force of Marx’s critique of 
Hegel unless we recognise that at some level this cannot have been Hegel's intention. For 
surely the whole thrust of Hegel’s critique of essentialist metaphysics and dualist 
epistemologies would seem to run against such a construction — of a ‘transcendent’ 
Absolute or ‘underlying’ logical order to the world, behind or ‘beyond’ what we find in 
our experience, and relegating empirical reality to its contingent, imperfect and superficial 
‘appearance’ or ‘expression’.9 As we have been seeing, this aspect of Hegel’s thought has
6 Marx 1867a, p. 102.
7 This case was first pressed by the Italian Marxist theoretician Galvano della Volpe: ‘The 
most important of the two works in our view is the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, 
even if till now it is incomparably less well-known ... than the 1844 Manuscripts, despite 
the attention drawn to it by Marx in 1873 ... Subtract thirty from 1873 and you have the 
exact date, 1843’. della Volpe 1955, pp. 161-2.
8 Marx writes there that ‘[i]n the Phenomenology ... the uncritical positivism and equally 
uncritical idealism of Hegel’s later works, the philosophical dissolution and restoration of 
the empirical world, is already to be found in latent form’. Marx 1844c, pp. 384-5 /  pp. 
403-4.
9 As Pippin says in attempting to dislodge the hold of readings such as Taylor’s: ‘much of 
the standard view of how Hegel passes beyond Kant into speculative philosophy makes 
very puzzling, to the point of unintelligibility, how Hegel could have been the post- 
Kantian philosopher he understood himself to be; that is, how he could have accepted, as 
he did, Kant’s reservations about the fundamental inadequacies of the metaphysical 
tradition, could have enthusiastically agreed with Kant that the metaphysics of the
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begun to come through more clearly in recent commentaries: Robert Pippin’s insistence 
that for Hegel ‘there is literally nothing “beyond” or “behind” or responsible for the 
human experience of the world of appearances’;10 or Stephen Houlgate’s that Hegel’s 
Logic must be seen as a radically <z»A-foundationalist text;11 or even Slavoj Zizek’s 
suggestion that Hegel’s arguments there already ‘articulate in advance the motif 
Feuerbach, young Marx, and Althusser proclaim as the “critique of speculative 
idealism”.’12 And indeed, my claim here will be that Marx’s critique of Hegel can be 
plausibly read as an attempt at a transformative recovery, in the practical and political 
dimension, of the radical anti-foundationalist impulse which originally motivates his 
philosophy.
To make sense of this paradox, we have to recover our sense of how Hegel 
arrived at such statements as that ‘Logic’ as the ‘pure forms of thought’ is the ‘animating 
soul’ of all other sciences. This, as we saw in Chapter Two, was by way of an acceptance of 
Kant’s assertion of the self-determining spontaneity of self-consciousness, and a rejection 
of his absolute oppositions of conceptual form and intuited content, as incompatible 
with that spontaneity. The result was, first, that we had to begin to think of experience as 
in some sense wholly determined by the self-conscious activity of the subject, and, as an 
immediate consequence, that it then made no sense to talk as if there might be something 
beyond experience that could act on it from the outside. The Kantian philosophical 
project, of attempting to lay bare the necessary and universal structures of that self- 
conscious activity, continued; but with the radical difference that this was no longer an 
attempt to transcendentally determine the possible ways in which the subject can relate to 
a world outside it, but rather amounted to an account of the possible ways the world 
could be structured, maybe even, the ways in which the world structures itself. This is 
why, in Pippin’s words, ‘the Logic not only represents thought’s articulation of itself, but,
“beyond”, of substance, and of traditional views of God and infinity were forever 
discredited, and then could have prompdy created a systematic metaphysics as if he had 
never heard of Kant’s critical epistemology. Just attributing a moderate philosophical 
intelligence to Hegel should at least make one hesitate before construing him as a post- 
Kantian philosopher with a precritical metaphysics’. Pippin 1989, p. 7.
10 Pippin 1989, p. 206.
11 Houlgate 1999, p. 28.
12 Zizek 1993, p. 138.
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in being such a self-articulation, determines comprehensively any possible actuality’.13 
The details of this argument and, even more so, the way in which Hegel actually cashes it 
out with his own system of necessary inter-conceptual relations, are of course highly 
complex and controversial, and I cannot undertake to work through all the issues raised 
within the confines of this discussion. Our primary purpose is to try to understand how it 
is that, on Marx’s reading, somewhere along the way Hegel’s philosophical project has 
fallen away from the revolutionary insight from which it was developed, so that in its 
final ‘mature’ applications it has begun to exhibit all the problems and negative 
consequences of the metaphysical dualisms it had originally set out to displace. What 
most concerns Marx, and what will here concern us, is the political dimension of this 
degeneration. But to understand this we first have to suspend Marx’s final judgment on 
the matter and look at what it is Hegel may have been trying to do with the Philosophy of 
Right.
2. The Philosophy o f Right as political epistemology
The idea of a universal and necessary ‘logic’ of political institutions will hopefully by now 
look like it has some kind ofprima fade plausibility. If political institutions are the external 
armature of some kind of collective agency, and collective agency may be said to follow 
certain basic rules as the condition of its possibility, and that these rules are basically the 
same as the rules by which individuals count as agents, and that these rules in turn are 
closely related to the rules by which conscious experience and knowledge is possible, 
then we may indeed expect to find echoes of a transcendental ‘logic’ in the ideal and 
actual shapes of political institutions. The minority of commentators who have actually 
tried to make sense of the role of Hegel’s Logic in structuring the Philosophy of Right (most 
stick to the ethical theory and political sociology) have in fact tended to come to an 
account that is quite close to this.
Thus Frederick Neuhouser proposes that ‘we think of the Concept ... as a highly 
abstract account of the kind of inner articulation required of a self-conscious being,
13 Pippin 1989, p. 180.
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whether individual or collective, in order for it to be a whole, fully integrated subject’.14 
The aim of the Philosophy of Right is then to set out the necessary structures of a collective, 
self-conscious agency. In Peter Steinberger’s description: ‘given certain premises 
regarding individuality, society, and human reason, Hegel seeks to deduce in general 
terms the conceptually correct forms of our living together’.15 Crucially, for Hegel this 
can not be secured by appeal to emotional ties or a pre-discursive felt unity with the 
social whole, as romantic or Schellingian conservatives might have had it. Because of the 
very nature of subjectivity and agency, any such unification must be conceptually 
mediated — as Pinkard puts it, ‘[wjhat unites us in the political life of the state is not a 
kind of fusion, a submersion of individual identity into some organic whole, but a general 
commitment to a way of life based on rational, coherent, principles’.16 And this raises the 
possibility that there may be certain fundamental practical concepts by which we regard 
or relate to ourselves as that collectivity, and by which we regard or relate to each other 
as members within it. These shared concepts would define the most basic ‘kinds’ of 
social roles, activities and relationships that would be the necessary conceptual form of 
any shared social world, in the same way as the transcendental categories of epistemology 
define the basic and universal kinds of objects, events and relations that could form part 
of a coherent experience. This is how Pinkard accounts for what he calls (following 
Klaus Hartmann)17 ‘social categories’:
a social category ... is an expression of a basic form of unity among people — a 
structure of mutual acknowledgement — in which various moral principles (rights, 
duties, and virtues) are embodied and which explains their possibility ... Such 
categories are both he result of human interaction (they have their ‘form of 
appearance and actuality’ in individuals) and are independent of individuals in 
that the rights, roles, duties and virtues found in them are independent of the 
individuals choosing them ... The articulation of such categories is thus the 
articulation of the practical Idea, of the moral world of a culture. They constitute 
the way in which we conceive and think of the moral world to ourselves. As
14 Neuhouser 2000, p. 134.
15 Steinberger 1998, p. 204.
16 Pinkard 1988, p. 146.
17 See Hartmann 1976.
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social categories, they structure not only the shared understandings that we have 
of this moral world; they also structure our own sense of identity and of what 
would be the good life.. .18
This I think begins to make clearer sense of Hegel’s proposition that his philosophy of 
‘Right’ develops as the universal and necessary conceptual form of ‘the will which is free 
in and for itself.19 The intrusions of the Logic into the philosophy of right thus only make 
explicit what we saw to be implicit in Kant’s Doctrine of Right — the system of right is the 
set of interconnected practical concepts that are entailed by and necessary for any 
instance of rational agency and which define the conceptual structure of the unified will 
upon which social coordination or harmonisation is based.
The difference from Kant, as we have already seen, is that the doctrine of ‘Right’ 
cannot be kept absolutely separate from the doctrine of ‘Virtue’; the two must be united 
in ‘ethical life’. And this produces a radically different system of ‘right’, as the most basic 
set of articulated practical concepts that integrate the concerns of ‘abstract right’ and 
‘subjective morality’, defining the minimal necessary structure of realised ‘ethical life’. 
Ethical life, says Hegel, is ‘the Idea of freedom as the living good which has its knowledge 
and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action’.20 The 
most basic social categories of this system are, for Hegel, the family, civil society, and the 
state.21 In Pinkard’s words, each of these social categories ‘is an expression of a basic 
kind of unity among individuals that gives content to their willing’.22 Family, civil society 
and state constitute different ways in which social activities and interactions can be given 
a clear institutional determinacy. Hegel’s presentation of these three spheres and their 
interrelation makes it clear that he sees important parallels with Intuition, Understanding 
and Reason as the three levels of the Kantian epistemological architecture, and the 
Doctrines of Being, Essence and Concept that explore the interdependent moments of
18 Pinkard 1988, p. 139.
19 Hegel 1821a, p. 67, § 34.
20 Hegel 1821a, p. 189. § 142.
21 Hegel 1821a, p. 62, § 33.
22 Pinkard 1988, p. 141.
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his own post-Kantian, post-epistemological ‘Logic’.23 Thus the family and civil society 
are necessary spheres of ethical life just as immediate unity and ‘division and appearance’ 
are necessary components of self-conscious knowledge or agency; while the political 
moment of the state unifies and encircles them both, revealing them to be not self- 
sufficient in themselves, but necessary levels of a self-determining whole. Hegel’s original 
critique of the Verstandesstaat might be said to find its final result in this crucial argument 
for the insufficiency of civil society and the necessity of the transition to the state proper. 
Hegel describes civil society as ‘the external state, the state of necessity and of the 
understanding,24 The market mechanism and its administrative enforcement means that a 
common good is arrived at as the condition of each particular interest. ‘But this 
unconscious necessity is not enough’, says Hegel — it must become ‘a knowing and 
thinking [part of] ethical life’ through the corporation and its engagement with the 
explicidy universal interest of the state.25 As Steinberger says, the ‘external state’ of civil 
society
overlooks the sense in which society, properly conceived, cannot be merely 
external to, and only protective of, the individuals that comprise it. Just as the 
logic of the Understanding overlooks the necessary interconnectedness of 
otherwise finite forms of thought, so the political theory of accommodation [that 
is, ‘society as a merely contingent or convenient concatenation or juxtaposition of 
individuals’] fails to see that society cannot be a mere aggregation of discrete 
atoms.26
As the final institutionalisation of a rational and unified will, recognised as such 
by all its individual members, the state is thus the vehicle of a collective freedom in which 
all share and that is restrained only by Reason itself. ‘The state is the actuality of the 
ethical Idea — the ethical spirit as substantial will, manifest and clear to itself, which think
23 Neuhouser notes that ‘the family, civil society, and the state are ... associated with the 
Conceptual moments of immediate unity, difference, and mediated unity, respectively’. 
Neuhouser 2000, p. 135. See also Kolb 1986, p. 59.
24 Hegel 1821a, p. 221, § 183.
25 Hegel 1821a, p. 273, § 255, Addition.
26 Steinberger 1998, p. 204.
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and knows itself and implements what it knows in so far as it knows it’.27 As Pinkard 
says, ‘[t]he state ... must be thought of as a moral agent in its own rig h t... as a single 
subject, the state must embody a set of coherent principles’.28 These fundamental 
principles that govern our self-determining collective agency define the constitution'.
The constitution of a society enables society to function as a coherent whole in 
terms of a unity of principles, instead of functioning just as a makeshift hodge­
podge of individuals locked in a struggle for dominion and mastery ... a 
constitution creates the possibility of individuals’ exercising power over other 
individuals not through market relations but through relations of justified 
authority.29
Hegel’s constitution, as the crowning section of his Philosophy of Right, should then 
provide a structure in which society’s self-determination is consciously embodied, and 
upon which all subordinate social roles and relationships are dependent, just as the 
‘Doctrine of the Concept’ that makes up the final section of the Logic furnishes the 
means by which we can think the unconditioned organisation of experience by Reason, 
to which all finite determinations are relativised.
It is important that the philosophical motivation of this project is taken seriously, 
lest we mistake the force of Marx’s critique. For my argument is that we cannot 
understand Marx’s response if we regard it as based on a total rejection of and opposition 
to the ambition of finding the necessary rational form of our individual and collective 
freedom, as if that were in itself an illegitimate and hopelessly pseudo-Platonic 
undertaking. As should be clear by now, it is nothing of the sort — it can quite reasonably 
be seen as a continuation of the Kantian project of defining the universal and necessary 
structures of a knowing and willing that is spontaneous and self-conscious. As Marx 
writes:
If by the constitution we mean the universal, fundamental determinants of the 
rational will, it follows that every people (state) must have this as its premise and
27 Hegel 1821a, p. § 257.
28 Pinkard 1998, p. 147.
29 Pinkard 1998, p. 148.
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that this premise must constitute its political credo. This is actually a matter of 
knowledge rather than will. The will of a people may not escape the laws of 
reason \Vemunft\ any more than the will of an individual. In the case of an 
irrational people we cannot speak of the rational organization of the state.30
My claim is that Marx ultimately retains something of this Kantian project — not that he 
does not transform and divert it in unique and fundamental and maybe even problematic 
ways, but that we will never be able to see what Marx is really trying to do without an 
understanding and appreciation of this project as a philosophically and historically 
necessary preliminary to his own. And indeed, I aim to show how Marx begins to 
approach his own distinctive standpoint on this project by means of an analysis of why 
Hegel’s variant of this project is problematic not so much because of what it attempts, 
but because of the fact that it fails by its own standards.
3. Hegel’s failure
Marx’s engagement with the paragraphs on the constitution in Hegel’s Philosophy ofPaght 
is a rough-hewn, fragmentary and incomplete affair, never intended for publication. It 
follows the order of Hegel’s text, interjecting here and there and sometimes with 
extended excursions on themes as they were raised by Hegel or occurred to Marx in 
response. At no point is there any attempt to draw these threads together or present a 
single summary of Marx’s argument — indeed, this is not a text that has an argument, but 
consists of a series of comments and elaborations that cut into the argument of Hegel’s 
text. Any bid to draw out the themes of an overall ‘critique’ is then necessarily tentative 
and reconstructive.
My interest here is in drawing out what I think are strong indications that Marx 
views Hegel’s political philosophy as ultimately failing to achieve what Hegel must have 
set out to achieve, and that is open to the precisely the sort of criticisms that Hegel 
himself levelled at other philosophical constructions, both epistemological and political. 
Marx is criticising Hegel from a standpoint that is in itself broadly Hegelian, or, perhaps
30 Marx 1843h, p. 120 /  pp. 61-2.
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it would be better to say, recognisably shaped by Hegelian arguments and insights. It is 
customary for explications of Marx’s text to give priority to the role of Feuerbach’s 
‘transformative critique’ of speculative idealism in supplying the methodology for his 
reading.31 Certainly Feuerbach’s arguments are important here, and we will be returning 
to them. But initially I am adopting a deliberate alternative tactic of attempting to show 
just how much of what Marx says can be seen as echoing and drawing from ‘Hegelian’ 
insights and arguments. My suggestion will be that this enables us to get a much clearer 
view of just what role Feuerbach’s innovations play in the development of Marx’s 
relation to post-Kantian idealism.
There are three steps to my argument. The first is to point out that Marx clearly 
sees Hegel’s constitutional structure in terms similar to those in which Hegel criticised 
other conceptions that he aimed to surpass: that it is formalistic, mechanical, and 
arbitrary; as political epistemology, it is a construction that instead of actualising social 
Reason has reduced it to the level of the Understanding. The second is that Marx’s 
presentation of this structure as inherendy self-mystifying is itself an extension of Hegel’s 
own arguments about the interconnected couplet of dogmatic empiricism and vacuous 
foundationalism that results from any such absolutisation of the Understanding. Thus 
Marx’s most distinctive and direct arguments against Hegel are themselves of 
demonstrably Hegelian pedigree. This, in turn, will help us to make clearer sense of the 
radical shift in philosophical and political orientation that Marx puts forward as the 
resolution of this impasse, which appears here in its first guise as ‘true democracy’.
A  Hegelian Verstandesstaat
A point that emerges very clearly from Marx’s notes is that he views Hegel’s construction 
as dualistic and formalistic in a way that unmistakeably evokes Hegel’s own criticisms of 
Kant, Fichte, and other philosophies and political theories of the ‘Understanding’. Marx 
now sees Hegel’s own constitutional construction as, to recall the metaphor he deployed 
at the point of his first conversion to Hegelianism, a carefully carpentered desk which he
31 See for example Avinieri 1968, pp. 8-12; O’Malley 1969, pp. xxviii-xxxii.
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must then fill with sand.32 A few lines near the end of Marx’s text that do come about as 
close as anything we have to a summary of his assessment makes this clear:
Hegel only expounds a state formalism \Staatfbrmalismus\. The proper material 
principle is for him the Idea, the abstract mental form of the state as subject, the 
absolute Idea which contains no passive, no material moment. By contrast to the 
abstraction of this Idea the characteristics of the actual, empirical state formalism 
appear as content and hence the actual content appears as formless, inorganic 
matter \Stof/\ (in this case the actual man, the actual society, etc.) 33
The state, for Hegel, expresses the consciousness of, and will, to unity on the part of its 
members. But this unity is already immanent in the subordinate spheres of the family and 
civil society — the state adds nothing to this, but only brings it to full self-consciousness. 
But this means that the state as institution embodies nothing but an abstract or empty 
universality. As Hegel himself said in his original critique of Kant, ‘nothing remains for 
Reason but the pure emptiness of identity’34 — Kant’s theoretical reason was a formal 
principle of unification that in fact added nothing to the content delivered by the 
interaction of sensibility and Understanding. This is the starting point of Marx’s critique 
of Hegel’s polity: ‘[t]he constitutional state is that form of the state in which the state 
interest, i.e. the actual interest of the people, is present only formally, though as a definite 
form alongside the actual state’.35 The redundancy of Hegel’s constitutional form is 
revealed through the whole series of its institutional ‘moments’. The sovereign power, as 
the moment of decision or will, can only ultimately be an abstract, empty willing. The 
executive power, as the activity of subsuming particular instances under universal laws, 
has no basis upon which to do so apart from the empty formalities of its own internal 
rules and procedures.36 And the legislature, as the power to determine and establish the
32 Marx 1837b, p. 1 5 / p .  11.
33 Marx 1843h, p. 186 /p . 125-6, translation modified.
34 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 80.
35 Marx 1843h, p. 129 /  p. 69, translation modified.
36 ‘Hegel does note expound the content of the bureaucracy, but only a number of general 
determinations of its ‘ formaP organization; and it is perfectly true that the bureaucracy is 
only a “formalism” for a content lying outside it.’ Marx 1843h, p. 106 /  p. 49.
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universal, can only do so on the premise of an abstraction of all the social elements 
represented within it from the actual content of their interests in civil society.
All this is a problem because, despite the emptiness of all these moments, these 
elements of the state are not mere formalities but active and effective forces in society, 
ruling over, organising and intervening in it. The problem is thus exactly the same as that 
identified by Hegel in Kant’s moral philosophy. As Hegel had continued in Faith and 
Knowledge: ‘[i]t would be of more particular interest, for another thing, to see how this 
empty unity, as practical Reason, is nonetheless supposed to become constitutive again, 
to give birth out of itself and give itself content’.37 In the case of the state’s institutions, 
as in the case of Kantian morality, this can only come about by a surreptitious raising of 
contingent empirical content to the status of an embodied universality.
the absoluteness which is present in the proposition by virtue of its form takes on 
a wholly different significance within practical reason; for it is also transferred to 
the content, which is by nature a conditioned thing \ein Bedingtes]. and contrary to 
its essence, this non-absolute, conditioned thing is raised to [the status of] an 
absolute as a result of this confusion ... through this confusion of the absolute 
form with the conditioned material, the absoluteness of the form is imposed by 
stealth on the unreal and conditioned character of the content, and this inversion 
and sleight of hand lies at the hart of the practical legislation of pure reason.38
This, Marx seems to be thinking, is precisely the consequence of Hegel’s political 
formalism. ‘Property, contractual agreements, marriage, civil society appear ... as the 
content within the framework of the political state which functions as the organized form,
37 Hegel 1802-3b, p. 81.
38 Hegel 1802-3a, p. 126. A good illustration of my general thesis about how Marx’s 
critique of Hegel has been misread is the way della Volpe seems to have been unaware of 
the Hegelian origin of this argument: ‘the originality of this new, really materialist, kind of 
critique of all a priori lies in its discovery of the effective consequence of any a priori 
abstraction, generic or hypostatic. This is not just the “emptiness” of these abstractions 
(as in the anti-rationalist, Kantian mould, shared also by Feuerbach), but rather their 
(faulty) fullness, a fullness of un-mediated, or un-digested, empirical contents, which in turn are 
transcended by these generic (preconceived or a priori) abstractions. This is a faulty fullness, 
and thus a negative one from the cognitive (and epistemological) point of view, as it 
involves, we have seen, the presence of circularities or tautologies of facts, and hence, in 
fact, basic tautologies, not merely formal or verbal ones’, della Volpe 1955, p. 167.
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as the mere Understanding devoid of any content \lnhaltlose Verstand\ which defines and 
limits, now affirming, now negating’.39 The political outcome is an order that is ultimately 
arbitrary and irrational,40 its fixed oppositions generating undecideable conflicts among 
the state’s institutions and with the elements of civil society they confront.41
So in the monarchy “‘state-reason’ \Staatsvemunff[ and “state-consciousness”
[Staatshewuftein] is a “single” empirical person to the exclusion of all others; but this 
personified reason [personificirte Vemunfi\ has no other content than the abstraction “I 
will”.’42 As a result £a part determines the character of the whole. The whole constitution 
must adapt itself to the one fixed point’.43 The individual in whom the state’s agency is 
embodies is qualified not by any moral attribute or social activity but by the purely 
physical fact of his ancestry, 44 and the will of the collective has no substantive content 
but is defined as whatever this individual happens to think or will at any given time. ‘The 
two moments are the accident of mil, caprice, and the accident of Nature, birth, and so we 
have His Majesty the A.ccident. Accident is accordingly the actual unity of the state’.45
39 Marx 1843h, p. 88 /  pp. 31-2.
40 ‘[W]henever a determinacy or individual quality is raised to [the status of] something in 
itself [%u einem A.nsich\, irrationality and (in a moral context) immorality \Unsittlichkeit\ are 
posited’. Hegel 1802-3a, pp. 125-6.
41 ‘Hegel presents us with an unresolved antinomy. On the one hand external necessity, on the 
other immanent purpose.’ Marx 1843h, p. 60 /  p. 6, translation modified.
42 Marx 1843h, p. 83 /  pp. 27-8, translation modified.
43 Marx 1843h, p. 87 /  p. 31.
44 The empirical fixation of ‘state-consciousness’ by hereditary lineage creates the 
absurdity that ‘[t]he highest constitutional act of the king ... is his sexual activity; for by 
this alone does he make a king and so perpetuate his own body’. Marx 1843h, p. 100 /  p. 
44.
45 Marx 1843h, p. 94 /  p. 36, translation modified. Breckman implies that Marx ignores 
the ‘painstaking mediations in which [Hegel] embedded’ his endorsement of personal 
monarchy, and that his implicit association of Hegel with the Positive Philosophers is 
‘misguided’. Breckman 1999, pp. 286-7. But as Steinberger points out, ‘it is not clear to 
what extent the monarch in Hegel’s state is really a “constitutional” monarch in any 
meaningful sense’ -  he is an absolute sovereign, not subject to the law, against whom no 
rights can be held. Moreover, ‘there is absolutely no suggestion that the monarch is a 
peculiarly rational, enlightened or philosophical individual’. Steinburger 1998, p. 194. O f 
course this need not necessarily result in a personal despotism, but Marx’s point is that 
Hegel’s system must rely on contingent and external circumstances to prevent it. 
Moreover, Hegel’s arguments for the necessity of this supreme moment of 
unquestionable individual sovereignty as the only alternative to political and social chaos 
are in essence no different from those of the Positive Philosophers.
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A similar antinomy characterises the attempt to embody the universal interest in 
the bureaucracy — £a pseudo-universal, an illusory universal class ... universality fixed in a 
particular class’.46 But since ‘the bureaucracy is only a “formal system” for a content lying 
outside it’, it becomes a ‘state formalism’ that ‘constitutes itself as an actual power and 
becomes itself its own material content’.47 That is, because the bureaucracy sets itself up 
as the universal in opposition to the manifold of interests that make up civil society, there 
can be no real content to this universal other than the corporate interest of the 
bureaucrats in maintaining their organisational existence, the structure of which, in their 
view, secures the universality of its outlook 48 ‘The mind of the bureaucracy is the formal 
mind of the state. It therefore makes the formal mind of the state, or the real 
mindlessness of the state, a categorical imperative’.49 This is an epistemological ‘magic 
circle from which no one can escape’50 linked together by the sheer mechanism of the 
command structure: each individual bureaucrat ‘acts as hammer on what is under him, 
[and] he serves as anvil to what is above him’.51 At the end of this chain is an outright 
opposition with civil society itself: e[t]he: “police”, the “judiciary” and the 
“administration” are not the representatives of a civil society which administers its own 
universal interests in them and through them; they are the representatives of the state 
and their task is to administer the state against civil society’.52 Thus ‘[i]n the bureaucracy
46 Marx 1843h, p. 112 / p .  54.
47 Marx 1843h, p. 107 /  p. 50.
48 ‘The universal spirit of the bureaucracy is secrecy, it is mystery preserved within itself by 
means of the hierarchical structure and appearing to the outside world as a self-contained 
corporation ... Within itself, however, spiritualism degenerates into crass materialism, the 
materialism of passive obedience, the worship of authority, the mechanism of fixed, formal 
action, of rigid principles, views and traditions’. Marx 1843h, p. 108 /  p. 51.
49 Marx 1843h, p. 107 /  p. 50.
50 ‘Its hierarchy is a hierarchy of knowledge. The apex entrusts insight into particulars to 
the lower echelons while the lower echelons credit the apex with insight into the 
universal, and so each deceives the other’. Marx 1843h, p. 108 /  p. 51.
51 Marx 1843h, p. 115 /  p. 57.
52 Marx 1843h, p. I l l  /  p. pp. 53-4. See also Marx 1843, pp. 108-9 /  pp. 51-2, translation 
modified: ‘its crass spiritualism is revealed in its wish to do everything. That is to say, it 
makes will the prime cause because it is nothing but active being and receives its content 
from outside itself, and can therefore only prove its own existence by forming and 
limiting that content. For the bureaucrat the world is no more than an object on which 
he acts’.
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the identity posited between the interest of the state and particular private purposes is 
such that the interest of the state becomes a particular private purpose opposed to the other 
private purposes’.53
It is to effect a spurious resolution of this conflict that the interests of civil 
society are ‘represented’ in the legislative assemblies alongside the monarchy and 
bureaucracy. ‘Because the people appear as representation [Vorstellung ,^ fantasy, illusion, 
representation \Keprasentation] — the Estates, or the represented people [das vorgestellte Volk\, 
existing as a particular power apart from the real power — the real opposition between 
people and government is abolished’.54 But Hegel is necessarily equivocal on the status of 
the Estates, discussing them ‘very much in terms of a “formal”, “illusory” 
phenomenon’.55 Since the bureaucracy has already been set up as the unimpeachable 
guardian of the universal standpoint, the contribution of the Estates is ‘partly superfluous 
and partly suspect ... The civil servants are able to do what is best without the Estates, 
and indeed they must do what is best despite the Estates ... The good will of the Estates, 
moreover, is suspect because their actions are rooted in their private standpoint and their 
private interest’.56 The Estates thus oscillate between functioning as ‘the people [V» 
minaturi\ against the government’ and ‘the government against the people’.57 Thus ‘[i]n 
the “Estates” all the contradictions of the organization of the modern state are to be 
found united. They “mediate” in every direction because they are themselves in every 
sense something intermediate’.58
All these entanglements indicate that, in Marx’s view, Hegel’s institutional 
‘mediations’ fail to genuinely mediate the constitutional form of the state with its social 
content, resulting in a structure that is unstable, coercive, and ultimately arbitrary. His 
commentary is clearly informed by his encounters with the conflicts and antagonisms of 
Prussian political life during his year as a radical journalist. But that should not lead us to 
see Marx’s critique of Hegel as simply an assertion of ‘hard realities’ against Hegel’s lofty 
idealisations. Any such impression needs correction in both directions. Hegel is perfecdy
53 Marx 1843h, p. 109 /  p. 52.
54 Marx 1843h, p. 134 /  p. 74.
55 Marx 1843h, p. 126 /  p. 66.
56 Marx 1843h, p. 127 /  p. 67.
57 Marx 1843h, p. 133 /  p. 73.
58 Marx 1843h, p. 133 /  p. 73.
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capable of perceiving and analysing real social conflicts, and ‘private interests’ 
masquerading as universal principles, as his lifetime’s writings and active engagement in 
his society’s political life amply demonstrate.59 Marx, on the other hand, is clearly 
conducting his mental argument with Hegel in Hegelian terms, expressing the problems he 
finds in Hegel’s system as a degeneration of the rational state organism to an arbitrary 
mechanism, resulting from a fundamental and unbridgeable opposition of form and 
content that it would have been precisely Hegel’s intention to avoid.
Hegelian mystification
The importance of this point is reinforced if we return now to Marx’s repeated 
descriptions of Hegel’s system as a ‘logical, pantheistic mysticism’,60 which bestows upon 
its institutional determinations a spurious metaphysical justification by wrapping them up 
in the speculative jargon of the Logic.
an empirical existence is uncritically enthroned as the actual truth of the Idea. For as 
Hegel’s task is not to discover the truth of empirical existence but to discover the 
empirical existence of the truth, it is very easy to fasten on what lies nearest to 
hand \die %unachtsliegende\ and prove that it is a real moment of the Idea. (The 
inevitable transformation of the empirical into the speculative and the speculative 
into the empirical will occupy us more later on.).61
There is a tendency to read these attacks as the beginnings of a materialist critique of 
ideology, as if it were simply a matter of Hegel ‘dressing up’ the institutions of 
Restoration Prussia in a lot of metaphysical mumbo-jumbo that must simply be peeled 
away in order to see the simple and brutal empirical reality. There is a sense in which this 
is what Marx does, but there is a danger in such characterisations in distracting us from
59 One should think in particular of Hegel’s own more ‘journalistic’ writings, concrete 
empirical analyses of specific political situations and conflicts such as his 1817 
commentary on the proceedings of the Wiittemburg Estates. See Avinieri 1972, pp. 72- 
80.
60 Marx 1843h, p. 61 /  p. 8.
61 Marx 1843h, p. 98 /  p. 40, translation modified.
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the extent to which Marx’s diagnosis is itself a ‘Hegelian’ argument, turned against Hegel 
hims?elf.
What I have in mind here is the argument that accompanies and is ultimately an 
inexttricable part of Hegel’s critique of the Understanding — that any fixation of its finite 
deteirminations can only come via a dualistic mystification, because that fixation must be 
giouinded in a supersensible essence or ‘Beyond’ that is ultimately nothing but the 
abdication of self-consciousness’s own all-encompassing self-determination in 
experience. This argument appears throughout Hegel’s career, from his early criticism of 
Kan t’s absolutisation of the Understanding and consequent doubling of its 
determinations into an unknowable realm of things-in-themselves that is taken to ground 
thenn,62 to his later polemical attacks on his positivist and historicist rivals for uncritically 
affirming the empirically immediate and in the same moment endowing it with an 
irrational spiritual sanctification.63 And as we have already seen, it is stated in its most 
general form in the ‘Doctrine of Essence’ that makes up the middle section of the Logic, 
which shows that the attempt to fix any finite conceptualisation as the identification of a 
particular ‘essence’ that anchors or explains a particular ‘appearance’ is ultimately 
undermined by a realisation of the dependence of such identifications on a notion of the 
wider totality that is the product of Reason’s own spontaneous self-grounding activity.
This, I want to suggest, is the basic problem that Marx identifies with Hegel’s 
political philosophy, and accounts for the paradox of its appearance as precisely the sort 
of empty dualism and spurious metaphysical foundationalism that it had always been 
Hegel’s project to avoid. If Marx is right that Hegel’s constitutional structure collapses 
Reason into the Understanding, then by Hegel’s own argument, this is precisely the effect 
that we would expect. It seems to me that Marx’s characterisations of this aspect of 
Hegel’s system do, paradoxically, carry suggestive Hegelian echoes:
62 ‘Kant never seems to have had the slightest doubt that the Understanding is the 
absolute of the human spirit ... the Idea of Reason is in the end re-established in its 
purity only to be brought to nought once more and placed in the irrationality of faith as 
an absolute Beyond which is a vacuum for cognition’. Hegel 1802-3b, p. 77, p. 81.
63 To insist that ‘there is no cognition of truth, and that God and the essential being of the 
world and the spirit are incomprehensible and unintelligible’ means that ‘only the untrue, the 
temporal’ and the transient enjoy the privilege, so to speak, of recognition’. Hegel 1818, pp. 
183-4.
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Actuality is not deemed to be itself but another actuality instead. The ordinary 
empirical world is not governed by its own spirit but by a spirit alien to it; by 
contrast the existence [Dasein] corresponding to the actual Idea is not an actuality 
generated out of itself, but is just the ordinary empirical world.64
empirical actuality is accepted as it is, it is even declared to be rational [vemiinftig]. 
However, it is not rational by virtue of its own reason [Vemunft], but because the 
empirical fact in its empirical existence has significance other than itself. The fact 
which serves as a starting point is not seen as such but as a mystical result. The 
actual becomes a mere phenomenon [Phanomen], but the Idea has no content over 
and above this phenomenon.65
The clearest statement of this general argument occurs, significandy, at a point where 
Marx is trying to unpick a Hegelian justification for a constitutional ‘mediation’ of what 
Marx views as actually irreconcilable oppositions — ‘real oppositions’ — between the 
various arms of government. Marx’s discussion makes clear that he views this as a 
spurious misapplication of the principle that ‘every extreme is its other extreme’,66 a 
principle that does have its truth in other contexts. The example he furnishes of extremes 
that are not ‘real extremes’, where the Hegelian principle does apply, are the extremes of 
‘abstract spiritualism [Spiritualismus]’ and ‘abstract materialism’:
the issue turns on the fact that a concept (being [Dasein], etc.) is viewed abstractly, 
that it is not treated as something independent [selbstdndig] but as an abstraction 
from something else and that only this abstraction has meaning; thus, for example, 
spirit is only an abstraction from matter. It is then self-evident that, precisely 
because this form constitutes its content, the concept is in fact the abstract opposite, 
while the object from which it abstracts (in this case abstract materialism) is in its 
abstract its real essence.67
64 Marx 1843h, p. 62 /  p. 8, translation modified
65 Marx 1843h, p. 63 /  pp. 9-10, translation modified.
66 Compare Hegel 1830a, p. 130, § 81: ‘each abstract determination of the Understanding, 
taken simply on its own terms, overturns immediately into its opposite’.
67 Marx 1843h, p. 156 /  p. 98, translation modified.
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How does all this apply to the question of the constitution? The state is supposed to be 
the means by which we achieve full self-determination, as the rational structure of our 
self-conscious collective agency. But we have seen that it is in fact an empty abstraction, 
existing alongside and in opposition to the rest of our social activity. Because it has no 
content of its own and sits in a relation of absolute opposition to that which is supposed 
to provide its content, its institutional organisation of and intervention in society is 
ultimately arbitrary and irrational. These organisations and interventions are posited as 
the identification and expression of the underlying truth of the social order, ‘behind’ its 
mere appearances. These particular determinations are thus absolutised, insulated from 
the true self-determination that would come with the realisation of their relativity to the 
rest of society’s activities.
This will be a little clearer if we illustrate the point by again looking at the three 
key institutions of Hegel’s construction. First, the monarchy: Hegel justifies the necessity 
of this moment on the basis of the fact that the state must act through individuals. Marx 
agrees — of course ‘the state is effective only through individuals’ — what he objects to is 
the connection of ‘the activities and agencies of the state’ to individuals not through their 
‘state-like qualities' but their 'physical being. This implies that the ‘essence of the “particular 
person” is ... his beard and blood and abstract Pbysif rather than his ‘social quality* One 
might have thought that the important thing about a head of state would be their 
personal characteristics, their political abilities, their connection to the rest of society, but 
for Hegel’s constitution none of this matters — what really counts about this individual is 
their pre-social, biological ancestry. This is the basis of Marx’s objection to the hereditary 
principle in general, which allocates ‘social positions and functions’ by the accident of 
birth and so represses the fact that ‘a particular birth can become the birth of a peer or a 
king only by virtue of general agreement’.69 But the arbitrary way in which the formal
68 Marx 1843h, pp. 77-8 /  p. 22.
69 Marx 1843h, p. 174 /  p. 115. Breckman writes that ‘[ijnsofar as Marx makes Hegel the 
representative theorist of the “person quand meme” [as opposed to the concrete ‘social 
person’] we have an indication of the extent to which he [ie Hegel] had become 
thoroughly confused with the Christian personalists. After all, it had been the ambition 
of the Philosophy ojRight to move from “abstract personality” to a form of “concrete 
personality” grounded in the complex mediations of family, civil society, and the state’. 
Breckman 1999, p. 288. On my reading, Marx does not overlook this ambition — his 
point is precisely that Hegel ultimately falls into contradiction with it, by tying social roles 
to pre-social determinations.
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state fills key positions and distributes property according the pre-social contingency of 
male lineage means that ‘the product of the self-conscious species [das Vrodukt der 
sebstbewuftten Gattung] is represented as the product of a physical species [physischen 
Gattungf. Marx offers this as an example of the way in which ‘[a]t every point Hegel’s 
political spiritualism can be seen to degenerate into the crassest materialism’.70
A similar paradox afflicts the bureaucracy, which stands apart from and in 
opposition to civil society and yet must lay claim to special knowledge of the real content 
of civil society, the universal interest which is immanent in it yet hidden from it. This also 
results in a spurious dualism:
Hence everything acquires a double significance [eine doppelte Bedeutunpp. a real 
significance and a bureaucratic one; in like fashion, there is both real knowledge 
and bureaucratic knowledge (and the same applies to the will). A real essence, 
however, is treated according to its bureaucratic essence, according to its 
otherworldly [jenseitigen], spiritual [jpirituellen] essence. The bureaucracy holds the 
essence of the state [das Staatsmser], the spiritual [spirituelle] essence of society, in 
its possession, as its private property.71
This knowledge must be asserted against the knowledge of private citizens, whose claims 
must be reduced to the status of a mere show or appearance. ‘Just as this abstraction 
credits the bureaucracy with an essence alien to it, so it attributes to the true essence the 
inappropriate form of mere appearance [Erscheinung .^ Hegel idealizes [idealisirt] the 
bureaucracy and empiricises [empirisirt\ public consciousness [das offentliche Beivufiteirtf .72 
The bureaucracy’s claim to such exclusive knowledge must be buttressed by its 
formalities and traditions, its examinations which function as ‘a Masonic rite, the legal 
recognition of a knowledge of citizenship as a privilege’.73 But in fact, on the inside, there 
is nothing to the bureaucracy but a ‘materialism’ no less crass than that which it perceives
70 Marx 1843h, p. 174 /  p. 115, translation modified.
71 M arxl843h,p. 1 0 8 /p . 51.
72 M arxl843h,p. 124 /  p. 65.
73 Marx 1843h, p. 112 /  p. 54.
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as the surface of civil society — a corporate defence of fixed institutions and the careerism 
of individual bureaucrats.74
This ‘doubling’ effect is seen again in the way Hegel analyses the participation of 
‘private’ individuals in the representative Estates, which results in a ‘separation and 
duplication [Trennung und Verdopplunj^  of the significance of the classes’.75 According to 
Hegel, it is in the Estates that this class ‘attains a political significance and function’.76 Thus 
their constitutional organisation brings out of these elements a political content which is 
different from and necessarily in opposition to their activities and relations in civil 
society. Again, Marx presents this as a vacuous and contradictory duplication:
It is self-evident that the private estate acquires [its political significance] in terms of 
what it is, i.e. in terms of its articulation in civil society (Hegel had already defined the 
universal class as the class of civil servants...) The Estates are the political 
significance of the private estate, of the unpolitical class — a contradiction in terms. Or, 
in the Estates as defined by Hegel the private estate (and in general the distinctions 
within it) acquires political significance. The private estate is an integral part of the 
essence and the politics of the state. The state therefore confers upon it a political 
significance, i.e. a significance other than its actual significance.77
Thus, ‘according to Hegel, class does not retain the significance “already present” (i.e. 
present in civil society), but instead, when the “Estates” incorporate it into themselves, 
they affirm its essence and, for its part, once a class has immersed itself in the sphere of 
politics it acquires its “own” significance, i.e. one proper not to itself but to the world of 
politics'.78
It is at this point that Marx’s analysis is generalised to produce the famous 
assertion that the constitutional state effects a separation of ‘man’ and ‘citizen’, the theme 
that would be central to Marx’s article ‘On the Jewish Question’ written immediately 
after his study of Hegel. The individual in general ‘must ... divide up his own essence. As an
74 Marx 1843h, p. 108 /  p. 51.
75 Marx 1843h, p. 148/ p .  91.
76 Hegel 1821a, p. 343, § 303.
77 Marx 1843h, p. 135 /  p 77, translation modified.
78 Marx 1843h, p. 148 /  p. 91.
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actual citizen he finds himself in a double organization [einer doppelten Organisation^79 To 
really understand what Marx is getting at here we need to suspend the usual assumption 
that in some way Marx is claiming to be able to discern the ‘true’ essence of human 
beings as social, communal, universal beings that is somehow ‘hidden’ behind or ‘covered 
over’ by the individualised, competitive, and conflictual ‘appearance’ of civil society.80 
Marx’s point is rather that this kind of abstract essence-positing is precisely what the 
constitutional state does, in its claim to be able to see past the competing claims and private 
interests of civil society to the true universal interest, on behalf of which it organises and 
intervenes in civil society. Marx’s argument is ultimately that this essentialising standpoint 
is inscribed in the very structure of the modem state, as a constitutional order set apart 
from and in opposition to society but which must nevertheless claim to be the true and 
final organising ‘form’ of that society. Such an agency is inescapably committed to 
making arbitrary judgements about the ordering of that society that must be portrayed as 
a penetration to its ‘true’ or ‘underlying’ reality, precisely because the ‘private’, ‘non- 
political’ activities and relationships of civil society itself cannot provide the basis for 
such judgements and must be relegated to a false or illusory ‘appearance’. Nothing can be 
taken as it is by the constitution, but as the expression or appearance of something that is 
its ‘essence’, its ‘real significance’ for the state.
My suggestion, then, is that the implication of Marx’s comments are that it is 
because Hegel’s state is (despite his intentions) a Verstandesstaat that it is caught in a logic 
of ‘Essence’, forced into justifying its institutional determinations as the expression of a 
‘true’ universal that is in some mysterious way beyond or beneath the ‘appearances’ of 
civil society. This is to say, Marx is not rejecting out of hand Hegel’s analysis of political 
reality in terms of logical categories. On those occasions when Marx gestures obliquely
79 Marx 1843h, p. 143 /  p. 86, translation modified.
80 See for example Brudney 1998, p. 19: ‘Marx is, in the end, committed to the claim that, 
given what he believes is the essential nature of human beings, and given what he 
believes is the structure of daily life in a capitalist society, he himself has no resources, 
within a capitalist society, adequately to justify his own alleged recognition of the 
essential nature of human beings (and so also no resources adequately to justify his claim 
about what the activity is through which human beings, in principle, realize their nature).’ 
My point is that this is precisely what Marx presents as the predicament of the state — it 
must claim to be able to organise and intervene in civil society on the basis of its superior 
insight into the universal interest and the proper place of particular individuals within it, 
despite its absolute insulation of itself from civil society as a cognitive resource upon 
which it might base such judgements.
224
5. KR E U Z N A C H  1843
towards some notion of what a ‘proper’ analysis of the modem state would look like, it is 
clear that it would indeed consist in an exploration of the ‘logic’ of the modem state: 
‘elaborating the definite idea of the political constitution’;81 ‘describing the essence of the 
modem state as it is’;82 ‘the discovery of the peculiar logic of the peculiar object’.83 My 
suggestion is that the kind of analysis Marx has in mind would in many ways resemble a 
Hegelian analysis of a Verstandesstaat, that is, analysis of real states in terms of the 
epistemological categories bequeathed by the Idealist philosophical tradition.84 From this 
point of view his quarrel with Hegel, put into Hegelian language, would be that Hegel has 
misidentified and absolutised a Verstandesstaat as a state of Reason. This would mean that 
Hegel has taken the philosophical terms of his analysis of the Logic of the Concept and 
pinned them to a practical-epistemological structure that in fact follows a Logic of 
Essence. And this would explain why Hegel’s philosophical project has become mangled 
in such a confusing and paradoxical way — why his argument seems to invite the 
‘demiurge’ reading — because he is applying terms like ‘Idea’ and ‘Concept’ to what would 
be better described in his own terms as ‘Essence’ or ‘Beyond’. As Marx says, ‘“Idea” and 
“Concept” are here autonomous abstractions’.85 It should be that the Idea is immanent in 
experience, just as it should be that self-conscious universality is immanent in social life — 
but Hegel’s insistence on identifying self-conscious universality with a structure that 
stands outside social life means that the Idea now appears in his text as precisely the sort 
of metaphysical construction that he had originally wanted to avoid.
This analysis in turn makes clearer just why the Philosophy of Right is so important 
to Marx. Marx repeatedly emphasises that Hegel’s text is significant not simply as the 
ideal constitution of a great philosopher but because it furnishes what is in some sense an
81 Marx 1843h, p. 69 /  p. 15.
82 Marx 1843h, p. 127 /  p. 68.
83 Marx 1843h, p. 159 /  p. 101, translation modified.
84 Marx 1843h, p. 158 /  p. 101, translation modified: ‘a truly philosophical criticism of
the present constitution does not content itself with showing that it contains
contradictions: it explains them, comprehends their genesis, their necessity. It grasps their 
peculiar significance’.
85 Marx 1843h, p. 70 /  p. 15.
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accurate account of the modem state as it in fact operates.86 My claim here is that we 
should not mistake these statements as merely an assertion that Hegel has simply 
observed the basic institutional structure of the Prussian state and then couched his 
description of it in obscure philosophical language in order to endow it with some 
spurious other-worldly authority.87 The significance of Hegel’s ‘mystifications’ goes wider 
than this — he is not just mystifying a mundane empirical reality, but effectively 
demonstrating the way in which it necessarily mystifies itself. It is in the very nature of 
the constitutional state to present itself as the institutional expression of a timeless order 
that underlies any empirical instantiation and is beyond the power of society itself to 
revise or amend. Hegel himself acknowledges this as a necessity:
it is at any rate utterly essential that the constitution should not be regarded as 
something made, even if it does have an origin in time. On the contrary, it is quite 
simply that which has being in and for itself, and should therefore be regarded as 
divine and enduring, and as exalted above the sphere of all manufactured 
things.88
In consequence the constitution lies ‘outside the sphere which the legislative power can 
determine direcdy’ and can only evolve only ‘imperceptibly and without possessing the 
form of change’.89 This is why Marx will assert that c[t]he contradiction between the
86 For example, Marx 1843h, p. 112 /  pp. 54-5: ‘Hegel has furnished us with an accurate 
description of the present empirical situation’; Marx 1843h, p. 127 /  p. 68: Hegel is 
‘describing the essence of the modem state as it is’.
87 See, for example, O ’Malley 1969, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv: ‘It is the philosophical form, not the 
empirical content of Philosophy of Right which is under attack; and Marx is careful to 
maintain the distinction between the two, form and content, because of his conviction — 
often repeated in the course of the Critique — that within his speculative framework Hegel
accurately depicts the existing institutions of political society.’ Or Fine 1995, p. 85: ‘Marx
read Hegel’s “dialectic” as no more than an irrational method of rationalising the modern 
state’. And Rosenthal 1998, pp. 149-50: ‘The bulk of Marx’s Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of 
the State is devoted to the task of exposing the mystification suffered by an otherwise 
mundane subject-matter through Hegel’s “logicizing” treatment of i t ... The outcome of 
the procedure ... is, in effect, to justify the empirical “existents” or, more simply put, 
matters of fact selected for discussion ... This is what makes for the essentially apologetic 
tendency of Hegel’s, and indeed Hegelian, political philosophy’.
88 Hegel 1821a, p. 312, §273.
89 Hegel 1821a, p. 336, § 298.
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constitution and the legislature is nothing but the conflict within the constitution itself a 
contradiction in the concept of the constitution’ — for Hegel seems here to have 
abandoned the very project of conscious collective self-determination that his state ought 
to have realised:
Is it now the case that the dominant moment — in the state which according to 
Hegel is the highest existence [Dasein] offreedom, the existence [Dasein] of self- 
conscious reason [der selhstbewuften Vemunft\ — is not the law, the existence 
[Dasein] of freedom, but the blind necessity of nature? ... Hegel always attempts 
to represent the state as the actualization of the free spirit, but in reality he solves 
all difficult conflicts by appealing to a natural necessity antithetical to freedom. 
Thus the transition from the particular interest to the universal interest is not 
achieved by a conscious law of the state, but is mediated by chance and against 
consciousness. And yet Hegel aims to show the realization of free will through 
the state!90
This is why Marx asserts the necessity of democracy, as the only possible realisation of 
the principle of free self-determination that he here clearly recognises as the root of the 
Idealist project.
4. Democracy
Throughout his commentary Marx insistently returns to a simple but, he thinks, radical 
truth: that ‘people make the state’;91 ‘man’ is the ''real subject f 1 that the ‘true ground’ of 
the state is ‘actual human beings and the realpeople'?1 This primary activity is always what 
Marx asserts against Hegel’s presentation of the state as if it were the realisation of an 
abstract Idea:
90 Marx 1843h, pp. 118-9 /  p. 60, translation modified.
91 Marx 1843h, p. 63 /  p. 9.
92 M arxl843h,p. 149 /  p. 34.
93 Marx 1843h, p. 87 /  p. 31.
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The family and civil society are the preconditions of the state, they are its true 
agents ... the family and civil society make themselves into the state. According to 
Hegel, however, ... it is not the course of their own life that joins them together 
to comprise the state, but the life of the Idea which has distinguished them from 
itself ... the fact is that the state evolves from the mass existing as members of 
families and of civil society.. .94
Or where Hegel describes patriotism as though it were an effect of state institutions, Marx 
protests that ‘the converse is just as true, namely that these institutions are an objectification 
of political sentiment’.95 To give a final example, where Hegel describes education as the 
process by which the state finds its substantiality in ‘mind knowing and willing itself, 
Marx counters that the ‘true starting-point’ is ‘spirit knowing and willing itself, without 
which the “end of the state” and the “powers of the state” would be meaningless 
figments, inessential or even impossible beings’.96
Marx’s labouring of this point can sometimes sound strangely reductionist, as if 
he were some kind of methodological individualist trying to assert that there is no such 
thing as society, only individuals and their families, and that the analysis of their activities 
and relationships is empirically straightforward and need not be cluttered by 
philosophical generalities.97 At other times it seems that Marx is simply erecting his own 
alternative ‘demiurge’, replacing Hegel’s ‘Idea’ with a similarly abstract and empty 
‘Humanity’ or ‘the people’ as a metaphysical unity behind and beyond ‘empirical’ politics 
and society.98 I want to suggest that Marx’s intention would have been quite consciously 
to avoid either of these positions, and to develop an approach to the state that goes
94 Marx 1843h, pp. 62-3 /  p. 9.
95 Marx 1843h, p. 65 / p .  11.
96 Marx 1843h, pp. 72-3 /  pp. 17-18, translation modified.
97 This seems to be the interpretation upon which is premised the argument in Ilting 
1984, p. 104: ‘In his critique of Hegel, Marx thus adopts the stance ... of an individual 
living only for the sake of his private interests, and refusing to pay a price for the political 
guarantees of his rights to freedom’; p. 107: ‘Marx assumes that empirical facts have no 
other significance in their existence than just that they are empirical facts.’
98 This is suggested in Rosen 1996, p. 178: ‘The metaphysical structure of Hegel’s 
philosophy is that of a monistic subject from which the predicates of reality emerge as 
part of a self-differentiating process. Whether this subject is called the “Idea” or “Man” 
is not the most important issue’.
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beyond both simplistic empiricism and metaphysical essentialism. Whether he succeeded 
in doing so — whether indeed such an approach is possible at all — is of course another 
question. But I think that in order to make any assessment of his attempt we need to try 
to recapture a sense of that original intention.
There is good textual and circumstantial evidence to suggest that Marx may here 
be trying to work his way back to a political and social equivalent of something very close 
to the founding insight of German Idealism: that there is nothing ‘behind’ the order of 
the world we experience other than ‘our own’ self-determining activity. This would mean 
that we should not see the unity of society or the state as something that is imposed 
upon ‘empirical’ individuals from the outside, in a political or a metaphysical sense. For 
what else is operative in society other than these individuals themselves? At the same 
time, however, we cannot derive the unity of society or the state from individuals as 
atomised individuals, as they appear in civil society, but rather must regard them as, in a 
certain sense, always already social, constituted by their relations to the whole and 
orientated to that whole in their activities — for if this were not the case then we would 
not have a ‘society’ to talk about but, as Hegel says, an atomised chaos. Marx’s insistence 
that ‘the people make the state’ should thus be seen as the political correlate of the post- 
Kantian identification of Reason with the ‘productive imagination’ or ‘intuitive 
Understanding’ that is the true synthetic origin of all our knowledge and experience.
What Marx is trying to reach for is the immanent self-determination of the social whole, 
a self-determination that can never be simply located in any of its moments taken in 
isolation from each other, but which neither should be seen as something acting upon 
those moments from without. The immanent self-determination of the social whole is 
then driven forward by the everyday activities of all its members, conceived as both 
origin and agents of the state’s universality. Individuals’ ‘very social existence [Dasein] 
already constitutes their actualparticipation’ in the state." It is by implication a fluid 
process that always ruptures the fixed demarcations of the Understanding: ‘a rational 
organism’ in which members ‘mutually maintain themselves only insofar as the whole 
organism is fluid and each of them is taken up [aufgehoberi] in this fluidity, in so far as no 
one of them ... is unmoved and inalterable’.100 Every role is relative to the activity of the 
whole — just as every finite conceptualisation turns out to be dependant upon Reason’s
99 Marx 1843h, p. 187 /  p. 127, translation modified.
100 Marx 1843h, pp. 96-7 /  p. 39
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estimation of the systematic unity of all experience. All ‘political determinations ... are 
socialproducts, bom of society and not of the natural individual’.101 All property is 
established as such ‘by the will of society*.102
This is then the basis for Marx’s affirmation of democracy as the form of polity 
in which this constant self-organising activity is brought to full self-consciousness and 
made the formal principle of an explicit collective agency.
Democracy is the generic constitution ... Democracy is both form and content. 
Monarchy is supposed to be only a form, but it falsifies the content ... in 
democracy the constitution itself appears only as one determination of the people, 
and indeed as its self-determination ... Democracy is the solution to the riddle of 
every constitution. In it we find the constitution founded on its actual ground: 
actual human beings and the actualpeople; not merely implicitly and in essence, but in 
existence and in actuality. The constitution is thus posited as the people’s own work. 
The constitution is in appearance what it is in reality: the free product of human
beings ... Just as religion does not make men, but men make religion, so the
constitution does not make the people, but the people make the constitution.103
Democracy is the constitution in which we recognise the reality of our own self- 
determination, it is the moment of self-consciousness that overcomes the externality of 
the Understanding.104
On the face of it, then, Hegel’s refusal of explicit democratic self-determination 
would seem to contradict the very principle of his political philosophy as an articulation 
of the rational structure of any free collective agency. But Hegel has good reasons for 
rejecting the modem form representative democracy. A universal and undifferentiated 
participation or representation of the state’s citizens simply as citizens can only take place
101 Marx 1843h, p. 174 /  p. 115.
102 Marx 1843h, p. 166 /  p. 108.
103 Marx 1843h, p. 87 /  p. 31, translation modified.
104 It may be relevant here that Bruno Bauer had in Das entdeckte Christentum described 
self-consciousness as ‘the solution of all riddles’. McLellan 1969, p. 80. According to 
McLellan the original manuscript of Marx’s 1843 critique shows that he ‘in several places 
crosses out the term “self-consciousness” which he had originally written and substitutes 
another term more evocative of practical realities’. McLellan 1969, p. 75.
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on the basis an institutionalised abstraction from the particular content of their social 
lives and a reduction of their activity to sheer free will or arbitrary decision. The result 
can only be empty, directionless, possibly terroristic.105 Similar considerations lie behind 
Hegel’s ambivalence towards public opinion and the role of a public sphere sustained by 
a free press.106 To a great extent Marx agrees with these estimations — indeed, they will 
ultimately become the basis for the Marxist critique of ‘formal’ liberal democracy, first set 
out in his essay ‘On the Jewish Question’, which presents the findings of his Hegel 
critique in polemical form.
But Hegel’s own critique of the abstraction and emptiness of representative 
democracy points him to what will be the most important conclusion of his engagement 
with Hegel. Thus he writes that ‘where the state organism is purely formal, the 
democratic element can enter into it only as a formal element. However, the democratic 
element should rather be the real element which confers a rationalform on the organism 
of the state as a whole’.107 Therefore, Marx concludes, the full realisation of democracy 
must be seen as an overcoming of the distinction between the political state and civil 
society. The endpoint of movements to extend the suffrage is thus seen as the 
dissolution of the political state itself into a fully politicised civil society.108
105 Hegel 1821a, p. 344, § 301: ‘The many as single individuals — and this is a favourite 
interpretation of [the term] ‘the people’ — do indeed live together, but only as a crowd, i.e. a 
formless mass whose and activity can consequendy only be elemental, irrational, 
barbarous, and terrifying ... The idea \Vorstellung\ that those communities which are 
already present in the circles referred to above can be split up again into a collection of 
individuals as soon as they enter the sphere of politics — i.e. the sphere of the highest 
concrete universality — involves separating civil and political life from each other and leaves 
political life hanging, so to speak, in the air; for its basis is then merely the abstract 
individuality of arbitrary will and opinion, and is thus grounded only on contingency 
rather than on a foundation which is stable and legitimate [berechtigt] in and for itself.’
106 In public opinion ‘the universal in and for itself, the substantial and the true, is linked 
with its opposite, with what is distinct in itself [dem fur sich Eigentiim lichen] as the particular 
opinions of the many. This existence [Existen^ [of public opinion] is therefore a manifest 
self-contradiction, an appearance of cognition; in it, the essential is just as immediately 
present as the inessential’. Hegel 1821a, p. 353, § 316.
107 Marx 1843h, pp. 185-6 /  p. 125.
108 ‘[I]f civil society forces its way into the legislature en masse, or even in toto, if the actual 
civil society wishes to substitute itself for the fictitious civil society of the legislature, then 
all this is nothing but the striving of civil society to create a political existence [Dasein] for 
itself, or to make its actual existence [Dasein] into a political one’. Marx 1843h, p. 188 /  p. 
128.
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Only when civil society has achieved unrestricted active and passive suffrage has it 
really raised itself to the point of abstraction from itself, to the political existence 
which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence. But he perfection of this 
abstraction is also its suspension \Aufhebung  ^ ... Therefore, electoral reform in the 
abstract political state is the equivalent to a demand for its dissolution [Aufldssung\ and 
this in turn implies the dissolution of civil society.109
There are a number of ways in which the epistemological themes we have been 
tracing through Marx’s early writings help us to understand what is involved in this new 
and in some ways notorious ideal. The first is that they allow us to see more clearly why it 
is that the simultaneous politicisation/dissolution of civil society involves precisely a 
suspension of its fixation of all members as abstract individuals relating to one another as 
external atoms. The social unity that was hitherto opposed on such individuals from 
outside and above by the external political state must now be immanent in the activity by 
which they constantly suspend and reform their social roles and identities in free and 
conscious interaction with one another. This is precisely what Hegel had ruled out from 
the very first, by beginning his analysis with an individual free will considered abstractly, 
establishing as a first principle its right to a domain of private property within which its 
personality can be extended and expressed without reference to any wider social context. 
But this only means that the immanent universality of civil society operates behind the 
backs of the individuals who make it up, through the ‘external state’ that is the market. 
And this is why the political state, despite being asserted as the moment of explicit and 
self-conscious universality, can only be a formal add-on, empty and arbitrary. As Marx 
says, c[t]he abstract personality was the subject of abstract right and it has not changed: the 
abstract personality reappears intact as the personality of the s ta t ic  That is to say, the state 
only repeats at a collective institutional level the formal identity or simple unity that 
defines the abstract, property-owning individual. Marx’s argument here is precisely to 
avoid the subordination of the empirical individual to the false unity of the state, but 
rather to recognise the fact that individuals are already socially constituted by the kind of 
‘intersubjectivity’ that Michael Theunissen has argued is systematically excluded from
109 Marx 1843h, p. 191 /  pp. 130-31.
110 Marx 1843h, p. 83 /  p. 27, translation modified.
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Hegel’s construction.111 But there is nothing to suggest that Marx thinks that individual 
identity, even some form of ‘property’, simply vanishes in this process, but, like the finite 
determinations of the Understanding, is recognised as always relative to a larger totality 
and always subject to suspension and reformation as part of that whole’s constant fluid 
movement.
This relates to the second point, perhaps another way of saying the same thing, 
which is that we should not expect a level of ‘political’ organisation to vanish either, but 
to be decentered, made relative to the intersubjectively constituted social whole and 
subordinate to its self-determination. Marx raises the idea that ‘the political state disappears 
in a true democracy’, and affirms that ‘[t]his is correct in the sense that the political state, 
the constitution, is no longer equivalent to the whole’.112 I would suggest that we should 
look upon Marx’s conception of the ‘constitution’ in a ‘true democracy’ as similar to the 
status of the Understanding within a post-Kantian conception of experience and 
knowledge — as necessary, inescapable, indispensable, valuable, but not to be absolutised 
or mistaken for the fixed and final word. This means simply that nothing can be taken to 
fall outside the reach of popular sovereignty if social self-determination is to be actual. 
The question ‘does the people have the right to make a new constitution? ... can only be 
answered unreservedly in the affirmative, for a constitution that has ceased to be the 
actual expression of the will of the people has become a practical illusion’.113
And this notion that democracy dispels the ‘practical illusion’ of any 
constitution’s absolute status is, I want to suggest, the key thought behind Marx’s 
description of it as the overcoming of the beguiling ‘duplications’ of the social world that 
takes place at the hands of the constitutional state. ‘In democracy’, says Marx at one 
point, ‘no moment acquires a significance other than what is proper to it’.114 Against the 
background of the mystifications of the Understanding that we have been following 
through his analysis of Hegel’s institutions, I think we cannot conclude that such 
comments are intended to invoke a naive epistemological simplicity. The point is rather 
that democracy abolishes the illusion whereby the state and its determinations are fixed 
and legitimised by implicit or explicit reference to a mysterious principle outside our
111 Theunissen 1991.
112 Marx 1843h, p. 88 /  p. 32.
113 M arxl843h,p. 120 /  p. 61
114 Marx 1843h, p. 87 /  p. 31, translation modified.
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actual social activity. Rather, every social role or relation is understood to be a moment in 
that self-determining activity. But this does not mean that society’s activity itself is 
‘simple’ or ‘transparent’ — the point is that it is already a complex network of activities 
and interactions that mediate individuals’ relations to one another and their needs. This is 
in fact made clear by Marx’s discussion of ‘representation’, not as something to be 
abolished but to be recognised as implicit in all social relationships:
a cobbler is my representative in so far as he satisfies a social need, just as every 
definite form of social activity, because it is a species activity, represents only the 
species. That is to say, it represents a determination of my own being just as 
every man is representative of other men. In this sense he is a representative not 
by virtue of another thing which he represents but by virtue of what he is and 
does.115
The very premise of such passages is precisely the complexity of society and its ‘system 
of needs’ — it is precisely because I know nothing of shoe-making that the cobbler acts 
on my behalf in his workshop.116 The point is not that I understand how he made my 
shoes, but that I recognise my shoes as a social product, as a moment in society’s self­
reproduction.
At the same time, however, Marx recognises that overcoming the civil 
society/political state opposition is not just a matter of consciously recognising its 
relativity. For it is precisely a function of society’s institutional fragmentation that its 
unification takes place ‘behind the backs’ of individuals as a force of necessity. The 
transcendence of this situation can only come about through an achievement of that 
collective self-determination that would by definition dispel the transcendent objectivity 
of any institutional framework. True democracy cannot come about by having all this 
pointed out to us, but must be a hard-won practical achievement. The solution of this
115 Marx 1843h, pp. 189-90.
116 See also Marx 1843h, p. 188 /  p. 127: ‘when we speak of specific affairs of state, of a 
single political act, it is .... obvious that it cannot be performed by all the people individually. 
If this were so it would mean that the individual was himself the true society and thus 
would make society superfluous. The individual would have to do everything all at once, 
whereas in fact society has him act for the others, just as it has them act for him’.
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riddle, the ‘reclamation of universal reason’, is the ‘task set by history’.117 This intrinsic 
conceptual linkage between the atomisation of civil society and the abstraction of the 
political state thus gives Marx the clue to a new historical dynamic that will point him in 
the direction of a radical new political project.
5. The inverted world
In the ‘Introduction’ to a planned publication of his Hegel critique in which the new 
focus this practical project is publicly announced for the first time, Marx makes use of a 
trope that would recur throughout his later analyses:
This state and this society produce religion, which is an inverted consciousness of the 
world, because they are an inverted world [eine verkehrte welf\ ... It is therefore the task 
of history, once the Beyond [Jenseits] of truth has vanished, to establish the truth of this 
world. It is the immediate task of philosophy, which is in the service of history, to 
unmask self-estrangement in its unholy forms once the holy form of human self­
estrangement has been unmasked. Thus the criticism of heaven turns into the 
criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of right, and the criticism of 
theology into the criticism of politics.™
It is rarely noted that this motif, of an ‘inverted world’ as the symptom of a 
misrecognition of ‘this world’ as having its truth in a realm ‘beyond’ experience itself has 
a clear Hegelian precedent.119 It appears in the Phenomenology of Spirit at precisely the point 
in the argument that corresponds most closely to the transition in the Logic from the 
‘Doctrine of Essence’ to that of the ‘Concept’, from the illusory projections of the 
Understanding to the self-determination of Reason.120
117 Marx 1843h, p. 89.
118 Marx 1844a, pp. 244-5 /  pp. 170-1, translation modified.
119 It is pointed out in Rosen 1996, p. 176.
120 On this correspondence see Pippin 1989, p. 304, note 35.
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The section, on ‘Force and the Understanding’, is announced with a 
characterisation of precisely that ‘doubling’ effect that we have been noting throughout 
Marx’s analyses of the operations of the constitutional state: ‘The true essence of Things 
has now the character of not being immediately for consciousness; on the contrary, 
consciousness has a mediated relation to the inner being and, as the Understanding, looks 
through this mediatingplay of Forces into the true background ofThings’.121 This moment is a 
necessary move forward from the inadequacy of sense-certainty; but it is also a moment 
that in turn must be overcome.122 The reason Hegel gives is that a conception of reality 
in this two-tiered sense leads into unacceptable paradoxes. Consciousness seeks to 
ground its organisation of experience by relating its conceptualisations to some 
underlying order behind sensible appearance; but this order can be nothing other than 
the order that is produced by consciousness itself. Hence we must either admit that in 
truth we know nothing of this supersensible world,123 and that our scientific discovery of 
‘laws’ explaining reality in fact does nothing more than tautologically redescribe this 
reality,124 or assert its relationship to the world of appearance in entirely dogmatic or 
mystical fashion.125
From the idea, then, of inversion, which constitutes the essential nature of one 
aspect of the supersensible world, we must eliminate the sensuous idea of fixing 
the differences in a different sustaining element; and this absolute Notion of the
121 Hegel 1807, p. 86, § 143.
122 Pippin’s account of Hegel’s argument is highly relevant here: ‘Hegel’s claim here is 
paradigmatic for much of what he wants to say about the limitations of traditional 
philosophical reflection, especially for his well-known attack on abstract or formal 
principles of practical rationality. Such principles either “invert” the real world, attempt 
to turn it into another, unreal world, or “pervert” it (another meaning of verkehren) by 
judging it to be permanently corrupt’. Pippin 1989, pp. 286-7.
123 ‘The inner world is, for consciousness, still a pure beyond, because consciousness does 
not as yet find itself in it. It is empty, for it is merely the nothingness of appearance, and 
positively the simple or unitary universal’. Hegel 1807, p. 88, § 146.
124 ‘In this tautological movement, the Understanding ... sticks to the inert unity of its 
object, and the movement falls only within the Understanding itself, not within the 
object. It is an explanation that not only explains nothing, but is so plain that, while it 
pretends to say something different from what has already been said, really says nothing 
at all but only repeats the same thing’. Hegel 1807, p. 95, § 155.
125 ‘in order that there may yet be something in the void ... we must fill it up with 
reveries, appearances, produced by consciousness itself. Hegel 1807, p. 88-9, § 146.
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difference must be represented and understood purely as inner difference, a 
repulsion of the selfsame, as selfsame, from itself, and likeness of the unlike as 
unlike.126
The climax of Hegel’s argument is then the arrival at self-consciousness — at an 
awareness of our own self-determined activity in constituting the world we experience:
The two extremes [of this syllogism], the one, of the pure inner world, the other, 
that of the inner being gazing into this pure inner world, have now coincided ... 
This curtain [of appearance] hanging before the inner world is therefore drawn 
away, and we have the inner being [the ‘I’] gazing into the inner world ... self- 
consciousness.121
Marx’s redeployment of this motif is not unique — indeed, it seems to have been a staple 
of Young Hegelian criticisms of religion and politics. Bruno Bauer had argued that the 
categories of religion ‘invert the laws of the real, rational world, alienate the universality 
of self-consciousness, rend it violently away or bring it back to representation as an alien, 
limited, sacral history’.128 Moses Hess similarly characterised the state and politics as an 
‘inverted world’ in articles written around the same time, 129 and in a seminal move, 
extended the analysis to economic forms in his essay ‘On the Essence of Money’, written 
around the end of 1843 or the beginning of 1844: W hat God is for the theoretical life ... 
money is for the practical life of the inverted world: the alienated power of men, their 
reified activity’.130 The repeated recourse to this motif provides further evidence that
126 Hegel 1807, p. 99. § 160.
127 Hegel 1807, p. 103, §165.
128 Quoted in Moggach 2003, p. 36. See also Bauer’ s Das entdeckte Christenthum, in which a 
chapter on the absurd pointlessness of Christian belief in the miraculous is entided ‘Die 
verkehrte Welf: ‘The Christian demands water from the stone and gets it. He commands 
water that it be wine and it is so; iron to not be heavy and it floats; fire that it not bum 
and he sings a beautiful aria in a glowing oven; the river that it not flow and he walks 
over its bed with dry feet.’ Bauer 1843, p. 77. McLellan suggests a strong influence of 
Bauer’s critique of religion on this passage of Marx’s text, but does not trace the relevant 
motifs back to the common Hegelian source. McLellan 1969, pp. 78-9.
129 Kouvelakis 2003, p. 147.
130 Quoted in McLellan 1969, p. 157.
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even as the Young Hegelians proclaimed an explicit break with Hegelian idealism, they 
did so on the basis of reconceived but still recognisably Hegelian arguments. For this 
reason, an understanding of Hegel’s project remains essential to understanding their own 
attempts at a refoundation upon new ground.
And I think this must apply also to Feuerbach, the most visible and explicit 
influence on Marx’s writings of this period and the author of the very terms through 
which Marx articulates his break’ with Hegel. It can I think be plausibly argued that 
Feuerbach’s declarations of his total abandonment of the Hegelian standpoint have led 
readers to overlook the extent to which his ‘anthropological’ writings themselves depend 
upon a redeployment of idealist arguments. In the case of The Essence of Christianity, 
Feuerbach’s deliberate and strategic shift of idiom from a philosophical and 
epistemological register into one of ‘psychology’ and ‘anthropology’ has invited readings 
of his arguments as if they constituted a reversion to some kind of pre-critical 
empiricism, missing the importance of the Kantian revolution they take for granted, or 
indeed anachronistically read back into them proto-Freudian notions of ‘repression’ and 
‘projection’, or quasi-Durkheimian sociologisations of religion.131 But the argument of 
the book is much more about relating religious belief to the necessary logical structures 
of human subjectivity and self-consciousness. As is well known, Feuerbach’s argument is 
that religion is nothing other than humanity’s misrecognition of its own ‘nature’ as an 
alienated other, but what is often overlooked is that for Feuerbach ‘[t]his nature is 
nothing else than the intelligence — the Understanding \Verstandf .X2>2 All the philosophical
131 Daniel Brudney presents Feuerbach’s argument as a theory o f ‘psychological 
projection’ in which God is worshipped as a symbol of our ‘collective human capacities’ 
and facilitates a kind of imaginary ‘wish fulfilment’ — an ‘illusory belief ... akin to those 
investigated by psychoanalysis’. Feuerbach’s critique of religion is thus intended as a kind 
of ‘therapy’ that will ‘preserve the force of the religious impulse’ but ‘rechannel it to its 
proper place’. Brudney 1998, p. 32, p. 57. Robert Nola, meanwhile, suggests that ‘with 
hindsight the genetico-critical method can be viewed, in part, as an early exercise in the 
sociology of knowledge, or, much better, the sociology of belief, in which the origins of 
beliefs are traced to causes other than their putative objects’. Nola 1993, p. 308. The 
point is not that Feuerbach’s project can’t be redescribed in this way, but that this kind of 
language can occlude the operative premises and structure of his argument — which 
Brudney and Nola do have some difficulty making sense of.
132 Feuerbach 1841, p. 33 /  p. 75. Nola writes that on Feuerbach’s account ‘our essence 
is very Cartesian: the essential properties of the human species are reason, will, and 
affection’. The possible relevance of Kantian and post-Kantian discussions of such topics
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definitions of God are attributes of the Understanding: "that which conditions and 
coordinates all things’, the ‘criterion of all reality’, the ‘self-standing and independent 
essence’, which ‘comprehends all things in itself, because it is itself not a thing, because it 
is free from all things’.133 The content of religion is then filled by humanity’s need to fill 
this empty conceptual space with feeling and personality, so that the imagination 
produces the conception of a personal God in the image of the individual who loves and 
forgives all imperfections.134 This attempt to fill the abstract, formal, objectified notion 
of the Understanding with the stuff of intuition, imagination and feeling is the generative 
contradiction at the heart of religious belief, funning through all its mysterious rituals and 
doctrines: incarnation, prayer, miracles, resurrection, the Holy Trinity.135
I would suggest that in its essentials this argument remains close to that originally 
mounted by the post-Kantian idealists against Kant’s own rehabilitation of religion as 
‘practical faith’, and which we discussed in Chapter Three as a likely source of Marx and 
Bauer’s criticisms of religion in the name of ‘self-consciousness’. The most important 
difference is that Feuerbach now extends this critique to Hegel’s own ‘speculative’ 
recuperation of religion, with his hypostatisation of human self-consciousness into a 
quasi-theological Concept that has now detached itself from actual finite subjects:
Why ... dost thou alienate man’s consciousness from him, and make it the self- 
consciousness of a being distinct from man, of that which is an object to him? ... 
Man’s knowledge of God is God’s knowledge of himself? What a divorcing 
contradiction! The true statement is this: man’s knowledge of God is man’s
is not considered. Appearing in an anthology devoted to The Age of German Idealism this is 
surely missing a trick.
133 Feuerbach 1841, pp. 33-43.
134 Feuerbach 1841, pp. 46-7. This shows how Warren Breckman’s focus on 
‘personalism’ as the target of Young Hegelian critique may not reach to the most 
fimdamental level of these arguments -  it is clear from Feuerbach’s exposition here that 
the attribution of personality to the divine is a consequence, necessary but nonetheless 
secondary, of the objectification and extemalisation of the Understanding that is the 
primary basis of theological belief.
135 Feuerbach 1843, p. 213: ‘God is universal, abstract Being, simply the idea of Being; 
and yet he must be conceived as a personal, individual being; — or God is a person, and 
yet he must be regarded as God, as universal, i.e., not as a personal being ... One half of 
the definition is always in contradiction with the other half.
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knowledge of himself, of his own nature ... what presents itself before thy 
consciousness is simply what lies behind i t ...
Thus Feuerbach argues for a turn to ‘anthropology’ precisely on the grounds that it is the 
basis for reconstructing ‘a true, self-satisfying identity of the divine and human being, the 
identity of the human being with itself. Hegel’s theory is supposed to achieve such an 
identity, but because it cannot overcome the separation of humanity and Reason inherent 
in its very principle, it is ‘in contradiction with itself and with the Understanding, -  is a 
half measure — a thing of the imagination — a perversion, a distortion; which, however, 
the more perverted and false it is, all the more appears to be profound’.136
Feuerbach’s subsequent recommendation in the ‘Provisional Theses for the 
Reformation of Philosophy’ that ‘we need only invert speculative philosophy and then we 
have the unmasked, pure, bare truth’137 may not be explicidy intended to evoke the 
‘inverted world’ passage in Hegel’s Phenomenology, but it is certainly arguable that the 
principle is closely related. His procedure of responding to an essentialist structure in 
which ‘the truth of the finite is articulated ... only in an indirect and inverted manner’138 by 
‘making the predicate into the subject and thus, as the subject, into the object and principle’ 
need not be taken as a reversion to simplistic or reductive empiricism, nor the erection of 
just another essentialism with the terms reversed. Rather it seems that this might have 
appeared as precisely the method by which to overcome the illusory ‘doubling’ to which 
the Understanding can fall prey and into which Hegel’s own philosophy itself seemed to 
have fallen. W e ... have everything twice in the Hegelian philosophy, as an object of the 
logic and then again as an object of the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of 
spirit’.139 It seems clear that both Feuerbach and Marx saw the solution to this misfiring 
of the original Idealist intention140 in a concerted re-siting of its first principle in a more 
‘embodied’ understanding of self-consciousness as inseparable from finite individuals:
136 Feuerbach 1843, pp. 230-1.
137 Feuerbach 1843a, p. 157.
138 Feuerbach 1843a, p. 160.
139 Feuerbach 1843a, p. 158.
140 ‘The essence of Hegel’s Logic is transcendent thinking, the thinking of the human being 
supposed outside human being?. Feuerbach 1843a, p. 158.
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one cannot separate the absolute spirit from the subjective spirit or essence of the 
human being without placing us back in the old perspective of theology and 
deluding us that the absolute spirit is an other spirit, distinguished from the human 
essence, a ghost of ourselves existing outside us.141
And this, also, seems to have been the nature of the Feuerbachian turn to ‘sensibility’ — 
not a retreat from idealism towards a simplistic empiricism so much as a repeat of the 
Idealists’ efforts to overcome the dualisms of reflection, by reasserting the inextricable 
involvement of all ‘thought’ with its own sensible content:
The differences between essence and appearance, ground and consequence, 
substance and accident, necessity and chance, speculative and empirical, do not 
constitute two realms or worlds of which one is a supersensible world to which 
essence belongs and the other is a sensible world to which appearance belongs; 
rather, these distinctions all fall within the realm of sensibility itself.142
The development of Marx’s early thought does not stop here (though Feuerbach’s seems 
to have progressed litde further).143 As far as we have taken it, his break with ‘idealism’ is 
on the basis of an alternative conception that remains abstract, unclear, perhaps crude.
Its most interesting turns and elaborations are driven by his attempts to turn such 
arguments to the analysis of particular historical, social, and economic conflicts and 
dynamics. But we cannot really grasp the meaning of Marx’s subsequent ‘materialism’ 
until we have fully understood the irony of its inauguration in a strategic inversion of 
Hegel that was itself a classically Hegelian manoeuvre.
141 Feuerbach 1843a, p. 158.
142 Feuerbach 1843b, p. 59.
143 See Wartofsky 1977 for an account of Feuerbach’s subsequent intellectual career.
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Marxism and epistemology
‘Capitalism is a contradictory reality for Marx, not because being a reality it must 
therefore be contradictory — as dialectical materialism would have it, but because 
it is a capsized, inverted, upside-down reality. I am perfecdy conscious that the 
notion of an upside-down reality appears to jar with the precepts of any science. 
Marx was convinced of the validity of this notion. I do not say that he was 
necessarily right. I cannot yet state whether the idea of an inverted reality is 
compatible with a social science.’
— Lucio Colletti, ‘A Political and Philosophical Interview’ (1974) 1
‘In his search for a concept with which to think the remarkable reality of the 
effectivity of a structure on its elements, Marx often slipped into the really almost 
inevitable use of the classical opposition between essence and phenomenon, adopting 
its ambiguities by force rather than by merit, and transposing the epistemological 
difference between the knowledge of a reality and that reality itselfinto reality in the form of 
the 1 inside and the outsidf ’, of the real, of the 'real movement and the apparent movement 
of the ‘intimate essenci and its concrete, phenomenal determinations, perceived and 
manipulated by subjects’.
— Louis Althusser, ‘Marx’s Immense Theoretical Revolution’ (1968)2
‘Marxism’, understood as the distinctive mode of inquiry and critique that Marx began to 
develop in the years after 1843, and the many and diverse traditions of commentary and 
elaboration it spawned, has not been the subject of this thesis. The foregoing discussion
1 Colletti [1974] 1977, pp. 337-8. Three years after giving this interview Colletti 
accounted for his abandonment of Marxism by reference to his failure to resolve this 
problem — Hegel’s dialectic, he had to admit, ‘is right there in Capitat and ‘one cannot do 
science with the dialectic. ‘The Crisis of Marxism’, in Mondoperaio (November 1977), quoted 
in Arthur 2000, p. 130.
2 Althusser and Balibar 1968, pp. 190-1.
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has been restricted to a set of early texts in which we find none of the most distinctive 
features or concerns of Marx’s later writings: his critique of political economy, his focus 
on class struggle, his advancement of a ‘materialist’ theory of history, his commitment to 
a proletarian communist politics. Indeed, it has been a concern of mine to avoid 
reference to these later themes and to try to guard against ‘reading back’ into these early 
texts anything that we know (or think we know) about Marx’s greater intellectual and 
political legacy.
But it is inevitable that any reading of these early writings will be partially 
informed by questions about the meaning and relevance of the more famous arguments 
and analyses of Marx’s later years. And indeed my hope is that the philosophical 
excavation conducted here may after all begin to throw some new light on Marx’s 
subsequent ideas. Any attempt to sketch these implications at this point must be highly 
provisional. I by no means wish to give the impression that I think that the point at 
which we have ended this story is the point at which Marx is ‘set up’ for the rest of his 
life’s work, and that there do not remain further developments, redirections, even 
‘breaks’, which will continue to transform in fundamental ways his theoretical and 
practical project throughout the decades that follow. A full investigation of the fate of 
the themes of my discussion in Marx’s later thinking would require a further detailed 
study, probably much larger than this one. But in this concluding chapter I do want to set 
out briefly why I think further investigation of these themes may be interesting and 
worthwhile.
1. Between ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’
Where did we leave Marx at the end of 1843? My argument has aimed to show that we 
can at this point see Marx preparing to relaunch, in a very different guise, what is 
nevertheless still recognisable as a variant of the post-Kantian project of rendering fully 
conscious the implications of an all embracing principle of self-determination. 
Furthermore, I think it is also possible to now see how an essential component of this 
project will involve a redeployment of the epistemological terms of the original Idealist 
analyses of the universal and necessary structures of subjectivity and knowledge as the 
framework for a new analysis and critique of ‘social structures’ — political, economic, and 
‘ideological’. In short, my suggestion is that Marx will begin to treat these social
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structures as themselves institutionalised embodiments of ‘forms of consciousness’, the 
shared forms, that is, through which human beings self-consciously mediate and 
reproduce their interdependence.
If this is right, then a number of important consequences would follow. One is 
that however insistendy Marx declares his new standpoint to be ‘materialist’, and 
however proudly he claims to have left behind his ‘idealist’ philosophical upbringing, we 
should not interpret this to mean that his thought ever stops being fundamentally 
concerned with self-consciousness and subjectivity. Rather the shift of emphasis is to an 
exploration of how forms of collective self-consciousness and intersubjectivity are 
embodied or institutionalised in what some might want to call ‘material’ structures and 
systems of relationship: positive religion and its organisational existence; the state and its 
laws, or ultimately the ‘economy’ and its ‘market’. At the end of this discussion it seems 
possible that all these possible ‘objects’ of social analysis and critique might be thought of 
as providing the basic forms and structures by which the individuals of a society 
conceptualise their practical interdependence, and on the basis of which they act to 
reproduce and develop that interdependence. And this, I suggest, is at some level how 
Marx thinks of them.
Following our exploration of the post-Kantian philosophical tradition from 
which Marx draws in forming this project, a little more can be said about the kind of 
patterns and dynamics we might expect such structures to exhibit. Perhaps the most 
important is that where these structures are fixed, beyond the control of those whose 
activity they mediate, they will follow what we have been designating an ‘Essence Logic’, 
the problematic dualistic structure that is the result of any absolutisation of the 
standpoint of ‘Reflection’ or the ‘Understanding’. This means that they will be 
experienced by those operating within them as an external or mechanical constraint on 
their activity, grounded in a transcendent organising principle that is projected into an 
obscure or hidden realm ‘Beyond’ their own activity. But in fact, we can further predict, 
this will be a special kind of illusion -  for in truth there is nothing beyond these 
individuals’ activity, and this deeper level of reality can in fact only be empty, or gain its 
content only through a tautologous or inverted reduplication of that activity.
The overcoming of this illusion would then take the form of a realisation that 
there is nothing truly constraining individuals’ social activity according to a principle that 
lies beyond it, that there is only that activity itself, and any structures that regulate it are 
themselves products of that free, ungrounded activity. This is the fundamental and all-
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encompassing activity through which we produce and reproduce ourselves and our social 
world. Marx will come to emphasise that this activity is a ‘material’ activity, and will 
identify it with ‘labour’ or ‘production’. This is his possibly his most important 
modification of the post-Kantian paradigm, and it is unfortunate that an adequate 
exploration of this shift could not be kept within the scope of the present study. At this 
stage I make only two points. One is to point out that in all of Marx’s later discussions it 
is always clear that by ‘labour’ or ‘production’ he means self-conscious, conceptually 
mediated, explicitly purposive engagement with the ‘material’ or ‘natural’ world, so that 
the epistemological issues we have been discussing are never far away. The other is that 
the story we have been able to tell so far does suggest that Marx’s deliberate step outside 
the established philosophical discourse of German Idealism does now look very much 
like it may be motivated by a desire to back out of a comer characterised by Marx as a 
relapse into precisely as the kind of arbitrary formalism, mystical dualism and loss of self- 
determination that it had been the original project of that tradition to overcome.
But the full recovery of the free and self-conscious organisation of our social 
world through productive labour will take more than a shift of philosophical perspective. 
As Marx is famous for insisting, it will take action — most importantly, collective action. 
For we can now see that the ossification the structures by which we understand and act 
on our interdependence into fixed transcendent orders that seem to constrain our activity 
from the outside is precisely the consequence of a failure to achieve a fully self- 
determining and self-conscious collective agency. Insofar as I act only as an individual, 
then the structures which regulate my social interaction are indeed external forces that lie 
beyond my power to control or even fully comprehend. The suspension of this 
objectification can only come about through the realisation of a united subjectivity that 
can recognise and suspend these structures as only the principles of its own free self- 
organisation. This is precisely the sort of intersubjective self-determination that is 
blocked by the fragmentation of society into private individuals, looking not to each 
other but to the transcendent principles of religion, law and the market to mediate their 
interdependence and embody their common interests. The projected possibility of a final 
consummation of such a collective subjectivity is without doubt the most utopian and 
controversial part of this overall picture. But hopefully we can at least see how Marx 
thought he could point to partial realisations of such a goal in the very interstices of his 
own fragmented, dualistic, and distorted society: in the free flow of facts and ideas of an 
uninhibited public sphere; in the mutual acts of ‘species recognition’ that ground our
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most everyday personal and social interactions; and ultimately in the dynamic and 
expansive cooperative activity that is the hidden heart of the capitalist production 
process.
As I have said, an adequate and convincing exploration of how some of the key 
themes and issues of post-Kantian Idealist philosophy can be seen to persist, in radically 
altered form, throughout much of Marx’s later thought, would take a further study of 
forbidding proportions. But in the remainder of this chapter I want to make some 
provisional suggestions as to how I think an awareness of these themes might help us 
understand the complexities and difficulties of Marx’s ‘mature’ project, and indeed 
appreciate its continuing relevance.
2. Labour and history
Marx’s better known social, political and economic thought is grounded in what he refers 
to in his ‘early’ works (of 1844) as humanity’s ‘species life’, and what appears in his later 
writings as the collective labour process that is taken to lie at the basis of any historically 
existing society. I am for my present purposes setting aside any exploration of the 
distinctions there might be between these two conceptions (and other variations that may 
appear in his writings) for the sake of gaining a clear view of the basic idea that they have 
in common. This is that human beings depend for their survival and development upon 
an ongoing process of collective interaction with each other and their ‘material’ or 
‘natural’ environment. It is his insistent stressing of the fundamentally social aspect of this 
process that he thinks marks him out from most liberal or individualist political and 
social theories. And it is the fact that this process is naturally or materially bounded that 
seems to mark him out as some kind of ‘materialist’.
But in order to understand how and why arguments and vocabularies of more 
‘Idealist’ provenance find their way into Marx’s social theory, we need to keep in mind 
the fact that for Marx this ongoing process of ‘species life’ or ‘collective labour’ is always 
conceptually mediated, and so inherently reflexive or ‘self-conscious’, and for that reason at 
some level ‘free’ or ‘spontaneous’. In his original appropriation of Feuerbach’s notion of 
humanity’s ‘species being’, for example, we find numerous statements such as the 
following:
246
CONCLUS I ON
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It is not distinct from that 
activity; it is that activity. Man makes his life activity itself an object of his will and 
consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with which 
he directly merges ... he is a conscious being, i.e. his own life is an object for 
him, only because he is a species-being. Only because of that is his activity free 
activity.3
Turning to Marx’s later writings, a similar meaning might be taken to be behind the 
famous passage in Volume 1 of Capital about the distinction between ‘those first 
instinctive forms of labour which remain on the animal level’ from ‘labour in a form in 
which it is a distinctively human characteristic’:
what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is that the architect 
builds the cell in his mind before he constructs it in wax. At the end of every 
labour process, a result emerges which has already been conceived by the worker 
at the beginning, hence already existed ideally. Man not only effects a change of 
form in the materials of nature; he also realizes his own purpose in those 
materials. And this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his 
activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it.4
Quotations such as these have become so familiar that, ironically, it seems little thought 
is given to the possibility that they might have quite precise philosophical implications. 
They are merely trotted out every time we want to evoke Marx’s rhetorical celebration of 
‘social labour’ as humanity’s most important activity. But if we look at the detail of 
Marx’s presentation of this idea it is hard to escape the suspicion that perhaps Marx has 
not moved all that far away from German Idealist premises — in the ‘architect’ quote, for 
example, we see not only a tight interrelation between conceptuality, self-consciousness,
3 Marx 1844c, p. 328. Andrew Chitty has interpreted such passages as meaning that the 
‘universality’ supposedly inherent in humans’ species activity turns precisely on the fact 
that it is conceptually mediated. See Chitty 1993.
4 Marx 1867a, pp. 283-84.
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and freedom, but moreover an identification of that free activity with giving a law to 
oneself.5
This then raises the further question that there might be more fundamental 
structures that make possible the self-relating inherent in the labour process, structures 
that are in some way ‘conceptual’ but may not necessarily be explicitly conscious at all 
times. According to Robert Pippin, this is precisely the question that motivates Hegel’s 
most radical developments of Kant’s original theory of apperception when posed in the 
epistemological context:
when S claims to know P, S must be implicidy understanding himself to be 
participating in the practice of judgment and justification, and that S must 
contextually or implicitly understand enough of such a practice to count as 
participating in it. (Such a reflexive awareness might simply always be implicit and 
evinced only by what else S can and would do.)
It is this idea of a structured self-understanding logically implicit in all particular acts of 
judgement that, according to Pippin, licenses the project of Hegel’s Logic, as ‘an 
extremely abstract, ideal account of the various Notions implicidy presupposed by an S 
self-consciously intending a claim about a determinate object, even though any actual S 
might only have the crudest sense of such presuppositions’.6
My suggestion here is that a similar argument might be seen to legitimate a move 
from the self-conscious conceptuality of all human labour to the possibility of a logical
5 Imprecise renditions of Marx’s ‘philosophical anthropology’ may be responsible for 
much (not all) of its notoriety as a dangerously naive and utopian perfectionism. Many 
people seem to think that Marx’s view of ‘human nature’ is that we all really enjoy 
working, and we all really get along with one another, and that if we don’t we are 
‘alienated’ or experiencing ‘false consciousness’. I think that a much more minimalist and 
much more persuasive account of the human condition is consistent with what Marx says 
and a more likely outcome of his philosophical development: that in a Kantian sense we 
are necessarily self-conscious and self-determining agents, and that (also in a Kantian 
sense, in fact) we are beings with needs that depend for their fulfilment upon our and 
others’ purposive engagement with ‘nature’. My strong claim is that pretty much 
everything else follows from this. But at least I hope it will be accepted that it is unlikely 
that Marx would have simply reverted to a simple ‘social instinct’ or ‘political animal’ — 
type anthropology after all his polemical attacks on feudal fetishisations of natural 
determinations as reducing social life to a ‘zoology’.
6 Pippin 1989, pp. 22-3.
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analysis of the wider social relations and structures that frame and are presupposed by 
such activity. It would take a great deal of work to elucidate and defend such an 
argument; right now I merely wish to suggest that maybe something like this is going on 
when, for example, Marx seems to claim that ‘the labour theory of value’ is somehow 
inherent in the very practice of commodity exchange., prior to any conscious formulation of 
this idea in the minds of those doing the exchanging: ‘by equating their different 
products to each other in exchange as values, they equate their different kinds of labour 
as human labour. They do this without being aware of it ... Later on, men try to decipher 
the hieroglyphic, to get behind the secret of their own social product’.7 Or, again, such a 
relationship seems to be being asserted when Marx makes the parallel claim that certain 
juridical concepts of free and equal personality can be seen as ‘tacitly’ presupposed by 
agents exchanging with one another, again independendy of the extent to which they are 
explicidy formulated:
... in developed trade, the exchangers tacidy recognise each other as equal 
persons and owners of the respective goods to be exchanged by them; they do 
this even while they are offering each other their goods and agreeing to trade 
with one another. This factual relation, which first arises in and through exchange 
itself, later obtains the form of right in the contract etc.. .8
It is at points like these that Marx wants to keep faith with his ‘materialist’ supposition 
that ‘social being determines consciousness’ and not vice versa and in the process 
appears to want to maintain a quasi-Humean story of concepts and rules emerging as the 
secondary epiphenomena of pre-existing conventions and patterns of behaviour. This 
raises some complicated issues;9 but the important point for my immediate purposes is 
that Marx clearly thinks that these rules and conventions, even if unconscious, are
7 Marx 1867a, pp. 166-7.
8 Marx 1975, p. 210.
9 Some of these issues are wresded with in Chitty 1998. He concludes that although ‘[i]n 
his keenness to oppose a thoroughly materialist alternative to idealist explanations of 
social phenomena, Marx does sometimes seem to suggest that human practical activity as 
such is thought-free’, nevertheless ‘[Relations of producing-for and transferring-to are 
relations that involve actions, and human action is always intentional, thus always imbued 
with thought and so with “forms of consciousness”.’
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nevertheless ultimately susceptible to conceptual expression and so logical analysis, and 
that their effectivity should not be thought of as if it were a kind of mechanical 
causation.10 The characterisation of the capitalist economy as a system of ‘material 
relations’ is then misleading if we expect as a consequence to be able to study it in the 
same way that natural science studies its ‘material’ objects. For the fact that these 
relations are rooted in and characterised by the ways in which human beings 
spontaneously give a ‘law’ to their own activities mean that we can never reduce their 
dynamic to laws of simple natural causality.11 Rather, the ‘social forms’ that material 
relations take on may be systematically related to one another in such a way as to be 
reconstructed through a procedure of transcendental conceptual derivation, which is to 
say, that one might seek to set forth their dialectical ‘logic’.12
What this points to then is a suggestion that the ‘objects’ of Marx’s social, 
historical, political and economic analyses are the basic practical concepts through which 
human beings (explicitly or implicitly) understand, reproduce and develop their ‘material’ 
interdependence. This, I would argue, is the kind of mediation Marx is drawing our 
attention to when he says, for example, that ‘[a]ll production is appropriation of nature 
on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society’.13 Marx’s focus 
is on the historically changeable ‘social forms’ which guide and underwrite the collective 
labour process which runs through all human history. These social forms should be seen
10 Such an argument is made in Adomo 1957, pp. 79-80: ‘The person who attributes the 
conceptual to social reality need not fear the accusation of being idealistic ... The act of 
exchange implies the reduction of the products to be exchanged to their equivalents, to 
something abstract, but by no means — as traditional discussion would maintain — to 
something material... It is not an illusion to which organizing science sublimates reality 
but rather it is immanent to reality’. See also Carver 1998, p. 27, for what seems to me a 
very similar argument.
11 For an attempt to do so see Elster 1985, pp. 18-27.
12 Elster of course is sceptical of the possibility Hegel’s ‘self-determination of the 
concept’ according to connections that are ‘neither that of cause to effect, nor that of 
axiom to theorem, nor finally that of given fact to its condition of possibility’. Elster 
1985, pp. 37-8. But I don’t think one needs to be able to defend (or indeed make sense 
of) every transition in the Logic to be able argue that Hegel’s project is rooted in a 
recognition of real epistemological issues that arise from Kant’s account of the 
interrelation of sensibility, understanding and reason, and that such issues might similarly 
arise from the necessity o f individuals’ conscious and purposive interactions with one 
another in a situation of ‘dynamic interdependence’.
13 Marx 1857, p. 87.
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as akin to ‘conceptual schemes’ that are expressed in language, ideology and culture, and 
institutionalised in legal, political and economic structures. Given material embodiment 
in this way they have a certain inertia or stickiness, which is to say that they do have 
causal effectivity on the labour process that they seem to ‘channel’.14 They will appear 
‘natural’ or immutable, and stake their claim to legitimacy in a transcendent realm beyond 
human beings’ productive activity. But ultimately there will be no ‘content’ to this world 
other than an ‘inverted’ reflection of the productive activities which they organise. This is 
realised at the point when the momentum of this productive activity runs up against the 
limits set by such forms and recovers its total self-determination by ‘suspending’ them. 
‘Then begins an era of social revolution’.15
3. Capitalism as a form of knowledge
A clear corollary of the proposal that the objects of social analysis are the historically 
variable conceptual schemes through which human beings understand their material 
interdependence is a rejection of a naive empiricism or positivism that would take these 
schemes for granted and simply reproduce them as the basic categories of their analysis. 
At the same time, however, it is still possible that such a positivist approach may produce 
important and valuable results insofar as it can be seen as precisely that elucidation and 
‘raising to consciousness’ of those conceptual schemes that might otherwise have 
remained implicit and unconscious.
This approach has been characterised by one contemporary Marx commentator, 
Patrick Murray, as ‘redoubled empiricism’ — ‘wherein the social forms of needs, 
production, distribution themselves — not just the behaviour of objects already subsumed 
under forms — along with the powers and interconnections of these forms, are subjects 
for experience-based inquiry’.16 This, I want to suggest, is why Capital seems at some
14 See Carver 1988, p. 33: ‘while they were derived (somehow) from deeper elements of 
conscious behaviour (unspecified), [economic concepts] have a further, distinctly 
formative effect on human behaviour and individuality. They have a conceptual structure 
quite independent of the “desires” or “interests” of agents. They almost have agency 
themselves... ’
15 Marx 1859, pp. 425-6.
16 Murray 1997, p. 39. See also p. 57.
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points to be a straightforward exercise in nineteenth century political economy, and at 
other points to offer a critique of political economy, a critique of political economy which 
is at the same time a critique of the capitalist system itself. For Marx, the categories of 
classical political economy — such as ‘prices’, ‘profits’, ‘rent’, etc. — are precisely an 
elucidation and extrapolation of the basic categories through which human beings in 
capitalist society understand and reproduce their material interdependence.
Thus Marx describes ‘vulgar economics’ as ‘nothing more than a didactic and 
more or less doctrinaire translation of the everyday notions of actual agents of 
production, giving them a certain comprehensible arrangement’;17 and remarks that
... vulgar economy feels particularly at home in the alienated outward 
appearances of economic relations, in which these prima facie absurd and complete 
contradictions appear and that these relationships seem the more self-evident the 
more their internal relationships are concealed from it, although they are 
understandable to the popular mind. But all science would be superfluous if the 
outward appearance and the essence of things coincided.18
The final sentence of this quotation has frequently been taken as if it were the final word 
on Marx’s methodology in Capital,’ justifying claims (positive or negative) that Marx’s 
critique of political economy is based on some kind of ‘essentialism’. I would want to 
argue instead that an understanding of the ‘Doctrine of Essence’ in Hegel’s Logic, and the 
interpretation I have been offering of the very similar language as it appears in Marx’s 
earliest writings, suggests that the position may be more complicated than this. It would 
suggest that Marx is describing the ‘essence logic’ that is inherent in the structure of capitalism 
itself that is to say, implicidy entailed by the ways in which individuals related to one 
another as commodity-exchangers. It would mean that we are all being, consciously or 
unconsciously, essentialists when we engage in this practice, and that it is precisely this 
that Marx wants to critique and overcome, as precisely the symptom of our loss of social 
self-determination.
17 Marx 1894, p. 969.
18 Marx 1894, p. 817.
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The clearest evidence for this reading is given in the way in which Marx relates to 
the ‘classical’ economic tradition of Smith and Ricardo, whom he absolves of the 
superficiality of ‘vulgar’ economists but yet whom he still wishes to go beyond. He 
recognises that these writers have indeed sought to look behind the surface phenomena 
of the market to trace the underlying laws that govern its movements. And it was their 
achievement, of course, to uncover the fundamental determination of value by labour 
time. Marx, as we know, endorsed this ‘labour theory of value’ as a valid description of 
the fundamental law of governing the movements of the capitalist economy. But the 
crucial break he made with Ricardo’s theory, still little recognised or understood, was that 
for Marx this law has no application or meaning beyond the capitalist economy. This 
comes through clearly in the discussion in Capital of commodity fetishism, where Marx 
refers to Ricardo’s ‘belated scientific discovery that the products of labour, in so far as 
they are values, are merely the material expressions of the human labour expended to 
produce them’. But in the same passage he states very clearly that ‘the fact that the 
specific social character of private labours carried on independendy of each other 
consists in their equality as human labour, and, in the product, assumes the form of the 
existence of value’ is ‘something which is only valid for this particular form of 
production, the production of commodities.’19
Later in the same section, Marx reinforces the point (the emphasis is mine):
Political economy has indeed analysed value and its magnitude, however 
incompletely, and has uncovered the content concealed within these forms. But it 
has never once asked the question why this content has assumed that particular 
form, that is to say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement 
of labour by its duration is expressed in the magnitude of the value of the 
product. These formulas, which bear the unmistakable stamp of belonging to a social 
formation in which the process ofproduction has master over man, instead of the opposite, 
appear to the political economists’ bourgeois consciousness to be as much a self- 
evident and nature-imposed necessity as productive labour itself.20
19 Marx 1867a, p. 167.
20 Marx, 1867a, pp. 166-7.
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Thus the ‘labour theory of value’ is in this sense internal to capitalism -  for Marx the very 
concept of ‘value’ is, like the concept of ‘capital’, historically specific. Capitalism is itself 
considered as a particular, practically enacted conceptual scheme through which human 
beings understand their collective labour process — it is not Marx who says that the value 
of a product is determined by its labour-time, but this in a sense is what capitalism as a 
system says.21 The law uncovered by Ricardo is a conscious formulation of the fact that 
within capitalism individuals effectively recognise the social character of the products of 
their labour by assigning them a ‘value’ that reflects the amount of socially necessary 
abstract labour time expended in their production. But as Marx makes clear, this 
essentialist, dualistic form of self-under standing is a consequence of our surrender of 
collective control over the labour process itself.
We begin now to see the force and resonance of Marx’s descriptions of 
capitalism as the ‘the bewitched, distorted, and upside-down world’,22 and of the 
‘metaphysical subdeties and theological niceties’ of the commodity as split between its 
outward sensible appearance and its ‘supersensible’ inner meaning or ‘value’.23 
Remember that the point of Hegel’s chapter on ‘Force and the Understanding’ in the 
Phenomenology is to take consciousness beyond the false objectification of its conceptual 
schemes to a realisation that the world before it is in many respects a world of its own
21 I think this may have been what Louis Althusser was trying to get at when he claimed 
that Marx’s way of theoretically approaching the ‘structural causality’ immanent in the 
capitalist system was ‘to locate in the real itself a distinction which is only meaningful as a 
function of a distinction outside the real\ since it brings into play a distinction between the 
real and the knowledge of the real’. Althusser and Balibar 1968, p. 190. It seems to me 
that Althusser’s highly penetrating investigations of some of these issues were obscured 
and perhaps derailed by, first, a questionable ascription to Hegel of a ‘Leibnizian’ model 
of ‘expressive causality’; and, second, a distinction between ‘ideology’ and economic 
‘reality’ which created problems when mapped onto this understanding of the capitalist 
economy as itself in some way akin to an epistemological structure. For an argument that 
Althusser failed to see that Hegel had had already arrived at something similar to a notion 
o f ‘structural causality’ beyond traditional ‘essentialism’, see Zizek 1993, pp. 125-64, and 
Hardey 2003, pp. 84-126. The difficulties that Althusser’s followers got into over the 
status o f ‘commodity fetishism’ can be traced through Ranciere 1965, Brewster 1976, and 
Callinicos 1985, pp. 130-2.
22 Marx 1894, p. 969.
23 Marx 1867a, pp. 163-4. See also the early drafts of these sections in which Marx talks 
of this process whereby products of labour take on this ‘two-fold’, ‘sensible- 
supersensible’ character precisely as an inversion. Marx 1867b, p. 140.
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making. In the summary of one Hegel commentator that casually but rather usefully 
anticipates my suggestion the movement is characterised thus:
Lacking self-consciousness, Understanding is snared by what Whitehead calls the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. That is to say, when it finds certain conceptual 
devices useful for some purpose it immediately and without further ado takes 
these for the definitive expression of the real. Understanding ... is still 
consciousness, focused on its object, not self-consciousness, aware of itself...
Not recogni2ing its own creative activity in its own products, it becomes enslaved 
to them as if they were independendy and eternally given.24
As I have presented it, capitalism is for Marx a logically interconnected set of social 
forms through which human beings understand and carry forward their collective labour 
process. It is characterised by a practical and experiential split between the concrete 
sensible character of individual labours and their products, and the practical valuation of 
these labours and products as manifestations or bearers of a certain quantity of socially 
necessary abstract labour time. The lesson of Hegel’s ‘inverted world’ seems to be that 
we should overcome this two-tiered structure by seeing it as a system of organisation that 
‘we’ as a society impose upon our collective labour process. But this kind of self- 
conscious, collective subjectivity is precisely what is denied us by our situation as atomised, 
individual commodity producers. A s individuals we are faced by the rules that coordinate 
social process as given, pre-existing; as individuals we can do nothing to change them. It 
is only by exercising conscious collective control over our collective labour process that 
we can overcome this ‘objectivisation’ of the economy and dissolve the illusion of its 
inhuman autonomy.
This is how I read Marx’s notorious claim that full socialisation would render 
social relations ‘transparent in their simplicity’ — not that everyone would be able to know 
everything about everything, but only that each would be able to see things for what they 
are.
24 Westphal 1979, p. 110.
255
C ONCLUS I ON
Let us finally imagine ... an association of free men, working with the means of 
production held in common, and expending their many different forms of 
labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force ... The total 
product of our imagined association is a social product... The social relations of 
the individual producers, both towards their labour and the products of their 
labour, are here transparent in their simplicity, in production as well as in 
distribution.25
Such a resolution to the argument is precisely what most people now find impossible to 
imagine. In the light of historical experiences, it this image that is now widely seen as 
impossibly utopian, and perhaps dangerously naive, and for these reasons of little interest 
to political philosophers. In particular Marx’s evocation of communist society as in some 
way ‘transparent’ to all its members without the need of political or institutional 
‘mediations’ seems to go against all contemporary awareness o f the essential complexity 
and structural differentiation of a modern polity and economy.
My suggestion, however, is that much of what Marx says along these lines has 
been misconstrued — that his ideal is not one of unrealistic social simplicity and 
informational perfection (indeed his own early political analyses militate against such a 
possibility) but rather the transcendence of a certain basic structure of social agency and 
knowledge that would be of a piece with the full achievement of a collective self- 
consciousness. To elucidate Marx’s ideal in this way is not to remove all the obstacles 
that might stand in the way of its attainment; but it does recuperate it at a philosophical 
level as, for our times, one of the most thoroughgoing and consistent version of the ideal 
that Robert Pippin identifies as fundamental to philosophical modernity:
As understood by Kant, the early Fichte and Schelling, and Hegel and the left 
Hegelians, the modem enterprise is ... tied to an essentially practical goal, what 
one might call a kind of ‘metaphysical politics’: working out, articulating, helping 
to defend and so to realize, the possibility of free self-determination, agency,
25 Marx 1867a, pp. 171-2.
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spontaneity, activity, a self-directed ‘purposive life’, eventually (in Hegel) a 
necessarily collective agency.26
My modest claim is that if these thinkers’ insights can be recaptured and rendered 
plausible and relevant to our own philosophical and political concerns today, then so, a 
fortiori, can those of Marx. My more ambitious claim would be that it is through Marx 
most of all that we can understand the ways in which liberal or communitarian 
formulations of this modern ideal of self-determination are frustrated and undermined by 
what are widely recognised today as the corrosive and disempowering effects of ‘market 
society’ and capitalist ‘globalisation’. As long as the need to revive and recover a sense of 
collective democratic control over our social and economic organisation remains a live 
issue, then so will the philosophy of Marx prove a living one.
26 Pippin 1997, p. 8.
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